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William Berridge: Thesis Abstract 
 
Under the Shadow of the Regime: the Contradictions of Policing 
in Sudan, c.1924-1989 
 
This thesis analyzes the institutional development of the Sudanese police 
between 1924 and 1989, focusing in particular on its role in governing 
Sudanese society and its relationship with the state at large. It seeks to 
challenge the static picture which represents the police as servile tools of 
ruling colonial and post-colonial regimes in Africa and a simple extension 
of the political executive. It contends that the police cannot be understood 
as the passive tools of the state, since both colonial and post-colonial states 
have been highly divided. The competing factions included legal and 
professional groups that wanted to develop a strong, united and 
institutionalized police force so as to exercise a systematic governance of 
Sudanese society, and political and administrative factions that sought to 
make the police serve the narrower political agendas of the regime. Central 
ruling factions, such as the Sudan Political Service in the colonial era and 
the military in the post-colonial era, have often seen a strong and 
institutionalized police force as a potential threat to their status, and have 
thus sought to weaken the police by conferring police authority to a number 
of parallel bodies. It will be seen that this conflict at the centre of the state 
helped to exacerbate the rift between the urban core and rural peripheries, as 
the various colonial and post-colonial governments sought to prevent the 
development of a united police force by dividing it along regional lines – 
and that the police came to serve, in some respects, as the state’s tools for 
enforcing this divide. Yet at the same time the thesis will seek to rehabilitate 
the police as actors within their own right, demonstrating the agency they 
exercised both as an institution and on behalf of various religious, ethnic 
and political groups to which they were affiliated. 
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Note on Transliteration 
 
 
All the translations in the thesis are the author’s own. The system used for translating 
words taken from Arabic texts is roughly based on that used by the International 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES), without the use of diacritical marks or 
the marking of long consonants. Proper names follow established usage where they 
are derived from or commonly used in English language sources. Notably, in these 
sources ‘g’ tends to substitute for the standard Arabic transliteration of ‘qaf’ as ‘q’ 
(an aspect of Sudanese colloquial), and ‘jim’ as ‘j’ (an aspect of Egyptian 
colloquial). However where proper names have been transliterated purely on the 
basis of Arabic language sources the IJMES system has been used. Where popular 
usage is unclear, the author has tried to be consistent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
Abbreviations 
 
 
ACS  Acting Civil Secretary 
APD  Arabic Press Digest 
CS  Civil Secretary 
DUP  Democratic Unionist Party 
FO  Foreign Office 
ICF  Islamic Charter Front  
LS  Legal Secretary 
NCP  National Congress Party 
NIF  National Islamic Front 
NRO  National Record Office 
NSO  National Security Organization 
NUP  National Unionist Party 
PDF  Popular Defense Force 
PDP  Popular Democratic Party 
PIS  Political Intelligence Summary 
PMD  Province Monthly Diary 
PSO  Public Security Organization 
SAD  Sudan Archives Durham 
SANU  Sudan African National Union 
SCP  Sudanese Communist Party 
SDF  Sudan Defence Force 
SJLR  Sudan Journal of Law Reports 
SPLA  Sudan People’s Liberation Army 
SSO  Sudanese State Organization 
SSU  Sudanese Socialist Union 
TNA  The National Archives [Kew, London] 
TMC  Transitional Military Council 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
Glossary 
 
 
 
Abid    slave (Ar.) 
ahl al-qura   Ali Dinar’s Personal Bodyguard (Ar.) 
amir    prince (Ar.) 
‘amid   Brigadier-General (Ar.) 
‘aqid   Colonel (Ar.) 
Ansar   followers of the nineteenth century Mahdi and associated  
   Mahdist sectarian movement/Umma political party (Ar.) 
Anya-Nya  a general name for the Southern Sudanese guerrilla movement  
   in the 1960s 
Araki   a type of Sudanese distilled liquor (Ar.) 
Ashiqqa’  pro-Egyptian wing of the National Unionist Party in the 1940s  
   and 1950s (Ar.) 
Ashlaq   Barracks (Standard Arabic: qushluqat) 
Bashi-Bazouks irregular unit of the nineteenth century Egyptian Army (Tur.) 
Biyada   infantry (Ar.) 
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Dia   blood money (Ar.) 
Effendi  ‘Mister’; term applied to members of the urban educated elite      
                                    (Tur.) 
Eid al-Adha  feast of the sacrifice, celebrates on the last day of the Muslim  
   Pilgrimage (Ar.) 
Fallata   derogatory term applied to West African migrants settled in  
   Sudan aspiring to make pilgrimage to Mecca (Ar.) 
Fard Kifaya  communal obligation under Islamic Law (Ar.) 
Felagna  term applied to retainers of a Darfurian shartai 
Fez’a   a community response to animal theft (Ar.) 
Ghaffir  guard or watchman (Ar.) 
Hadd (pl. Huduud) religiously prescribed Islamic punishments (Ar.) 
Hakimdar  chief of police (Tur.) 
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Hajj   the annual pilgrimage to Mecca (Ar.) 
Hajjana  a term for the camel corps within the Army and Police (Tur.) 
Haram   lit. ‘forbidden’ or as a noun, ‘sanctuary’; prohibited under  
   Islamic law (Ar.) 
Imam   Muslim prayer leader; divinely ordained leader of an Islamic  
   State (Ar.) 
Intifada  uprising (Ar.) 
Jahiliyya  the ‘age of ignorance’ in pre-Islamic Mecca (Ar.)  
Jallaba   Sudanese term for a merchant from the riverain north (Ar.) 
Jallabiyya  a long, white, flowing garment worn by Sudanese men (Ar.) 
Jihadiyya  military corps in the Turco-Egyptian and Mahdist army (Ar.) 
Kasha   lit. ‘sweep’; police operation against ‘vagrants’ 
Khafir (pl. Khufara’)  watchmen or guard (Ar.) 
Khalwa  a Qur’anic school (Ar.) 
Khatmiyya  the largest single sufi movement in Sudan  
Khayyala  cavalry unit of the police (Ar.) 
Kuttab   another name for a Qu’ran school, lowest grade of elementary  
   Education (Ar.) 
Mahdi   Messiah figure who will redeem Islam in Sunni and Shia  
   Eschatology (Ar.) 
Mahdiyya  the period of rule of the Sudanese Mahdi and the Khalifa  
   Abdullahi, 1885-1898 
Malik   king (Ar.) 
Ma’mur  a district official (Ar.) 
Mek   Sudanese term for ‘King’ 
Merissa  a local fermented beer  
Merkaz  government centre; district Headquarters (Ar.) 
Mudir   Anglo Egyptian Provincial Governor; Provincial  
   Commissioner during the May Regime (Ar.) 
Mufattish  British Inspector, 1898-1924; re-titled District Commissioner  
              in 1924, but Arabic name remained the same (Ar.) 
Mulazim                      lieutenant (Ar.) 
Muhafiz             regional governor (after 1980 Local Government Act) (Ar.) 
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Muhtasib  ‘inspector of the market’ adopted in Islamic society in the 
               early Abbasid period to ‘propagate virtuous acts and forbid  
                                     evil’ (Ar.)                                                                      
Nafar   rank and file policeman; private (Ar.) 
Nazir   a northern Sudanese notable (Ar.) 
Nas   ‘The people’ (Ar.) 
Onbashi                       corporal (Tur.) 
Ra’id   major (Ar.) 
Sawari   cavalry (Ar.) 
Sayyid   term applied to religious notables such as the ‘two Sayyids’,  
   Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi and ‘Ali al-Mirghani (Ar.)                       
Shakla   local quarrel or fight (Ar.) 
Shartai   Western Sudanese notable (Fur) 
Shawish  sergeant (Tur.) 
Shaykh  a Sudanese notable (Ar.) 
Shari’a   the revealed law of Islam (Ar.) 
Sol                               warrant officer (Tur.) 
Sulh   a form of peace agreement (Ar.) 
Turkiyya  Sudanese term to refer to the period of Turco-Egyptian rule  
   after the conquest of Sudan by Muhammad ‘Ali, 1820-1885 
 ‘Umda  a Sudanese headman (Ar.) 
Zariba   a thorned enclosure used for defensive purposes; used to hold  
   captured slaves in the nineteenth century (Ar.) 
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1 
 
Introduction 
 
After a public celebration in the late 1970s of one of the anniversaries of Jafa’ar 
Numayri’s ‘May Regime’, Sudanese police officer Abu Humayd Ibrahim returned to 
his house in Hassaheissa to discover that a young demonstrator had daubed an anti-
government slogan on the walls of his house. Ibrahim’s recollection of how he dealt 
with the situation reflected to a great extent the ambivalent position of Sudanese 
policemen between state and society. He did not arrest him, which Ibrahim believed 
would probably have resulted in his torture by the state security services. Instead, 
Ibrahim simply instructed him to wash the paint off his wall; then he invited him into 
his house to try and get to know him better over a cup of tea and explain his position 
to the young man. Ibrahim recalls that 
 
I said to him “You know me personally: I am a police officer; I serve the 
country and the citizen, and it is not wise for you and others like you to think 
that all who wear khaki are part of the ruling regime. This thinking contains a 
great deal of stupidity...I hate [the] May [Regime] more than you do… Many 
ruling regimes do not respect man (al-insan) and treat him with barbarous 
savagery and violate his rights but we in the police force are entrusted with 
fighting crime in every time and place and on all levels...thus police work 
involves respecting man and not humiliating him and thus the police lose 
value under the shadow of many ruling regimes”.1 
 
As this thesis will show, the Sudan Police Force has a long history as an institution 
and its highest officers have repeatedly sought to assert its professional identity and 
independence from governments, as Ibrahim’s attempt to distance himself from the 
May Regime suggests. But over thirty years on from this encounter, the Sudanese 
police continue to appear in media and investigative reports and much academic 
literature to operate ‘under the shadow’ of the ruling regime. The police gain 
prominence in this literature primarily through their enforcement of state security 
and of legislation considered repressive by international standards, and they very 
                                                 
1
 Abu Humayd Ahmad Ibrahim, Qissat Kifah wa Najah: Mudhakkirat al-Shurti [Stories of Struggle 
and Success: Memoirs of a Policeman] (Khartoum, 2007), p. 224. 
2 
 
often appear indistinguishable from the state itself or from a range of other security 
forces.
2
  
 
Despite the general prominence of the police in reports of state repression in 
Sudan, they are virtually invisible in historical scholarship. No history of the 
Sudanese police exists in the English language and there are only occasional 
mentions of the police in the standard general histories of Sudan.
3
 The three 
published histories of the police in Arabic are all authored by Sudanese police 
officers and thus together represent something of an ‘official history’.4 At the same 
time, wider studies of policing in Africa and the Middle East have tended to identify 
policemen entirely as predators on society and as the servile tools of ruling colonial 
and post-colonial regimes.
5
 Yet the significance of police forces to the history of the 
state itself has been emphasized in the principal study of policing in Africa, by Alice 
Hills. Whilst a study of the police’s role as agents of the state has obvious potential 
to improve our understanding of state-society relations, ‘the relationship, both in 
Africa and elsewhere,’ she says, ‘has received astonishingly little academic 
attention’.6  
 
This thesis will therefore provide the first scholarly examination of the police 
in Sudan and in doing so will make a new contribution to the study of African 
policing more generally. It will argue that whilst the police may have operated under 
the shadow of the state, they have in turn also reflected the tensions and divisions at 
its very heart and the unequal and problematic relationship between Sudan’s centre 
and periphery. The thesis will provide a history of the recurrent attempts by some 
members of the police force, together with allies in the judiciary, to develop 
                                                 
2
 Eg. ‘Sudanese police arrest women protesting over flogging video’, The Guardian, 14 Dec. 2010. 
Khalid ‘Abd al-Aziz, ‘Sudan police clash with opposition protesters’, Reuters, 19 Jan. 2011. The 
African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies, Sudan Human Right Monitor December 2009-May 
2010, p. 15. 
3
 Peter Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: The Unstable State (Boulder, 1990). Douglas Johnson, Root 
Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars (Oxford, 2003). 
4
 Umar Salih Abu Bakr, Tarikh al-Shurta fi Sudan (Riyadh, 1990). ‘Abdallah Hasan Salim, Tarikh al-
Shurta (Khartoum, 2008).  Abu Haraz Mu’tader, Kitab Muqtasir fi Tarikh al-Shurta.(Khartoum 
2008). 
5‘African Nation Divided over Police Brutality’ May 5 1999 BBC News Website. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/336149.stm (Visited 11 Sep. 2010), Patrick Chabal & Jean-
Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (Oxford, 1999), pp. 77-8. Jean-Francois 
Bayart, The State in Africa: the Politics of the Belly (London 1993), pp. 77, 264. 
6
 Hills, Policing Africa, preface p. ix. 
3 
 
institutional identity, independence and strength, and of the resistance and mistrust 
with which these efforts were met from the state administrative organs. It will 
therefore challenge the prevailing views of the police in Sudan – and in Africa and 
the Middle East more widely – which dismiss them as entirely subservient to state 
political and security agendas. It will also revise previous scholarship on policing in 
Africa to show that the drive for a more civil form of policing in the late colonial era 
did not come entirely from colonial reformers within the state but also from 
subaltern police officers who appropriated British ideals of professionalism and 
institutional ethics in order to wage their own lasting struggle against the state 
administration. Ultimately, the thesis will argue, both colonial and post-colonial 
governments would perceive this institutional development of the police to be 
threatening to their own dominance of the central state. Yet at the same time the 
security priorities of successive governments also required that the limited police 
resources be concentrated at the central nodes of state power and wealth, creating a 
simultaneous dependency and mistrust at the very heart of the state. This conflict at 
the centre of the state helped to exacerbate the gulf between the urban core and 
marginalized rural areas, as the various colonial and post-colonial governments 
sought to prevent the development of a united and centralized police force by 
dividing it along regional lines. By examining the history of the police in Sudan, the 
thesis will thus explore the nature of the Sudanese state itself, and in turn challenge 
the wider literature on the nature of the colonial and post-colonial state in Africa. 
 
 
State Power and State Weakness in Africa 
 
A key question for the thesis is how capable the colonial and post-colonial states in 
Sudan were of policing their subject populations. The extent to which the twentieth-
century governments were capable of exercising control over those they ruled is a 
much debated question in the wider scholarship on Africa. Berman argues that there 
are two contending models of the colonial state in Africa. One depicts the state as a 
‘paternalistic mediator’ with few resources and limited coercive capacity, whereas 
the second represents a state with an expansive bureaucratic apparatus intervening in 
4 
 
ever-widening areas of the political economy.
7
 Naomi Chazan remarks of the post-
colonial state in Africa that it ‘has been depicted, alternately, as weak and powerful, 
as repressive and feeble, as fragile and absolutist, as dependent and autonomous, as 
expanding and collapsing’.8 However, Crawford Young asserts more decisively that 
twentieth century colonial states in Africa were capable of exercising power in a far 
more total manner than their predecessors. He states that 
 
African societies were to encounter a colonial master equipped with doctrines 
of domination and capacities for the exercise of rule that went far beyond 
those available in earlier times and other places. The African, for the colonial 
state, was in a far more systematic sense a subjugated other.
9
 
 
Young further observes that after World War I ‘the superstructure of colonial 
domination was institutionalized, rationalized, and routinized’.10 His emphasis on the 
pervasive nature of colonial power is comparable to Marxist approaches towards 
policing in Africa, which emphasize ‘the conception of policing as social control, 
social regulation and surveillance over subordinate classes by an emerging ruling 
class’.11 
 
  Such an emphasis on the totalizing nature of colonial power reflects the 
broader theoretical concerns of interpreters of colonialism such as David Scott, 
whose article ‘Colonial Governmentality’, developing the Foucauldian notion of 
‘governmentality’, emphasizes the transformative nature of colonial power. For 
Scott, the development of the colonial state in Asia, Africa and the Middle East 
represented an extension of the modern state and modern power. Colonialism, for 
him, was ‘a form of power... which was concerned above all with disabling old 
forms of life by systematically breaking down their conditions’.12 For the purpose of 
this thesis it is particularly important to explore some of Scott’s statements about the 
                                                 
7
 Bruce Berman, Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: the Dialectic of Domination (London, 1990), 
pp. 424-5. 
8
 Naomi Chazan et al., Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa (Basingstoke, 1988), pp. 38-9. 
9
 Crawford Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (London, 1994), p. 75. 
10
 Ibid, p. 10.  
11
 Philip Ahire, Imperial Policing: the Emergence and Role of the Police in Colonial Nigeria, 1860-
1960 (Milton Keynes, 1991), p. 28.  
12
 David Scott, ‘Colonial Governmentality’ Social Text, 43 (1995), pp. 191-220 at p. 193. 
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nature of colonial legal power. For him, colonial governmentality represented a shift 
away from a previous style of colonialism, whereby the colonial state was 
characterized by ‘extractive domination’, towards an attempt to regulate wider 
colonial society through the introduction of European law codes in order to regulate 
individual behaviour. Scott emphasizes ‘the introduction of a new game of politics’ 
which depended on ‘the constitution of a legally instituted space where legally 
defined subjects could exercise rights, however limited those might have been’.13 
Thus, he argued, ‘what the rationality of colonial power is doing is inscribing a new, 
authoritative, game of justice into the colonized space, one which the colonized 
would resist, but to whose rules they would have to respond’.14 
 
 Scott’s notion of ‘colonial governmentality’, although put forward as 
universal, was developed mainly with reference to South Asia and in particular Sri 
Lanka, where British domination lasted roughly two centuries. In contrast, British 
hegemony in Sudan only continued for 58 years and never witnessed the 
development of infrastructures quite as extensive as those that emerged in South 
Asia. The European colonies in Africa that tended to develop extensive state security 
structures were those of white settlement
15
 and there was no such settlement in 
Sudan. Certainly, the Sudan government did establish a new game of justice by 
creating the Sudan Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code and various other law 
codes in 1899 and by establishing police forces separate from the Egyptian army to 
enforce them. These codes were not derived directly from English law but were in 
fact ‘simplified versions’ of codes adopted in Colonial India.16 However, the Indian 
codes themselves tended to be based on English law and the colonial judiciary 
acknowledged that it was ‘guided but not governed by English common and statute 
law’.17 The colonized would later respond to this by replacing the colonial codes 
with Islamized codes in 1983. However, their success in achieving this demonstrates 
the limitations on the ‘colonial graft’18 as much as its strength. Woodward argues 
                                                 
13
 Ibid. p. 208. 
14
 Ibid. p. 212. 
15
 Jeffrey Ira Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control 
(Princeton, 2000), p. 17. 
16
 Zaki Mustafa, The Common Law in Sudan: An Account of the ‘Justice, Equity and Good 
Conscience’ Provision (Oxford 1971), p. 46. 
17
 Vasdev, Krishna, The Law of Evidence in the Sudan (London, 1981), p. 3. 
18
 For this phrase see Scott, ‘Colonial Governmentality’, p. 212. 
6 
 
that the colonial state structure in Sudan rarely focused on anything other than ‘the 
basic tasks of law, order, and tax collection’.19 Daly similarly states that the greatest 
achievement of the Condominium regime was ‘order’,20 but one would assume that 
by this he means the elimination of challenges to the state, rather than any pervasive 
policing of society. The overwhelming military power of the colonial state ensured 
that there were no major rebellions against it after the 1920s but did not guarantee 
the more widespread regulation of Sudanese society. 
 
 Why then did the colonial government in Sudan appear to have such limited 
ambitions in comparison with the regulatory goals of the kind of colonial states 
depicted by Young and Scott? For Daly, weak statehood in Sudan can be related to 
the ambiguous position of the British in the country. Britain technically ‘re-
conquered’ Sudan in 1899 on behalf of Egypt, where it effectively possessed a 
‘veiled protectorate’. Thus Sudan was not ruled via the Colonial Office, like other 
British sub-Saharan colonies, but via the Foreign Office as the ‘Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium’.  Although de facto sovereignty over Sudan was in practice exercised 
by the British, the result of this unusual arrangement was, as Daly observes, that 
‘while the British and Egyptians were factors in the political and economic 
development of the Sudan, neither fully controlled it’.21 Thus whilst British colonial 
policy could be transformative, the colonizers only had limited capacity to direct the 
nature of these transformations. 
 
Woodward adds that one of the reasons why the colonial state in Sudan was 
weak was that ‘there were limited resources for governing such a vast and poor 
country’, resulting in only ‘a light structure for the administration of peoples’.22 
Resource limitations underlie the history of the police in Sudan and help to some 
extent to explain the weaknesses and limited ambitions of the state itself. The model 
of the ‘gatekeeper’ state put forward by Frederick Cooper for colonial sub-Saharan 
Africa may therefore be more appropriate than the powerful, governmentalist state 
models for understanding the nature of the Sudanese state and its police. In Cooper’s 
words, gatekeeper states ‘had weak instruments for entering into the social and 
                                                 
19
 Woodward, The Unstable State, p. 231. 
20
 Daly, Empire on the Nile: The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898-1934 (Cambridge 1986), p. 451. 
21
 Ibid, p. 451. 
22
 Peter Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: The Unstable State (Boulder 1990), pp. 1, 231. 
7 
 
cultural realm over which they presided, but they stood astride the intersection of the 
colonial territory and the outside world’.23 He observes that the main source of state 
revenue was duties on goods coming through colonial ports.
24
 In other words, the 
‘extractive domination’ that Scott argues ‘colonial governmentality’ had phased out 
remained the principle system of governance in sub-Saharan Africa. This pattern was 
in turn reflected in policing policy, according to Fourchard. The police forces 
established by colonial governments remained focused on the principal commercial 
and residential quarters of major cities where European interests were located, whilst 
‘indigenous’ areas were policed by under-resourced, under-educated bodies attached 
to ‘local political interests’.25  
 
Cooper also applies his gatekeeper state model to post-colonial Africa, 
arguing that security has become even more focused on the capital as the post-
colonial state, unlike its colonial predecessor, does not have the option of calling in 
troops to protect itself.
26
 Political scientists of Africa interpret the structural 
weakness of certain post-colonial states by reference to their excessive size. Herbst 
ascribes civil wars and lack of state control directly to this, arguing that the European 
notion that large states were strong states – reflecting the fact that in European 
societies state boundaries were drawn up when the process of state-building had 
already occurred – does not apply in Africa.
27
 Numerous studies of the state in Africa 
have pointed to the fact that state authority does not extend beyond the capital and 
major ports. Hence Bierschenk and de Sardan’s citation of the saying in the Central 
African Republic that ‘The state stops at PK 12’, or 12 kilometres from the capital, 
Bangui.
28
 The battle to secure the capital has therefore become a zero-sum game in 
which various factions struggle for the gateway to the global economy and sources 
of aid and military support – what Bayart terms the ‘resources of extraversion’.29 The 
notion of ‘gateway’ security can also be developed further to involve not just 
protecting the capital but also the main transport ‘nodes’ and routes of 
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communication. For instance, Roussillon argues that the post-colonial Egyptian 
state, in spite of its ‘heavy, all powerful’ apparatus, has limited its ambitions to 
controlling the ‘main axes’ of the country, including rivers, checkpoints between 
governorates and town centres.
30
 
 
However, as the example of Egypt suggests, the decision to restrict state 
security ambitions to protecting strategic gateways, centres and axes may not merely 
be the result of state weakness or limited resources. It is important to recognize that 
the inability of states to govern their peripheries could have been as much due to 
political motives for focusing security on the capital and principal urban areas as to 
weak resources and the challenge posed by territorial size. In Sudan too, the state 
would use the police and parallel security organizations to protect the capital, port 
and major development scheme, and on a secondary level to control the various 
nodes of commerce and communication throughout the country, particularly in the 
northern riverain heartlands. A key question for the thesis is to what extent this was 
the result simply of limited resources and state weakness, or how far it reflected the 
political agendas and cultural attitudes of successive ruling administrative elites. 
 
 
The divided colonial state 
 
One of the key factors that the thesis seeks to emphasize is the role that ambivalence 
about the merits of ‘civilization’ and internal divisions played in limiting the 
expansion of the colonial state. Discourses that emphasize the role of country size 
and limited resources in restricting the extension of the state often neglect the extent 
to which the attitudes of Sudan’s rulers have led them to limit the extension of its 
state apparatus. We will see here that colonial uncertainty about the merits of the 
‘civilizing mission’ and administrative distrust of the centralized legal institutions, 
would limit the growth of the Sudanese state even in the central riverain area, but 
particularly in the vast rural areas of the south, east and west. Although Young 
emphasizes that the twentieth-century colonial state possessed previously unknown 
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technologies of social control, this century was also a time in which the fall-out of 
the two World Wars led to a great deal of ambivalence about modern European 
values. The various agents of empire, both in the colony and the metropole, debated 
intensely the question of which methods would be most appropriate in establishing 
European colonial governance.
31
 In particular, colonial powers were divided over the 
question of whether to transform local society on the Western model or simply to 
conserve existing structures of government.
32
 In the colonial context, these clashes 
usually occurred between figures with an administrative and political outlook and 
those with a professional, specialized and modernizing one. It was this dichotomy 
that Homi Bhabha was trying to understand when he talked about the ‘ambivalence’, 
and ‘lack at the heart of the coloniser’s identity’.33 As one reader of Bhabha has 
observed 
 
One element of colonial discourse, then, envisions the colonized subject’s 
potential for reformation and gradual approximation to the elevated position 
of the colonizer, through the redeeming experience of benevolent imperial 
guidance, while another contradicts this with a conception of the ontological 
difference (and inferiority) of the colonized subject.
34
 
 
Members of the colonial administration in Sudan, while often paying lip-service to 
the ‘potential for reformation’ discourse, usually fell within the latter category. They 
used crude kinds of cultural essentialism to argue that the Sudanese were not yet 
ready for modern systems of policing and government, to the frustration of 
professional judges and policemen (see Chapters 1 and 3).  
 
However, administrative dominance did not remain unchallenged and 
members of the Legal Department frequently pressured the administrative elite, or 
Sudan Political Service, which was headed by a ‘civil secretary’, to facilitate the 
introduction of modern systems of law and policing to the provinces. Thus the 
implementation of the law became related to wider political tensions within the 
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colonial state. Just as Zubaida describes the state in the Middle East as a ‘political 
field’ in which a number of actors compete for influence without trying to overthrow 
the system,
35 the realm of law enforcement in Sudan was a ‘legal field’ in which 
judges, district commissioners, police officers, and collaborating Sudanese chiefs 
and Nazirs all pursued their separate agendas. 
 
Political Service officers often aspired to the ideals of British officers serving 
in countries like Iraq, Transjordan and the Gulf Emirates, where rule was ‘indirect’ 
and the British officer would rely on his supposed ‘affinity’ with Arab culture rather 
than on an attempt to introduce any transformative system of government. As Priya 
Satia has demonstrated, such figures justified themselves by employing an 
‘otherisation’ of Arab culture that reified and indeed glorified its supposed 
traditionalism and resistance to change.
36
 Since Arab culture was seen as impervious 
to European empirical systems of law and governance, British officers with specialist 
‘knowledge’ of Arab culture would serve as interpreters in perpetuity.37 These 
attitudes towards Arab culture were fundamentally wrapped up in the ‘noble savage’ 
complex through which colonial officers found a channel for their anti-modernist 
attitudes.
38
 However, as Yoav Alon has demonstrated, the myth of Anglo-Arab 
cultural affinity entirely neglected the reality on the ground and led the British to be 
complacent about their forms of administration. This was the case in Britain’s 
mandate of Transjordan, where the imperial power’s belief that it could rule the 
territory with six British officers severely weakened the impact of its presence.
39
  
 
Although British colonies in sub-Saharan Africa (like Sudan) did have far 
more extensive legal departments than was the case in Iraq and Transjordan, similar 
techniques of administrative monopolization of power structures obtained. Berman 
observes that administration in Kenya was ‘prefectural’ in that it offered particular 
license to the ‘men on the spot’ to administer the law as they saw fit, with relatively 
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little judicial regulation.
40
 Anderson characterizes the debate between judges and 
administrators over legal matters as a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ between ‘judges on the 
one hand who could not sacrifice the accepted principles of English law to the 
peculiarities of Africa and district administrators on the other who were less 
concerned with justice per se than with the wider issue of law and order’.41 
 
The belief that administrative officers’ ‘understanding’ of Sudanese culture 
should be prioritized over more sophisticated forms of European knowledge led the 
Political Service to limit the expansion of more specialized and technical institutions 
of government. Naturally this was not simply ideological as much as power-
mongering for its own sake. The Political Service was unique in that most of its 
members spent their entire career in Sudan, in contrast to the more itinerant 
administrators who served elsewhere in the empire working under the Colonial 
Office.
42
 As a result, these administrators developed an intense attachment both to 
their position in Sudan and to each other,
43
 which was threatened both by specialist 
institutions such as the police and judiciary as well as by educated Sudanese who 
could potentially replace them in a number of their roles. As Willis has 
demonstrated, the office of the civil secretary, which accumulated increasing 
influence from the 1920s, was wary of challenges to its authority from the office of 
the legal secretary, the head of the judiciary.
44
 Some studies of the post-colonial 
Middle East have focused heavily on the manner in which independent governments 
have sought deliberately to marginalize rival institutions and thus employ a ‘politics 
of neglect’ (see below). However, their colonial predecessors were past masters at 
this art. Although commentators on the development of the Sudanese state tend to 
emphasize its sheer size as a factor in limiting the growth of centralized 
institutions,
45
 this politicized neglect was also crucial.  
 
 
                                                 
40
 Berman, Control and Crisis.  
41
 David Anderson, ‘Policing, prosecution and the law in colonial Kenya, c. 1905-1939’, in Anderson 
and Killingray (ed.), Policing the Empire, p. 191. 
42
 Daly, Imperial Sudan, p. 399. 
43
 Ibid, p. 399. 
44
 Justin Willis, ‘Hukm: The creolization of authority in Condominium Sudan’, Journal of African 
History, 6 (2005), pp. 29-50 at p. 34. Also see Daly, Empire on the Nile, pp. 274, 349-50. 
45
 Woodward, Unstable State, p. 230. 
12 
 
Colonial ambivalence over ‘civil policing’ 
Having come to the understanding that certain colonial states were ambivalent about 
the introduction of modern systems of government to the colonies, this thesis will 
seek to challenge the notion that they were keen to introduce a system of civil 
policing on the British model as a natural part of the extension of European values. It 
will be shown that the administrative tendency to ‘otherise’ Sudan and develop 
personally-controlled and politicized police forces led the colonial government in the 
country to obstruct civil policing, a process associated with ideals about English 
liberty.  
 
The extent to which colonial governments did this is debatable, in the sense 
that precisely what civil policing means is contested. A number of English police 
historians understand English police values as a part of a proud heritage that has 
been exported to the Commonwealth.
46
 Critchley argues that it is the triumph of the 
English police system that it relies on ‘popular support’ rather than power.47 For 
Tollefson, the ideals associated with a ‘civil constabulary’ include ‘adherence to the 
rule of law, respect for civil liberties, fair treatment of individuals, honesty, and non-
interference in political affairs’.48 Robb has argued that the shift towards a more civil 
system of policing in nineteenth-century India involved ‘a shift of emphasis from the 
need mainly to defend the person and property of the rulers towards the attempt to 
manage conduct in society as a whole’, as well as an emphasis on a more 
professional, apolitical and independent force which would act as a separate 
department of government.
49
 However, Ahire describes the introduction of ‘civil 
policing’ in Nigeria as ‘neither progressive nor democratic’, arguing that it simply 
amounted to ‘legalized coercion’.50 For Ahire, civil policing remained focused on 
controlling potential threats to the colonial economic order, while conventional 
crime would be left as a problem to be dealt with by ‘Native Administration’ police 
bodies.
51
 This variety of historical perspectives on the meaning of civil policing in 
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colonial Africa and Asia perhaps reflects the ambiguity of the position of the 
colonial state in regard to the purpose that modern forms of policing were meant to 
serve. Perhaps Ahire should be arguing not that civil policing had a limited scope, 
but rather that the colonizers never really introduced a civil form of policing despite 
their claims.  
 
Even in Britain, true civil policing remained something of an ideal. Tollefson 
acknowledges that Western countries like Britain and America ‘often violate’ the 
standards of ‘civil policing’ although ‘adherence to them is relatively greater’ than in 
a number of non-democratic regimes.
52
 The notion of English civil policing as 
apolitical, non-military and purely consent-based is the product of a Whig history of 
policing that neglects the extent to which British police practice has been politicized 
and made quasi-military.
53
 Police forces in nineteenth and twentieth-century Britain 
were required to perform parade-ground drill and were often officered by former 
soldiers and used to police political demonstrations and industrial disputes.
54
 
 
In Sudan, the ambiguous position of the state was a product of the 
unwillingness of colonial administrators to divert resources to establish a genuinely 
public-orientated police service. In keeping with wider colonial policy throughout 
the empire,
55
 the colonial administration in Sudan preferred to use the police force to 
guard against direct threats to the regime, rather than to exercise pervasive control 
over colonized society. In spite of this, colonial police historians tend to attribute the 
initiative for a ‘civil’ police force in the non-settler colonies to the emergence of 
William Johnson as the first colonial police advisor in 1948.
56
 However, they do 
acknowledge that colonial officials and policemen on the ground wrangled over the 
merits of introducing a system of ‘civil policing’ versus continuing with a quasi-
military model closely linked to the administration that would be capable of dealing 
with the forces of anti-colonial nationalism.
57
 In particular, a number of district 
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administrators in Africa cherished their ‘informed and politically sensitive role’ in 
the field of policing.
58
 This further reflected the internal tensions that characterized 
certain colonial states. Robb’s notion of civil policing as an attempt to ‘manage 
conduct in society as a whole’ reflected the type of ‘governmentalist’ outlook 
possessed by the rulers of twentieth-century India that, as demonstrated above, the 
Political Service was wary of establishing in Sudan. However, the struggle to 
professionalize the police and assert civil policing ideas against the administrative 
priorities of the Political Service would be driven not simply by British police 
professionals like Johnson, but also by Sudanese officers. 
 
 
Colonial collaborators or subaltern agents? Sudanese policemen and 
the mimicry of civil policing 
 
This thesis argues that Sudanese policemen were not merely acquiescent 
‘collaborators’ with the colonial state and oppressors of colonized society. Previous 
literature on colonial policing has tended to look at imperial constabularies simply as 
a means by which colonial states controlled and regulated colonized society.
59
 Thus 
the police are implicitly understood largely as ‘collaborators’. This word has 
acquired a highly negative meaning in the post-colonial lexicon and is often 
contrasted with resistance to European imperialism.
60
 However, this work will show 
that rather than being passive tools of European rule, the Sudanese police were just 
as capable of exercising agency as other sectors of colonized society. 
 
Once we accept the notion of the divided state then any simple notion of 
collaboration becomes problematic. The thesis, having examined the divisions within 
the colonial state in Sudan, will demonstrate that Sudanese policemen exploited 
these schisms for their own purposes, as much as being used by the state themselves. 
Thus to understand the role of the police we must accept Cooper’s point that 
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subalterns played on colonial weakness and internal tension and that ‘the institutions 
of colonial states, from crop marketing to law courts, did not operate as their 
designers intended, but were appropriated, contested, and transformed even while 
European flags flew over colonial capitals’.61 The problem with the literature on 
‘colonial governmentality’ is that it tends to assume that the appearance of modern 
systems of government in Africa and Asia were simply the result of European 
cultural imperialism. Rather, both subaltern elites educated in colonial schools and 
‘defensive developmentalists’ expanding and modernizing their own states to keep 
them outside the colonial grasp saw the development of modern systems of 
government and law as a means for the removal of the colonial raison d’être.62 This 
is what Heather Sharkey is referring to when she describes the educated Sudanese, or 
effendiyya, as ‘colonialism’s intimate enemies, making colonial rule a reality while 
hoping to see it undone’.63 This was possible because, as Bhabha observes, colonized 
subjects have through education come to understand for themselves the fractures 
within colonial ideology, which sought simultaneously to reform and otherise the 
colonized subject. ‘The menace of mimicry is its double vision which in disclosing 
the ambivalence of colonial discourse also disrupts its authority’.64 In other words, 
by learning the English language and studying the English police system Sudanese 
officers could expose the hypocrisy of the colonizers’ argument that they were 
introducing a truly modern police system to Sudan. 
 
 Understanding this point helps us counter notions of collaboration which 
represent the police and other members of the effendiyya employed by the colonial 
state merely as deculturated traitors to the colonized and a tabula rasa upon which 
European ideals were inscribed. This appears to have been the approach taken in 
‘Abdullahi Ali Ibrahim’s Manichean Delirium. A recent study of the Sudanese 
judiciary, an institution with parallels to the police, this book offers a useful point of 
comparison for this thesis. Ibrahim argues that members of the Sudan judiciary were 
at the same time products of European, colonial schools and agents of a penal code, 
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the Sudan Penal Code, that was European in origin. He argues that this code inflicted 
a ‘moral injury’ on the Sudanese nation through its permissive attitudes towards 
alcohol, gambling, homosexuality and apostasy against Islam.
65
 Ibrahim’s views 
reflect to some extent those of the wider Islamist movement, which sought to remove 
the police officers who as effendis had supposedly become divorced from their 
society (see Chapter 5). Thus, the prejudices of the Islamist movement ironically 
reflected earlier colonial attitudes towards effendis. 
 
 However, it is possible to challenge Ibrahim’s perspective on a number of 
grounds. Discourses that emphasize the deculturation of collaborating elites deny the 
capacity of colonized Africans to develop ‘a multiplicity of identities’.66 As is typical 
of cultural and religious ‘revivalists’ who suppose a ‘Manichean’ split within the 
moral fabric of an idealized past, Ibrahim enters into little discussion of Sudan’s pre-
colonial history. He thus leaves it to be assumed that the British and their Sudanese 
‘collaborators’ imposed ‘moral injury’ on a population that was previously rigidly 
moralistic, whereas in reality alcohol and prostitution have been just as constant a 
factor in Sudan’s long history as the application of shari’a law.67 More significantly, 
although he acknowledges tangentially the contempt that European administrators 
had for the effendi class, he does not investigate what this reveals about the divided 
nature of the colonial state and the role that the effendi elite played in removing 
colonialism. Looking back into the nineteenth century enables us to break down the 
notion of a ‘collaborating’ elite manufactured by the British. The police officer corps 
                                                 
65
 Abdullahi Ali Ibrahim, Manichean Delirium: Decolonizing the Judiciary and Islamic renewal in 
Sudan, 1898-1985 (Leiden, 2008). 
66
 T. Abdou Maqilam Simone, In Whose Image?: Political Islam and Urban Practises in Sudan 
(Chicago, 1994). Achille Mbembe makes a similar point to Simone, although he interprets it more 
negatively, talking of the ‘tragic duality’ and ‘inner two-ness’ of the post-colonial self. See Achille 
Mbembe, On the Post-Colony (Berkeley, 2009). 
67
 As Fluehr Lobban states, however, by the nineteenth century widespread knowledge of Islamic law 
had been spread on a popular level by localized sufi brotherhoods and West African pilgrims passing 
through Sudan on the way to Mecca. As she puts it, ‘the Shari’a was undoubtedly interpreted as the 
correct Muslim way and practice would have been monitored by the larger community of worshippers 
of which an individual was a part’. See Fluehr-Lobban, Carolyn, Islamic Law and Society in Sudan 
(London, 1987). However, it seems unlikely that shari’a was highly influential in every part of the 
Northern Region. Layish and Warburg even argue that in the nineteenth century shari’a had extended 
only to the cities whereas in the countryside ‘custom enjoyed unassailable sovereignty’. See Layish, 
Aharon and Warburg, Gabriel, The Re-instatement of Islamic Law in Sudan under Numayri: an 
Evaluation of a Legal Experiment in the Light of its Historical Context, Methodology, and 
Repercussions (Leiden, 2002), p. 70. For the widespread practice of prostitution in Sudan in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see Jay Spaulding and Stephanie Beswick, “Sex, bondage and the 
market: the emergence of prostitution in Northern Sudan, 1750-1950”, Journal of the History of 
Sexuality, 5 (1995), pp. 512-534 at p. 531. 
17 
 
in the twentieth century was dominated by the same ethnic group that had dominated 
the Egyptian Army in the nineteenth century, the Shayqiyya of the riverain area to 
the north of Khartoum, whose influence in the police (and army) challenged the 
colonial state’s claim that it had genuine monopoly over the means of physical 
violence (see Chapters 1 and 2).  
 
Thus the weakness of the Sudanese colonial state was not, as Ibrahim 
charges, that its institutions were fundamentally separate from Sudanese society.  
Rather, we should observe Chabal’s and Daloz’s point that the weakness of the state 
in twentieth-century Africa is that it has not been sufficiently institutionalized and 
thus emancipated from society.
68
 This is particularly true of Sudan, where 
Woodward observes that the army has been ‘not so much a detached institution (as 
Latin American armies are often alleged to be and perhaps, nearer at hand, the 
Egyptian Army) as something of a mirror of Sudanese society, if a somewhat uneven 
one’.69 This point is crucial and is just as applicable, probably more so, to the 
Sudanese police. Unlike other colonies, where policemen were brought in from the 
peripheries of the colony to police the centre,
70
 the fact that the Sudanese police 
officers were recruited from amongst the same northern riverain ethnic groups that 
comprised the nationalist movement and urban labour movements ensured a much 
closer relationship with the public at the riverain core. The proximity of colonial 
police forces to colonial society has not been sufficiently explored in the police 
literature to date. Anderson and Killingray observe that police morale and efficiency 
could plummet when they were caught in the dilemma of policing an anti-colonial 
society on behalf of the colonial state.
71
 This was true, but in colonial Sudan, 
policemen also developed far more positive identification with sections of Sudanese 
society and the nationalist movement and identified with the nationalist call for a 
civil style of policing (see Chapter 3). 
 
This thesis will demonstrate that in Sudan both Sudanese policemen and 
nationalists exploited the tensions within the colonial and post-colonial states to push 
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for a system of civil policing akin to that in Britain, a style of policing that the 
British colonizers had frequently preached but rarely practiced. The eagerness of 
certain policemen to introduce a civil system of policing to Sudan was clearly 
demonstrated by the 1951 Police Strike, which indicated the desire of Sudanese 
police officers for a modern, independent and professionalized force. The actions of 
the policemen who participated in the strike certainly demonstrated the social 
porosity of the police, since they were clearly influenced by the tactics of the 
emergent trade union movements as well as by members of the Sudanese 
intelligentsia calling for a civil police that would not be used to suppress the 
nationalist movement (see Chapter 3). It is important to understand that colonized 
societies in Africa have not simply rejected foreign policing systems as colonial 
impositions, but rather have demanded that they be used to benefit society rather 
than the government, by protecting it from theft, violence and other forms of anti-
social behaviour.
72
 Non-Western societies have at times been willing to use police 
techniques developed in the West if they produce an obvious benefit in dealing with 
crime. For instance, Fahmy has observed that in nineteenth-century Egypt, even 
before the British occupation, communities would not raise religious objections to 
modern forensic techniques such as autopsies if they felt that it was their best chance 
to establish justice.
73
 
 
However, the eagerness of a number of Sudanese nationalists and policemen 
to apply the supposedly British model of civil policing did not necessarily reflect 
blind imitation of the colonizer. These colonial policemen did not, as some have 
argued, come to resemble the colonizer ‘to the point of disappearing in him’.74 As 
Willis has observed, Bhabha’s notion of ‘hybridity’ is somewhat inappropriate to 
describe cultural processes given that it implies ‘the genetic mixing of two clearly 
distinct strains’.75 Indeed, civil policing was never really a distinct strain. As 
demonstrated above, the values and practices that British police officers claimed 
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were associated with their civil police system – non-military organization, 
independence from politics and service of public interests – were neither specifically 
British nor fully practiced in Britain.
76
 Thus it was not the British system of policing 
that professional Sudanese policemen attempted to mimic, but rather the ideals that 
the British claimed were associated with it.  
 
Discourses about what ‘modern’ policing represented would frequently be 
reworked and understood in an Islamic context. Thus the Sudanese police mimics 
were, as Bhabha would have it, ‘almost the same, but not quite’.77 It is also important 
to understand that this form of mimicry was practiced by a particular group within 
colonial society. Since the vast majority of educated Sudanese police officers hailed 
from the riverain elite, such discourses were also shaped to fit ‘civil’ policing into a 
context that emphasized the importance of urban riverain culture (see Chapters 3 and 
4). Nevertheless, the strategy of these modernizing police officials was still 
‘governmentalist’ in a manner in which colonial strategies had not been and aimed at 
expanding what Scott calls ‘legally instituted space’.78 While this in some respects 
enabled the police to offer beneficial services to Sudanese society, a more modern 
and interventionist policing also facilitated the greater intrusion of the police into 
society and thus offered capacity for the abuse of police power. This has particularly 
been the case when the institutional independence of the police has offered them the 
ability to evade judicial regulation and protect their members from criminal 
investigations (see Chapter 5). 
 
 
The Sudanese police and divisions within the post-colonial state 
 
This study will develop its analysis of the divisions within the colonial state by 
showing that the post-colonial state in Sudan was just as ambivalent towards the 
development of the central legal institutions as its Condominium predecessor had 
been. Thus, since the state remained divided, we will see that the police were no 
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more malleable collaborators with it than they had been under the British. They 
pursued their own separate agenda as a faction within the state, and although they 
sought to strengthen themselves as an institution, this institution remained subject to 
pressures from a variety of legal, political and social forces.  
 
Post-colonial regimes in Africa and the Middle East, whether military or 
party-based, faced a typical series of dilemmas when it came to their relationship 
with their police force. Strengthening central government institutions offers the state 
the opportunity to expand its ‘mobilizational’ capacity and enhance its wider 
security, but if such institutions become too strong they can threaten to become 
alternative power centres. Numerous leaders have chosen to deal with this challenge 
by abandoning the prospect of developing significant ‘mobilizational’ strength and 
simply choosing to focus on their own political survival.
79
 Dorman terms this a 
‘politics of neglect’.80 
 
 A number of post-colonial regimes have thus proved particularly keen to 
undermine the police as an institution, as Hills shrewdly observes:  
 
If the police do their job well, they could threaten their regime. They might 
launch their own coup or, if they were truly independent, they would 
investigate regime officials suspected of violating the law. It is thus not in 
regime interests that the police should become efficient, effective, or provide 
citizen protection.
81
 
 
A growing rift has also emerged between the legal and executive arms of some post-
colonial states over the use of the police, continuing the classical colonial schism. 
The politicians and administrative officers at the centre of the state have sought to 
use either personalized security forces
82
 in the context of political policing, or 
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vigilante groups in the context of criminal policing,
83
 to bypass judicial supervision 
of the police. The result is that the police become de-institutionalized and the state 
has little control over the manner in which it regulates society at large, to the extent 
that everyday policing becomes, in Marenin’s words, ‘unsystematic, sporadic and 
personalistic’.84 
 
There were a number of factions within Sudanese political and social life that 
attempted to manipulate the police in the post-independence era. The post-colonial 
Sudanese state was even more porous than its colonial predecessor, as it was 
alternately captured by a number of competing social and political organizations. 
Woodward has categorized five separate groups. The first of these was the Mahdist 
Ansar religious order and its affiliated political movement, the Umma party, the 
traditional support base of which was in western Sudan and the area along the Blue 
and White Niles to the south of Khartoum. The second was the Khatmiyya sect, 
which had commercial and patrimonial links to the north and east of Sudan, and 
sponsored the National Unionist Party, Popular Democratic Party and Democratic 
Unionist Party (a later amalgamation of the earlier two). The Sudanese military, 
which dominated the governments of Abboud and Numayri and remained influential 
behind the scenes during the parliamentary eras, was a third. Fourth were the 
‘modern forces’, represented by the trade unions and professional associations that 
were historically liberal and progressive and in varying degrees linked to the 
Communist Party. Finally, there was the Islamist movement, which sponsored the 
Islamic Charter Front and then the National Islamic Front, and grew in strength in 
Sudan in the late 1970s on account of the growing importance of Islamic banks 
affiliated to the movement and its alliance with Numayri at that time.
85
  
 
 It is difficult to place the police squarely within any of these groupings, since 
the force as an institution was not wholly politicized. In a number of respects, the 
police in some African states represented a set of independent actors in their own 
right, given they had the power to abandon regimes and arrest and monitor political 
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activists.
86
 Like the military, they have been able to an extent to live in an 
‘autonomous world’87 with its own economy, housing and service provision.88 
Marenin even goes so far as to say that the Nigerian police are ‘quite willing, and 
they have the autonomy, to shift sides when their own interests dictate’.89 However, 
this statement seems a little too strong to apply in Sudan, where regimes controlled 
at different times by the various power groupings listed above have been able to 
exert influence over the police either by purging their ranks, making political 
appointments, changing their organization, or transferring resources to parallel 
organizations (see Chapters 4 and particularly 5). 
 
The thesis will demonstrate that the police related to each particular set of 
power groupings in different ways. Relations between police forces and militaries in 
a number of states in the Middle East and Africa have been highly competitive and at 
times violent.
90
 Although Hills argues that ‘regime concerns ensure that African 
police forces remain urban, under-resourced, brutal, and stagnant’, this thesis will 
demonstrate that a number of policemen in Sudan strove hard to avoid this state of 
affairs. The most liberal and progressive of policemen identified with the 
professional associations, in that they strove for greater professionalization, 
independence, and labour rights for the police. As Hills observes, the police could 
often act as a trade union in their own right.
91
 However, their use by both colonial 
and post-colonial regimes to suppress these same groups created an obvious rift with 
them. Nevertheless, police officers, professionals and unionists all came from the 
same homogenous riverain elite and there were times when this social linkage 
prevented the police from taking action against movements dominated by fellow 
professional groups, in particular during the uprisings of 1964 and 1985. Another 
such professional group was the judiciary, which as in the colonial era contested the 
regime when it tried to politicize the police. 
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The thesis will also compare the extent to which relations with state and 
society impacted on police practice during parliamentary and military regimes. Both 
parliamentary and military regimes in Sudan would reveal the manner in which the 
various factions within the divided post-colonial state manipulated police practice. It 
is an oft-made generalization that parliamentary regimes in post-colonial Africa were 
no less corrupt, violent or detested by the people than the military dictatorships that 
followed them.
92
 Although Reid admits that ‘legislatures were carefully controlled’ 
and ‘judicial independence was undermined’, he also argues that ‘more commonly, 
military regimes were no more incompetent or corrupt or brutal than the civilians 
they had replaced’.93 Some writers closely equate military and civilian regimes. 
Anderson takes this approach, arguing that the Sudanese maxim that ‘the present 
regime is the worst possible…until the next one’ has ‘repeatedly proven its timeless 
wisdom’.94  
 
However, the thesis will demonstrate that the capacity of the judiciary and 
the media to exercise moral and legal influence over government use of the police 
during the parliamentary regimes ensured that these regimes had less capacity to 
abuse the police than their military counterparts, which used numerous strategies to 
distance the judiciary from the police (see Chapters 4 and 5). Nevertheless, such 
restraints could only be exercised at the riverain centre, due to the greater social 
porosity between these legal and journalistic bodies and the ruling groups there, and 
brutal and collective forms of policing would be practiced in both the urban and rural 
peripheries during both military and parliamentary regimes (see Chapter 6). As 
Sudanese political scientists have argued, the truly crucial periods would be the 
transitional ones between military and parliamentary regimes, when the educated 
professional groups that led the popular urban uprisings would try and bring in more 
progressive forms of governance before being replaced after elections by the 
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traditional sectarian parties which possessed mass rural support.
95
 It will be seen that 
it was during these periods that the media, the judiciary and the educated 
professional groups showed the greatest potential to hold the government and police 
officers to account for abuse of police power. However, even during these periods 
efforts to strengthen the notion of ‘civil’ policing were usually restricted to the 
riverain centre. 
 
 
The impact of the divided state upon Sudan’s centre-periphery 
divide 
 
The thesis will further explore the extent to which the police in Sudan were 
influenced by regional, social and ethnic divides within Sudanese society and in 
particular the schism between the affluent urban centre and the marginalized rural 
periphery. As the principal study of policing in Africa emphasizes, police forces may 
be key indicators of state-society relations more generally.
96
 It might then be 
expected that the Sudanese police would embody what has commonly been seen as a 
fraught and dysfunctional state-society relationship in Sudan. 
 
To understand the influence of these social divides upon the development of 
the police force, we must understand the complex historiographical debate about the 
relationship between the growth of the modern state in Sudan and the centre-
periphery dichotomy. Some argue that Sudan’s ethnic and regional diversity is the 
original cause of the instability of the state apparatus in the country. For Francis 
Deng, the current instability of Sudan is the result of ‘a long historical process in 
which Northerners and Southerners were the principal antagonists in the war of 
racial, cultural and religious identities’.97 Similarly, for Lesch it is the struggle over 
‘the identity of the Sudanese nation and the cultural boundaries of that nation-state’ 
that has ‘nearly destroyed the country’.98  
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Nevertheless, others blame the state itself for creating and perpetuating 
social, ethnic and regional divisions within the country, rather than seeing these 
divisions as primordial. A less essentialist school of thought than that put forward by 
Lesch and Deng blames the divisive policies enacted by the British colonial state in 
Sudan for the post-colonial conflicts in the country. For instance, Mahmoud 
Mamdani, who has called upon analysts to investigate not only ethnic divisions but 
structures of power in understanding post-colonial African conflicts, has argued that 
the British laid the seeds for conflict in Darfur by deliberately ‘retribalizing’ the 
region and separating it from the riverain centre of Sudan.
99
 Much earlier, nationalist 
historians from the riverain centre blamed the British for creating an artificial divide 
between the north and south of Sudan that made civil war in the south a post-colonial 
inevitability.
100
 Historians who support independence or regionalism in peripheral 
regions such as Darfur or the south also blame the British not for keeping the regions 
separate but for favouring the riverain region in terms of economic and educational 
development.
101
  
 
Other historians have sought to move beyond debates over colonial 
culpability by emphasizing the broader continuities between the pre-colonial, 
colonial and post-colonial regimes. Johnson notes the fact that ‘inequalities in 
economic, educational and political development’ often ‘built on earlier patterns’.102 
This lopsided development focused on the ‘riverain triangle’ at the centre of Sudan 
and to some extent the bordering regions of Kordofan and Kassala.
103
 Daly argues 
that the Condominium regime built itself upon the foundations of the old Turco-
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Egyptian regime (1820-1885) during which these uneven patterns of development 
began.
104
 
 
Nevertheless, this thesis will demonstrate that rather than the police passively 
incorporating pre-existing Sudanese social divisions, the policy of both the colonial 
and post-colonial states actively ensured that the police system was both defined by 
the schism between the centre and the margins of Sudanese society and used to 
reinforce it. This was partially because of the political and economic benefits of 
perpetuating this rift. However, it was also due to the desire of the dominant factions, 
as demonstrated above, to prevent the emergence of a powerful, united and 
centralized police institution that could challenge central authority. 
 
  Thus the centre-periphery dichotomy that the nineteenth and twentieth 
century states established within Sudanese society and politics ensured that the 
police acted as ‘protectors’ of a very specific version of Sudanese society. The 
division within that society created by the uneven levels of integration within the 
state is similar to that depicted by Mamdani in his work Citizen and Subject, which 
focuses on the impact of colonialism in sub-Saharan Africa. Mamdani characterizes 
the judicial system in colonial Africa as a ‘bipolar affair’, in which only ‘non-native’ 
citizens were dealt with by European law codes, whereas ‘native’ subjects faced a 
system of administrative justice handed down largely by the courts of ‘chiefs’ 
collaborating with the colonial system.
105
 Mamdani’s model needs qualification 
before application to Sudan, although it is still highly relevant. Firstly, it was mainly 
the urban, ‘Arab’-identified elite that replaced European settlers in the role of 
‘citizens’ in Mamdani’s sense, in that these were regulated by the central police force 
applying the government legal codes in central courts. Elsewhere, in Sudan’s 
sizeable rural peripheries, administrators either used their own personalized police 
forces to apply methods of administrative justice that flagrantly violated the Code of 
Criminal Procedure or they delegated policing to local authorities such as chiefs and 
Nazirs. As argued by Amir Idris, who has applied Mamdani’s model of ‘citizen and 
subject’ to Sudan, colonialism in Sudan ‘de-individualized’ citizenship by treating 
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Sudanese as groups and communities, thus making ethnic and racial differences 
institutional.
106
 As will be seen, this was reflected in the ‘administrative policing’107 
of the Political Service, which often understood criminality as a communal activity 
and meted out collective punishment accordingly (see Chapter 1).   
 
Scott argues that the colonial introduction of a new game of politics and law 
was more crucial than the question of ‘whether natives were included or 
excluded’.108 However, this study will show that exclusion was a fundamental aspect 
of the system the British established in Sudan, since their policing of the country 
made citizens of those present at the riverain core, and de-individuated subjects of 
those on the peripheries. Cooper has argued that it was in the post-World War II era 
that the colonial state shifted from its policy of leaving African subjects as ‘non-
individualized collectives’ to approaching them as ‘individuals defined in relation to 
the social body’.109 Nevertheless, in Sudan this process, at least in the context of 
policing, was heavily contested and still focused largely on the riverain centre. 
 
The centre-periphery dichotomy would remain highly relevant to the post-
colonial era and also began to play itself out in the major cities as migration from the 
rural to the urban areas increased. Thus Bierschenk and de Sardan’s paradigm of the 
state that can only control its capital is somewhat problematic for Sudan in that here 
the state has historically neglected large peri-urban areas of its own capital, whose 
populations are drawn from outside the riverain centre. T. Abdou Maqilam Simone’s 
In Whose Image? provides an excellent study of the post-colonial Sudanese state’s 
inability to exercise control over such ‘hybrid’ settlements on the outskirts of 
Khartoum.
110
 A number of Middle Eastern and African commentators have 
interpreted the emergence of such settlements in terms of an increasing ‘ruralization’ 
of the cities, a reversal of the traditional Western pattern in which the countryside 
becomes increasingly influenced by urban modes of life.
111
 This is particularly 
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important since colonial states and their police forces were initially purely urban 
phenomena. Thus the post-colonial police force acted as defenders of urban society 
against supposedly threatening rural and ‘tribal’ migrants from the countryside. As 
critics of the post-colonial dispensation of power in Sudan have observed, the 
riverain elite inherited colonial discourses that presumed to exercise a ‘monopoly of 
modernity’ and otherised peripheral Sudanese as ‘superstitious, chaotic, unruly, 
tribalistic, irrational, and barbaric’.112 
 
This reveals a wider theme in Sudanese centre-periphery relations. As in 
British society,
113
 wider social stratifications have undermined the capacity of the 
force to offer a neutral form of policing to all members of society. This study will 
observe that the Sudanese police have been used historically not just to secure the 
capital, although this undoubtedly attracted more resources than elsewhere, but in 
general terms as a means of defending the central urban core of Sudan (Khartoum, 
Wad Medani, Atbara, Shendi, al-Ubayyid and Port Sudan in the east) against 
perceived threats from the peripheries. The state has thus become divided into Arab-
identified riverain Sudanese ‘citizens’, and de-individuated ‘subjects’.114 Islam and 
Arabic culture were held by the ruling elite to be the only potential unifying factors 
in a nation otherwise perceived as ‘tribal’.115 Thus the key government institutions 
since independence have been dominated by what el-Battahani terms the ‘Riverain 
Arab-Muslim Power Bloc’.116 In particular, this power bloc focuses on acquiring 
jobs and developmental resources for three particular ethnic groups from the 
northern riverain region: the Shayqiyya, Ja’aliin and Danagla.117 Analysts of the 
country’s post-colonial wars have held this riverain ‘Arab’ bias within the state to be 
one of the key causes of conflict in Sudan, as rebel movements on the peripheries 
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have developed ‘Africanist’ ideologies to counteract the central Arabizing and 
Islamizing discourse.
118
 
 
The thesis will demonstrate that this riverain bias has also contributed, in a 
more general sense, to the manner in which the state was policed. As Amir Idris has 
argued, ‘as the state grew economically and ideologically, both its internal and 
external boundaries became the cultural and political divide between “civilization” 
and “savagery”’.119 Thus it will be seen that the state tends to police the boundaries 
of major cities almost like international boundaries, although such security usually 
remains fundamentally porous (see Chapter 6). 
 
The thesis will also demonstrate the manner in which state (in)action in the 
periphery fed back into the central state. On account of the increasing migration of 
refugees from war and famine to the principal riverain cities, the state has now found 
that the war on the margins is coming back to haunt it.
120
 Thus police campaigns 
against the peri-urban populations of Khartoum have increasingly begun to mirror 
the militaristic styles of policing used by the state in the peripheries. Paradoxically, 
the rank and file police have, on account of the state’s deliberate neglect of the force, 
become dominated by men from the shanty-towns, posing further challenges to the 
government (see Chapter 6). 
 
While the state and its police were porous in that they were captured by 
specific northern riverain groups within Sudanese society, it is important to 
remember that vast sections of peripheral Sudanese society did not penetrate the state 
on the same level. Thus both models that depict the state as being penetrated by 
society, and as being fundamentally outside society, are on some level applicable in 
Sudan. However, this is not to say that, as Cooper demonstrates, the lower echelons 
of state institutions were not subverted at a local level.
121
 The use of Native 
Administration police forces to pursue local agendas and the phenomenon of the 
impersonation of police officers for criminal purposes continued to demonstrate the 
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weak integrity of the state, that is, its inability to control the violence of its own 
agents (see Chapter 2, 5). 
 
 
Sources 
 
This thesis is the first scholarly English-language history of the police in Sudan to 
integrate English and Arabic-language sources. The sources used for the 
Condominium period up to the late nationalist era are largely colonial ones: court 
records, the memoirs of British policemen and administrators, official 
correspondence, intelligence reports and the amateur ethnographic Sudan Notes and 
Records, as well as government reports. These sources are most useful for 
representing how the colonial government regarded the role of its police force. 
Memoirs are a particularly useful source for analyzing some of the vagaries of 
policing in Sudan, as colonial officials were often candid about their lack of respect 
for the colonial state’s legal norms when writing in retrospect. The same can be said 
for low-level correspondence not intended for widespread circulation. These sources 
are the more useful because of the relatively sparse information on policing found in 
official colonial reports, a problem that has been acknowledged by other scholars 
working on imperial policing.
122
 Frustratingly, reports on ‘policing’ or ‘public 
security’ often provide nothing more than a banal description of recent infringements 
of colonial law or reports that local police forces were ‘well turned out’ or ‘excellent 
at shooting practice’. Another problem was that I was denied access to the majority 
of the provincial records in the National Record Office in Khartoum, with the 
exception of the Khartoum, Kordofan and Darfur files, on the grounds that the 
records were in poor condition. I was thus unable to consult the files for Northern 
province (where the headquarters of the Sudan railways are located), Blue Nile 
Province (the location of the major cotton-growing schemes), and Red Sea/Kassala 
Province (the location of the country’s major port). Thus I have not been able to 
study the policing of Sudan’s economy in any great depth. 
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Although the factual value of colonial sources is often limited by the cultural 
and political biases of the authors, they remain valuable because the manner of their 
racialism often reveals the languages of power that were constructed in colonial 
Sudan. For instance, sources that emphasize the ‘tribal’ nature of Sudanese society 
reflect administrative attempts to exclude legal bodies from areas of the country 
where the administration argued that a modern system of criminal policing was 
inappropriate. 
  
The attitudes of the elite, educated northern Sudanese inside and outside the 
police become more accessible from the 1940s through a variety of writings 
published in Arabic. The earliest nationalist Sudanese newspaper available for the 
purposes of this project was published in 1946 and although the collection for the 
immediate post-war period in the National Record Office in Khartoum is patchy, 
others were consulted by means of translations in British Intelligence Reports. After 
around 1950 the holdings of the Record Office are in better condition, so it has been 
possible to read Sudanese press commentaries on such important events as the Police 
Strike of 1951, the Neguib Riots of 1954 and the Southern Mutiny of 1955. 
Information on the colonial period as a whole has also been garnered from historical 
research done by Sudanese policemen themselves, such as Salim and Abu Bakr and 
also police authors writing in the Police Magazine. Sudanese police sources have 
been vital in demonstrating the agency that Sudanese policemen sought to achieve in 
striving for a more professional and independent police force.  
 
As Sudan Ministry of Interior records for the post-colonial era are 
inaccessible it has been necessary to make substantial use of the Sudanese media. 
This includes the press, as well as the national radio, transcripts of which are 
available in the BBC’s Summary of World Broadcasts. Using the media has proved 
most problematic for the periods of military dictatorship, when the press was heavily 
controlled. Nevertheless, whilst Sudanese newspapers and radio broadcasts during 
these periods inevitably presented a one-sided view of the state’s police and prison 
system, alternative perspectives are available: underground newspapers such as the 
Communist organ al-Midan, SPLA radio broadcasts, memoirs, oral recollections and 
scathing criticisms of the military regimes in the press in the years following their 
overthrow. However, it is important to remember that a number of these sources 
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were as tendentious as the regime’s own organs, and could potentially have exploited 
the government’s shrouding of the facts to add a fictitious element to their accounts. 
Particularly venomous depictions of the Numayri regime come from al-Midan, 
which frequently refers to the dictator as ‘al-Saffah’, or ‘the murderer’. I have 
acknowledged where sources may be questionable, and have where possible used 
them only when corroborated by other information. 
 
The Arabic language writings of Sudanese policemen have also been heavily 
used in this thesis, among them the memoirs of ‘Abd al-Wahhab Ibrahim, Abu 
Humayd Ibrahim and Muhammad Zubeir Muhammad.
123
 ‘Abd al-Wahhab Ibrahim 
was a policeman who went on to be the Minister of Interior and his memoirs have 
been very useful for observing the tensions between the police and the military 
during the Numayri regime. Muhammad Zubeir Muhammad was a member of the 
Strike Committee of 1951 and his memoirs have been extremely useful in 
identifying the desire for a modern and professional system of policing that 
characterized the agenda of the strikers. Abu Humayd Ibrahim was the first of the 
Hamr, a group of cattle-herding nomads from West Kordofan, to enter the senior 
echelons of the police in Sudan. As something of an ‘outsider’ to the central riverain 
region, he offers a more critical view of the national police system. The Police 
Magazine has also been a vital source for analyzing the views of Sudanese police 
officers and, although access to it has been patchy, I have been able to view a 
number of copies from the 1964-81 period in the National Record Office in 
Khartoum and the American Library of Congress. In spite of the restrictions on 
freedom of expression under Numayri’s regime, the 1981 independence jubilee 
edition of the Police Magazine was relatively outspoken about the poor condition of 
the police and thus remains an invaluable source. Independent publications by 
Sudanese legal experts, such as Sa’id al-Mahdi’s al-Jarima wa’l Uqubat (Crime and 
Punishment),
124
 have also proved valuable in assessing the cultural attitudes of the 
Sudanese police and the approach they took towards the ‘crime problem’. Crime 
statistics published by the Sudan Police Headquarters have been used, although they 
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have proved more useful for indicating the level of police presence at different times 
and in different regions than for measuring actual levels of crime. 
 
On a second visit to Khartoum in December 2009, a number of interviews 
were conducted with police officers, journalists, politicians, members of the Native 
Administration, and other Khartoum inhabitants. These interviews often helped 
clarify and supplement material obtained from the written literature. They also 
proved valuable for tackling issues that were not discussed in the written material, 
such as the social and ethnic composition of the police, police family lives and the 
relationship between the police and the Native Administration in the post-colonial 
era. Interviews were conducted mainly in English (though occasionally in Arabic), 
interpreted with the help of a research assistant, Kamal Ahmad Yousif. While 
interview material varies in terms of factual value, like the records of colonial 
administrators it is useful for reflecting the languages of power that were constructed 
in the struggle over the administration of criminal law. For instance, Native 
Administration figures referred to the ‘primitive’ nature of the Sudanese people as a 
justification for their continuing role in lieu of the police, while police figures talked 
of the gradual expansion of the central police system in terms of the slow spread of 
‘civilization’. 
 
One problem with relying on oral and media sources rather than departmental 
records is that the information on pay and service conditions is not very systematic, 
being based as it is on the impressions of former officers and journalists. However, 
information of this sort is not entirely subjective. For instance, such a wide variety of 
sources seem to agree that the police force was run down by Numayri between 1978 
and 1985 that it seems difficult to dispute the fact. 
 
Although use of Sudanese source materials offers an antidote to the 
somewhat Eurocentric source literature on policing to date, even this yields its own 
problems. Most of the sources, both written and oral, represent the views of the 
urban literate elite that inhabited the central area of Sudan around Khartoum and 
dominated the higher echelons of the police as well as other branches of government. 
National newspapers such as al-Ra’i al-‘Aam and al-Ayyam tend to discuss policing 
mainly in the context of the national capital, Khartoum, with only occasional forays 
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into the regions. However, the fact that many of these sources repeat a number of the 
well-established colonial tropes concerning the peripheral areas of Sudan has been 
useful in terms of identifying the similarities between colonial and post-colonial 
styles of policing. 
 
Conducting further investigations on the relationship between the police and 
local communities in Sudan’s regions remained outside the scope of this research: it 
would have posed obvious practical and political difficulties. As a result, the material 
on policing in the south tends to be reliant on northern sources, with the exception of 
newspapers such as The Vigilant, Nile Mirror and Modern Sudan Daily Times, all of 
which the prominent southern journalist and politician, Bona Malwal, had a role in 
producing. It remains true that interviews with southern police officers and in the 
south more widely would have provided a wider perspective on policing in the South 
and this remains an important area for future research.  
 
 
Chapter plans 
 
Chapter 1 will explore the ambivalent policy of the colonial state towards the 
development of its police force. It will be argued that the colonial state had limited 
transformative capacity and was over-reliant on the power-structures inherited from 
the regimes that had colonized the Nile basin in the nineteenth century. It will also 
demonstrate that the British administration was afraid to expand the modern police 
system outside the principal urban centres because of its over-reliance on urban 
riverain groups such as the Shayqiyya in the force, and because of its desire to 
preserve its own role in law enforcement in the provinces. Thus it will be argued that 
the divides within the colonial state led to a bifurcation of the police system in Sudan 
between the urban centres, where a modern and professional system of policing 
gradually developed, and the rural periphery where the Political Service applied a 
system of ‘administrative’ policing that neglected the modern legal codes. It will 
therefore show that the administration’s desire to cling on to its own privileges in the 
field of law enforcement both exacerbated the centre-periphery divide in Sudanese 
society and reduced the overall capacity of the state to govern its people. 
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 Chapter 2 will develop the analysis of Chapter 1 by demonstrating that the 
administration had limited the overall governmental capacity of the state to the 
extent that it was unable even to govern its own tool of governance, the police force. 
The chapter will argue that the unwillingness of the Condominium to institutionalize 
and professionalize the Sudanese police force led it to be captured by specific social 
and political groups within Sudanese society, both on a national and a local level. 
The state’s refusal to develop a well-equipped police force left policemen trapped in 
a cyclical relationship between vulnerability and violence, which often displayed 
itself during police action against popular demonstrations. Thus it will be seen that 
police violence was as much a result of the state’s limited development of the police 
infrastructure as it was of sheer state power. 
 
Chapter 3 will continue the analysis of the divisions within the colonial state 
over the development of the police force through an analysis of events before, during 
and after the famous Khartoum Police Strike of 1951. It will argue that the strike, 
although represented by the administration as a result of ‘character’ failings among 
senior British policemen, revealed a wider series of tensions between administrators, 
judges, and both British and Sudanese police professionals over the status of the 
police within the state. It will explore the manner in which the British administration 
continued to use cultural relativism and in particular Sudan’s regional diversity as a 
justification to stall the development of a modern and united police force in the 
country. Meanwhile, the chapter will demonstrate the agency that the Sudanese 
police strikers exercised in demanding an improved position for themselves within 
the colonial state. It will show the extent to which Sudanese policemen were capable 
of escaping their stereotypical role as deculturated ‘collaborators’ and of identifying 
with broader trends within Sudanese nationalism, in particular the calls for civil 
policing in the nationalist press. 
 
 Chapter 4 will demonstrate that Sudanese policemen continued to assert 
institutional agency and understand their force as ‘civil’ well into the early 
nationalist period. It will be seen that these professionals used the opportunity 
granted to them by independence to expand the capacity of the police to act as a tool 
of governance, seeking as much as possible to use new technologies and sciences of 
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social control to do so. The chapter will focus on the period between 1956 and 1969 
and in particular events following the October Revolution of 1964, when police 
activity came under intense public scrutiny following the police shooting of the 
student Ahmad Qurayshi. These events will be used to demonstrate the fact that the 
police in this period remained, as in the colonial period, socially porous. It will be 
demonstrated that they could be influenced by public and legal institutions such as 
lawyers’ unions, the judiciary, the national press and other professional unions – thus 
demonstrating that they were not purely a tool of the regime. However, the chapter 
will acknowledge that even during this period the Sudanese police were not a 
comprehensively civil force – both because the notion of civil policing in Sudan was 
predicated to an extent upon exclusive interpretations of national identity, and also 
because various political and administrative factions continued to interfere in police 
business. 
 
 Chapter 5 will explore the initial expansion and then slow disintegration of 
the Sudanese police as an institution during the 1970s and 1980s, in particular during 
the military regime of Ja’afar Numayri (1969-1985). The chapter will argue that, 
contrary to the logic espoused by Numayri’s allies in the Islamist movement that the 
‘Islamization’ of the law in 1983 represented a rejection of colonial legal values, 
Numayri’s policies towards his agencies of law enforcement during the later years 
his of regime not only reproduced the tactics of the colonial administration but 
carried them even further. Specifically, it will be seen that Numayri applied a policy 
of regional decentralization on the police force as a means of keeping power over the 
central legal organs within the hands of the executive, and delegated police authority 
to a number of non-police actors. The chapter will show that, just as in the colonial 
era if not more so, this led to the fragmentation and subversion of police authority, 
which began to be exploited by both police and non-police actors. However, the 
chapter will also analyze the events that lead to the popular uprising of 1985 which 
overthrew Numayri and the subsequent debates over police practice during the third 
democratic period (1986-1989) as a means of demonstrating that the idea of civil 
policing was still an important tool in public discourse, and that the divides within 
the state between the judiciary and the political executive remained just as important 
as in the colonial period. 
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 Chapter 6 will focus on the policing of the divide between the central and 
peripheral regions of Sudan in the post-colonial era, arguing that policemen in the 
independent era remained crippled by the legacy of the Condominium’s 
unwillingness to bridge the gap between the affluent urban areas and marginalized 
rural areas. It will be seen that the governors of post-colonial states reproduced 
colonial attitudes with regard to the merits of localized and collective forms of 
policing, even after Numayri’s official abolition of the ‘Native Administration’ in 
1970. However the chapter will demonstrate that what was new about the post-
colonial era was that the police force began to apply these collective methods with 
particular vigour in the peri-urban settlements on the edges of Khartoum and other 
major cities. It will argue that the police, having been institutionally bifurcated on a 
centre-periphery basis by the British, became the state’s principal tool for enforcing 
the divide between the rural and urban areas – demonstrating the limitations on the 
notion of civil policing developed by police officers of the nationalist generation. 
However, the chapter will at the same time suggest the limitations on a simplistic 
centre-periphery analysis – both because security at the borders of major riverain 
cities remained relatively porous, and because the police themselves began to absorb 
a vast number of recruits from rural regions in a manner that was both feared and 
exploited by the state. 
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1 ‘Thank goodness Habeus Corpus did not run in 
Nahud’: The police system and the centre-periphery 
divide in colonial policy, 1898-c.1956 
 
 
In 1930 the governor of Kassala wrote to the civil secretary in Khartoum observing 
that police officers in his province should focus mainly on the supervision of well-
digging and road-building, and asking ‘does not the growth of Native Administration 
bring the conclusion that the [Police] School is turning out perhaps too many police 
officers, and that numbers should be decreased?’.1 This memorandum epitomized the 
policy of the Political Service towards the police in Sudan. In their view, the vast 
majority of local offences should be dealt with by Sudanese Shaikhs, Nazirs and 
chiefs associated with the colonial state via the mechanism of Native Administration, 
with the government police serving either to protect the security of the colonial state 
itself or act as administrative factotums for the Sudan Political Service. Later 
chapters will examine the agency of Sudanese police officers to show that they did 
not simply accept this envisioned role, but firstly this chapter explores the colonial 
policies that would restrict such agency and that revealed the divisions within the 
state itself. 
 
 This chapter will examine questions concerning the transformative capacity 
of colonial rule and demonstrate the reliance of colonial governments on pre-existing 
state structure.
2
 Although it does not deny the transformative capacity of colonial 
rule, it will argue that the colonial state, which relied heavily on the power structures 
it had inherited from the various regimes that had attempted to colonize the region in 
the nineteenth century, had only a limited capacity and limited ambition to control 
and direct the transformations for which it was responsible. Scholars working on 
other parts of the British Empire have identified a tendency for colonial powers to 
play ‘divide and rule’ with their police forces, using illiterates from the rural 
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peripheries to police educated, urban nationalists.
3
 However, during the period in 
which they ruled Sudan the British had less success at playing this game. The 
Condominium police retained a great deal of the character of the Egyptian Army that 
had been the principal agent of the conquest of the Sudan both during the period of 
Turco-Egyptian rule between 1820 and 1885 (known as the Turkiyya) and the Anglo-
Egyptian Reconquest of 1898. This was important since the police continued to be 
dominated by the same ethnic group, the Shayqiyya, which had dominated the 
Egyptian Army. Although the colonizers identified the Shayqiyya as a ‘martial race’, 
they also feared them because of their literacy and ethnic and social affiliation to the 
subsequently pro-nationalist and often pro-Egyptian ‘effendi’ class within the central 
government administration, which was seen to pose a key threat to the colonial state. 
 
 This raises another key question, that is, the extent to which the British 
colonizers had a single unified policy towards the development of their police force. 
This chapter will argue that the system of policing established by the British in 
Sudan reflected the fundamental tensions within the colonial state itself. The 
Political Service feared that the emergence of a professional cadre of policemen 
applying the civil policing models developed in Britain, together with the modern 
legal codes favoured by the Sudan judiciary, would not only bolster the nationalist 
movement but cause a clash with their own, more conservative understanding of the 
methods of policing that Sudan required. 
 
The administration thus made strenuous efforts to isolate these educated and 
professional men, both British and Sudanese, from the provincial police forces. The 
provincial governors and ‘inspectors’ of the Political Service had possessed direct 
control over provincial police units ever since the government transferred authority 
over the police to them from the Egyptian Army in 1905. At this stage most 
administrative personnel were soldiers seconded from the Egyptian Army, and the 
methods of policing their forces adopted reflected this.
4
 However, even after the 
Political Service developed a more civilian character in the aftermath of World War 
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I
5
 they were far from keen to foster civil forms of policing. These administrators 
often emphasized their own peculiar ‘understanding’ of the Sudanese as a 
justification for maintaining a position of authority over the colonial constabulary, 
and consequently marginalized British police professionals whose desires to 
modernize the Sudanese police system were deemed inappropriate. It will be seen 
that administrators expounded ideals about ‘the Sudanese’ which fitted in with their 
own crude notions of cultural relativism, and the supposed peculiarity of the 
Sudanese environment and its resistance to modern and rational techniques of 
policing. In contrast, police and judicial professionals increasingly tried to forge a 
modern, disciplined, literate and legally-knowledgeable institution out of the Sudan’s 
police.  
 
This conflict corresponded to the tensions between the department of the 
legal secretary, which oversaw the judiciary and that of the civil secretary, who 
oversaw the Political Service. Daly argues that, with the brief exception of Wasey 
Sterry in the post-World War I period, the legal secretaries came to be increasingly 
subordinate to the civil secretary.
6
 In particular, the civil secretary diminished the 
role of the Legal Department from the early 1920s onwards by establishing a system 
of local Native Administration courts which his department oversaw directly.
7
 
However, Daly also argues that after 1938 the judiciary obtained an increasing role 
in criminal work in Sudan’s provinces and that this ‘halted the trend towards 
subordination of the law to administrative goals’.8 This argument fits in with the 
literature that depicts the latter period of colonial rule in Africa as one in which the 
technical departments, including the police, gained increasing prominence.
9
 
However, this chapter and the next one will demonstrate that whilst the legal 
department, the judiciary and the police attempted to exert more control over 
criminal work in the provinces in the later period of colonial rule, the administrators 
struggled to maintain their own authority over the police force and disregard the 
styles of policing being advocated by the legal department. The tensions this caused 
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would eventually reach its climax during the Khartoum Police Strike of 1951, which 
will be discussed in the Chapter 3.
10
 
 
Understanding these conflicts, in which the administration usually retained 
the upper hand, enables us to explain precisely why colonial governance of Sudanese 
society, in terms of the state’s ability to systematically regulate the behaviour of its 
subjects, was so restricted. The British had limited resources to govern Sudanese 
society, but also limited intent. It has been argued that while the police in the south 
remained a quasi-military body subject to the administration, nevertheless ‘in the 
North they became more of a modern crime-fighting force’ after the introduction of 
professional commandants in 1925.
11
 The phrase ‘in the North’ could probably be 
restricted in definition to the main urban centres in the central riverain area. The only 
places where the administration seriously allowed a professional force to develop 
were Khartoum, Port Sudan and to some extent in Blue Nile Province, where the 
colonial state’s major cash-crop project, the cotton-farming Gezira Scheme, was 
located. Thus this chapter will argue that the colonizers focused primarily on 
policing the ‘gateways’ of the colonial economy12 and not on developing a 
‘governmentalist’13 approach based on regulating Sudanese society as a whole.  
 
Focusing on colonial policy towards the police will also allow us to study the 
extent to which the Condominium had a role in perpetuating the centre-periphery 
divide. This chapter will argue that it actively exacerbated this divide, as its 
disjointed policy towards the Sudanese constabulary effectively ensured that the 
colonial state subjected Sudanese outside the main urban riverain centres to an 
‘administrative’ form of police control. This administrative policing often either 
neglected the Sudan Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure, or bypassed them 
by outsourcing law enforcement to the Native Administration – creating what Hills 
has termed an ‘institutional bifurcation’.14 Governors, District Commissioners (DCs, 
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who replaced ‘inspectors’ after 1924) and their Native Administration allies would 
apply forms of justice that treated Sudanese societies on the periphery as ‘tribal’ and 
thus unsuitable for modern systems of justice that dealt with crime on an individual 
basis. Therefore it will be demonstrated that in the context of policing the colonial 
state treated the inhabitants of the rural peripheries as Mamdani’s de-individuated 
‘subjects’,15 whereas in the urban and riverain north the idea of civil policing slowly 
began to grow. Another upshot of this was that technical and professional methods 
did not spread far into the provincial police system, which did not focus itself 
heavily on the growth of intra-regional crime, particularly with regard to the 
movement of drugs and stolen goods. 
 
 
Colonial security and the birth of the Sudanese Police 
 
Police forces in early colonial Africa usually took on a military character, and Sudan 
was no exception.
16
 The police force emerged gradually out of the Egyptian Army, 
ensuring that from its very inception it served the political aims of the colonial state. 
In 1897-9, the British had used this army, in conjunction with their own imperial 
forces, to defeat the Mahdist regime that had itself overthrown the Turco-Egyptian 
government of Sudan in 1885. The British and their Egyptian subordinates faced 
several immediate challenges to their hegemony, in particular from a variety of self-
proclaimed Mahdis who exploited lingering sympathy with Mahdist beliefs to lead a 
number of local uprisings against the Condominium in 1903, 1908, 1910 and 1912.
17
 
The colonial state was also engaged for the first three decades of its existence in a 
series of ‘pacification’ campaigns in the south and the Nuba Mountains against 
independent rulers as well as communities who refused subjection to taxation.
18
 The 
responsibility for crushing these risings fell jointly on the police and the Egyptian 
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Army.
19
 Although there was a British army garrison, it stood at only 785 officers and 
men in 1913 and remained focused on guarding Khartoum.
20
 
 
 This participation in the ‘pacification’ campaigns shaped the character of the 
early Sudanese police forces.  Between 1896 and 1905 policing was carried out 
entirely under the aegis of the Egyptian Army, controlled by Egyptian administrative 
officers known as mamurs at district level using soldiers of the Egyptian Army as 
police.
21
 However, the British occupiers recognized that the various nineteenth 
century conflicts in Sudan had isolated the army from the general population and that 
it was necessary to establish a separate police force. Thus in 1899, Governor-General 
Wingate appointed a number of Egyptian Army officers to the rank of Yuzbashi to 
lead these forces
22
 and gave them a separate budget of 20,000 Egyptian pounds.
23
 
This force was given very basic police training but was rapidly able to take over 
police duties from the army, albeit with the assistance of local Shaikhs and southern 
chiefs, as had been the case during the Turkiyya.
24
 Then in 1905 the police were 
placed under the command of the provincial governors, who became responsible for 
overseeing their recruitment, training and financing on a provincial basis. They were 
led more directly by the British ‘inspector’, who was theoretically responsible for the 
training and supervision of crime fighting, and by the Egyptian military mamur in 
the field.
25
 
  
The emergence of specialized police units was also defined by the security 
prerogatives of the colonial state. A Criminal Investigation Department, referred to 
by police historian Abu Haraz Mu’tader as the ‘secret police’ (bulis sirri),26 was first 
established in 1908, but rapidly came under the aegis of the Intelligence Department. 
This was established in 1910 and then put under the civil secretary and in 1915 
renamed the ‘Public Security Department’; its broad functions were later described 
by the Sudan government’s police adviser J. S. Ewart as ‘the watching and control of 
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all influences, political, criminal, religious, or other’.27 The immediate pretext for the 
establishment of the ‘secret police’ appears to have been Wad Habouba’s Mahdist 
uprising of 1908, which led to a government obsession with monitoring Mahdist 
activity that had been characterized as somewhat paranoid.
28
  In this respect, Sudan 
was quite different from other British sub-Saharan African colonies, where 
centralized intelligence departments were not established until after World War II.
29
 
Thus colonial police officers in Sudan exercised overlapping criminal and political 
functions for most of the colonial era. 
 
The politicization of the police by the administration was also evident in the 
fact that it hired British ‘intelligence’ experts from India to assist with police 
organization. The first of these was J. H. Plumbridge, an officer in the Indian Police 
hired in 1910 who was regarded as an expert on anti-government societies and was 
appointed the Hakimdar of the Omdurman Police on the grounds that Omdurman 
was the centre of Mahdist activity.
30
 In 1924, the then governor-general, Lee Stack, 
hired J. S. Ewart, another British Indian police expert, to assist with re-organizing 
the intelligence functions of the police amidst increasing pro-Egyptian agitation in 
the lead-up to the White Flag Revolt of the same year.
31
  
 
The militarization of policing 
The limited institutional identity of the police was underlined by its continuing 
similarity to the Egyptian Army, or Sudan Defence Force (SDF) as it became after 
1925. When the first police unit was established in Bahr al-Ghazal in 1903, local 
officials referred to its recruits as Jihadiyya, which was a term used for slave soldiers 
in both the Egyptian Army of occupation and the Mahdi’s army.32 The internal 
organization of the police also retained a military character. They were divided into 
the infantry (biyada), whose job was guarding markets and ensuring security in the 
individual merkaz (government headquarters), and the cavalry (al-quwwa al-rakiba), 
who were divided into horse riders (khayyala) and camel riders (hajjana) and 
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functioned in the countryside.
33
 Furthermore, the police had military ranks, such as 
askari, nafar, shawish, bash-shawish, based on the Ottoman titles that were used by 
the Egyptian Army. Not surprisingly, as late as the 1950s, the Arabic language 
newspapers referred to the police as junud, meaning ‘soldiers’.34 To clinch the 
parallels, in the 1920s and early 1930s provincial police forces throughout Sudan 
were re-armed with the rifle that was also standard issue for the SDF. The 
justification for this re-armament was to make the provincial police more effective as 
a ‘fighting force’, particularly at outposts, and to enable them to ‘act in closer and 
more effective co-operation with the Sudan Defence Force on military patrols’.35 In 
Khartoum, these rifles were issued to the Omdurman police since there were no army 
units stationed there to intervene in the event of serious disturbances, as was the case 
in the other two of the ‘Three Towns’, Khartoum Central and Bahri.36 
 
The militarization of the police was also apparent in the establishment of 
paramilitary (shibh-qitali) units known as buluk (companies). These were initially 
formed as a response to the Nuba uprising in Dilling in 1915 and ‘Ali Dinar’s 
declaration of the independence of Darfur in 1916, and continued to be used to 
control various inter-ethnic conflicts in Darfur and the south. In the aftermath of 
World War II, the system was expanded to meet the needs of policing urban 
nationalism, and four regular reserve companies were established at Atbara, Port 
Sudan, Khartoum and Wad Medani. These were trained on military lines and given 
additional training in handling crowds, in baton and riot drill.
37
 Meanwhile, in Upper 
Nile Province, the government established a Mounted Police force which served both 
military and police functions throughout the colonial period. In 1926 K. C. P. Struvé, 
Governor of Upper Nile, observed that ‘a really efficient force of M. P. reduces 
reliance on the Army on such an occasion as a general tribal rising’38 and indeed by 
1932 there was no army unit stationed in Upper Nile, the Mounted Police performing 
its role exactly.
39
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This process of allowing police and military roles to overlap worked both 
ways. The army was regularly used in conjunction with the police to mount 
euphemistically-termed ‘patrols’ in the Nuba Mountains40 and the even more 
euphemistic ‘Nuer Settlement’ of 1928. The Nuba ‘patrols’ most commonly 
involved the torching of crops and villages and confiscation of cattle.
41
 Similarly, the 
Eastern Arab Corps assisted in the police campaign against armed poachers on the 
River Dinder.
42
 This use of the army to perform police functions effectively 
continued even into the 1940s. For instance, in 1941 the numbers of police in Darfur 
were ‘drastically reduced’, which led to the SDF offering to participate in training 
recruits and taking over a number of police functions, including acting as guards and 
manning police stations. These troops were also to perform ‘special manoeuvres’ in 
‘special cases’ where ‘it is advisable for some reason or other that the people should 
see the might of the Government, but where no disturbance involving the use of 
troops is either anticipated or at all likely to occur’.43 Again, the cross-over of roles 
between police and military reflected the reluctance of the colonial state to develop a 
civil police force that would work according to the British ideal and operate within, 
rather than outside, Sudanese society. 
 
 
A ‘martial race’? The role of the Shayqiyya 
  
The colonial state’s weak presence and reliance on the set of power structures 
inherited from the Egyptian Army was also evidenced by its inability to adjust ethnic 
imbalances in Sudanese state structures to suit its own purpose. In other British 
African territories, such as Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya, the British bound the police 
more closely to the state by recruiting marginal ethnic groups into the central police 
forces.
44
 In spite of the British government’s politicization of the police force, this 
was not the case in Sudan, where the central police were dominated by the 
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Shayqiyya, an ‘Arab’-identified ethnic group from the riverain region to the north of 
Khartoum. This group posed a particular threat to the colonial state because of its 
close identification with other branches of the riverain elite. 
 
The Shayqiyya were first incorporated into the Egyptian Army after the 
invading Egyptians had defeated the malik of the Shayqiyya in 1821 at the battle of 
Korti.
45
 After this, a number of Shayqiyya were formed into an irregular cavalry 
corps known as the ‘Bashibazouks’ which assisted Muhammad Ali in the conquests 
of Taka and Sennar and became responsible for preserving security and collecting 
taxes, as well as slave-hunting in the south.
46
 Nicoll states that ‘each province 
maintained its own force of these irregulars, who were widely loathed and described 
in one British report as “swaggering bullies, robbing, plundering, and ill-treating the 
people with impunity…a constant menace to public tranquility”’.47 Mu’tader 
describes them as ‘the worst police in the world’.48 
 
Together with other ‘Arab’-identified groups from the northern riverain 
region that possessed literacy in Arabic, such as the Ja’aliin and the Danagla, the 
Shayqiyya came to dominate the main branches of government in colonial and post-
colonial Sudan. The Shayqiyya largely dominated the officer corps of the police (and 
the army) throughout the country, as well as the rank and file in the riverain areas of 
the north. Alleyne Nicholson recalled that when he recruited police in Shendi and 
Merowe, he would only accept recruits if they could read and write Arabic, giving 
the Shayqiyya ‘a great sense of responsibility’.49 L. M. Buchanan remembered that 
the migration of the inhabitants of the northern Nile to the rest of Sudan seeking their 
fortune was common during the colonial era. This was especially true of ‘the 
Shaigia, who enjoyed a strong martial tradition (quite different from the Danagla) 
and were proud to form the backbone of the S.D.F. and the Police in the Northern 
Sudan’.50 Although the Danagla, as we see here, were perceived to be less martial 
and often filled the role of the merchant in colonial ethno-stereotyping, they also 
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found their way into the police elsewhere in Sudan. One colonial official in the 
Gezira observed that ‘the majority of ghaffirs are Danagla and Shaigia, and come 
here to get what they can out of the Gezira’.51 The use of Danagla and Shayqiyya 
appears to have been a necessity the colonial state accepted grudgingly, as  
 
The local man has been tried at the job but has failed. Westerners are 
increasing and are an improvement on the Northerner, in that they are less 
likely to bully the local Arab.
52
 
 
Thus the British recognized the same tendency for the Shayqiyya police to act as 
‘bullies’ as had been present in the nineteenth century, but were unwilling or unable 
to prevent it, as the next chapter will show. The strategy of bringing in westerners, 
who were often Mahdist-affiliated, was a strategy adopted by the colonial state to 
combat the pro-Egyptian influence amongst groups such as the Shayqiyya in the 
police. In 1924 the government used the Ansar supporters of Sayyid ‘Abd al-
Rahman al-Mahdi to attack demonstrators with whips and sticks during the White 
Flag Revolt (see below).
53
 After the British expelled Egyptian Army units from 
Sudan following the revolt, the Condominium government decided to create a new 
police post to guard the European trading centre in Khartoum. The acting governor 
of Khartoum decided to rely on the colony of Darfurian Ta’isha Ansar in 
Omdurman, a hangover from the era of Mahdist rule, selecting eighty of the most 
able-bodied men.
54
 However, this did not affect the fact the central police force 
remained dominated by the Shayqiyya. 
 
There was a key difference in the British strategy of employing the 
Shayqiyya as a ‘martial race’ and the use of such tactics in other parts of the empire. 
Elsewhere, the British cultivated ‘masculine’ and ‘rugged’ types from the rural 
peripheries of a colonial territory to police the literate and educated population of the 
towns, who formed the bulk of the nationalist movement.
55
 However, in Sudan the 
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Shayqiyya overlapped with both these groups, serving as clerks, lawyers and 
administrators as well as soldiers and policemen. For instance, the first Sudanese 
chief justice, Muhammad Abu Rannat, and a pioneering nationalist politician, 
Ahmad Kheir, were both Shayqiyya.
56
 The Sudanese police at the riverain centre had 
relatively high levels of literacy. Standards began to rise when Plumbridge 
established a training school for police officers in Omdurman in 1913 and in 1915 
introduced allowances for police clerks to foster increased literacy.
57
 A police 
training school was opened in 1926
58
 and by 1937 62 per cent of the Khartoum 
police force could read and write.
59
 It was this versatility in the role of the 
Shayqiyya, both as a ‘martial race’ and educated elite, that would complicate British 
policies towards the development of the police in Sudan. 
 
 
Colonial fears of ‘the effendi’ and the structuring of the police force 
in the aftermath of the White Flag Revolt 
 
After the proto-nationalist White Flag Revolt of 1924, the Political Service became 
increasingly focused on preventing the spread of the educated class of nationalist and 
often pro-Egyptian Sudanese, including professional policemen, throughout Sudan’s 
provinces. The revolt was engineered by the White Flag League, which was founded 
by ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Latif, a Sudanese army officer of Dinka origins. It espoused the 
principle of unity with Egypt, though this was possibly just a tactic for obtaining 
Egyptian support.
60
 The League, which ultimately provoked mutinies by both 
Egyptian and Sudanese battalions that would be put down by British troops, 
triggered a number of colonial anxieties about the positions that Sudanese were 
taking in the state apparatus. Firstly, it demonstrated co-operation between ethnically 
heterogeneous groups within the officer corps of the army, in spite of the divisions 
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between ‘Arab’, often Shayqiyya officers, and ‘Sudani’ officers recruited from 
Islamized ex-slaves from the peripheral regions, such as ‘Abd al-Latif.61  
 
The revolt also emphasized the existence of a substantial constituency of 
government officials, officers and merchants ‘of more prominent social origins’ 
within the riverain elite who although not exclusively pro-Egyptian identified with 
the model that Egyptian nationalism had established and had begun to press the 
government to set in motion a plan for the eventual independence of Sudan.
62
 This 
nascent nationalist movement had a solid base in the literate class of Sudanese 
clerks, soldiers and other officials, known as the effendiyya, who had benefited from 
the appearance of government schools at the riverain centre.
63
 They had begun to 
agitate against Britain and in favour of her co-dominal partner, Egypt, as a reaction 
to the British supporting notable and religious figures over the secular and educated 
elite.
64
  
 
The British feared that expanding the central system of government would 
empower this ‘effendi’ class, as well as create a sizeable category of ‘detribalized’ 
Sudanese from the peripheries who – having been removed from their more local 
ethnic ties – would become more inclined towards nationalism. Indeed, Abu Bakr 
claims that a number of young educated police professionals had been sympathetic to 
the Revolt.
65
 This fear of the educated ‘effendi’ elite clearly had an effect on the 
structure of the police force in Sudan. While the increasing numbers of educated 
policemen in the urban riverain areas led to the growth of a police force at the centre 
that was becoming increasingly centralized and professionalized, in the provinces 
British administrators attempted to keep the police as an adjunct to the 
administration or delegate policing altogether to the Native Administration.  
 
Police-administration tensions and the limited growth of the central force 
The administrators’ contempt for educated policemen led to a series of tensions with 
the modernizing British professionals who were keen to develop the force. These 
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frictions first came into evidence after the dismissal of Plumbridge in 1920 following 
a falling-out with the then civil secretary. This disagreement focused on the two 
principal issues that caused frictions between the administration and police 
professionals: police education and the right of the professionals to exercise 
independent control over provincial forces. Initially, the disagreement was caused by 
the civil secretary’s refusal to accept Plumbridge’s proposal that police officers and 
NCOs be sent to Egypt and England for further training.
66
 The civil secretary argued 
that there simply were not enough funds for such a mission, although it is more 
likely that the administration was worried about the potential politicization that could 
result from officers visiting Egypt in particular, which was in the throes of anti-
British nationalist agitation; the administration would turn down a similar request 
from José Penney when he was commandant of the Police School in 1927.
67
 
Mu’tader also claims that the civil secretary had also repeatedly written to 
Plumbridge requesting that he not interfere with the provincial forces, and it was 
rumoured that Plumbridge was aspiring to become commissioner of police, a 
position which did not exist at this time.
68
 This was something the civil secretary 
resisted, since creating a commissioner of police would hamper the administration’s 
unchecked control over the police forces of Sudan.
69
 
 
 Struvé, governor of Upper Nile, wrote in 1926 that police officers and 
administrators rarely got on well.
70
 This was often due to different attitudes towards 
the ‘Sudanese character’. Struvé complained of his local police officer, Coryton, that 
he ‘does not understand Sudanese, and always favours any man who has a tinge of 
yellow in him… Coryton cannot see any virtue in the Sudani’s qualities, and denies 
them even courage’.71 DCs thus asserted their own ‘special knowledge’ of Sudanese 
culture. They often took great pride in their police forces and disliked the possibility 
that they might fall into the hands of those who knew the local languages and people 
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less well.
72
 They also often reacted negatively to the education of policemen and 
demanded more ‘martial’ qualities. Owen recalled that 
  
There were even District Commissioners who somewhat suspected that, from 
an innate if twisted feeling that education saps a man’s virility and virtue, 
these damned fellows who would wield a pen must at best be ‘pansy’ and 
sea-lawyers and at worst be crooks; and that the old, illiterate, unimaginative 
nugget was more reliable.
73
 
 
In spite of the administrators’ mistrust of educated policemen and British 
professionals, at the centre the combination of economic development and the 
perception of a growing nationalist threat to the colonial state necessitated the slow 
growth of the police force. Although initially hired as an intelligence expert, 
Plumbridge is now regarded by Sudanese police officers as the father of the modern, 
professional police force in Sudan, and with some justification.
74
 Apart from his 
efforts to improve literacy, he also established a general service register, constructed 
numerous police barracks (qushlaqat),
75
 and organized traffic regulation and the 
guarding of those awaiting trial.
76
 
 
When Ewart arrived as police adviser in 1924, his report on existing police 
arrangements was scathing and he recommended the establishment of a more 
centralized system. He re-organized the Public Security Department into three 
departments, one for record-keeping, another for ‘investigation’ (al-mubahith), and 
another for ‘supervision’ (al-muraqaba).77 Nevertheless, as the threat of Mahdism 
receded and the British colonial regime in Sudan became increasingly obsessed with 
a variety of external political threats, such as Egyptian nationalism and Communism, 
this department came to be increasingly focused on preserving the colonial 
‘gateway’. The British colonial government responded to the events of 1924 by 
proposing a plan of action that would comprise ‘preventive action of all sorts against 
                                                 
72
 H. A. Nicholson Memoirs, n. d., SAD 777/10/45.  
73
 Owen memoirs, c. 1960-1, SAD 769/11/43.  
74
 Mu’tader, Kitab, p. 45. 
75
 Although often referred to by Sudanese as ‘Ashlaq. 
76
 Mu’tader, Kitab, p. 40. 
77
 Ibid., p. 51. 
53 
 
possible outside agencies – such, for instance, as Egyptian enclaves, like that of the 
Irrigation Department, still in Sudan, and the infiltration of Bolshevik propaganda 
from Arabia’.78  
 
The re-organization of the Public Security Department also left the police 
firmly in the hands of the administration. Ewart observed:  
 
I am strongly of the opinion that, for as long as it is possible to visualize, the 
Province must remain the unit of Police administration, with the authority of 
the Governor unimpaired, and scope for local variations. I can see no present 
or prospective justification for a superior departmental organization for the 
police.
79
  
 
Neither was the newly re-organized Public Security Department to exercise 
significant criminal instead of political functions. Ewart argued that ‘original 
professional crime with wide ramifications does not exist in the Sudan, and no 
elaborate Criminal Investigation Department is required’.80   
 
The limited governmental ambitions of the colonial administration and its 
combined fear of, and contempt for, educated Sudanese also explain why the 
numbers of officers passing through the Police School remained extremely limited. 
Just as expansion of educational facilities for training clerks and civil servants was 
reined in as a result of the White Flag Revolt, the Police School after its opening in 
1926 remained to an extent stillborn, with the number of officers graduating each 
year in the late 1930s staying in single figures.
81
 Apprehension about police 
education culminated in 1935 with the closure of the Police School out of fears that 
the newly educated generation of policemen were becoming too attracted to the 
nationalist movement, although the school was re-opened later in the same year, 
albeit as a school for the training of administrators as well as policemen.
82
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The provincial and district administrators of the Political Service 
theoretically retained executive control over the police in the exercise of their crime-
fighting duties. Nevertheless, the professional British police commandants who were 
appointed by the governor-general in the wake of the White Flag Revolt gradually 
became responsible to the commissioner of police as head of the Police Department 
for matters of internal administration. The Police Headquarters first started sending 
out circulars to provincial police forces in 1930 and after this its bureaucracy 
gradually expanded as a regular regime for reporting criminal cases was 
established.
83
 In the urban areas, which presented more opportunities for a 
professional style of policing, Owen recalled that ‘the Police became a distinct 
organization merely co-operating with the Administration’.84  However, the areas in 
which this obtained were relatively few. In 1934 the governor-general observed of 
the police: ‘Except at Khartoum, Port Sudan, and, to some extent, in Darfur and the 
Blue Nile Provinces, this force is being administered as a part time function by 
Political Officers’.85 In 1937 the governor-general appointed senior members of the 
Political Service as ‘Inspectors of Police’ in every province except Equatoria, which 
was still left without any inspector, and Khartoum and Port Sudan which possessed a 
‘Commandant of Police’ with the ‘requisite professional qualifications’. The railway 
police also possessed such a commandant.
86
 In other words, the only places where 
specialized professionals were in charge of the police were the capital and the 
colonial state’s major port, where the Department of Public Security had assumed 
direct control over law and order in 1923.
87
 This demonstrated the state’s focus on 
‘gatekeeper’ security. 
 
The colonial state paid lip-service to the issue of police independence in 1938 
when a Director for Public Security, José Penney, was appointed head of a re-
organized Public Security Department. Yet this remained a hollow position 
subservient to the civil secretary and the provincial police forces continued to exist 
under the control of their local governors.
88
 Nevertheless the ‘Director for Public 
Security’ was given the task of overseeing a more elaborate Criminal Investigation 
                                                 
83
 Mu’tader, Kitab, p. 54. 
84
 Owen memoirs, SAD 769/11/44. 
85
 Note on Police by Governor-General, Stewart Symes, dated 14 July 1934, NRO Civ Sec (1) 99/1/3. 
86
 GGAR 1937 p. 12. 
87
 Kenneth J. Perkins, Port Sudan: The Evolution of a Colonial City (Boulder, 1993), p. 156. 
88
 Abu Bakr, Tarikh al-Shurta, p. 102. 
55 
 
Department. Its remit included dealing with suspicious deaths, arms-trafficking, 
drugs-trafficking, counterfeiting, stealing, shop-pilfering and pick-pocketing.
89
 In 
1942, the Public Security Department would be transformed into a far more 
substantial ‘Police Headquarters’ with greater powers of supervision over the 
provincial police forces, although this would be strongly contested by local 
administrators, as will be shown in Chapter 3.
90
  
 
The same period witnessed the establishment of the ‘Special Branch’, also 
referred to as the ‘Security Intelligence Branch’, under James Coutts, the Deputy 
Director for Criminal Investigation and Security. Although the functions of this body 
were purely political, it drew its staff entirely from the CID branches of the regular 
force. Its purpose was to monitor the activity of trade unions, leftist students 
returning to Sudan after having received their education in Egypt, and the Graduates’ 
Congress.
91
 The government had sanctioned the formation of the Graduates’ 
Congress in 1938 to act as sop to educated Sudanese who had passed through the 
intermediate schools, but this body had soon started to object to the government’s 
slowness in devolving power to Sudanese and acted as a forum for nationalist 
ideas.
92
 Since such groups had their regional base almost entirely within the northern 
riverain centre, this further skewed the geographic focus of the central police.  
 
Administrative control over the police in the provinces 
In the provinces, members of the Political Service attempted to stall the growth of 
this centralized police force by using government policemen for their own 
administrative purposes. Owen recalled that in the rural areas the police remained to 
a large extent ‘the district commissioner’s men’.93 Sudanese ‘police officers’ in the 
countryside were never quite what their title implied. In the 1920s they were 
frequently recruited from the training school for administrative ‘sub-Mamurs’, rather 
than the Police School, and their functions overlapped with those of administrators.
94
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British administrators argued that the police officer who possessed exclusively 
criminal functions was too much of a ‘one line man’, except in major towns.95 The 
demand for ‘police officers’ with more administrative specialisms began to shape the 
evolution of the Police School itself, which was re-organized as a joint 
administrative and police training centre in 1935.
96
 Until it was re-organized as a 
‘Police College’ once more in 1948, this would absorb students from Gordon 
College, the school established by the colonial government for the purpose of 
training local Sudanese to serve in the administration, and would thus produce far 
less technically specialized officers.
97
 Under the new organization, entrants would 
acquire both administrative and police training before being assigned as either 
‘police’ sub-mamurs or ‘administrative’ sub-mamurs upon leaving the school.98 
 
Meanwhile, both the rank and file (anfar) and NCOs would be recruited 
locally and trained in local depots, although they could be sent to the Police School 
for specialized courses.
99
 Local administrators often assigned them multiple roles, 
including serving as drivers, prison warders, tax collectors, labour organizers, and 
locust exterminators – and guards for ginning factories in the Gezira Scheme, 
prisoners on guarantee schemes, and even for the DC’s children against 
crocodiles.
100
  Often, too, they acted as a sort of ‘retinue’ for the DC, escorting him 
while out on trek and chivvying the baggage animals.
101
 This was typical of colonial 
administrative cadres, who often exploited their position to live out militaristic and 
aristocratic ideals and exercise a form of authority that had fallen into abeyance in 
Europe.
102
 Rowton Simpson, a former DC, recalls that in al-Ubayyid he and other 
administrators were accompanied by mounted policemen on a ‘town ride’ bearing 
the British and Egyptian national flags, sometimes briefly arresting a town inhabitant 
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for ‘failing to stand up or for not dismounting from his donkey or otherwise not 
displaying proper respect’.103 Thus administrators preferred a personal force which 
prioritized loyalty above literacy and would sacrifice professional police 
specialization to participate in the general administration. 
 
 There was little place in this system for Police School graduates with 
technical training in criminal investigation. Although Plumbridge’s training school – 
and after 1926 the Police School as well – increasingly started to turn out trained 
Sudanese who would from 1923 take up roles as ‘Police Officers’104 under either 
British commandants of police or British DCs, the administration preferred that such 
officers should be restricted to the riverain areas. In 1934, the governor-general 
observed that recent Police School graduates dispatched to serve in the ranks should 
preferably do this in Wad Medani, Khartoum, Port Sudan or Atbara, the principal 
towns of the urban riverain region.
105
  
 
 Meanwhile, Political Service officers outside the riverain centre often used 
arguments about preserving local cultural difference to substitute a less substantial 
form of local training for Police School education. In 1932, R. E. Bailey, the 
governor of Kassala, argued that local Beja policemen would be ‘likely to return 
from Khartoum bewildered instead of improved’ whilst ‘the atmosphere here is more 
wholesome and natural’.106 Thus the province administration sent local policemen 
for a limited one-month course in Kassala town, rather than allowing them more 
professional training in Khartoum.  Duncan Cumming, who combined the roles of 
DC for Kassala District and provincial police commandant, argued that although this 
was a ‘simple’ course and ‘the number [of policemen] who know the elements of a 
policemen’s duties...is small’, the local training system was justified since ‘the fact 
that the men work among friends and in their own environment appears to outweigh 
the advantages of the longer course given at the Omdurman Police Training 
School’.107  
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Similarly, in Darfur during 1929, meanwhile, the British police commandant 
established his own system of training based on a touring system whereby, together 
with two other NCOs, he would tour the districts giving instruction to local 
policemen. Again, it seems that this system of training was far less professional than 
that in the riverain centre. The local branch of the SDF in Darfur, the Western Arab 
Corps, played a major role in this training.
108
 Dupuis, the province governor of 
Darfur, used this system of training to substitute local officers for more specialized 
officers trained in the Omdurman Police College. Dupuis proposed creating a new 
type of police officer to work only in Darfur. Such an individual would be selected 
‘for his fitness for administrative responsibility, and for his general utility, rather 
than for his proficiency in specialized police work’. Dupuis was in fact using this 
new type of ‘police officer’ to substitute for Gordon College-trained sub-mamurs, 
who, he complained, were ‘invariably of the intelligentsia class’. Not surprisingly, 
this system did not provide officers qualified to run the Darfur police in the long run. 
The first Sudanese commandant of the Darfur Police, Ahmed Gelly, appointed in 
1946, would be a Police School-educated professional from the riverain region.
109
 
The fact that, when the British did begin to allow the ‘Sudanization’ of the police, 
they relied on an officer recruited from the riverain region to manage the force in 
Darfur, reflected their persistent reluctance throughout the colonial era to expand 
professional methods of policing in the provinces. Meanwhile, they would 
compensate for their refusal to expand the centralized police system into the rural 
peripheries by cultivating more local forms of policing. 
 
Administrative policy towards the Native Administration police 
The Political Service also reduced its reliance on the regular police to deal with 
infringements of colonial law by delegating criminal policing to the Native 
Administration. This administration was formalised by a series of ordinances in the 
1920s and 1930s which served the function of excluding riverain ‘effendis’ from 
provincial administration. In 1922 the government issued the Power of the Nomad 
Sheikhs Ordinance, which devolved judicial and police functions on the rulers of 
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various nomadic ‘tribes’ in the north. It was followed in 1927 by the Powers of the 
Sheikhs Ordinance, which extended similar powers to the rulers of sedentary ‘tribes’ 
in the north.
110
 The policy was particularly keenly applied in the regions of Darfur, 
Kordofan and Kassala.
111
 A similar policy was also developed for the south, where 
after 1922 the government began to establish ‘Chief’s Courts’ which would be 
endowed with similar powers to those enjoyed by the Shaikhs in the north.
112
 In 
some places the creation of ‘Native Authorities’ simply amounted to a recognition of 
already existing local notables who had exercised de facto authority since the 
beginning of the Condominium and assisted the police in a similar manner in the 
1910s and 1920s;
113
 elsewhere, the colonial state was forced to step in and establish 
customary authority where it had not previously existed.
114
 
 
The colonial state legally empowered Native Administration bodies to 
exercise police powers. In the Criminal Procedure Code, Shaikhs were granted 
authority to play the role of policemen in investigating and drawing up reports on 
suspicious deaths in their area; and they were legally bound to report the passage of 
suspected criminals through their village, quarter or district.
115
 The colonial 
administration also decided that the newly empowered local potentates would need 
their own police forces to match their new legal powers. The new forces were known 
as ‘chiefs’ police’ in the south and ‘retainers’ of the Nazir or Shaikh in the north. 
Both Shaikhs and their retainers had the power to arrest without warrant in cases 
where ordinary policemen could arrest without warrant, such as cases of homicide, 
bodily harm, theft, robbery and certain types of assault.
116
 The extent to which the 
Native Administration and its police system supplemented the government court 
system in criminal work varied from province to province. In Khartoum, the vast 
majority of criminal cases continued to be tried in government courts. In provinces 
such as Blue Nile and Kassala, which were relatively well integrated into the riverain 
                                                 
110
 Daly, History of the Sudan, p. 118. 
111
 Daly, Empire on the Nile, p. 220. 
112
 Daly, History of the Sudan, p. 119. 
113
 Mu’tader, Kitab, p. 31. 
114
 Daly, History of the Sudan, p. 118. 
115
 1925 Code of Criminal Procedure, articles 110 and 110A, in Cecil Bennet (ed.), Laws of Sudan Vol 
9 (London, 1956), p. 167. 
116
 1925 Code of Criminal Procedure, article 107, in Bennet (ed.), Laws of Sudan (London, 1956), p. 
165. Also see Schedule I, pp. 230-268, for offences for which policemen could arrest without warrant. 
60 
 
centre, there was more of a balance.
117
 In Kassala, government courts dealt with 
2,768 criminal cases in 1938 while the ‘Native Courts’ administered 2,015.118 
However, in the more isolated province of Darfur, which possessed a Native Court 
even in the provincial capital, Fasher, the vast majority of criminal cases were dealt 
with by the Native Administration.
119
 
 
Johnson argues that the Native Administration police remained 
supplementary to the regular police as rural courts were separate and largely 
subordinate to the urban courts.
120
 This may have been the case, but the 
overstretched colonial administration afforded these police considerably more 
authority than in theory they should have possessed. Native Administration authority 
even extended into some of the major urban centres. From February 1930, the town 
‘Umda and his Native Administration ghaffirs were made responsible for 
maintaining public security in the ‘native quarter’ of Fasher Town, which was 
understood to be the whole town except the British cantonment and Western Arab 
Corps lines.
121
 In the same year, control of the town ‘watch and ward’ in Kassala 
was handed over to the force of ‘native retainers’ under the ‘native bench’ of the 
town.
122
 Similar systems obtained in Tokar and Gedaref by the early 1930s.
123
 In Dar 
Rizeigat and Dar Masalit, Native Administration ghaffirs were left in sole charge of 
CID work,
124
 apparently in the latter case because the Sultan of Dar Masalit objected 
to the use of government police.
125
 Even where the government police were 
permitted to make investigations, the Code of Criminal Procedure stipulated that two 
Shaikhs must accompany the police on any search of property in order to act as 
witnesses, which was a further indication of their pervasive influence.
126
  
 
These forces were even further from meeting the professional police ideal 
than the government police. Often, their creation was simply a legal empowerment 
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of already existing chiefly retinues.
127
 Bell recalled that Nuba ‘Chief’s Police’ in the 
1930s were taken to small settlements like Talodi for ‘a few days’ course of drill and 
basic police duties’, but this was usually the limit of their training.128 C. A. Willis, as 
Governor of Upper Nile in 1930, argued that ‘the name is not exactly wholly 
suitable, because they will include not only police but trained men of all sorts, as 
opportunity is found to train them in any capacity, whether medical, veterinary or 
mechanical’.129 Barter wrote of one set of retainers in Hadendoa District that ‘their 
activities are wide, varied and to a great extent unorganised’.130 Thus the Political 
Service ensured that the Native Administration police forces were subject to even 
less regulation and institutionalization than the regular force. 
 
Policing and ‘Southern Policy’ 
The situation in the south of Sudan was particularly revealing of the challenges faced 
by a colonial state trying to restrict the influence of the riverain north in the 
governance of the peripheral regions. Between 1930 and 1947 the British 
administration declared a new ‘Southern policy’, the purpose of which was to foster 
separate cultural and political development for the region.
131
 But in some cases 
British policy towards the police facilitated the continued northern penetration of the 
south that had begun in the nineteenth century. As mentioned above, in Upper Nile 
the Mounted Police force, largely composed of discharged Sudanese soldiers from 
the north, was also intended to double for the army.
132
 There was little local 
recruiting in Upper Nile, largely due to the aversion of the colonial state towards 
pastoralist communities in the south.
133
  
 
In 1930, with the rise of ‘Southern Policy’, the colonial state attempted to 
diminish northern influence in the Upper Nile. As Willis observed, ‘This limitation 
of the use of mounted police has been proved to be necessary as the Northern 
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Sudanese cannot be trusted not to loot, rape, and generally misbehave when let loose 
on people they call “Abid” [slave]’.134 Once again though, this attempt to combat 
police abuses was somewhat half-hearted. Willis regretted that ‘the mounted police 
are still in the process of growing and the unmounted police southern type [sic] are 
only recently organized and still require a good deal of training’.135 Thus it was 
decided to substitute southern-style police in all stations south of Malakal and retain 
northern Mounted Police in Malakal, Kodok, Melut and Renk.
136
 However, it is 
unclear to what extent this policy was actually carried out and in 1932 economic 
recession forced cutbacks in the number of foot police in the province, whereas the 
Mounted Police continued to ‘form the first line of defence’.137  
 
Where they were retained, the Mounted Police were very much intended to 
intimidate rather than protect the local population. MacPhail, the DC of Northern 
District, Upper Nile in 1938, observed that the advantage of northern Mounted 
Police was that ‘the moral effect of horsemen on certain of the local tribes is still 
considerable’.138 MacPhail’s notes on use of the ‘mounted police’ included 
guidelines on how to make surprise raids on villages and round up cattle and people. 
Just like the slave-hunting mercenary armies of the nineteenth century, the Mounted 
Police were expected to form zeribas, make-shift fortresses constructed out of thorny 
trees, to provide them with defence from local communities, and to guard prisoners 
captured in the name of enforcing law and order.
139
 Identification with the north was 
a key element in the status of these policemen. In 1945 Kingdon wrote that  
 
The idea of the F.S. [Financial Secretary] that they can be shortly replaced by 
Nilotics on a lower rate of pay is quite impractical. The majority of them 
must remain northerners or southerners who are detribalised and to all 
practical purposes, northerners, with a sprinkling of Nilotics as 
interpreters.
140
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The situation in the two other southern provinces of Equatoria and Bahr al-Ghazal 
was somewhat different. The founding of the Equatorial Corps in 1910 provided a 
number of soldiers who could be brought into the police in Equatoria and Bahr al-
Ghazal.
141
 In Equatoria and Western Bahr al-Ghazal, a far greater number of mission 
schools was established among the sedentary communities than in Upper Nile and 
these produced numerous recruits from the Zande, Lotuko, Madi, Moru, Jur and 
others.
142
 However, Arabic became a lingua franca for policemen even in Equatoria 
and Bahr al-Ghazal. According to A. N. Tucker, who was invited to be a language 
consultant to the south of Sudan in 1923, Arabic had a ‘great prestige’ because ‘the 
native police are not as a rule recruited from the tribes among which they function, 
but from neighbouring or even distant tribes, speaking totally different languages’.143  
In these provinces, too, the state chose to restrict the influence of the central police, 
who would supposedly act as a conduit for the spread of northern riverain influence, 
and to develop Native Administration instead. Between 1930 and 1932 the number 
of regular police in Equatoria was reduced from 484 to 331. It is true that this was 
partly due to the global recession, but the official report observed that it was made 
possible in particular by the ‘prestige’ of chiefs’ administrations.144 In Equatoria 
there were 712 chiefs’ police by 1931145 and an impressive 14,200 criminal cases 
were recorded to have been tried by Native Courts in 1937.
146
 The chiefs undertook a 
similar burden of public security in Upper Nile province. Longe observed of Shilluk 
District in 1944 that there was little need for the government to worry about ‘tribal 
fights’ so long as killings were in the heat of battle; and that ‘Chiefs need reminding 
that public security is their own duty and they will not be given government police 
for the asking’.147 
 
Thus with regard to policing, as in other regards, the south represented an 
extreme periphery of the colonial state. Although both government and northern and 
Arabic influences did spread there throughout the colonial period, the government 
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ensured that the professional ethos of policing that was beginning to evolve in the 
north did not. The Political Service was particularly keen to develop the Native 
Administration in order to prevent the use of government police in the south, and 
where government police were deployed they acted as a quasi-military force that was 
distant from the society around it. 
 
The spatial distribution of police resources 
The objectives of the central administration were demonstrated by the distribution of 
police resources and professional police personnel. When Kyles, the assistant 
commissioner of police, introduced his system of ‘beat patrols’ in 1944, it was only 
applied in Khartoum, Port Sudan, Wad Medani, Kassala, al-Ubayyid, and Atbara.
148
 
It was clear that the majority of police resources were to be devoted to guarding the 
security of Sudan’s capital, principal port and major development scheme. In 1947, 
the Khartoum police force possessed a headquarters staffed by a British 
commandant, C. M. Coutts, as well as two Sudanese police mamurs. There were also 
two British police superintendents attached to staff district commands in Khartoum 
and Omdurman districts, the latter of which also possessed a Sudanese assistant 
superintendant. This was in addition to the numerous staff in the National Police 
Headquarters.  Meanwhile, Blue Nile Province as the centre of the country’s 
principal development scheme possessed a British commandant, a Sudanese 
superintendent and three police mamurs. In Kassala province, there was a 
commandant and superintendent in Kassala itself, in addition to two British 
superintendants in Port Sudan. However, Darfur and Upper Nile Provinces possessed 
only a single commandant of police, and Equatoria and Bahr al-Ghazal provinces 
were at this stage yet to acquire commandants at all.
149
 
 
These disparities are also evident in terms of the spatial distribution of rank 
and file policemen. The provinces of the south and west lost the greater number of 
police during the cuts necessitated by economic depression in the 1930s. In Darfur 
police numbers were cut from 491 to 301 between 1926 and 1932.
150
 Even after the 
expansion of the state following World War II the government kept the presence of 
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the police in the south and west limited in comparison with the centre. In 1952, the 
cities of Khartoum and Port Sudan alone possessed 988 and 447 policemen 
respectively, while Blue Nile Province as a whole had 973 men. In contrast, the 
entire province of Darfur possessed only 519 government policemen, Upper Nile 
687, Equatoria 422, and Bahr al-Ghazal 340.
151
 These figures reflected the priorities 
of an administration that was principally concerned with securing the principal urban 
centres of the colonial state in the eastern and riverain region, and restricting the 
influence of the institutions, personnel and cultures of the central state in the 
peripheries.  
 
 
Administrative neglect of government law codes in provincial 
policing 
 
Throughout the colonial period, members of the Political Service serving in the 
provinces, such as governors and DCs, used their authority over the police force to 
enforce their own understanding of how Sudan’s regions should be policed. While 
the Legal Department saw provincial police forces as potential vectors for the 
emergence of a centralized law enforcement system upholding universal principles 
of law, administrators frequently criticized the impracticality of attempting to use 
such forces to apply a modern or ‘civil’ system of law in the regions. The result was 
the development of a form of administrative policing which eschewed the use of 
government policemen to launch detailed criminal investigations. Instead, 
administrators would either leave Native Administration personnel and their police 
forces to resolve local offences, or use both Native Administration and government 
police forces to apply arbitrary forms of justice that paid little heed to the niceties of 
the central legal codes. Supposedly traditional methods of imposing justice that were 
in reality often innovative were used to justify excluding professional methods of 
policing from the local criminal process. Even though the judiciary in the late 
colonial period tried to prevent the subjection of the law to administrative purpose 
and encourage local administrators to conduct criminal investigations in a more 
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professional manner, these local officials often opposed this and continued in 
practice to exercise their own system of policing. 
 
The lack of interest that local administrators showed in launching detailed 
investigations was exemplified by the DC of Nyala, who observed in 1944 that  
 
Police seldom arrive to investigate a crime until some days after it has 
happened. As there are few fully literate police in the District and none of 
them are experienced in investigation, no investigation is likely to be 
complete or accurate… I seldom feel able to draw any conclusion from a 
contradiction of a statement given to the police and I think most experienced 
magistrates find the same.
152
  
 
Administrators resented having to use provincial police forces to resolve 
offences under the Sudan Penal Code that resulted from shaklas, or large inter-
village fights, where they believed that local methods of dispute resolution might 
have been more appropriate. In 1945, the governor of Darfur, Dudley Lampen, wrote 
to the civil secretary expressing his resentment at being required to command police 
investigations into every homicide case that occurred in the province. Recent 
homicide trials that had been conducted in Darfur involved those resulting from two 
shaklas, one between the Fur and Beni Hussein, and another between the Berti and 
Meidob. Lampen protested that  
 
In both cases, but particularly in the first, an enormous amount of work fell 
on the investigating police, and the magistrates and the judge (in all three 
cases the District Commissioner) for a result which carried only some of 
those responsible. The District Commissioner had to hold down a difficult, 
and in one case dangerous tribal situation threatening public security, while 
the lengthy criminal proceedings progressed as no settlement could be 
effected until the processes of law were finished.
153
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Instead Lampen supported the use of Native Courts which would ‘punish with an eye 
on the final settlement’ by using ‘blood money’ or dia settlements to compensate the 
relatives of the deceased and thus facilitate a peace (sulh) between the opposed 
factions.
154
 The collective nature of dia punishments, which fell on the entire kin-
group from which the killer or killers came, was in Lampen’s eyes infinitely 
preferable to the more retributive nature of the westernized Sudan Penal Code. From 
the 1920s to the 1950s, administrators like Lampen had a number of similar debates 
with judges, usually persuading them to reduce heavy sentences of imprisonment 
after agreeing that dia should be paid.
155
 This occurred even after the abolition 
following World War II of the section of the Sudan Penal Code that sanctioned 
awarding compensation to the family of homicide victims, since this abolition 
merely furthered the use of dia settlements out of court as an administrative rather 
than judicial practice.
156
 
 
 In Lampen’s view, the European legal practice of attributing individual guilt 
simply caused a greater deterioration in ‘public security’ by distributing punishments 
unevenly, rather than balancing the culpability of the respective parties to the fight. 
If the Legal Department wanted to impose a more decisive form of justice, Lampen 
believed – just like the DC in Nyala cited above – that this would require ‘trained 
investigating police, better communications, transport to get them to the spot and a 
Province Judge who could relieve overworked District Commissioners’.157 It is 
ironic that Lampen should have pointed this out, since elsewhere administrators 
would discourage the emergence of an educated and professionalized police force. 
By supporting the continued practice of dia, the Political Service was helping to 
maintain a sphere in which Sudan’s professional judiciary and professional police 
force had little capacity to intrude. 
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Another means by which administrators avoided the need for Police School-
trained criminal investigators was by use of footprint trackers. Their use reflected 
provincial administrators’ fetishization of the concept of ‘local knowledge’. Rowton 
Simpson observed how trackers could ‘also memorise a footprint left by a putative 
criminal and later be able to pick it out at an identification parade. This identification 
was most impressive’.158 Not surprisingly, judges were less impressed and their 
criticism of local officials’ use of trackers emphasized the administrative tendency to 
neglect strict legal procedure. Judicial criticisms observed that trackers were often 
provided with information before they traced ‘footprints’ to a culprit’s house and 
urged administrators to use two sets of trackers.
159
 They also observed that ‘the 
identification may be dishonest because of professional pride, laziness, desire for 
revenge, or personal grudge’160 and that trackers ‘are subject to a tendency to draw 
conclusions first, and then make facts fit them’. 161 
 
Colonial administrators running local courts also displayed an unwillingness 
to be burdened by niceties of English legal procedure with regard to habeus corpus. 
R. C. Mayall proudly recalled in his memoirs how he dealt with the case of three 
robbers who had attacked three merchants leaving Nahud, where he was DC. Mayall 
suspected that the robbers had hosted the merchants in Nahud prior to their 
departure, and hoped that the one blind merchant who had survived the attack would 
be able to identify the culprits.  
 
I therefore sent word back to Nahud to the police officer that every man who 
lived in the street where the blind man had stayed was to be arrested on 
suspicion and questioned about the crime. I then continued my trek, but cut it 
short and returned to Nahud about ten days later. The blind man, I found, was 
better, but still in hospital and about 170 men were still detained in prison on 
suspicion without a charge having been laid against them. Thank goodness 
Habeas Corpus did not run in Nahud!! 
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Mayall’s tyrannical behaviour did achieve results; an identity parade was later held 
in which the blind man claimed to have identified the murderer (presumably by his 
voice).
162
 
 
The issue of habeus corpus provided another area of friction between 
provincial administrators and the lawyers in Khartoum, although it was not until later 
in the colonial period that the Legal Department started to challenge administrative 
laxity with regard to the rights of the accused. In 1950 a new Criminal Circular, No. 
27, was distributed. This reminded administrators that under Section 236 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code the police had the power to imprison a suspect without 
trial for 15 days before they must be produced before a magistrate, at which point – 
should the prosecution not have enough evidence available – they should apply for a 
remand. In 1952, the governor of Darfur distributed this circular, reminding his DCs 
that he had recently issued a provincial order that all unconvicted prisoners should 
appear weekly before a magistrate. However, he regretted that ‘in spite of this order 
instances have been occurring in which local courts  – who have no power to remand 
– send prisoners back to gaol for long periods without the magistrate apparently 
being aware of it’.163 Thus even during the late colonial period the administrative 
sphere of arbitrary, non-professional and illegal policing persisted, unrestrained by 
the attempts of the Legal Department to control it. 
 
The anti-individualistic nature of administrative justice was also apparent in 
DCs’ continued use of collective punishment. One extremely irregular but common 
colonial practice was to arrest the families of criminals to convince them to turn 
themselves in.
164
 During his time as assistant district commissioner in Port Sudan in 
the early 1920s, J. W. Miller recalled that at one point he visited a nearby community 
and arrested 11 men, 6 women and almost 600 goats to force them to hand over a 
murderer.
165
 In his memoirs from Upper Nile, J. Winder recalled how his 
predecessor as DC at Akobo, J. C. Alban, dealt with Nuer cattle thieves. He would 
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have the Eastern Nuer Chief’s Police visit the suspected sections, and then ‘take 
hostage’ all the cattle and marriageable girls to force the section to hand over the 
culprits.
166
 Such practices remained current even in 1953, when following a murder 
in Bor District suspected to have been committed by a Murle ‘all Murle over a very 
wide area were rounded up, with their cattle, for questioning’.167 Hence we see a new 
and innovative notion of law being formed – one that was not quite like pre-colonial 
law and not quite the law the colonizers had claimed to introduce either.
168
 This level 
of capacity to incarcerate was novel to Sudan but the manner of its use was also at 
variance with British law. T. H. R. Owen recalled of communal punishment that: 
 
Such punishment has no basis in law. It is an administrative measure, and 
provided that it is scrupulously reserved for suitable instances, is entirely 
justified…In a highly developed community criminal responsibility is rightly 
a purely individual matter. Under conditions of tribal life this is much less so; 
and when a given community, man, woman and child, is actively or tacitly 
abetting a series of crimes there is nothing inequitable in enforcing 
communal responsibility and it is the only feasible method of guarding public 
interests.
169
 
 
The Sudanese community was thus stereotyped as a collective, de-individuated 
crowd. This was convenient for the colonial state, which, as seen above, usually 
possessed neither the resources nor local knowledge to make investigations and 
pinpoint individual culprits. Instead its policing in the provinces consisted for the 
most part of ‘administrative measures’. 
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The effects of the bifurcated system on the extension of police 
methods 
 
British officials themselves often acknowledged that the divisions inherent within 
the system of policing in Sudan sapped the capacity of the government to spread 
technical police procedure throughout Sudan. They often conceded their failure, or 
reluctance, to establish co-operation between the various police forces in the country, 
and to establish throughout the country efficient forensic systems and drugs trade 
controls. Thus the deliberate fostering by the Political Service of the centre-periphery 
rift left the state unable to merge the professional system of policing which obtained 
at the centre with the more amateur forces ran by local administrators. 
 
For instance, the disjointed system of policing in Sudan led the government 
to take only weak measures against the cannabis trade. This was in spite of the fact 
that since the beginning of the twentieth century medical and legal professionals 
throughout the British Empire had been touting the supposed link between cannabis 
and criminality to justify greater police intervention in the societies that Britain had 
colonized.
170
 In the 1920s and 1930s trade in hashish was spreading throughout 
Sudan, originating in the cannabis farms located in the dense forests of Bahr al-
Ghazal, from where it was brought down the Nile.
171
 Colonial administrators and 
policemen either played down the issue or made excuses as to why effective 
measures could not be taken against the trade. Although plain-clothes police were 
used to make searches, officials tended to stress that discoveries were made as a 
result of direct information or by chance when the police were searching for other 
things.
172
 It was noted that local communities were rarely hostile to drug 
smugglers
173
 and that such information as was received was a result of personal 
grudges against those involved.
174
 In 1935 the police commissioner to Port Sudan 
observed that he was unable to prevent the smuggling of opium into Sudan from 
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Jeddah as the plain-clothes police did not have an ‘interest in’ or ‘aptitude’ for the 
work.
175
 In the same year, the governor of Khartoum told the civil secretary that 
‘there is no doubt that when the Police Force of the country is reorganized and there 
is more co-operation and liaison between the Police Forces of the various Provinces, 
much more effective measures will be possible and there will be far greater 
possibilities of tracking down imports [of drugs]’.176 This was in effect an admission 
of the inadequacy of the fragmented system of policing the colonial state had 
established, though the extent to which provincial administrations were genuinely 
eager to co-operate with the police in this regard is questionable. It is worth noting 
that when the government police force, in the 1950s, did launch a concerted 
campaign to deal with cannabis production at its source, the conduct of this 
campaign was looked upon with some disdain by the local governor (see Chapter 3). 
 
Administrators were often forced to acknowledge that the localized crime-
fighting system they had arranged in Sudan was incapable of dealing with inter-
regional crime. In 1932 Arkell admitted that gangs of international camel thieves 
operating through Sennar, Kordofan and White Nile Province were usually ‘much 
too clever for the native courts, who [sic] have difficulty in collecting all necessary 
accused and witnesses’.177 Another type of intra-regional theft that British officials 
admitted to failing to deal with was that which occurred on the railways and 
steamers. This became a particular problem during World War II, when a large 
quantity of highly marketable goods was reported stolen. In a frustrated circular sent 
out in 1945, the civil secretary remarked that  
 
The amount of the stolen property recovered is negligible, and the number of 
thieves caught and prosecuted is very small. This reveals that something is 
very seriously wrong with the police investigations of these cases.  
 
He went on to blame this on lack of liaison between the railway police and the 
provincial police forces, noting that the time between the theft being reported and 
                                                 
175
 Mynors to Civil Secretary, for Police Commissioner Port Sudan, 15 Feb. 1935, NRO Civ Sec (1) 
13/7/27. 
176
 Governor Khartoum to Civil Secretary, 16 Feb. 1935, NRO Civ Sec (1) 13/7/27. 
177
 A. J. Arkell, Handing-Over Notes for Sennar District, Nov. 1929-May 1932, SOAS Library MS 
210522 Box 1. 
73 
 
action being taken was on average over three weeks.
178
 This indicates that the 
efficient co-operation between police forces anticipated by the Governor of 
Khartoum in 1935 was, in 1945, yet to occur. 
 
British officials often acknowledged the inadequacy of the forensic aspect of 
the police work in the provinces. Due to the centralized nature of the professional 
police apparatus, administrators and policemen investigating murders in the 
provinces would have to send forensic evidence all the way to the Lee Stack 
Research Laboratories in Khartoum. Moreover, administrators’ poor training in 
forensic science often led to the results of investigations being botched. As late as 
1952, Ministry of Health officials in Khartoum were complaining that provincial 
administrators were ruining medico-legal investigations by sending forensic 
specimens that were unsealed, unregistered and often wrapped together as one 
piece.
179
 This demonstrated that, in spite of the increasing role of technical 
departments at the twilight of the colonial era, these departments remained 
dependant on local administrators who possessed little technical expertise. Following 
a murder trial in Kordofan in 1942, the appeal judge ridiculed the local DC for 
stating that his Sudanese medical assistant had given his evidence ‘extremely well’: 
 
How is it possible to regard seriously the views of a witness who states “The 
blood on the knife was human blood. I could recognise the distinctive smell 
of human blood when the knife was brought to me, and I am prepared to 
swear to this without any analytical examination”? As the Senior Medical 
Inspector has written, this is nonsense. Not only is it common knowledge that 
it is impossible to distinguish human blood by smell but it is even impossible 
for the most skilled medical expert to distinguish it by microscopical 
examination.
180
 
 
                                                 
178
 Civil Secretary to all Governors, 22 Dec. 1945, NRO 2.D.1 Fasher A. 32/1/3. 
179
 M. Haseeb, Assistant Director of Research at Ministry of Health to Director of Medical Services at 
Ministry of Health, 10 Dec. 1952, NRO 2.D.1. Fasher A. 32/1/3. 
180
 Sudan Government vs Sabit Rahamtalla AC-CP-191-42 KDN-Maj.Ct-52-42. SAD Hayes Box 1 
File 3. 
74 
 
 The ease with which this isolated DC in Kordofan followed the intuitive 
recommendation of his medical assistant perhaps reflected the administrative 
tendency to believe that modern, scientific modes of criminal procedure should not 
be applied in Sudan. The British did attempt to apply modern forensic techniques at 
the Lee Stack Research Laboratory in Khartoum, one of the primary purposes of 
which was to ‘to aid criminal investigations in poisoning cases...by the detection and 
experimental determination of toxic agents, particularly those obscure potent 
substances employed by the natives’.181 However, these substances were to remain 
largely obscure to the British. In 1946, the director of the laboratory admitted that it 
was impossible for him to identify by chemical analysis the vegetable poisons that 
were often used as murder weapons in southern and western Sudan.
182
  
 
Overall it seems that British officials were willing to acknowledge and accept 
that there was a disconnect between the professional police system found in the 
centre of the state and the non-technical forms of policing administered by the 
Political Service in the provinces. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The colonial state, in its persistent reluctance to bring a ‘British’ style of policing to 
Sudan, revealed its limited integrity. This weakness was reflected in the fact that the 
colonial police came to resemble the Egyptian Army, which was necessitated to 
some extent by an aggressive policy towards neo-Mahdist millenarianism and 
various independent societies in the Nuba Mountains and the south. However, even 
after the overt military challenges to the state were removed, the British colonizers 
were reluctant to develop systems of policing that would put into practice a thorough 
regulation of Sudanese society. Partly this was because of the colonial 
administration’s pre-occupation with purely political policing and its focus on 
protecting its main strategic nodes. However, it also reflected wider ideological and 
political tensions within the colonial state itself. The British had become reliant on 
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one of the riverain ethnic groups, the Shayqiyya, to man the police force at the urban 
riverain heartlands of the state. Whilst these officers, encouraged by British 
professionals, began to develop a more specialist and educated outlook to meet the 
requirements of policing the urban riverain economy, the Political Service became 
wary of employing these riverain professionals throughout the country. This was 
partially because agents of the Political Service preferred to assert their own outlook 
with regard to the policing of provincial Sudan, which eschewed modern and 
professional methods. It was probably also due to the fact that the administration did 
not wish to expand a force dominated by a riverain ethnic group such as the 
Shayqiyya at the same time that educated professional groups in the riverain centre 
were becoming increasingly involved in the nationalist movement. 
 
The result was that the colonial state established a bifurcated system of 
policing in Sudan. In this system, the administration left the specialized police 
professionals educated at the Police School to manage the major towns of the 
riverain area while delegating provincial policing to Native Administration bodies. 
Meanwhile, the Political Service used government policemen in the provinces to 
serve as the personal retinues of British officials. This system ensured that the 
administration, which often admitted to the lack of unity within the police system, 
did not subject the vast majority of Sudanese to the specialist, technical, and 
individualistic forms of policing envisaged in the Sudan Penal Code and Criminal 
Procedure code. 
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2 ‘Guarding the guards’: the limited ambitions of the 
colonial administration to govern police violence, c. 
1922-1956. 
 
 
On 16 November 1948 the Khartoum police clashed with an unauthorized 
demonstration in the capital organized by the Ashiqqa’, the party of the pro-Egyptian 
Sudanese, which resulted in the death of five of the participants due to botched use 
of tear gas. J. M. Kyles, the commissioner of police at the time, concluded that the 
tear gas bombs – imported from Britain – had exploded too fiercely because they had 
been ‘seriously affected by the climate’.1 The police’s inability to predict how tear 
gas would react in an African climate was symptomatic of the colonial state’s 
incompetence in attempting to apply British methods of ‘soft’ or ‘civil’ policing in 
an African environment. On a more basic level, the incident displayed the limited 
capacity of the colonial state to control the use of force by its constabulary.  
 
This chapter will continue to assess the extent to which the colonial state was 
capable of exercising widespread governance of Sudanese society. It will cover the 
period from the early 1920s, when the Political Service was entrenching its position 
as the dominant faction within the state, until the end of the colonial period in 1956, 
at which stage the Political Service was increasingly being challenged by the rise of 
the technical departments such as the police. As we have seen in the previous 
chapter, the colonial administration was for political reasons keen to avoid 
establishing the kind of modern and rigidly institutionalized police force that would 
grant it an impartial monopoly over the use of violence. The consequence was that, 
with its authority weak at almost every level of this force, the state struggled to 
discipline those policemen who were supposed themselves to discipline the colonial 
population. Thus the chapter will also examine questions of subaltern agency by 
arguing that Sudanese policemen, far from being the compliant tools of colonial rule, 
exploited colonial institutions to serve their own purposes. 
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It is often argued that colonial violence in the Middle East and Africa was 
due to a rigid division between a foreign and hostile state and local society.
2
 
However, this neglects the porosity of colonial power structures and the extent to 
which colonial states favoured the interests of particular groups within subaltern 
society above those of others. Here it will be seen that in Sudan the Condominium 
state allowed the upper echelons of the central police in the riverain area to be 
captured by a specific ethnic group in this region’s elite, the Shayqiyya.3 This often 
led the police to follow the agenda of this group and more specifically that of the 
Khatmiyya sufi order and National Unionist Party (NUP), to which the Shayqiyya 
had links. Thus in the riverain area the weakness of the colonial police was, as 
Chabal and Daloz would put it, its ‘poor emancipation’ from local society,4 rather 
than its distance from it. This was most noticeable in the period leading up to 
independence, when the NUP was most vociferous, and hence it will be seen that the 
police remained to some extent weakly institutionalized even at the time when 
colonial police forces in Africa experienced the most expansion. 
 
This chapter will also consider the effect that the administration’s refusal to 
extend the professional system of policing into Sudan’s provinces had on its ability 
to regulate its regional forces. It will be seen that the Political Service made only 
limited efforts to control corruption and abuse of power within the provincial police 
forces and even less effort to guard against it amongst ‘chief’s police’ forces. 
Partially this reflected the typical colonial fear that punishing policemen would 
‘lessen their authority’ in the eyes of colonial subjects.5 However, the half-
heartedness of the administrators’ attempts to prevent corruption also reflected the 
same anti-governance outlook and insistence upon the ‘status quo’ they displayed 
when arguing that professional standards of policing had little place in Sudan’s 
provinces. Although this was on one level a policy of deliberate neglect, the policy 
of the colonial state clearly did change the status quo, since by providing arms and 
authority to both government and Native Administration police forces it altered the 
balance of a variety of local conflicts. In this sense colonial police policy was 
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transformative, but the state did little to control the transformations it had unleashed. 
The impersonation and abuse of plain-clothes police powers for criminal purposes 
was another phenomenon that reflected the weak institutionalization of the colonial 
state, and its inability to control the extent to which its authority was mimicked and 
subverted. 
 
The chapter also seeks to investigate the extent to which police violence 
occurred on an atomistic level and the extent to which it was a part of over-arching 
state policy. As McCracken observes with regard to colonial Malawi, ‘if police 
coercion was pervasive, the extent of their control was not’.6 This chapter will 
demonstrate that the violent acts of colonial policemen were also a result of the 
vulnerable position into which their neglect by the colonial state had put them, 
although admittedly this was to some extent an inevitable side-effect of the logistical 
challenges posed by the sheer size of Sudan. Isolated and under-equipped policemen 
often found that they had little choice but to use violence if they were to enforce the 
state’s will, particularly since the weak and porous system of security created by the 
colonial state did little to regulate the possession of weapons amongst the Sudanese 
population. This was demonstrated even in Khartoum during the Neguib Riots of 
1954, when members of the outnumbered and ill-equipped provincial police force 
were hacked and bludgeoned to death with weapons nominally outlawed in the 
capital. These riots will be given special attention in this chapter, since they revealed 
two specific flaws within the colonial system: first, the vulnerable position into 
which the porous system of colonial security put the police; and second, the northern 
riverain bias within the police which prompted the savage handling of the mainly 
rural and Ansari rioters. It is in this relationship between violence and vulnerability 
that we see the roots of the ‘weak’ but ‘fierce’ state identified by commentators on 
the Middle East.
7
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Government failure to regulate police abuses 
 
The subversion of police authority at the central level  
As observed in Chapter 1, the positions in the government police force in Sudan not 
occupied by British officers were dominated by the Shayqiyya, an ethnic group with 
links to the Khatmiyya sufi Tariqa, the largest and most influential Tariqa in Sudan. 
This Tariqa had accrued particular influence amongst Sudan’s mercantile elite in the 
nineteenth century and had built close relations with both the Egyptian and then the 
Condominium regime.
8
 However the government’s reliance on the influence of this 
Tariqa to some extent biased its own actions, demonstrating how colonial institutions 
could be subverted to serve the agendas of particular groups. The influence of the 
Tariqa was particularly important where the government police were at their 
strongest, in the riverain areas of central Sudan, where the dominance of this 
particular ethnic group biased police action in ethnically and religiously-tinged 
political conflicts in a manner that the colonial state had little capacity to control. 
 
  This was demonstrated by the controversial use of police firearms at the town 
of Hag ‘Abdallah on the Blue Nile in 1947. The events occurred as the police were 
responding to trouble caused by protests against an article published in the Sawt al-
Sudan newspaper which contained an attack on Sharif ‘Abd al-Rahman Yusuf al-
Hindi, Shaikh of the Hindiyya Tariqa of which most of the local residents of Hag 
‘Abdullah were members. The inhabitants suspected Shayqiyya merchants of Hag 
‘Abdullah town of being behind the article and as a result several hundred villagers 
took part in an organized attack on the town, wrecking the shops of two merchants 
and seriously injuring another. The official report claimed that the police, who were 
composed mainly of Shayqiyya, quickly arrived and opened fire on the crowd, 
killing six and wounding two.
9
 Although the consequent trial concluded that the 
police action had been justified by the need to restore order, Winifred Johnson 
recalled in her diaries that the police had fired ninety rounds into the crowd and not 
one over their heads or at their feet, killing six and wounding forty (not two).
10
 This 
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was in contravention of official guidelines that the police should first give the crowd 
a chance to disperse,
11
 which, as Robertson, the civil secretary, admitted privately,
12
 
they did not do in this instance, and that, if they failed to disperse, the police should 
shoot first at the knees. Moreover this excessive use of force had decisive ethnic, 
sectarian and political consequences. Since the majority of the police involved in the 
incident were Shayqiyya, the government’s Political Intelligence Summary 
concluded that ‘the whole affair is regarded by the local inhabitants as a tribal fight 
between the Shaigia on the one hand and the followers of the Sherif on the other, and 
the fact that the latter lost not only six men killed but also had to pay a large fine and 
incur sentences of imprisonment is held inequitable’.13 The result was a political 
disaster, with the local Shayqi Shaikh, Falal Ibrahim, becoming so unpopular that the 
government was forced to suspend him.
14
 The incident demonstrated that use of 
force by agents of the state could rarely be impartial in local conflicts and often 
made them worse. 
 
Even more revealing of the frailty of the colonial state was the fact that its 
reliance on the Khatmiyya-supporting Shayqiyya in the police force hampered its 
exercise of authority in strongly Khatmiyya areas. This became particularly 
problematic for the colonial state in the years after World War II, when a great 
number of Khatmiyya were involved in nationalist protest against it. After blaming 
the anti-government stance of Sayyid ‘Ali al-Mirghani, the head of the Khatmiyya 
Tariqa, for an attack on the police by Hadendoa in Port Sudan in 1948, Robertson 
was advised by colleagues that ‘any determined action against them would be 
dangerous as the police and Eastern Arab Corps Company are largely Khatmia’.15 
This attitude was also reflected in the despairing remarks of E. D. Arbuthnot, the DC 
of Shendi in 1951, that it was impossible to curb the activities of Khatmiyya youth 
groups in breach of the Penal Code as ‘practically everyone’ sympathized with them, 
including the police. Arbuthnot regretted that ‘an attempt by me to enforce the law 
strictly would almost certainly lead to ignominious failure’.16 
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The extent to which the administration was hamstrung by its dependence on 
the Shayqiyya in the police and army was fully revealed in a memorandum by Luce, 
the senior adviser to the governor-general, in 1954. He admitted that in spite of the 
British administration’s long-running political battle with the NUP, which was much 
closer to the anti-British Egyptian government than the Umma Party, independence 
under the NUP would be ‘more likely to achieve H.M. Government’s aim for the 
Sudan’ than independence under the Umma; this was because the NUP could rely on 
the army and police, the majority of whose officers were Khatmiyya.
17
 In other 
words, the relationship between the NUP and the police and army forced the British 
administration to co-operate with a political party to which it had a firm aversion. 
Thus the British administration’s relationship with its police force reflected the fact 
that, as in other aspects of colonial governance and politics,
18
 it was as much 
controlled by the sectarian tensions that dominated contemporary northern Sudanese 
society as it was able to use them for the benefit of the state. 
 
‘One of the disadvantages of isolated police posts’: administrative indulgence of 
corruption and violence amongst government provincial forces 
The manner in which the colonial state had allowed the police in the riverain centre 
to exercise violence on behalf of a particular ethnic group was mirrored at a local 
level by its lax attitude towards corruption and violence among forces operating in 
Sudan’s peripheries. A Kordofan monthly report from 1938 observed that the wife 
and mother of a policeman had been arrested for possession of araki, a Sudanese 
liquor, and wryly observed ‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodies?’ (‘Who guards the 
guards themselves?’). This remark typified the reconciled attitude of British 
administrators towards law-breaking within the police force. One DC observed of 
police in Dar Masalit that ‘it is worth a merchant’s while to slip them £10 to let a 
consignment of goods through’.19 Sometimes policemen used their position to extort 
money from members of the public. Another DC observed of Raga, where there was 
no government official above the rank of police sergeant, that ‘apparently the Police 
are abusing their powers, even racketeering on Greek merchants’.20  Again the 
language of the official here is somewhat distant and off-hand. Penn observed as DC 
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in Sennar in 1935 that the ‘Railways Police in the dam and our own posts in the 
market and Wad El Haddad have great opportunities of making money by 
threatening lorry-drivers for technical offences such as over-loading, or by delaying 
their passage unnecessarily over the dam’.21  
 
What is interesting about these accounts is that they seem to reflect an 
attitude of casual acceptance of this state of affairs by the colonial authorities: the 
colonial state did not have much desire to turn even its most important instrument of 
governance into a well-regulated institution. When Leslie James, the modernizing 
commandant of the Khartoum police, tried to do this he was ridiculed by 
administrators (see Chapter 3). Only occasionally did administrators make efforts to 
punish corruption. For example, in 1932 the governor of Halfa recorded that the 
authorities had heavily punished two policemen for collaborating with three 
Sudanese who were liquor smuggling, but admitted that carrying this out between 
Egypt and Sudan was easy if the police patrols could be bribed.
22
 In 1952 the 
customs department was obliged to introduce a rewards system for policemen who 
caught smugglers, implying that they could not be relied on to carry out their duties 
without special incentives.
23
 
 
 The banalization of police violence was further evidence of the colonial 
administration’s limited ability to govern its own system of governance. This 
violence was at its most arbitrary where police forces continued to bear a direct 
resemblance to the original military forces of colonial occupation and were thus alien 
to Sudanese society. The Hajjana, or police camel corps, which as Abu Bakr recalls 
generally had the opportunity to ‘interfere’ with local villages by seizing food 
without payment, was probably the best example of this.
24
 Hawley says that in the 
late 1940s the police in Gedaref were ‘sometimes heavy handed with their 
truncheons’ when dealing with alcohol–related affrays, so he attempted to teach 
them jujitsu as a means of ‘reducing broken crowns’.25 The continuing ‘outsider’ 
status of policemen could lead to violence as break-downs of trust occurred when 
                                                 
21
 Penn, Handing-Over Notes for Sennar Province, Nov. 1933-Nov. 1935, SAD 722/11/34. 
22
 Governor Halfa to Civil Secretary, 13 Aug. 1932, NRO CivSec (1) 43/1/7. 
23
 B. Lewis, Handing-Over Notes for Dar Masalit, 1952, SAD 600/3/19. 
24
 Abu Bakr, Tarikh al-Shurta, p. 82. 
25
 Hawley, Donald, Sandtracks in Sudan (Norwich, 1995), p. 59. 
83 
 
they attempted to enforce the law. As demonstrated in Chapter 1, the relationship 
between police and Sudanese communities was considered so fragile that the 
Criminal Procedure Code required the presence of local Shaikhs during property 
searches. When two policemen were killed by the angry inhabitants of a property in 
Omdurman in 1944, the commissioner of police directly attributed the deaths to the 
failure to enact this provision.
26
 
 
However, the most blatant examples of police violence against local 
communities occurred in southern Sudan, where the force continued to resemble an 
army of occupation (see Chapter 1). McComas recalled one incident in Equatoria 
where his sergeant-major, Magorbok Aciner, took a girl from a local village to his 
hut and refused to return her to her relations upon being summoned to do so by the 
village chief. Upon their arrival at his hut to demand the surrender of the girl, 
Magorbok fired a ‘warning shot’ at her approaching relations before giving in and 
surrendering the girl. The chiefs later told McComas that having heard this shot ‘we 
guessed it was war between the police and the people’.27 The idea that there could be 
a war between ‘police’ and ‘people’ indicates just to what extent the government 
police were still perceived to be outsiders. Moreover, Magorbok’s behaviour recalls 
the period of the initial colonial invasions of Africa, when colonial soldiers were 
granted free license to take women from local communities.
28
 Another example of 
police behaving in an aggressive manner towards local people came in Upper Nile in 
1937. The Province Monthly Diary reported matter-of-factly in April that  
 
Some Anuak visitors from the Baro came to blows with a policeman. The 
Anuak hosts from the village of Purithor South-West of Pil decamped across 
the river.  The chief has been instructed that if he does not return and pay his 
tribute within a month, the village will be destroyed.
29
 
 
                                                 
26
 J. M. Kyles, Comissioner of Police and Prisons to all Governors, 22 Nov. 1944, NRO 2.D.1 Fasher 
A. 32/1/3. 
27
 R. G. McComas Memoirs, 1982, SAD 815/9/8. 
28
 Timothy Parsons, ‘All Askaris are family men: sex, domesticity and discipline in the King’s 
African Rifles, 1902-1964’, in Killingray and Omissi (eds.) Guardians of Empire: the Armed Forces 
of the Colonial Powers, c. 1700-1964 (Manchester 1999), pp. 167. 
29
 Upper Nile Province Monthly Diaries, April 1937, NRO Civ Sec (1) 57/5/20. 
84 
 
However, two months later the local official established that the fight between police 
and Anuak broke out because of the ‘bullying’ behaviour of the police, who had 
fought with the Anuak for some giraffe meat and seized a number of the women 
from the village to punish them.  The Anuak had consequently deserted the village 
for fear of further reprisals. Again, this represented an imitation of the tendency of 
colonial militaries to live off the countryside and prey on local women.
30
  The local 
authorities had clearly assumed too easily that the police were in the right. The report 
noted apologetically that ‘This is one of the disadvantages of isolated police posts 
which cannot be sufficiently supervised’.31 Thus the colonial state was not all-seeing 
and could not always control the transgressions of its police force, let alone the 
Sudanese population. If we follow Agozino’s argument that it is disparities of power 
rather than ‘underdevelopment’ or poverty that creates crime,32 then we might 
conclude that the use of armed constabularies to police local communities actually 
increased the potential for violent conflict and disruption of the local social fabric. In 
other words, the British had created a class of police more prone to crime than those 
whom they were supposed to be policing. 
 
Colonial police violence was also partially a result of the state’s indulgence 
towards those who were found guilty of it. Admittedly, policemen who broke the law 
were tried in the colonial courts for offences including murder, accepting bribes, 
causing death through negligence, intimidating witnesses, fabricating evidence, theft, 
causing deaths through drink-driving, illegal arms-dealing, and beating prisoners in 
custody.
33
 However, the punishment they received was often light. Magorbok, the 
sergeant-major who abducted a local girl, was merely transferred and demoted to 
lance-corporal by the local administration in Equatoria.
34
 Hussein Hamo, an ex-
officer, recalled that in about 1950 a young policeman in Darfur called Mahmoud 
Haroun was jailed for six months for beating a man in custody. However, when the 
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Darfur police commandant, Ahmad Geili, moved on to Khartoum he asked as a 
parting request from the British governor that Haroun have his sentence reduced to 
only two months so that his dismissal from the service could be avoided; this was 
granted.
35
 Thus, even during the later colonial period when the legal department was 
making its most strenuous efforts to regulate the police (see Chapter 1), a regional 
governor was willing to treat offending policemen leniently. To some extent these 
policies reflect the tendency of the administration to protect its own interests and 
those of its henchmen. However, they also demonstrated a more fundamental 
incapacity and unwillingness to reform and discipline the very body of men that was 
itself intended to discipline the colonial population. 
 
The limited regulation of the Native Administration 
The inability of the state to regulate the actions of its policemen was most noticeable 
in the areas where it was forced to rely upon proxy policemen attached to the Native 
Administration. Although the actions of chiefs and their police forces were 
theoretically supervised by local DCs, the colonial administration had in practice 
little capacity – and relatively little desire – to regulate the violence of its Native 
Administration police forces. This was in spite of the fact that it had little trust in 
these bodies, as was displayed by its vacillating policy on arming them. The first 
instance of arms being issued to Native Administration forces occurred when this 
was approved by the acting governor of Mongolla Province in 1924: 50 old-
fashioned Remington rifles were issued without ammunition. The intention was for 
these arms to be purely symbolic, representing the authority of the chiefs’ police.36 
When Willis demanded 280 Remingtons with 10,000 rounds of ammunition for 
Nuer, Dinka and Shilluk chief’s police, he was refused outright, it being noted that 
such a policy was ‘dangerous as in the event of trouble in the case of the Nuer the 
rifles might go to swell their existing armoury’.37 However, R. E. H. Baily, the 
governor of Kassala, by persistently appealing to the governor-general throughout 
the late 1920s and pointing out that retainers would have to face armed criminals in 
the course of their duty, managed to gain permission for those in the Butana area to 
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be given access to a small amount of ammunition.
38
 Ammunition was also granted to 
retainers and ‘chief’s policemen’ in areas that had not yet been cleared of arms, such 
as Fung Province, Upper Nile Province, the Nuba Mountains and the western Bahr 
al-Ghazal.
39
 
 
The colonial government had limited ability to control the numbers of arms 
in the hands of the police. Although in 1924 the governor-general had only 
sanctioned the issue of 50 old Remingtons to the chiefs’ police forces in Mongolla, 
by 1931 583 out of the 712 chiefs’ police were armed.40 Moreover, it seems unlikely 
that in these areas the colonial authorities trusted their Native Administration 
policemen any more than those who already possessed firearms. Thus in 1931 the 
civil secretary suggested that in selecting future chief’s police ‘he saw no objection 
to the appointment of natives who already possessed rifles of their own as opposed 
to the natives who did not possess them. The effect of this would be to bring under 
better control rifles already in the tribesman’s hands’.41 In other words, the best way 
to police those armed illegally was to make them the police. This evidence raises a 
serious question over arguments which stress the omnipotence of the colonial power, 
such as Killingray’s assertion that the great imperial powers ‘sought, largely 
successfully…to disarm the indigenous civil population in the colonies and (colonial 
forces excepted) to keep modern weapons in European hands’.42 The bracketed 
caveat exposes the ambiguity in Killingray’s statement. If any group of men with 
guns were capable of being made policemen, were these colonial forces or loose 
colonial proxies? Either way they were unlikely to be unswerving servants of the 
state. 
 
By emphasizing the lax approach of the colonial administration we should 
not underestimate the undeniably transformative effect of its policies on society at a 
local level. Policies towards the Native Administration, as Justin Willis argues, were 
innovative in practice even if ‘traditional’ in theory, because they offered power to 
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those willing to defy social mores in order to seize labour or demand taxes.
43
 Thus 
the colonial state provided these newly empowered policemen with arms and 
ammunition, but often failed to regulate the manner in which they used these new 
assets. Harold MacMichael, in justifying the system of Native Administration in 
Sudan, argued that while chiefs, Shaikhs and Nazirs had ‘a predilection for tyranny’, 
this must be accepted since ‘the native prefers to submit to a few abuses at the hands 
of his own Chief than to be pestered with rules and regulations and view-points of 
alien origin’.44 This resort to cultural relativism – somewhat misleading given the 
essentially novel source of some of the abuses – typified the lax approach that British 
administrators took towards corruption and brutality in Native Administration police 
forces. Just as was the case with government police, accounts of corruption amongst 
such ‘police’ are interesting not so much because of the (usually predictable) nature 
of the corruption as of the resigned attitude adopted by colonial officials in giving 
them. Arkell in Dar Masalit observed of corruption amongst the Sultan’s retainers 
that ‘though no doubt they occasionally ‘akal’ [eat] the ‘nas’ [people], still [it 
happens] almost certainly less than before the occupation’.45 Boustead, a local 
administrator in Darfur, recalled that the felagna, or ‘chief’s orderlies’ of one 
Darfurian shartai of the 1930s, were ‘notoriously brutal at times’, without 
mentioning any steps he took to remedy this.
46
  
 
Indeed, the administration’s fear of the challenge that the central judiciary 
and police system posed to its own authority led it to prevent these institutions 
regulating the Native Administration. Willis demonstrates that in 1936, the civil 
secretary and local administration in Dar Kabbabish were willing to ignore 
investigations conducted by the legal secretary and a local police inspector to favour 
a relative of the Kabbabish Nazir Ali el Tom, who had used his influence to marry an 
already wedded woman. The civil secretary resented the affront that these 
investigations represented both to his own status and that of the Native 
Administration. The local administration thus allowed the resulting case to be tried 
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in Ali el Tom’s court, in spite of the fact that this led to a ‘grave miscarriage of 
justice’, admitted to by the deputy civil secretary.47 
 
Not surprisingly, the state could do little to control the manner in which the 
behaviour of chiefs’ police forces affected local conflicts. Nadel, the anthropologist 
of the Nuba writing in the 1940s, observed that local Nuba were upset about chief’s 
police imposing livestock fines because ‘the all-embracing viewpoint of kinship 
makes you see in the tribal policeman, not impartial agents of the law, but members 
of another clan or family who have come to take what is yours’.48  Another example 
of how the colonial state exacerbated ethnic rivalries in the course of nominally 
pursuing justice came after the flight of eleven Dinka Aliab from Terakeka prison in 
1953. The official report observed that 20 Mandari from a local cattle camp were 
summoned to assist the police in catching these refugees, and were ‘naturally ... 
willing to join in any anti-Dinka campaign and immediately armed themselves with 
spears, bows and arrows, clubs and other paraphernalia of war’.49 Although the 
police sergeant appears to have persuaded these Mandari to re-intern the eleven 
Dinka without recourse to their extensive war-gear, this was strong evidence of the 
partiality of colonial justice, which tipped local power balances in favour of colonial 
agents. Such activity certainly represented a ‘trickle-down’ of colonial power but it 
was a ‘trickle-down’ that the state barely controlled. 
 
The limits to police institutionalization and the abuse and mimicry of plain-clothes 
powers 
The failure of the colonial state to regulate the ‘trickle down’ of power that it had set 
in motion was also apparent in the exploitation of police powers both by plain-
clothes officers themselves and by those who impersonated them. This phenomenon 
was also indicative of the limited institutional identity of the force. The fact that 
abuse of plain-clothes powers was a particular problem in Condominium Sudan 
reflects two important themes: the confusion caused by the divisions between 
separate branches of the colonial state and the manner in which individuals exploited 
the limited regulation of the police to make it serve their own purposes.  Given a far 
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greater degree of independence, and without any particular ideological commitment 
to the colonial state, plain-clothes policemen frequently operated as a law unto 
themselves.  
 
In one particularly embarrassing incident, one plain-clothes policeman was 
convicted after he apprehended two civilians committing no specific breach of the 
law and then picked a fight and killed one of them. Summing up the case, the 
provincial judge insisted that after these events only uniformed police should be 
employed in Nahud, as  
 
It is customary for such plain-clothes policemen to be known to all the 
undesirables of the town. They tend through officiousness and an 
overweening sense of the importance of spy work to make a nuisance of 
themselves to ordinary inoffensive citizens, and there is an ever-present 
danger of them being bribed.
50
  
 
In a similar manner, the use of plain-clothes agents by C. A. Willis’s Intelligence 
Department between 1921 and 1925 caused a great deal of discontent amongst 
members of the provincial administrative staff, who feared that they were acting as 
‘agent provocateurs’ and conducting general spy work in their provinces without 
their knowledge.
51
 This was another example of the structural tensions that existed 
between the central police body and the administration, which resented the 
appearance of the latter’s agents in the provinces. Robertson’s method of dealing 
with problematic plain-clothes figures during his time as a local DC was indicative 
of the antipathy between the two departments: 
 
These agents in many cases used their position to blackmail influential or 
wealthy local people with the threat of a damaging report to the Director of 
Intelligence. I heard many such stories and asked for the Governor’s advice. 
The answer was simple. The agents had no obvious means of livelihood and 
could not admit officially that they were intelligence agents; nor would that 
department acknowledge them. They could therefore be arrested as 
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vagabonds. I often wondered what my dossier at Intelligence H.Q. was like 
after I had dealt with a few of these men in this way.
52
 
 
The world of plain-clothes policemen also reflected the limited integrity of the state 
in a more fundamental regard, as was seen in their mimicry by ordinary members of 
the public: people often impersonated them for the purpose of extorting money from 
citizens.
53
 This was not a rare occurrence. In 1925 Ewart referred to ‘the numerous 
fraternity, which levies blackmail in the guise of the “Government informer”’, 
blaming this on the lack of communication between the Public Security Department 
and provincial administrators.
54
 In October 1949 it was reported that ‘The rate of 
arrests in the Northern Gezira District for the impersonation of plain clothes 
policemen remains steady at one a month’.55  
 
One possible explanation for this phenomenon would be that the colonial 
government did not make clear enough to its subjects that plain-clothes policemen 
were obliged to provide identification before they could charge anyone. Since plain-
clothes policemen doubled as both criminal investigators and intelligence agents, 
local authority figures were wary of challenging persons they could not identify. One 
Shaikh in Blue Nile who failed to arrest a recently-released prisoner impersonating a 
medical assistant offered by way of justification that he felt he must have been a 
member of the secret police.
56
 Since subjects of the colonial state were familiar with 
arbitrary and often unexplained actions on the part of what to them was a mysterious 
and distant new regime, these actions could easily be mimicked by random 
individuals who effectively made themselves microcosms of the colonial state. That 
this state could be so easily mimicked was indicative of its limited presence in 
Sudanese society. It is noticeable that individuals with most knowledge of the state 
were least vulnerable to this type of trickery; for instance, an ex-soldier uncovered 
one such imposter when he asked to see his pay-book.
57
 Migrant populations were 
most vulnerable as they had the least knowledge of police procedures in their 
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temporary home. Creed pointed out that the ‘Fellata’ communities of West African 
pilgrims were frequent victims of such men in Nahud.
58
  
 
 
Crowd control and the relationship between violence and 
vulnerability 
 
Police violence was often a result of the administration’s unwillingness to commit to 
any serious regulation of the force which would prevent the abuse of police power; 
but it also occurred because the administration’s physical neglect of the police left it 
weak and vulnerable, and put it in a position where resorting to violence was the 
only way to enforce it authority. In 1948, the police in Port Sudan were forced to use 
firearms against a group of Hadendoa who assaulted the district prison, killing five 
or six of them.
59
 After these events, the Assistant Sudan Agent in London passed on 
a telegram concerning the killings to a young friend in Exeter. ‘The British are 
having a bad time’, he commented on this, ‘They are being pushed about. Why are 
they killing so many of our poor Sudanese? Are they afraid?’60  
 
Indeed, the interplay between vulnerability and violence played a crucial role 
in police activity throughout the colonial period, and was symptomatic of the 
Condominium’s inability to establish an extensive system of social control. Given 
the weak resources that the colonial administration afforded them, the police often 
found themselves out-gunned and undermanned when dealing with rebels, urban 
criminals, and armed brigands. Policemen often suffered heavy casualties in the 
armed uprisings that occurred during the early period of colonial rule. For example, 
17 were killed during Wad Habouba’s Mahdist revolt at Katfia in 1908.61 After the 
assault on the government police post at Nyala during the famous uprising of 1921, 
20 policemen were killed and 16 injured out of a total of 40.
62
 Police posts often 
formed the most obvious targets during rebellions, as during the White Flag Revolt 
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when the police barracks in Khartoum was assaulted and a number of policemen 
killed.
63
  
 
Even after the phase of early rebellions against the colonial government had 
passed, the physical vulnerability of policemen indicated the fragile nature of the 
state’s presence. In 1947, the Legal Department issued a circular stating that 300 
cases of assaults on policemen had been recorded in the last year in the capital alone, 
and that as a consequence magistrates should always impose substantial prison 
sentences for such offences.
64
 Reports from the south in the early 1950s contain 
accounts of chiefs’ policemen being either beaten up or running away from local 
fights;
65
 policemen were still being killed by Anuak bandits on the Ethiopian frontier 
with Upper Nile Province.
66
 Andrew Paul, the governor of Kassala province, 
observed that ‘it was possible as recently as 1951 for an armed policeman who 
attempted to intercept six Hadendowa raiding Beni Amer cattle to be cut down with 
over sixty sword wounds on his body’.67 
 
Another factor that made provincial policemen vulnerable was the ready 
availability of firearms throughout the country. For instance, in 1932 one DC in 
White Nile estimated that there were 300 rifles in his province ‘at a conservative 
estimate’ and that ‘hardly any youth who cannot lay his hands on L.E. 4 has not got a 
rifle’.68 Police campaigns on the Ethiopian border in the aftermath of the conflict 
with Italy in 1941 struggled to impound the numerous firearms that spread 
throughout the regions of Sudan bordering Ethiopia during the conflict, which local 
populations usually hid outside villages in hollowed-out trees.
69
 In a series of anti-
poaching campaigns in the 1940s on the Dinder, near the Italian border, the police 
came under fire from armed poachers. In one particular incident two policemen were 
ambushed by a gang of fourteen heavily armed poachers and one was shot dead.
70
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Indeed, it was this relationship between vulnerability and violence that made 
the policing of political troubles in this period so chaotic. Firearms were used 
frequently by policemen to deal with crowd protests in the post-war era, as was the 
case during the protests at Hag ‘Abdallah (see above). Other instances were at Tokar 
in 1946, where police used firearms in a clash between Nurab Arabs and western 
labourers, killing three of the Arabs; and they used them again to quell the Rufa’a 
Riots of 1947, although here casualties were relatively light (three injured) as the 
official injunction to fire first at the ground was followed.
71
  
 
The failure of ‘soft’ methods of control contributed to this failure to avert the 
need for violence on the part of the police. In the 1930s, before the introduction of 
tear gas, police units usually had to resort to firearms to break up affrays in rural 
areas.
72
 Although tear gas became a key asset in urban policing following the rise of 
protests in the wake of World War II, the effects of its use were variable. It was used 
with success to break up fights between western labourers in the Khartoum Deims,
73
 
against demonstrations staged by the pro-Communist International Struggle Front,
74
 
and during a riot by members of the Fellata ethnic group in Darfur.
75
 However, on 
other occasions – notably during the unauthorized demonstration led by the Ashiqqa’ 
leader Mohamed Nur el Din, on November 16 1948 (discussed above) – its use was 
disastrous. Robertson recalled of this event that: 
  
The police were instructed on my authority to prevent the procession going 
on and they used tear smoke bombs to disperse them when they refused to go 
peaceably. Unfortunately some of these bombs seem to have been flung 
among the crowd and five persons died later in hospital as a result of the loss 
of blood.
76
  
 
As a result of this incident Robertson instructed Kyles, the commissioner of police, 
to make an investigation into the state of the tear gas bombs. He concluded that they 
                                                 
71
 PIS Aug.-Sep. 1946, TNA FO 371/53328; Note on Law and Order in Kassala, by Broadbent, 
Governor Kassala, 23 Dec. 1951, SAD 403/10/42-3. 
72
 Boustead, Wind of Morning, p. 121. 
73
 PIS Aug.-Oct. 1947, p. 21, TNA FO 371/63047. 
74
 Gezira Province Monthly Diaries, Nov. 1948, NRO Civ Sec (2) 30/8/18. 
75
 Henderson, Governor Darfur, Darfur Annual Report 1951-2, SAD 534/14/41.  
76
 Robertson to Mayall, 16 Nov. 1948, SAD 522/3/6. 
94 
 
were ‘seriously affected by the climate’ and as a result exploded either too softly or 
too fiercely, making them a danger to nearby civilians. At this point Robertson stated 
that he was issuing orders that these bombs not be used again and a fresh supply 
investigated.
77
 Nevertheless, by 1951 Corfield, the governor of Khartoum, had 
agreed to the request of Beatty-Pownall, the commissioner of police, that the exact 
same model of tear gas grenade should be brought back into service. ‘I understand’, 
he argued, ‘that they are difficult to use without hurting someone but that it is 
probably preferable to rifle fire’.78 
 
 A yet more compelling demonstration of the relationship between police 
vulnerability and police brutality came a mere month after Sudan’s full 
independence on 1 January 1956. It was brought about by the police mishandling of 
a strike made by cotton cultivators at Juda, near Kosti, on 21 February 1956, barely 
two months after official independence. The police opened fire on the crowds of 
demonstrators after tear gas had failed to disperse them and the ensuing conflict lead 
to the death of twelve cultivators and three policemen.
79
 Worse still, the police 
arrested as many as 281 suspects and found that the only place available to intern 
them in was the newly built army barracks, which was unsuitable to hold so many 
detainees. As a result of overcrowding, 189 of those detained were found dead from 
heat exhaustion the next morning: thus the police were responsible for a massacre.
80
 
The press blamed the departed British administration for the weak and divided 
system of policing they had left behind. Meanwhile, senior officers blamed the 
catastrophe on the government for failing to provide an adequate number of 
policemen in the province, arguing that it was this that forced the police to close the 
windows of the barracks for fear of the prisoners fleeing.
81
 Again, this was 
compelling evidence of the relationship between the administration’s neglect of the 
force and its excessive use of violence. 
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The Neguib Riots 
 
This chapter will conclude with a case study of the Neguib Riots, as the events 
surrounding these riots are indicative of a number of important themes that have 
been discussed throughout the chapter. They demonstrated the failure of the colonial 
state to prevent the police as an institution being sucked into ethnic, religious and 
political conflicts; they also showed up the extent to which the porous security 
systems in place in the capital and the inefficient and ill-equipped nature of the 
Khartoum police force deprived the state of ‘soft’ systems of coercion and 
necessitated a violent, frantic and knee-jerk response to the riots.  
 
The riots, which are referred to by Sudanese as the ‘March Events’ (ahadith 
maris), occurred on 1 March 1954, during the transitional period from colonial rule 
to self-governance (1954-6). Although these events took place during the twilight of 
the colonial era, the police were at this time still responsible to a British governor-
general, and the Khartoum force was still under a British commandant, McGuigan. 
The riots were precipitated by the arrival of the Egyptian president, Muhammad 
Neguib, to Khartoum in order to participate in the inauguration of the new Sudanese 
parliament. The main party supporting Neguib’s arrival was the National Unionist 
Party (NUP), a party recently formed from previous pro-Egyptian groups that had 
the backing of the Khatmiyya order and Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani.
82
 However, it was 
resented by the Umma party, the party of the Mahdist Ansar movement that opposed 
union with Egypt. The majority of the Umma party’s Ansari supporters came from 
rural regions of northern Sudan, particularly the western provinces of Kordofan and 
Darfur, although there were also many from the regions of the Blue Nile and White 
Nile south of Khartoum. Groups of Ansaris began to flock into Khartoum and their 
anti-Egyptian protests ultimately led to a violent clash with the Khartoum police 
force, which was mainly composed of Khatmiyya and NUP-affiliated Shayqiyya. 
 
One factor which led to the demonstrations running out of control was the 
less than impermeable nature of security on the outskirts of Khartoum. According to 
Ahmad Muhammad Yas, a senior NUP figure, the key Umma leader Siddiq al-
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Mahdi and his fellow Mahdist, Khartoum Police Superintendent Mustafa al-Mahdi, 
had formed an agreement that neither the police nor the Ansar would carry weapons 
during the protests of 1 March.
83
 However, a number of Ansaris violated this 
agreement and it was not till late on that the police realized that what they thought 
had been sticks wrapped in leather carried by the Ansar were swords.
84
 The trial held 
into the events rebuked Mustafa al-Mahdi for preventing a policeman disarming the 
Ansar on the grounds that it would provoke hostility.
85
 These arms included knives 
concealed by the Ansar under their jallabiyas. Some Sudanese police officers and 
historians would later argue that the role of Mustafa al-Mahdi in allowing the Ansar 
to bring their weapons through was part of a British conspiracy to derail Sudanese 
independence by forcing the introduction of a state of emergency, noting that a 
number of other senior (and presumably Khatmiyya) officers were transferred out of 
Khartoum just before the riots occurred.
86
 However, if this was the case then it had 
tragically ironic consequences for Mustafa al-Mahdi himself, who later died amidst 
the riots. 
 
 The actual outbreak of the Neguib riots also demonstrated the frailties of the 
police riot control procedures. One crucial factor appears to have been that the police 
magistrate, in the north-west end of the square, was not equipped with any public 
address apparatus and was thus incapable of communicating a command to disperse 
to the various groups of Ansar located within it.
87
 As a result, tear gas was resorted 
to without an effective warning. The results were not just ineffectual in dispersing 
the Ansar but in fact extremely provocative, as Luce recalled:  
 
Owing to a high wind the gas was only partially effective, but it was 
sufficient to enable the police to reform. But it also inflamed the temper of 
the crowd without disabling them.
88
  
 
According to the report delivered at the trial, ten to fifteen minutes of chaos followed 
in which eleven policemen were killed by either sticks or knives.
89
 Al-Ra’i al-‘Aam 
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recalled that the protestors surrounded Mustafa al-Mahdi’s car and smashed the 
windows and that when he got out of it he was stoned, axed and knifed to death.
90
 
McGuigan died after having been reportedly stabbed 36 times.
91
 The police were at 
this stage so overrun that they could not even recover their injured
92
 and were being 
forced to jump into the river.
93
 The engagement was turning into a ritual humiliation 
of the police, with one of the rioters taking a police baton and horse and riding 
around in front of the fallen police declaring ‘criminals, fear the police…these 
soldiers standing in front of you’.94 However, the police, with the assistance of the 
palace guard, eventually regrouped and drove the Ansar away, firing 
indiscriminately at the retreating crowd.
95
 
 
  According to Luce, 11 police were killed and 66 injured during the riots, with 
about 21 civilians killed and 45 injured.
96
  Thus in the very capital of the colonial 
state, its agents of law and order had proved to be supremely vulnerable. The bloody 
response to the victimization of the police by the Ansar gave ample evidence of how 
this vulnerability, brought about by the inability of the colonial state to provide an 
over-arching system of security and effective ‘soft’ methods of control, caused 
violent action by its police forces that it could do little to prevent. 
 
The nature of the police response to the riots was also evidence of the 
colonial government’s inability to prevent police action being prejudiced by 
political, ethnic and religious agendas. The days following the Neguib Riots 
witnessed an immediate and violent series of reprisals against westerners and 
Ansaris on the part of the Khartoum police. Taking full advantage of the declaration 
of emergency powers permitting the police and army to ignore habeus corpus and 
keep prisoners without charge for up to 14 days, they had arrested 300 westerners 
and Ansaris by 5 March, including prominent Umma party figures.
97
 Further arrests 
on 7 March followed the cordoning off and searching of a number of houses at 11 
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o’clock in the evening, which led to the discovery of sticks and knives.98 Even more 
arrests were made outside Khartoum, notably in Hassaheissa and Sennar, where the 
trumpet-blowers held responsible for inciting the Ansar crowds were taken into 
custody.
99
 There were also arrests in Atbara, where a key Umma politician was 
seized,
100
 and in Shendi, where two young Zaghawa Ansaris working on an 
agricultural project were interned on account of incriminating battle wounds.
101
 The 
series of arrests finally ended with the termination of emergency law on 11 March.
102
 
 
 This all occurred within the context of sectarian tension heightened by the 
fact that the rioters had mainly been Ansaris and the Khartoum police (in spite of the 
role of Mustafa al-Mahdi) mainly Khatmiyya. As Luce observed, this tension ‘was 
further increased by the Ansar belief, justified to some extent, that the police, who 
were predominantly Khatmiyya, were making use of the state of emergency to 
avenge themselves unfairly on the Ansar’.103 The fact that arrests were made in 
riverain areas such as Khartoum, Atbara, Shendi, Sennar and Hassaheissa but not in 
Kordofan and Darfur themselves suggests that police activity was restricted on a 
geographic and sectarian basis (see Chapter 1). The Khatmiyya were not strong 
enough in the Mahdist stronghold of western Sudan for the police to risk provoking 
retaliation by making arrests there. In Khartoum, the Umma party newspaper 
complained that those arrested were being ‘packed into prison and they are punished, 
tortured and they are respected persons exposed to the worst sort of persecution’.104 
Moreover, the police were said to be arresting random Umma politicians and then 
releasing them when they could find no justification for keeping them.
105
  
 
Once again, the British felt powerless to challenge the strength of the pro-
Khatmiyya, pro-NUP feeling within the police. There were fears that the police 
would reveal evidence linking the key Mahdist figure, Sayyid Siddiq, to the rioting, 
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which would have destabilized the political situation even further.
106
 Moreover, Luce 
decided that the British could not declare a constitutional state of emergency as this 
would cause disaffection in the predominantly Khatmiyya army and police.
107
 The 
position was even more uncomfortable because pro-NUP figures felt that British 
administrators and police officers were responsible for the catastrophe on account of 
their inadequate handling of the build-up to the riots.
108
 At this point British families 
were beginning to evacuate,
109
 but tensions eased when on 23 May Sayyid Siddiq al-
Mahdi was allowed to leave the country having given his evidence to the police 
prosecutor Fadl el Obeid, as directed by the magistrate.
110
 A British intelligence 
report observed that ‘For some days afterwards the reaction of several of the Police 
Officers was uncertain but the rank and file remained unmoved and, with the 
peaceful ending of the enquiry shortly afterwards the matter dropped into the 
background’.111 It seems that Sudan’s newly inaugurated prime minister, Isma’il al-
Azhari, may have played a key role in preventing further reprisals, in spite of the 
insistence of a number of his fellow party members that all Umma Party politicians 
be arrested.
112
 Nevertheless, the events before and after the Neguib Riots represented 
clear evidence of the colonial government’s limited ability to exercise an impartial 
and controlled monopoly on violence. 
  
 
Conclusion 
 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the British administration continued 
throughout the colonial era to cherish the personalized, quasi-militaristic styles of 
policing that it had fostered in Sudan, knowing that the creation of a more 
professional system would pose a threat to its own authority. The result was that it 
made little attempt to transform and ‘govern’ its own police force; thus the police 
force became a means by which the colonial state’s agents could use the state, just as 
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much as the state could use them. On a macrocosmic level, this refusal to create a 
heavily institutionalized force was reflected in the continuing domination of the non-
British higher ranks of the police by members of the same ethnic groups from the 
riverain area to Khartoum’s north who had also tended to monopolize other non-
British positions in the government. Thus the state in its policing of Sudan often 
reflected both the prejudices and agendas of this particular group. Furthermore, the 
political and religious affiliations of this group to the Khatmiyya sufi order and its 
political ally, the NUP, hampered the capacity of the colonial state to use the police 
against these particular groups when it wished. It also led to the police acting 
arbitrarily against the sectarian and political opponents of the Khatmiyya, as during 
the Hag ‘Abdallah riots of 1947 and Neguib Riots of 1954. However, as will be 
demonstrated in the next chapter, police identity was not simply defined by the 
historic dominance of the Shayqiyya but also, particularly after World War II, by a 
growing professional ethos appropriated from senior British police officers – 
although this would simply cause further tensions within the colonial state due to the 
Political Service’s distrust of police institutionalization. 
 
The administration’s unwillingness to set up a well-regulated and 
institutionalized police force was also demonstrated by its establishment of 
independent police forces attached to the Native Administration, which again it had 
little commitment to regulating and which often tipped the balance in various local 
conflicts. The fact that the colonial government created a well-armed police force 
which it made little effort to regulate also facilitated the abuse of state power by 
corrupt and violent members of the force, and ‘fake’ policemen whose capacity to 
impersonate the state served the ultimate judgement on its divided identity. 
However, resorts to violence by the police whilst they were performing duties such 
as riot control, suppressing rebellion and everyday criminal policing, were also a 
result of the vulnerability in which they were left by the Condominium regime’s 
neglect of their development. Thus by proudly clinging to its own power the 
administration had sapped the overall power, independence and impartiality of the 
colonial state. 
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3 ‘What the men are crying out for is leadership’: The 
Khartoum Police Strike of 1951 and the battle for 
administrative control1 
 
 
On 4 June 1951, the commandant of the Khartoum police, Leslie James, learnt of a 
secret meeting being held by 70 members of his constabulary to discuss the 
formation of a police federation. Incensed by the plotting, he summoned the 
Khartoum force’s reserve company to break up the gathering. Although it dispersed 
without trouble, the disgruntled policemen regrouped to form a march near the 
Khartoum North Workers’ Club, chanting anti-imperial and Communist slogans; 
before it eventually ended, the demonstration was accompanied by 300 members of 
the public. On the next day, 5 June, James dismissed 11 of the demonstrators, 
thereby provoking a strike of all 700 police constables in Khartoum; on the 
following day they were joined by the local railway police and most of the warders 
from Khartoum Province Prison. It was only after a further week, during which the 
SDF was called in to maintain order, that the striking policemen returned to duty. 
Robertson, as civil secretary and acting governor-general, rapidly called for a 
commission of enquiry (subsequently known as the Watson commission
2
) which 
made scathing criticisms of both the methods and personalities of the professional 
British police officers in Sudan. The result was the summary dismissal of James, his 
deputy G. F. Harrison, as well as 222 of the strikers.
3
 Although termed a ‘mutiny’ by 
British figures such as James, Roberston, Harrison and Watson this event is 
universally remembered by Sudanese policemen – as well as by Sudanese and non-
Sudanese academics – as a strike. What do these events tell us about the relationship 
between the Political Service and the professional police officers in Sudan, and 
between these British officers and their Sudanese constables? And how did the 
police relate to the wider nationalist movement? 
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The fact that the official custodians of the colonial state went on strike 
against it compels us to be wary of understanding the Sudanese police as the faithful 
collaborators of the colonial state in its battle against the emergent nationalist 
movement. Anderson and Killingray observe that colonial states struggled to 
maintain morale amongst their police forces, which were stigmatized by nationalists 
for their role in stifling public protest.
4
 This proved particularly true in India, where 
two police strikes in 1945 and 1947 heralded the demise of colonial rule.
5
 However, 
this chapter will demonstrate that Sudanese policemen also forged a more positive 
identification with the nationalist movement and particularly the labour movement, 
whose organizational tactics the police strikers borrowed. The strike did not emerge 
out of a vacuum, as Sudanese policemen had been preparing for action since before 
their officers issued a memorandum to the governor-general in 1948, demanding 
improved terms of service, housing, and the establishment both of a separate 
department for the police as well as a ‘federation’ to represent their grievances. 
Sudanese policemen and the nationalist movement both aspired to the establishment 
of a force that, rather than being used to crush nationalist demonstrators, would act 
more often as a tool of modern government and protect society against crime. 
Nevertheless, the strike ultimately failed to secure sufficient support amongst the 
nationalist movement to put significant pressure on the British, which probably 
reflected the fact that the police remained trapped by their role in arresting 
nationalist leaders and subduing demonstrations. This chapter will demonstrate that 
whilst the limited achievements the strike did achieve revealed the failure of the 
colonial state to establish a complete social divide between the police and the 
nationalist and labour elite at the centre, its overall failure revealed the colonial 
state’s success in dividing the force between centre and periphery (see Chapter 1).  
 
The strike also offers an opportunity to examine the various ideological 
divides within the colonial state and the manner in which they impacted on police 
practice. It has been argued that colonial states in post-war Africa increasingly 
attempted to develop their systems of governance so as to incorporate their subjects 
as individuals within a wider social body.
6
 Historian of late colonial Africa have 
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argued that in doing so they offered increasing scope to technical departments, such 
as the police, to exercise wider authority throughout colonized territories.
7
 However, 
it will be demonstrated here that the Political Service sought to delay this process by 
emphasizing the social, cultural and ethnic divisions between Sudan and Britain, and 
within Sudan itself. The administration used the strike as an opportunity to scapegoat 
the British police professionals who had slowly begun to turn the Sudanese police 
into a modern crime-fighting force; it also used it to vindicate the administrative 
viewpoint that Sudan was not prepared for a modern and bureaucratic system of 
policing. In particular, the attempts of both the Legal Department and the police 
professionals to create a more disciplined and legally regulated force were held to 
indicate an overly governmentalist approach inappropriate in Sudan. The debates 
over personal responsibility that emerged in the aftermath of the strike should 
therefore be understood as an expression of various ideological and political 
conflicts between the colonial administration and these professional officers. 
Acrimonious debates with regard to the ‘character’ required of British professionals 
and Sudanese policemen also concealed the more instrumental grievances of the 
police rank and file with regard to housing, pay and service conditions.  
 
British police professionals such as James and Harrison had made the 
administration aware of these grievances, but their complaints against the 
administration also involved a wider conflict of ideas concerning the development of 
the force. The Watson commission had attempted to depict the Police Strike as a 
result of divisions between the British police officers and their Sudanese 
subordinates, but emphasis was placed on these divisions partly to conceal many of 
the shared grievances that these parties had against the administration. Educated 
Sudanese officers, as well as British professionals such as James, wished to create a 
police force in Sudan that was literate, professionalized, independent and non-
military. British professionals strove to take police authority out of the hands of the 
Political Service and distribute it between an independent police department and the 
newly emerging units of local government. Meanwhile the Political Service tended 
to obstruct all such developments, fearing that an independent and educated force 
would incline towards nationalism, and preferring instead to see police forces both as 
                                                 
7
 Anderson & Killingray, ‘Policing the End of Empire’, pp. 7-8. Leonardi, ‘Knowing Authority’, p. 
48. 
104 
 
personalized retinues of local administrators and offshoots of the army whose first 
priority was to guard the security of the colonial state. Eventually, the colonial state 
won out, exploiting the police’s lack of support in the nationalist movement. 
Although limited concessions were made towards policemen’s material grievances, 
the strike was used as a pretext to reverse all the political gains achieved between 
1945 and 1951 and to put control over the police back into the hands of the 
administration. 
 
 
The background to the Strike 
 
The increasingly governmentalist role of the Sudanese police 
The period following World War II witnessed the emergence of an expanded police 
force in Sudan led by technocratic professionals who slowly began to challenge the 
anti-governance orientation of the administration. It displayed an expanded central 
bureaucracy and made more attempts to regulate and discipline its officers, as well as 
to compile information about the various activities deemed criminal by colonial law. 
The police historians Abu Bakr and Salim acknowledge that the period after the war 
was a genuine point of transformation for the Sudanese police.
8
 New branches were 
created at the summit of the administration in Khartoum, with a new headquarters 
and complete control over the Khartoum Police as well as, theoretically, over the 
police in the provinces.
9
 Meanwhile a number of new professional officers were 
hired, including J. M. Kyles and L. M. Mackay from the Palestine Police. More 
importantly, a number of officers were hired from the Metropolitan Police in 
London, including D. G. Brown, Leslie James and Gordon Price.
10
 A new system of 
crime returns was introduced, to be compiled month by month and district by district 
by the local police officer, and staff at the police headquarters were encouraged to 
make more regular visits to their colleagues in the provinces.
11
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 The role of officers arriving from Scotland Yard, especially James, was 
crucial. James was not impressed by the lax system of policing that had been 
operated by the Political Service. As superintendent of Khartoum District Police in 
1946, he observed with some exasperation that ‘As no statistics have been compiled 
in previous years no reliable statement concerning the growth of drug traffic can be 
made’. He added that ‘the traffic in Hashish is much heavier than ever’ and that ‘the 
difficulties besetting the Police in checking traffic control are almost 
insurmountable’.12 The next year, the governor of Khartoum observed that the police 
were now ‘very active’ in making raids on drug addicts and traffickers, having been 
required by Kyles, the commissioner of police, to make a special effort in this 
regard.
13
  
 
 This newly governmentalist police ethos also involved a far more systematic 
attempt to regulate the police themselves. James, as commandant in Kassala between 
1947 and 1950, made a much greater attempt to ‘discipline’ the force than any of his 
predecessors in the administration. In his report for 1948, he observed that he had 
punished 693 of the 1,000 officers in the force for ‘breaches of discipline’.14 Out of 
these, James dismissed 76 for misconduct, 9 for inefficiency and had 11 sentenced 
by court. He was almost as strict in the next two years, imposing a total of 1143 
disciplinary punishments, 94 dismissals and 22 court sentences.
15
 In a debate held in 
1982 for Durham University’s Condominium Remembered series, Gawain Bell, a 
former administrator, criticized James’s observations about the ‘poor discipline’ of 
the police. ‘I find it hard to subscribe to that’, he remarked.16 In reply, James said 
that  
 
These would be offences of drunkenness on duty, or slovenly appearance, 
that kind of thing. They weren’t serious offences like corruption or giving 
false evidence in court.
17
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However, the numerous court cases mentioned in James’s report were presumably 
for the more serious type of offence. Thus it was clear that he did not have the same 
resigned attitude towards ‘indiscipline’ and ‘corruption’ as his counterparts in the 
administration (see Chapter 2). This conflict of attitudes would prove highly relevant 
in the debates that followed the Police Strike. 
 
The ‘secret struggle’ between administration, judiciary and police 
Debates about the administration of the police force in the post-war period would 
reveal precisely how acute the ideological and political divides between the various 
branches of the colonial state had become. Although the police were gradually 
becoming a more centralized force in the aftermath of World War II, the issue of 
who controlled them was in reality a very thorny one. Control was contested between 
administrators, on the one hand, who feared the effects that professionalization 
would have on the ‘martial’ qualities of policemen and more importantly their 
political malleability, and – on the other – modernizing British professionals and 
judges who strove for an independent, apolitical force. Mu’tader states that at this 
time a three-way ‘secret struggle’ over who should control the police was being 
waged between Kyles, the commissioner of police, Sir Charles Cummings, the legal 
adviser to the government, and the provincial governors.
18
  
 
 The 1948 police memorandum provoked particularly bitter criticism of the 
manner in which professionalization had affected the ‘character’ of police officers. 
Hancock, the Governor of Kassala, argued that  
 
I would deprecate any further improvement of terms of service… I believe 
that we may be recruiting our police officers from too highly educated 
persons and that it would be better for the majority of our officers to be less 
highly qualified academically and perhaps endowed with more robust 
physical qualities. The Legal Department are demanding high standards of 
police procedure in the courts, but it is surely more important for a policeman 
to be able to quell a riot or deal with violent criminals.
19
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Furthermore, the administration feared that British professionals sympathized too 
much with educated policemen and their demands. Robertson wrote to all the 
provincial governors observing that he was not ‘absolutely certain’ that ‘one or two 
British officers’ were unsympathetic to the police agitation.20 Hancock responded by 
stating that James had listened ‘too sympathetically’ at a meeting held by Sudanese 
officers concerning their situation, adding that ‘he has very strong feelings himself 
about departmentalising the police, and improving their terms of service’. Gordon 
Prince, one of the other officers hired from London, ‘probably took the same line’.21 
James made his own feelings towards the administration very clear when he 
observed in a debate with a number of former administrators in 1982:  
 
I would have to admit myself that there were occasions when I felt the police 
service was under some pressure from the central government to take action 
as you might say in support of central government ideas. There is a danger of 
the police service seeing itself as an instrument of the government, of 
becoming over-powerful.
22
 
 
James also observed that ‘the police service felt that they would be supported by the 
courts in adopting a very strict objective attitude and we would have expected an 
offence to be proved to the hilt before we instituted proceedings, whether or not it 
was convenient to the government’.23 This reflected some of the support that the 
British police professionals had from the Legal Department, who were used to 
criticizing administrators for their abuses of legal authority and particularly of 
habeus corpus.
24
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‘The last thing that we should relinquish to weaker hands’: The Marshall Report and 
debates about centralizing the police force 
Attempts to reform provincial administration in the late 1940s offered more scope 
for the various branches of the colonial state to vie with each other for authority in 
the field of law and order. In 1949, the Sudan government hired A. H. Marshall, city 
treasurer of Coventry, to prepare a report on the feasibility of establishing local 
councils in Sudan’s provinces to replace British DCs, thus adapting the old system of 
Native Administration into a more regulated form of local government.
25
 Amongst 
other issues, the Marshall Report would focus on the possibility of devolving police 
powers on these councils. The debates this provoked would demonstrate the manner 
in which the Political Service used the notion of regional diversity to stall the 
expansion of the central police into Sudan’s provinces. 
 
In the aftermath of the war police professionals had been making strenuous 
efforts to bridge the gap between central and Native Administration police forces. In 
1945 courses were introduced in the provinces so that members of the regular police 
would train Native Administration retainers in their work. In the late 1940s local 
authorities in major northern towns such as al-Ubayyid and Kassala were already in 
charge of corps of night-watchmen who were assigned to specific quarters to prevent 
theft, continuing the 1930s policy of granting control of such watches to the Native 
Administration (see Chapter 1).
26
  In 1947 Kyles, the commissioner of police, issued 
a memorandum recommending that control over the police in the provinces be 
transferred from the DCs to the newly formed Local Authorities that were intended 
to replace the Native Administration.
27
 Thus the regular police and local 
administration would be merged, as had been suggested in 1945 by Local Authority 
officials on the Advisory Council.
28
 The inclination of police professionals to 
devolve control over policing to elected or semi-elected local bodies reflected the 
desire of police professionals to establish a ‘civil’ system of policing akin to that 
which existed in Britain. 
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In spite of these desires, the role of both the District Commissioner and the 
Native Administration in policing remained more significant at the time of 
Marshall’s tour of Sudan’s provinces. As he made his report, Marshall 
acknowledged that 
 
In a few areas, operation control is by local commandants, but in the main 
District Commissioners control day-to-day work. Policeman guard the 
merkaz [provincial headquarters], accompany the District Commissioner on 
trek, drive the merkaz vehicles and do administrative work for the District 
Commissioner such as the supervision of prisons.
29
 
 
Other functions that the police continued to exercise in the post-war era were 
accompanying the DC on town rides and guarding members of British 
administrators’ families.30 Thus the police still acted in the provinces as 
administrative assistants for the DC as had been the case in the pre-World War II 
period. The relationship between the police and DC remained strong since in all but 
the most urbanized of districts the latter still had magisterial roles.
31
 In spite of the 
plan to merge government and Native Administration forces under local authorities, 
the outsourcing of policing to the retainers of the Native Administration also 
continued. These remained, in Marshall’s words, ‘a quasi-tribal police force attached 
to the tribal hierarchy, acting as messengers for chiefs, and doing a considerable 
amount of public security work, including a deal of the arrest of wanted persons’.32 
G. M. Tibbs recalls that in the rural areas of late colonial Sudan Nazirs and ‘Umdas 
remained responsible for tax-collection and law and order, for which they still 
possessed ‘their own tribal police force’.33 In 1947 55,598 criminal cases were dealt 
with by Native and Chief’s Courts compared to 22,442 that were resolved by 
government courts in accordance with the Sudan Penal Code.
34
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 Marshall advised in his report against an immediate devolution of police 
authority to local authorities, noting that they could be ‘swayed by sectional feelings 
in times of stress’ and that most Sudanese he had interviewed felt ‘that the proposed 
units of local government either are not fit to take over the police, or would not be fit 
for many years to come’.35 Marshall thus recommended devolving police authority to 
a series of elected supra-local ad hoc bodies that would cover the area of, and co-
operate with, several local authorities.
36
 However, he acknowledged that since in 
many areas fully constituted local authorities were yet to form the DC would have to 
retain effective control over the police in these regions for some time.  Robertson, 
addressing the governing council after the publication of the report, exploited its 
ambiguity and emphasized that the Local Government Advisory Board felt ‘the 
present was far too early for any transference of authority over the Police Force’.37 
He thus recommended successfully to the council that its discussion would be 
‘premature’.38 
 
 Lampen, the governor of Darfur, more clearly demonstrated the 
administration’s views on this matter when he wrote to Robertson in the same year. 
‘Public security’, he maintained, ‘was our first responsibility on coming into the 
Sudan and it should be the last thing that we relinquish to weaker hands’.39 Neither 
was the Political Service eager to replace the authority of the local councils with the 
authority of an expanded central force. Rather, the police would continue to remain 
under the authority of the DC as in the past. Robertson told the governing council 
that the Marshall Report had advised against a strong, centralized police force in 
Sudan on a number of grounds. These included the fact that such an apparatus would 
be too cumbersome and make the chain of control ‘too long and too remote’; it 
would also cause the force to become ‘full of paperwork’. Interestingly, Marshall 
himself argued that a strong central police force could act as a potential weapon of 
persecution and that ‘the methods of a central force would become too unified for a 
country whose leading characteristic is the great variation between the Districts’.40 
Thus once more the language of Sudan’s cultural diversity and potential persecution 
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by the centre was being used by the administration to uphold its own arbitrary hold 
over power and to stall the extension of central technical departments. 
 
In spite of Robertson’s efforts to prevent the extension of a centralized police 
system into Sudan’s provinces, it was exactly this for which Beatty-Pownall, the 
commissioner of police, was resolved to push. In 1950 he wrote a note that 
recommended establishing the police as a separate department of government under 
the civil secretary. Beatty-Pownall acknowledged the wrangles of recent years when 
he wrote that ‘a strong and efficient force is more likely to be obtained under a 
Police Department than under the present system, whereby nobody really knows who 
is or who is not in charge of the police’.41 While he acknowledged that the control 
exercised by provincial governors over the police must be ‘very much closer’ than 
that exercised over employees of other departments, he advised that local police 
officers should have considerably more independence at the district level.
42
 ‘We are 
proposing now’, he suggested, ‘that the District Commissioner should have no 
control over the district force except by virtue of his powers as a magistrate. This 
means that the police officer will be forced to act very much more on his own 
initiative’.43 Beatty-Pownall further argued that since the DC would disappear under 
the Marshall report, the state should rapidly set itself to training police officers to 
replace them in exercising security roles at district level.
44
 Robertson acknowledged 
that at the recent governor’s meeting it had been agreed that the ‘time was ripe’ for a 
police department in ‘most parts of the country’ and thus Beatty-Pownall’s proposal 
provided a ‘good basis for consideration’.45 However, while passing the latter’s note 
over to a fellow member of the Political Service for review, Robertson observed that 
his ‘chief worry’ was that ‘the Governor (and District Commissioner in the out 
district) should have adequate power over the police force at his disposal’.46 One 
governor, Hancock, had argued that the creation of a police department should only 
occur when there were sufficient personnel with ‘sufficient knowledge of the 
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country’,47 again reflecting the administration’s belief in its unique understanding of 
the Sudanese. Thus the lines of conflict between administrators and police 
professionals, between local knowledge and technical expertise, were clearly drawn 
before the strike.  
 
 
Police grievances 
 
The influence of nationalism and the clamour for a ‘civil’ police 
The behavior of the Sudanese constabulary in the post-war period demonstrated that, 
far from being isolated from Sudanese society at large, they were often strongly 
influenced by it. The fact that Sudanese policemen came from the same relatively 
homogenous riverain social groups which provided the basis of the nationalist 
movement in Sudan (see Chapter 1) contributed towards this. Although the influence 
of the Shayqiyya riverain ethnic group in the government police force often led it to 
identify with a narrow religious and sectarian agenda (see Chapter 2), these officers 
at times associated with broader trends within the nationalist movement. Both 
policemen and members of Sudan’s educated elite pushed for a system of ‘civil 
policing’ akin to that which supposedly existed in Britain, in which the police force 
would be used to protect rather than oppress the public.
48
 ‘We consider that the 
occupation of the CID with political business’ the newspaper al-Rai’ al-‘Aam 
commented in 1948, ‘makes them miss many opportunities to uncover the traces of 
crimes and thefts’.49 ‘Should we accept,’ the same newspaper argued two months 
later, ‘that you apply in our country the worst of what exists in the regimes of 
Eastern governments even though it is said in the Governing Council that our regime 
corresponds with the most modern of administrative regimes in Britain while the 
police go out with cudgels (hirawat) and bombs and bullets to clash with 
demonstrations?’50 This represented the capacity of Sudanese nationalists to ‘mimic’ 
colonial values in order to expose the ambivalence of colonial discourse. 
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 However, members of the force were not insensitive to these criticisms. In 
the secret meetings held before the Police Strike, members of the force protested at 
being forced to ‘beat those demonstrating in the cause of freedom’, and the 1948 
police memorandum demanded the establishment of a better relationship between 
police and public.
51
 Hussein Hamo recalls that while he was an officer in Khartoum 
Bahri in the late 1940s, he policed a nationalist demonstration organized by various 
parties calling for the end of colonialism. Hamo allowed the demonstration to 
proceed from the Graduates’ Club to the Workers’ Club and then back again, in spite 
of what he claims were repeated demands from Harrison, his British officer, that he 
‘go out there and beat those people’.52  
 
Another index of the extent to which Sudanese policemen were open to wider 
social influences was their mimicry of the techniques practiced by various sectors 
within the Sudanese nationalist and labour movement. Members of the police were 
inspired by groups such as the Sudan Workers Trade Unions Federation, the Sudan 
Students Union and the Unions of Farmers and Women, all of which were using the 
power of education and literacy to gain concessions from the government.
53
 Thus 
Sudanese policemen increasingly attempted to facilitate the education of the force. 
This was the fruit of the efforts of senior officers such as Ahmed Gelly and Bilal 
Awad, who encouraged an emphasis on recruiting more literate and hence more 
politically aware individuals, touring schools in search of candidates who could do 
the three month training course at Omdurman. By 1950, the first ten of these had 
graduated and immediately began to arrange the syndicalist mobilization of the 
police, learning from the methods used by trade unionists.
54
 Each of them formed 
their own secret cell located in the various police districts (gisms) in Khartoum, in 
addition to one cell in Port Sudan. These started publishing pamphlets demanding 
increased support for literacy in the police, the administration’s greatest bugbear. 55  
 
  The aspirations of these men to achieve a status similar to that of other labour 
groups were frustrated when the government refused their memorandum of 1948. 
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This demanded the creation of a police federation akin to the one that existed in 
Britain, a new police law, the promotion of Sudanese within the police, more courses 
at the Police College, and generally improve service conditions.
56
 Their pamphlets 
complained particularly bitterly about policemen being housed in their horses’ 
stables and whole police families living in a three-by-three metre room.
57
 All in all, 
the police were frustrated that they had not won similar concessions granted under 
new labour legislation to other workers, not least their clerical counterparts, who had 
far less dangerous, time-consuming and unpopular work.
58
 Thus these men saw the 
education of new generations of policemen not as a means of spreading colonial 
values but of gaining their own rights and of reducing their dependency on their 
colonial master. 
 
The frustrated aspirations of the officer corps 
The Police Strike came at a time when professional Sudanese officers were gradually 
rising through the ranks of the force and trying to forge a more prosperous position 
for Sudanese policemen in the colonial world. They identified with the demands of 
British police specialists for increased professionalization and departmental status; 
and they were frustrated by the efforts of the Political Service both to favour the 
administration and stall the ascent of Sudanese officers to positions of higher rank. 
 
The prospect of Sudanese officers rising through the ranks was initially 
treated with some disdain by the British. In 1939, predicting an upsurge in 
nationalism in Sudan similar to that in other ‘Oriental’ countries, Penney, the 
director of public security, observed that ‘Political development of this sort 
eventually translates itself into political agitation and presents practical police 
problems which cannot effectively be solved by Sudanese officers’.59  Sudanese 
were thus initially kept from serving as police commandants in the key centres of 
urban nationalism until after World War II, although in 1940 Yahya Omran was 
appointed as commandant of police in the more remote region of Darfur.
60
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After World War II, the British were forced to make more concessions to the 
aspirations of this corps of men, partly due to the need to expand the force but more 
to deal with the expansion of urban nationalism and the urban economy. In 1946, 
Amin Ahmed Hussein was appointed as a superintendent at police headquarters and 
Babiker Deeb as an assistant superintendent to Leslie James in the Khartoum police, 
while a number of Sudanese were appointed to superintendent, assistant 
superintendent or ‘police mamur’ roles throughout the country.61 Amin Hussein 
would go on to become the commandant of police in Blue Nile Province in 1949, 
where he would make strenuous efforts to improve service conditions (see Chapter 
4). By the time the Police Strike occurred in 1951 there had been a further wave of 
Sudanizations, with six Sudanese being appointed to important positions in the 
police headquarters in 1950, including Babiker Deeb as the commandant of the 
CID.
62
 
 
Nevertheless, individuals in both the British administration and Police 
Department expressed distrust towards promoted Sudanese officers. A note by the 
director of public security on serving British and Sudanese police officers in 1943 
cast doubt on the capacity of a number of the serving Sudanese police officers for 
promotion. Ahmed Geili was described as ‘potentially competent if properly 
supervised and driven’ but ‘ambitious, conceited and excitable’.63 Robertson 
observed in 1951 of Khalifa Mahjoub, who had recently been appointed as a Police 
Commandant in Upper Nile, that ‘The trouble...is that he is really a bounder and I 
think it is on the social side that he falls down’.64 As civil secretary, Robertson was 
wary of entrusting police posts seen as politically sensitive to Sudanese officers. 
Upon the transfer of Amin Ahmed Hussein in 1950, he decided to send him to 
Kassala, as it could be ‘more easily Sudanised’ than the other provinces. Robertson 
argued that ‘Khartoum and Northern are more likely to have labour or political 
troubles; B.N.P. has its rather peculiar Gezira problems; in the Southern provinces 
the organization of more professional police forces requires the guidance of British 
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officers for some time yet’.65 When serving at Wad Medani in 1948, the same officer 
was described as ‘very anti-British’ by Winifred Johnson, wife of the DC there.66 
 
It also seems that the British thwarted the ambitions of Sudanese police 
officers by favouring the administrative officers in terms of both potential for 
advancement and service conditions. The result of this was that a number of police 
officers, who had been trained jointly with administrators between 1937 and 1948 
(see Chapter 1), only entered the police because they could not find posts in the 
administration. In 1949 the governor of Khartoum observed that there were 20 police 
officers who had been ‘compelled’ to join the police on these grounds.67 Henderson 
observed in the same year that this had happened to Ahmad Widalla, who ‘passed 
quite high up and is in my opinion much better suited to be an administrative officer 
than a police officer’.68 The implication was that the administrative service was an 
elite service, whereas the police was an inferior service and was to be treated as 
such. 
 
As already noted, just like British officers such as James, these educated 
Sudanese officers also wanted the police to be a civil body under a genuinely 
independent department (maslaha) run by police professionals.
69
 This was also 
observed by Beatty-Pownall in his note of 1950, when he stated that officers who 
had been through the police training school and studied on specialized courses to the 
United Kingdom ‘all feel that they are part of a technical service, which should be 
commanded and directed by its own technical officers’.70 Part of the reason for this 
was that departmental status would mean a greater number of high-ranking posts for 
police officers. Beatty-Pownall also argued that these officers particularly resented 
being responsible to DCs, since these British administrators were often a lot younger 
than themselves.
71
 Thus it can be seen at this time that officers working in the 
riverain centre possessed a clear sense of institutional identity and institutional 
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interests. These officers also had a clear set of grievances against the administration 
which defined the context in which the strike would occur. 
 
Police motives in the immediate build-up to the strike 
After the officers’ memorandum of 1948, the British administration was complacent 
about the notion that discontent could spread from police officers to the rank and file 
and NCOs. This probably reflected typical administrative presumptions that it was 
only a minority of the most educated Sudanese that objected to colonial rule. When 
the officers’ discontent was discussed at the governors’ meeting of 1950, it was 
agreed that ‘there is little danger of the disgruntled officers affecting the morale of 
the lower ranks’,72 in spite of senior British police officers warning that this would 
happen.
73
 The Police Strike demonstrated the extent of the governors’ misjudgement: 
the committee which carried out the strike was composed of ten privates (anfar) and 
one corporal (onbashi), while the ‘shadow committee’ set up to manage it included 
three privates (anfar), four sergeant-majors (sol), a sergeant (shawish) and a lance-
corporal (wakil).
74
  
 
 There were numerous reasons for the spread of police discontent to the NCOs 
and rank and file. There was a great deal of homogeneity between the officer corps 
and other ranks – both Sudanese officers in Khartoum North, for instance, were 
promoted rankers.
75
 A number of muawins, lower-ranking officers promoted from 
the ranks, had sympathized with the 1948 memorandum.
76
 The fact that no strike 
action occurred in Wad Medani and al-Ubayyid reflected the fact that there were 
Sudanese commandants in these towns with whom the strikers sympathized.
77
 As 
demonstrated above, it was literate rank and file officers recruited by Awad and 
Gelly who first started syndicalist mobilization in the ranks of the police. All eleven 
of the strike leaders came from riverain Sudan, and seven from Northern Province,
78
 
so it is likely that they would have sympathized with the nationalists and labour 
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agitators who also came mainly from this area. Again, this reflected the failure of the 
British to play ‘divide and rule’ in this regard.  
 
Even as the strike was occurring, British officials did not do justice to its 
deep roots in Sudan itself and its relationship to wider trends in Sudanese 
nationalism. This was due to the tendency of officials to attribute unrest in Sudan to 
malevolent ‘outside’ causes and to take public gossip for intelligence. This led them 
to attribute more influence than was warranted to the machinations of the Ashiqqa’, 
the militantly pro-Egyptian wing of the National Unionist Party, and the influence of 
Communism in Sudan. The official intelligence report on the strike noted that while 
many Communists openly encouraged the police during the strike, ‘Many Sudanese 
believe that the outside impetus and the money used to bribe the police to mutiny 
came from the non-Communist but anti-British Egyptian Government working as 
usual though their agents, the Ashiqqa’ leaders’.79 Robertson noted during the strike: 
‘the latest news of the Egyptian share in it all is that the Ashiqqa’ are promising all 
men who have been dismissed that they will be re-employed by the Egyptians’.80 In 
one respect this prophecy was fulfilled, when in March 1952 Egyptian officers came 
to Sudan to recruit for King Farouq’s personal guard and hired 300 to serve in this 
capacity from ‘ex-policemen, detribalised southerners and riff-raff from the 
market’.81 However all that this demonstrated was opportunism on the part of the 
Egyptians and a number of policemen who found themselves out of a job after the 
strike; it was not conclusive evidence that the Egyptians had inspired the police to 
mutiny. 
  
The only actors charged in this respect, apart from the Police Committee 
itself, were Muhammad Sayyid Sallam, the supposedly pro-Communist president of 
the Trade Unions Federation, and Shafi’ Ahmad al-Shaikh, its secretary. These two 
were each sentenced to a one-year term of imprisonment. Robertson suspected 
Sallam might be a channel for Communist funds designed to support the police of 
West Barracks during the strike.
82
 Nevertheless, the role of the Communists and 
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labour agitators beyond the ranks of those police involved in the strike was equally 
marginal and opportunistic. Al-Ra’i al-‘Aam argued that  
 
No foreign hand would have been able to move this strike if they [the 
strikers] had not been affected by a number of grievances. If these grievances 
had been eliminated, no foreign hands – if they did exist – would have been 
able to affect policemen secure in the knowledge their legal rights were being 
guaranteed.
83
  
 
The police strikers only established contact with al-Shaikh because they were 
seeking a lawyer to help them draft a constitution for a police federation and all the 
other lawyers they had spoken to had turned them down.
84
 With regard to the 
exhortations of the police by Sallam and Shafi’, Roberston himself admitted: ‘I think 
the Police Soviet has made a mistake in allowing this, as the great bulk of the rank 
and file are not for revolution, but want a few minor improvements in their terms of 
service, and little else’.85  
 
Although Robertson was playing down the extent of police grievances, this 
was an admission that the roots of the problem were somewhat closer to home. 
Indeed, all of the strikers’ demands were apolitical, the first 14 focusing on terms of 
service. They included salary increases, increases to urban and long service 
allowances, post-service pensions (as opposed to mere gratuities), longer leave 
periods, free education for police children until intermediate level, the provision of 
sanitary housing for both married and unmarried men, alterations to the recruitment 
and promotion system, and the creation of a body to ‘fight for these rights’.86 The 
last two demands were prompted by the excessive discipline that the strikers felt had 
been meted out by their senior British officers, presumably James and Harrison. Item 
number 15 demanded the abolition of ‘revengeful severe punishment’.87 The 
administration would give these latter demands particular attention in the subsequent 
inquiry.  
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The Watson Commission, the government-sponsored inquiry into the causes 
of the strike, concluded that ‘there is no evidence of any direct agitation from any 
external sources, communist or otherwise’.88 This exposed the misjudgement in 
British officials’ arguments – built on a misconceived and paternalist belief in the 
gratitude of Sudanese subjects to their British colonizers – that opposition to the 
colonial state in Sudan could only be stirred up from outside. Rather than passively 
absorbing external ideologies, the nationalist and educated policemen who inspired 
the strike were motivated both by the successes of fellow nationalists in other fields 
of work, as well as frustration at the poverty of their service conditions. 
 
 
Suppressing the strike 
 
Hopes were high at first that the administration, initially represented by the governor 
of Khartoum, would reach a favourable deal with the ‘Police Committee’ speaking 
for the strikers. However the strike committee would ultimately be undermined by a 
number of factors, including the loyalty of the SDF, the geographically limited basis 
of the discontent, lack of support from the nationalist movement, and the success of 
the British in making the police relatively unpopular among the nationalist 
population. 
 
The Police Committee began with three initial demands: first, that the 
policemen who had been dismissed following the meeting that James had broken up 
should be re-instated; second, that James and ‘Abd al-Nur Khalil, another figure 
associated with excessive ‘discipline’, should be transferred; and third, that the 
government should recognize the rights of the police to form a federation. Since the 
1948 memorandum specifically mentioned the British Police Federation
89
 we should 
assume that this did not mean a police trade union with the legal power to strike, but 
simply a representative body to put forward police grievances to the government.  
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The first two demands were agreed to quickly, demonstrating James’ weak position 
and ultimate expendability.
90
 However, although on 5 June the governor of 
Khartoum, accompanied by police officers Deeb, Wynne and Picton had met the 
strikers and promised that all three demands would be met immediately, the 
government procrastinated in complying with the third.
91
 At first the governor 
insisted that Beatty-Pownall, who did not return until the evening of 7 June, would 
have to come back to discuss the federation with the committee; and then there were 
debates as to whether the federation could be appointed directly by the civil secretary 
or whether the matter would have to be referred to the Legislative Assembly.
92
 
 
At this time a number of factors led to a breakdown of trust between the 
negotiating parties. Firstly, the arrival of SDF contingents on 7 June to replace 
striking jailers in Khartoum prison, directly adjoining Khartoum Police 
Headquarters, led members of the committee to fear that the administration was 
manoeuvring against them. The governor of Khartoum became more insistent that 
any ‘police federation’ should be ‘properly formed and legally constituted’, which 
would of course take time. Disagreements over this and the government’s suspicion 
of the influence al-Shaikh was beginning to exercise over the strikers led the 
negotiations to break down.
 93
 Eventually the government, frustrated at the rise in 
thefts, housebreakings and the like that occurred in the absence of the police, used 
British troops to arrest the strike committee and intern them in Khartoum jail.
 94
 
Although the government was unable to reach an accord with the second committee, 
formed in the wake of these events, Sudanese intermediaries – first of all Judge Abu 
Rannat on 10 June, then ‘Abdullah Khalil in his position as head of the Legislative 
Assembly on 11 June – succeeded in persuading the striking policemen to return to 
work, although no immediate agreement had been made with regard to their 
grievances.
95
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Why were the British able to de-rail the strike? Firstly, it must be emphasized 
that the strikers never threatened to use physical force against the government, even 
though they were sitting upon a large stockpile of arms. The rapid arrival of 
contingents of the SDF from Gedaref and al-Ubayyid in just under 26 hours and their 
seizure of the contents of the police arsenal at night as the strikers slept, guaranteed 
control of the security situation to the British. This said, it is clear that some of the 
SDF resented being used against the strikers
96
 and Robertson admitted it would have 
been a ‘severe test’ had the SDF been required to fire on the police.97 
 
Another indicator of the strike’s limited success was its failure to spread 
outside the principal towns of the central riverain region. As mentioned above, the 
police held out from striking in Wad Medani and al-Ubayyid because of the presence 
of Sudanese commandants there, although the Wad Medani police sent a telegram of 
support.
98
 A group of 45 policemen at Atbara and a large proportion of the Port 
Sudan police also went on strike in support, although this happened in the days after 
the Khartoum strike had already been ended.
99
 There was no support for the strike in 
the west or south, in spite of the strike committee attempting to reach out to the 
police in these regions. One of its demands was that northern and southern rates of 
pay should be equalised.
100
 However, the fact that policemen in the south were 
unable to react to this attempt to reach out to them demonstrated the success of the 
administration in fracturing the police force by leaving the educated professionals to 
police the riverain core and adopting a more administrative form of policing in the 
peripheries (see Chapter 1). It was the same case in the west, where the governor of 
Darfur reported that ‘The police themselves had very little interest in the affair and 
did not understand it’.101 Thus the Police Strike had failed to unite officers from 
central and peripheral backgrounds. 
 
Most importantly, the strike did not receive widespread support from any 
sectors of the nationalist movement other than the Communist Party. Although the 
head of the taxi union rented 150 houses at his own expense to shelter the families of 
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the strikers after the government had cast them out of the police barracks,
102
 no other 
branches of the labour movement went on strike.
103
 Nor did the strike receive any 
support from the mainstream political parties.
104
 All of the northern political parties 
during the period leading up to full Sudanese independence in 1956 were set on 
achieving this goal by peaceful means, a tactic which ultimately proved successful. 
The Legislative Assembly was at the time dominated by the Umma party, since the 
pro-Egyptian Unionist parties had boycotted the 1948 elections. The Umma would 
have had little reason to support the strike as they had a relatively close alliance with 
the British;
105
 in any case the majority of police officers were Khatmiyya. This is 
probably why ‘Abdullah Khalil, who was also head of the Umma party, told the 
strikers: ‘You do not understand that this movement is contrary to law and that the 
government has the power to destroy you all’.106  
 
Neither did the strikers receive any support from the head of the Khatmiyya 
order, Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani,
107
 although the fact that al-Mirghani sent ‘some of his 
high-ranking types’ to tell the strikers to return to work reflected the importance of 
the Khatmiyya order among them (see Chapter 2). Another reason for the strike’s 
lukewarm reception, as Robertson suggested, was that the strikers’ belated 
embracing of Communist support lost them the sympathy of less radical nationalist 
groups. For instance, the editor of al-Sudan al-Jadid, prompted by the chants of the 
pro-Communist demonstrators who accompanied the Police Strike and protested 
against the Korean War, asked ‘what is the relationship between General MacArthur 
and the demands of the Sudanese Police?’108 Finally, it should be remembered that 
while the police aspired to join the broader flow of Sudanese nationalism, the 
government had to some extent succeeded in isolating them from the public by using 
them – despite the efforts of Sudanese officers to get around this onerous duty – to 
suppress nationalist demonstrations, thereby earning them the title ‘black English’ 
(ingliz sud).
109
 The Sudanese historian Muhammad ‘Abd al-Rahim recorded how the 
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perception of the Sudanese police changed during the period of the railway workers’ 
strikes, when he stated that they were ‘stripped of their virtuous and human features 
when they began to strike and kill their citizens with no compassion and no 
mercy’.110 Thus Robertson remarked that the strike was likely to fail as ‘public 
opinion…is anti-police anyhow’.111 Thus while the police were clearly inspired by 
other sectors of the nationalist movement, the administration had succeeded in 
keeping them just separate enough to be able to crush the strike. 
 
 
The Watson Commission and the politicization of the strike 
 
The manipulation of the inquiry by the Political Service 
The inquiry into the strike further laid bare the extent to which ideological divides 
within the colonial state had influenced the development of the police force in the 
country. The ability of the administration to dictate the manner in which the Watson 
Commission investigated the strike was further evidence of its pervasive power in 
police matters. The administration would manipulate this inquiry so as to vindicate 
its belief that the police should be subservient to the Political Service and serve its 
political goals. Hayes, the chief justice, was horrified by the administration’s 
behaviour in arranging the Watson Commission within 15 days of the Police Strike. 
As he pointed out, the administration’s swift action denied their scapegoat, James, of 
whom Hayes was himself a staunch supporter, the chance to prepare a proper 
defence. It had also denied him and the other judges the chance to bring their legal 
expertise to bear on the inquiry.
112
 Harrison, the other senior police officer dismissed 
by the government, was on leave at the time he was officially scapegoated and thus 
wrote angrily to Robertson protesting his inability to defend himself.
113
 James 
himself observed to Harrison that ‘my lawyers have taken the line that the report is 
based on impressions and not on fact, that the enquiry was secret with no opportunity 
to cross examine and that some witnesses were admittedly prejudiced’.114 Harrison 
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complained that Robertson’s dual role as civil secretary and acting governor-general 
had allowed him to dictate the whole affair. It is worth noting here Daly’s judgement 
that Robertson could be ‘small minded, vindictive, sly and intolerant’.115 In his role 
as civil secretary he had recommended to the executive council that James and 
Harrison be dismissed and then presided over the council’s acceptance of his 
recommendations in his capacity as governor-general.
116
 Harrison’s letter outlined an 
interpretation of events contrasting significantly with that of Robertson and the 
administration, which dominated the Watson Commission. 
 
By manipulating the inquiry, Robertson and the Political Service were able 
both to underplay the structural grievances of the police and blame the strike on 
individuals whose ‘character’ failings were held responsible for the discontent of 
their men. In this regard, at least, they seem to have had a great deal of material to 
work with. The report concluded that ‘a spirit of something approaching suspicion, 
envy, distrust, appears to have permeated the higher officers’ cadre of the force’.117 
Beatty-Pownall and Jim Coutts, the head of the Security Intelligence Branch, had 
become bitter enemies, while Leslie James had tried to ‘steer the line’ between them 
but ended up too distant from Coutts.
118
 The report of the Watson Commission was 
probably truthful here, since these disputes were acknowledged by Harrison.
119
 
 
However, some of the report’s other criticisms were little short of deliberate 
character assassination. James, apparently, did not possess ‘tact and the gift of 
leadership’, whereas Harrison was ‘a man of fiery temperament…unsympathetic to 
his officers and men’.120 Both James and Harrison were held to have failed to win the 
sympathy of the lower-ranking Sudanese officers and rank and file. James in 
particular could not ‘count as a supporter one single soul of the Sudanese’.121 
Although it is true that James was unpopular in Khartoum, where the strike 
committee had demanded his dismissal, it is worth remembering that in Kassala he 
was seen by the governor as too sympathetic to his men. 
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There was an even more political motive for the dismissals of Harrison and 
James. In writing to the executive council to justify their treatment, Robertson 
observed that he did not think that they could ‘usefully continue service in the 
Sudan, with regard to the duties of the Province CID Branch and the Security 
Intelligence Branch of Police Headquarters’.122 James, as demonstrated above, 
believed that his police force should avoid being a tool of the government. Robertson 
observed that his province police force had resented the house searches made by the 
Security Intelligence Branch in Khartoum and Omdurman and its attempts to deal 
with the province CID branch directly.
123
 While the commission targeted James 
heavily, its treatment of Coutts, the head of Security Intelligence, was more lenient. 
Although the report acknowledged that he had split the force ‘into two camps’, it 
also stated that ‘the loyalty of the Sudanese to him’ amounted to ‘genuine 
affection’.124 
 
More generally, Robertson used the aftermath of the strike and the Watson 
Commission to justify reversing some of the gains that professional police officers 
had obtained from the administration after World War II. Robertson quite 
emphatically recommended to the executive council that ‘reverting to the old 
system’ was essential as ‘the chief objective at the moment must be to rebuild the 
morale of the force’.125 This met with approval and by July Robertson could write to 
the governor of Khartoum informing him that the executive council considered that 
‘in future the Governor must exercise more control over police matters than he has 
done in recent years. He must be in much closer touch with his Commandant, and 
must be prepared to interfere and override him when he considers it necessary’. This 
would be in matters concerning ‘public security’ not ‘technical police 
administration’. Moreover, the province was to be divided into police districts in 
which the DC must be responsible to the governor for law and order. ‘He must 
therefore take a considerably greater part in the supervision of police matters than 
before’.126 In 1952 Governor Charles de Bunsen wrote to Picton, the new 
commandant of police: ‘I mean to regard them not, as hitherto, as a sort of 
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constabulary on the English model, but as an army in the field…The old theory, 
always unrealistic and premature in most peoples’ opinion, finally proved fatal last 
summer’.127 Hence police independence was to be curtailed both at province and 
district level and the police force was once more conceived by the government as a 
quasi-military body. 
 
‘Knowing’ the Sudanese 
The Watson Commission enabled the Political Service to have its own views about 
the Sudanese ‘character’ and the merits of administrative policing in Sudan 
vindicated. Police officers like James and Harrison had supposedly failed to gain the 
sympathy of their officers because they did not understand this ‘character’ in the 
same way that administrators did. One key incident cited by the commission to 
demonstrate the lack of affinity between officer and constable was a general meeting 
held to debate the administration of the canteen fund. Watson chose to describe this 
meeting as being like an ‘Arab meglis’128 – a gathering which conventionally fell 
within the administrator’s range of expertise – as if to emphasize the professionals’ 
folly in believing they could manage police staff in Sudan in the same manner as in 
Britain. The fact that they only possessed an elementary degree of Arabic and were 
thus forced to speak through interpreters, was another failing the commission 
emphasized to indicate the officers’ unsuitability in a Sudanese environment. The 
friction between officers and men soon reached its catharsis as Harrison ‘got angry, 
banged the table and made some rather indiscreet remarks alleging they were the 
worst of men he had ever seen’.129 
 
Meanwhile, the decision of James and Harrison to appoint two Copts, 
Christians indigenous to Sudan, as deputy superintendents was considered 
insensitive on religious grounds; and since these officers did not have the same 
attachment to their men as fellow Muslims would have been likely to achieve, they 
could not ‘act as a conduit for their woes’ either.130 In this James and Harrison 
compared unfavourably with Coutts, who had served 19 years in the country and 
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‘knew exceptional Arabic’131 – and was, of course, more willing to carry out the 
administration’s political agenda. 
 
The highly personal assault on the abilities of professional police officers 
served a political purpose for the commissioners of the report, who sought to 
demonstrate that Sudanese policemen preferred a more personal and less 
professional style of leadership. If the professional police officers were failing to 
elicit the sympathy of their men, then it justified a return to the ‘good old days’ 
where the DC, a jack of all trades, controlled the police as his own quasi-military 
force. The Watson Commission insisted that ‘what the men are crying out for is 
leadership’ and cited Khartoum police constables brought before the commission 
who claimed they would be happy under just a DC and their own promoted officers. 
The report also insisted that the emphasis on literacy and the use of the written word 
in communications was breaking down personal relationships between police officer 
and constable, a criticism that went hand in hand with the administrative dislike of 
educated policemen.
132
 
 
A good deal of the language of the commission and Political Service officers 
about the importance of ‘personal relations’ with Sudanese was hypocritical. As 
Daly and Deng demonstrated in the oral research they conducted for Bonds of Silk, 
deeply personal relationships hardly ever existed between administrators and their 
immediate subordinates. One official remembered that there was ‘hardly any social 
life’ with them, while another stated: ‘Of course I got to know my servants and staff 
very well as individuals, but not on any basis of equality’.133 A Sudanese informant 
recalled that relationships were ‘very stuffy, formal, polite’.134 Although a minority 
of officials admitted to having close relationships with servants in the more relaxed 
atmosphere of the countryside, one British official remarked that the experience was 
not possible in Khartoum.
135
 Hence the highly idealized relationship between DC 
and police discussed by Robertson was a convenient contrast to Harrison and James’ 
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behaviour, but not a credible one, especially since it contrasted rural experiences 
with urban ones. 
 
In spite of this hypocrisy, the administrators who had acquired renewed 
influence over the police quickly used the opportunity granted to them by the strike 
to impose their views on the ‘character’ of policemen. Pease, the DC of Khartoum, 
wrote to the new commandant of police on 15 June 1951 describing those recently 
recruited in Khartoum for the Police College as ‘gutter-snipes’, 42 out of 49 he had 
dismissed from the school. He added that he had last been posted in Roseires in Blue 
Nile Province and that if he had known that Khartoum was lacking in quality recruits 
he could have provided some men who would have been ‘illiterate, mostly, yes, but 
loyal and tough’.  
 
Pease also dismissed one of the key aspects of the centralized police force, 
the police oath, as being insufficient for eliciting the loyalty of the majority of the 
men: 
 
There is only one oath to a Moslem and that is a religious one. The Police 
Oath is the oath used in England and many other countries, but it is in my 
opinion entirely unsatisfactory here. I do not think the oath should 
necessarily be uniform for everyone in this country: for instance an 
Ingessenawi or a Nubawi, I believe, swear on the rifle and five rounds of 
ammunition.
136
 
 
Again, administrators were using cultural relativism as the context for undermining 
the centralization of the police and dividing it into separate ethnic and religious 
factions. 
 
Disputes over ‘discipline’ 
The issue of ‘discipline’ provided another opportunity for the Political Service and 
the Watson Commission to drive home their point about the unpopularity of the 
senior British police officers among their men and express their distaste for an overly 
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legalistic approach towards the management of the force. Harrison was described as 
‘very regimental’ and ‘a strict disciplinarian’;137 James was said to have similar 
faults. However, their attitude towards ‘discipline’ was also in some respect a 
reflection on the policy of administrative neglect of the police that had been 
practised in the years before their arrival. The commission reported that James felt 
that ‘discipline in administrative matters and particularly kit and turn-out’ had 
‘become slack’ under Coutts. He thus began to inspect night patrols and inflict 
punishments on those poorly turned out that, according to the commission, ‘the 
whole force felt…unjust’.138 It seems to have been mainly these actions that brought 
about the strikers’ demands for less ‘severe punishment’ and for James and ‘Abd al-
Nur Khalil, who administered the punishments, to be dismissed. ‘I stressed that you 
were always scrupulously fair’, James wrote to Harrison after the inquiry, ‘– even if 
you expected a higher standard of conduct than the Sudanese were accustomed to 
give’.139 
 
 Some of the criticisms of ‘excessive discipline’ also reflected administrative 
dislike of judicial regulation of the police. This seems to have been a particular 
reason for the targeting of the police magistrate, Mr Whitlock. Ostensibly, he was 
targeted by the commission for being ‘irritable and unsympathetic’; it noted a case 
where he had dismissed a policeman simply for using a piece of paper hidden behind 
his notebook to refresh his memory while reporting a traffic incident.
140
 However, 
Hayes’ protest at the decision to censure Whitlock revealed that the administration’s 
hostility to him may have been prompted by another motive. Hayes hinted that 
Whitlock might have offended officers by ‘insisting on observance of the safeguards 
for the accused contained in our procedure’.141 Hayes recalled that Whitlock had 
reported a number of officers to him for not following the correct legal procedure 
and in all of these cases he had upheld Whitlock.
142
 Debates over the ‘discipline’ of 
policemen therefore once more demonstrated a clash of outlooks. On the one hand 
were judges and police professionals who aspired to a legally regulated and well 
organized force; on the other were colonial officials who had a more flexible attitude 
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towards legal procedure and were ever willing to latch onto attempts to discipline the 
police in order to charge professionals with ‘not understanding’ the Sudanese. 
 
‘A depressed class, neglected by the government’: housing and service conditions 
While the Watson Commission emphasized the ‘personal’ factors that had 
contributed towards the Police Strike, it played down to some extent the seriousness 
of the more structural grievances of police officers with regards to their housing and 
service conditions. The approach of the commission’s report to these issues was 
indeed ambiguous in the extreme. Towards the end of the document it was admitted 
‘that the police as a whole did have a subconscious feeling of being a depressed 
class, neglected by the Government particularly as regards housing’.143 Nevertheless, 
this appeared as a barely developed footnote to a conclusion that was otherwise a 
diatribe against the inadequacies of the senior members of the force. It seemed that 
the convenors of the Watson Commission had been directed not to consider housing 
as a major grievance, for the issue was only dealt with under ‘minor grievances’ in 
the major body of the text. The report stated that:  
 
This subject we include under the head of minor grievances, but it is minor 
only in relation to our terms of reference and to the refusal of the Police to go 
to work on June 6
th
. It is indeed, we believe, the major grievance the police 
have.
144
 
 
How the ‘major’ grievance of the police would be of ‘minor’ relevance to their going 
on strike is quite unclear and the use of the phrase ‘terms of reference’ certainly 
suggests guidance by the administration. Nevertheless, the report did reveal a 
shocking state of neglect, noting that houses in Khartoum East station condemned as 
unfit for habitation in 1937 were still in use. It also charged the government with 
failing to comply with its statutory liabilities under the Police Regulations (section 
16) to provide barrack accommodation for married and unmarried men. It was noted 
that this left a deep-rooted feeling of neglect among the rank and file and that ‘the 
Central Government must accept its proportion of the blame’.145 In spite of this 
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statement, which reversed the previous pattern of blame, no criticism was made of 
the government in the conclusion to the report. Moreover, other issues were simply 
glossed over. Pay, apparently, was only an issue because housing was expensive, 
whereas  
 
other minor points such as sick leave, inadequacy of gratuities and the like 
have been mentioned en passant, but we pass over them without comment. 
They clearly had no bearing on the troubles and are matters of minor 
importance.
146
  
 
Harrison for one certainly felt that the report had made light of the issues of pay and 
housing, complaining that these questions, which appeared in the strikers’ list of 
grievances, were dealt with as major grievances by the strikers, whereas criticisms of 
James and himself were dealt with as major grievances but not listed in the strikers’ 
grievances.
147
 This was a slight deception: the last three strikers’ grievances dealt 
with problems of the systems of promotion and discipline, for both of which James 
and Harrison were culpable.
148
 Nevertheless, the rest of the grievances focused on 
housing and service conditions, from which the report clearly tried to deflect some of 
the attention by targeting the ‘character’ of the British officers. Robertson, writing 
confidentially to a colleague in Accra, offered a more balanced view than that 
produced by the commission he sponsored. While writing to the Sudan agent in 
London he produced the mono-causal explanation that ‘our police officers are a 
pretty poor lot, and we may have to make some radical changes’.149 However, he 
told ‘General Whistler’ a different story:- 
  
The officers generally seem to be out of touch with their men, but of course 
that was not the only cause of the trouble. I think police grievances have been 
neglected in the past and perhaps they have been badly done by in 
comparison with the SDF.
150
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Such an admission of the administration’s failings did not appear in any 
correspondence with fellow Sudan officials.  
 
Indeed, the efforts of the police professionals to rectify the housing 
grievances of their men showed them in a far better light than members of the 
Political Service. Harrison claimed to have raised the issue of housing with ‘the 
highest official in Sudan’, pointing out that 30 homes deemed unfit for habitation 
were still being used as married quarters by police, and observing, as Muhammad 
did in his account of the strike, that the mounted troops were still living in their 
horses’ stables.151 Harrison also claimed to have raised the issue of police clothing 
and short-term contracts; and he criticised the administration for not forestalling the 
demands of the police union with an inquiry into their grievances.
152
 The standards 
of housing in the provinces were even worse than they were in Khartoum. In 
Kassala, for instance, plans in 1945 to build brick and stone houses with grass roofs 
for policemen had to be set aside due to cost; and all but six of these planned houses 
were replaced with cheaper wood and grass, mud-plastered houses.
153
 Leslie James 
himself observed, as commandant of police in Kassala in 1949, that housing for 
police in the province was ‘still inadequate’ and that ‘it is doubtful whether the 
LE.7000 approved in the 1949-50 building proposals will be sufficient even to house 
all single police for whom the government is legally bound to provide 
accommodation’.154  
 
However, in some respects the approach of the British police professionals 
towards the material needs of their men was just as unsympathetic as that of the 
British administration. One of the reasons that James and Harrison fell out with their 
men was their decision to shut down the Khartoum police force’s canteen fund, 
which was being used by bachelors to secure loans for childbirth in order to settle up 
with their mistresses. James had in 1950 issued an order to the effect that all loans 
for childbirth would be terminated. Harrison believed that, rather than being used to 
help with the family lives of policemen, the fund should contribute towards the 
development of sports teams to compete with those of the SDF. It was the 
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disagreement of Sudanese officers with this proposal at the canteen fund meeting 
that led Harrison to lose his temper and state that this was ‘the worst exhibition of 
lack of esprit de corps that I recollect having come across’.155 While this revealed 
that Harrison was almost certainly responsible to some extent for the breakdown of 
relations with his men, this story revealed the somewhat paradoxical nature of the 
commission’s critique. Rather than revealing a modern bureaucrat obsessed with 
literacy, Harrison’s views demonstrated his belief in the public-school ideals of self-
sacrifice, manliness and esprit de corps of the Political Service, as well as to the 
imperial belief that Africans should be educated to be ‘less self-centred, take pride in 
the corporate body of which he is a member’.156 However, the Sudan government, 
which, as Harrison complained, had never provided any funding for the development 
of a sports team, had neglected the police to the extent that its officers could not live 
up to these ideals.  
 
Thus, while the emphasis of the Watson report was deliberately twisted so 
that the ‘personal’ factor appeared more prominent in the events surrounding the 
Police Strike, the prevalence of housing and service conditions as an issue in the 
strikers’ demands betrayed its true importance. Watson, Harrison and Robertson 
were all aware how badly the police had been neglected in this regard by the British, 
whose policies were in stark contrast to those of emerging Sudanese police 
commandants such as Amin Hussein, who had immediately emphasized the 
importance of using funds to improve police living conditions. 
 
The approach taken to service grievances after the strike 
The government did make some efforts to ameliorate police conditions in the 
aftermath of the strike, although its efforts fell well short of meeting the full 
demands of the strikers and were largely focused on the riverain centre, hence 
deepening the urban-rural dichotomy within the police system. Robertson requested 
that the Development Committee release funds for the improvement of police 
stations and the Police College; he also asked the financial secretary to make further 
provisions in the development budget ‘for the betterment and replacement of existing 
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housing which has been found below standard’.157 ‘I have already speeded up and 
completely re-organised the grossly delayed police re-housing program’, De Bunsen 
informed the Khartoum commandant of police, ‘and you have been ordered to report 
progress every 3 days. There will be no relaxation of pressure on PWD [the Public 
Works Department] and Municipal Engineer until it is completed’.158 The new 
houses comprised two mud rooms with a kitchen and a store.
159
 Moreover, a Police 
Club was set up with government support.
160
 Nevertheless, even by 1953 the Police 
College entry guidelines were forced to admit that there were ‘not sufficient houses’ 
to implement its policy of allotting one to every police officer’s post.161  Moreover, 
the positive changes that did occur led to an even greater disparity between the 
police forces in Sudan’s urban towns and its rural peripheries, which as Daly rightly 
comments was an example of the government ‘greasing the squeaky wheel’.162  
 
Robertson also jettisoned the administration’s initial promise to consent to 
the establishment of a police federation, instead substituting a provisional order 
amending the Police Ordinance that sanctioned the formation of ‘Police 
Associations’ on a provincial basis. This order was officially confirmed by the 
Legislative Assembly on 30 October 1951. In response to a member’s observation 
that the police ought to have a country-wide federation, Robertson said that ‘The 
federal principle suggested could be achieved quite easily by Commandants pooling 
at the annual meetings the proposals put forward by their respective local 
associations’.163 While the associations were to be elected by the police rank and file, 
this geographic decentralization and the reliance on the commandants to express 
grievances on a central basis undermined the potential for united expression of police 
grievances. Furthermore, the associations were to be limited to matters of welfare 
and efficiency while discipline, promotion and ‘individual complaints’ were 
excluded from the remit of the associations since ‘order had to be preserved in the 
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Police Force’.164 Thus by the beginning of the period of transitional government in 
1954 only a start had been made to meeting police grievances over service 
conditions. 
 
 
The continuation of the administration-police dispute into the late 
colonial period 
 
In the two years following the strike the power struggle between the police and the 
administration, which would continue to resent the extension of the central crime-
fighting apparatus into the provinces, would continue unabated. James was 
dismissed for good, although Harrison – after his impassioned defence of his conduct 
– was allowed back on probation on condition that he should remember ‘that 
personal contacts and sympathy with the rank and file are as important as good paper 
work’.165 On 19 August 1952, Beatty-Pownall, who had not been as involved in the 
events of 1951 as James and Harrison, caused further friction by issuing a letter in 
which he stated that the authority of the police headquarters would be extended 
throughout the provincial units in Sudan. He insisted that governors should delegate 
their powers over the police to the commandants of police ‘as soon as possible’.166 A 
practical example of the extension of the central crime-fighting apparatus into the 
rural periphery could be seen in the campaigns against hashish that were organized 
in the south after the appointment of British police commandants in Bahr al-Ghazal 
and Equatoria. A drive against hashish in Bahr al-Ghazal saw 350 people arrested 
and over 300 of them crammed into the province’s overflowing prisons; this elicited 
sarcastic remarks about the ‘ill-timed zeal’ of the police from the local administrator, 
T. H. R. Owen.
167
 It was this cynicism towards an interventionist style of policing 
that made governors refuse outright Beatty-Pownall’s demand that they devolve their 
powers.
168
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Nevertheless, as independence approached, the rapidly diminishing British 
administration decided to concede to a number of police demands, having lost any 
incentive to pursue its power struggle with them. On 5 April 1953, on the directions 
of the governor-general, the governors of the provinces delegated their powers under 
Section 8 of the Police Ordinance to their commandants of police, making them 
responsible for all technical, administrative, organizational and disciplinary aspects 
of police work. The commandants would become answerable to the commissioner of 
police, who would in turn be answerable to the governor-general.
169
 Unsurprisingly 
this change engendered a further series of frictions. Although the governor remained 
responsible for law and order, administrators objected that it would be impossible for 
him to maintain security when his principal security force was part of an independent 
body responsible to someone in the distant capital.
170
  
 
Meanwhile, the police headquarters protested that police independence had 
not gone far enough and on 7 December 1953 the commissioner of police passed the 
governor-general a memorandum signed by 42 officers demanding the establishment 
of an officially independent police department.
171
 This was something the 
government had promised to investigate in the aftermath of the strike, but on which 
it had stalled. However, this memorandum was successful in persuading the British 
administration to grant genuine departmental status to the police, effectively 
separating them from the newly established ministry of interior, which had 
effectively replaced the civil secretary’s office.172 This concession probably reflected 
the fact that the Political Service had been morally deflated by the 1952 Anglo-
Egyptian agreement, which had made the imminent independence of Sudan 
inevitable,
173
 and had thus to some extent abandoned their drive to retain a decisive 
monopoly on power. 
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Thus when the police force was fully Sudanized and handed over to its first 
Sudanese commissioner, Amin Ahmed Hussein, on 4 December 1954,
174
 the 
departing British administration could claim to have bequeathed Sudan an 
‘independent’ police force on the British model, but this was only true in the most 
superficial sense. While British administrators may finally have lost interest in their 
power struggle with the police, their Sudanese successors re-engaged in that struggle 
with vigour. Tensions would continue throughout the transitional period, as ‘very 
rude letters’ were exchanged between the police and administration.175 These 
tensions surfaced once more following the Southern Mutiny of 1955, during which a 
number of police and army units rebelled against the government. Claims were made 
to the Cotran Commission, which investigated the mutiny, that one of the causes of 
the breakdown in security in the south was the fact that, because of the transfer of 
police powers to an independent department, ‘the administration knew no more 
about what was secretly going on in a Province than the man in the street’.176 The 
Cotran Commission dismissed these claims, stating that the administration was fully 
aware of what was going on throughout the mutiny and that the police officers who 
participated in it were caught up in wider regional tensions and were not motivated 
by their conflict with the administration. 
 
Nevertheless, the newly Sudanized administration soon found a pretext to 
terminate the Police Department’s brief period of self-regulation, using the police 
responsibility for the massacre at Juda in 1956 (see Chapter 2) as a pretext.  
Members of the administration blamed the massacre on the police, arguing that they 
had not consulted them about the decision to put the men in the barracks because of 
their recently granted status as an independent department.
177
 These statements led to 
a rapid escalation in the tensions between the police and the administration.
178
 
Eventually, the latter won out, as the government put the police back under the 
Ministry of the Interior and cancelled the position of the commissioner of police.
179
 
This was particularly humiliating for the police as the post-colonial civil service, the 
successor to the Political Service, also fell under the aegis of the Ministry of the 
                                                 
174
 Mu’tader, Kitab, p. 122. 
175
 Report of the Commission of Inquiry, p. 12. 
176
 Ibid., p. 12. 
177
 Al-Istiqlal, 25 Feb.1956. 
178
 Al-Istiqlal, 1 March 1956. 
179
 Andrews to Lloyd, 16 March 1956, TNA FO 371/119668; Salim, Tatawwur, p. 275. 
139 
 
Interior. Since both services operated within the same ministry, transfers between 
them were permitted; and, since administrators continued to receive higher salaries, a 
number of the best qualified policemen transferred.
180
 Moreover, provincial police 
commandants were once more made subservient to governors and DCs in the 
provinces.
181
 Thus the police department’s two-year independence would represent 
little more than a blip in a long history of colonial and post-colonial 
authoritarianism. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Political Service at first portrayed the Police Strike as a product of subversive 
Ashiqqa’ and Communist activity and then as the fruit of character inadequacies, 
failures of ‘leadership’, and attempts to introduce a professional style of policing on 
the part of the British police officers leading the force. Each of these was only a 
partial truth. Both the Communists and Ashiqqa’ exploited the situation without 
creating it. Its roots lay more in the frustration of the police with poor service 
conditions and their ability to identify with other sectors within Sudanese society 
that had been successful in improving their own lot. The strike also reflected the 
desire of Sudanese police officers for a professionalized, modernized and 
nationalized police force rather than an adverse reaction to professionalization. 
While James and Harrison seem culpable of poor man-management on their own 
evidence, their lack of personal identification with the Sudanese was typical of 
imperial practice rather than the exception that Robertson and his commission 
charged. If anything, it was the sympathy of modernizing professionals likes James 
with Sudanese demands for an apolitical, independent and better funded Police 
Department that made them dangerous to the administration. The Political Service 
was able to use the strike to vindicate its own model of ‘administrative policing’, 
representing the strike as the inevitable result of an attempt to apply modern methods 
too soon. The models of ‘civil’ and ‘military’ styles of policing are more useful for 
analyzing the politics of the relationship between administrators and professional 
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police officers than for depicting a smooth and periodized transition in colonial 
policy.  
 
Moreover, the Watson Commission minimized the instrumental grievances 
with regard to pay and housing that most likely provided the real motivation behind 
the strike. Thus it was as much a political performance as a genuine investigation 
and it achieved its aim. James was dismissed and the police remained directly under 
the aegis of the executive until just before independence, leaving a legacy of 
administrative direction of police affairs that would prove to be highly relevant to the 
post-colonial period. Although Sudanese police officers attempted to exploit the 
divisions within the colonial state by demanding a ‘civil’ police force themselves, 
the administration was able to frustrate their demands. Part of the reason the Police 
Strike failed to achieve all its goals was that, in spite of the fact it was influenced by 
the wider labour and nationalist movements, it had become isolated from colonial 
society at large when the British government used it to crush demonstrations and 
arrest agitators. By using the police as a tool of oppression, the government had 
bound the police to itself and was thus not obliged to grant it the same privileges 
acquired by other sectors of society envied by the police. The successes and failures 
of the strike were also connected to the colonial policy of dividing the force along 
regional lines. While the strike was initially so successful in the riverain centre and 
gained limited concessions there because of the relative social and cultural 
homogeneity of the force in that region, it acquired little support outside this core. 
This was indicative of a wider centre-periphery split in Sudanese nationalism that 
would continue to be relevant to the development of the force throughout the 
twentieth century.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
141 
 
4 The 1964 October Revolution and the peak of ‘civil’ 
policing in Sudan 
 
 
For liberal Sudanese, the ‘October Revolution’ of 1964, by which the military 
regime of General Ibrahim Abboud was removed, remains a ‘glorious memory’1 of a 
halcyon age where mass civil disobedience was capable of overthrowing arbitrary 
regimes. Sudanese intellectuals proudly claim that the leaders of the October 
Revolution had achieved the task of removing a dictatorial regime through mass civil 
disobedience ‘for the first time in Africa and the Middle East’.2 On one level, the 
police force was cast in this drama in its usual role as the villain of the piece. 
Nevertheless, this chapter will show that the events which provided its spark – the 
invasion of Khartoum university campus and the shooting of the student Ahmad 
Qurayshi – were, in the frenetic manner in which they unfolded, indicative of the 
police’s weakness and limitations as a systematic tool of regime coercion. Moreover, 
the reaction of the police to the October Revolution and the criticism they received 
during it showed their social porosity and their capacity to adapt and mimic the 
educated and professional sectors of Sudanese society comprising the ‘modern 
forces’ (al-quwwat al-haditha) that had engineered the public protests. Just as during 
the Police Strike of 1951 the strikers had followed the strategies of the emergent 
professional unions, so it will be demonstrated that following the October 
Revolution police officers sought similarly to strengthen their professional and 
institutional identity and gain concessions from the regime. Although events 
following the ‘University Incident’ (as Qurayshi’s killing would become known) 
would mark the high point of the internal police drive for greater reform and 
institutional autonomy, it will be seen that they also highlighted the ambivalent 
position of the police: at once a part of the state and in tension with the various 
factions that dominated it. These factions would include the post-colonial civil 
service, the military (in power between 1958 and 1964), the ‘modern forces’ that 
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dominated the transitional regime which lasted for five months following the 
October Revolution, and the sectarian political parties – the Umma, PDP and NUP – 
that replaced the ‘modern forces’ after the 1965 elections. Thus the police were both 
hampered by and able to exploit the divides within the state. 
 
 Studying the institutional development of the police force during this period 
enables us to explore questions about the level of agency that it was able to exercise 
and thus understand the precise extent of its independence within the state. As during 
the late colonial era, police officers sought to expand police education as a means to 
increase the professionalization of the force – since, as Hills observes, 
professionalization facilitates autonomy.
3
 In the 1960s professional officers also 
attempted to achieve autonomy by making the force akin to a family in its own right, 
fostering economic self-dependence through the establishment of co-operative 
projects and financial provision for the children of its members. Autonomous police 
forces can act almost as unions
4
 and this occurred in 1964 and 1965 in a similar 
manner to 1951, with policemen using strikes and demonstrations to exact 
concessions from the regime. 
 
How strong was the notion of civil policing in this period? The legacy of the 
‘University Incident’ and the October Revolution of 1964 would prove highly 
relevant to a force that, facing increasing public stigmatization for what was depicted 
as the murder of Qurayshi, increasingly attempted to represent itself as a civil force. 
The chapter will argue that a number of Sudanese officers attempted to apply values 
that their British colonizers had advocated but not exercised, consciously attempting 
to re-engineer their image and expand the police force so as to make it more 
accessible to the public. However this did not necessarily represent police 
‘autonomy’ and a capacity to change sides at will, as Marenin would have it5 – 
political purges and public condemnation of the police both played a significant role 
in encouraging the police to adapt their image. Nevertheless, the considerable 
restraint exercised by both the public and the judiciary over the Sudanese Police 
Force during the early postcolonial period challenges prevailing scholarly and 
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journalistic depictions of African and Middle Eastern police forces as predatory and 
alienated from society.
6
 The independence and institutional authority of the judiciary 
during this era enabled it to regulate to some extent the corruption and politicized 
abuse of power by policemen to an extent that was not possible during other periods. 
Moreover, the fact that the majority of the police force within the central urban areas, 
in which revolutionary activities occurred, continued to hail from the same relatively 
homogenous and socially integrated riverain population made it possible for the 
media to ‘shame’ the police.   
 
 This chapter will show that Sudanese police officers in the 1960s were 
attempting to build a ‘governmentalist’ and transformative force, developing the 
technologies of social control they felt had been denied to them by a colonizing 
power with a limited focus on purely political security. The function of this police 
force would be to respond to the emergence of novel forms of crime that had begun 
to appear in the twentieth century and to safeguard urban Sudanese civilization. In 
this sense, the Sudanese understanding of what a ‘civil’ police force represented was 
fundamentally exclusionary because it effectively otherized Sudan’s vast rural 
frontier regions, especially in the west and south. Even in the Nile Valley area, the 
concept of the ‘civil’ police force was never fully realized and the public remained 
suspicious of the force on account of the colonial legacy and the continuing 
manipulation of the police by politicians. 
 
 
The University Incident and the role of the police during the 
October Revolution 
 
The physical clashes between police and students that led up to the shooting of 
Qurayshi would demonstrate that police violence was as indicative of police 
weakness and the ineffectiveness of their methods of control as it was of a deliberate 
policy of brutality (see Chapter 2). The shooting occurred in the context of 
increasing tension between the Ministry of Interior and student groups over the 
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latter’s right to hold seminars criticizing the government’s war policy in the south. 
On 10 October the ministry had forbidden further discussion of the ‘southern 
question’ within the university and arrested and then released on bail the president 
and secretary of the Khartoum University Students’ Union.7 The union responded on 
14 October with a letter accusing the government of tyrannical behavior towards 
itself and in dealing with the situation in the south, which resulted in its entire 
executive council being arrested on 15 June.
8
 Thus when the students gathered again 
on 21 October, the police again tried to break up their meeting. It appears that the 
students were alerted to their arrival by the discovery of plain-clothes men mingling 
among them and had prepared themselves by bringing sticks and stones into the 
boarding houses.
9
 Immediately rejecting an ultimatum to disperse, they were sprayed 
with tear gas. However, the circumstances of how long it took the police to open fire 
and why they did so, remain unclear. According to the Egyptian newspaper al-
Akhbar, it occurred almost immediately after the students had started throwing 
stones.
10
 However, a reporter in the Sudanese paper al-Sahafa claimed that it 
happened after a one and a half hour battle between students and police.
11
 The 
Sudanese Ministry of Interior statements and British embassy both reported that the 
police had been encircled by students by the time they opened fire.
12
 The ministry 
spokesman stated that it was an officer of the rank of Hakimdar (commandant) who 
had given the order to open fire and that he had shouted two warnings beforehand.
13
 
Whatever the cause of the order, its result was the effective martyrdom of Qurayshi 
and the injury of around 80 other students. 
 
While the University Incident and its aftermath demonstrated the potential 
for police violence, it also showed the limitations on the use of the contemporary 
police as a tool against opposition elements. ‘Abd al-Wahhab Ibrahim, a serving 
officer at the time, argues that the police made a mistake in actually entering the 
university campus as this inevitably led to them being surrounded by students and 
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being forced to open fire. According to Ibrahim, the police leadership at the time was 
divided over whether to enter the university or wait outside and disperse the students 
if they chose to demonstrate on the streets.
14
 The use of plain-clothes policemen – 
contrary to their whole purpose – simply exposed the police to the students. As for 
the tear gas, this was no more successful than it had been in the colonial period (see 
Chapter 2). Henderson states that most of it ‘blew back or was thrown back in their 
faces’.15 Witnesses recalled that the students retreated to the dormitories and waited 
for the police to run out of tear gas bombs, then attacked again.
16
  
 
The limited coercive capacities of the police were also demonstrated by their 
inability to prevent the indefatigable ‘Abd al-Rahman Mukhtar of the daily al-Sahafa 
from printing and distributing 13,000 copies of a special edition exposing what had 
occurred. This edition conveyed the protest petitions of the teachers, lawyers, judges, 
and press editors, as well as a very detailed account of events surrounding the 
shooting. While it was being prepared at the al-Sahafa headquarters, Mukhtar 
received a visit from police officer Ismat Maani, who insisted on seeing the proofs 
for the next day’s edition. However, Mukhtar was able to meet him outside and 
convince him that the proofs were not yet ready and that he would not publish any of 
the petitions. Mukhtar then ordered his staff to continue writing without speaking a 
word to each other, and using only candlelight, to avoid attracting further police 
attention.
17
 This also suggests that the police were at this time still wary of intruding 
upon private space, thus giving elements opposed to the regime vital opportunity for 
manoeuvre.    
 
The police response to the public condemnation of the shooting 
The resultant edition of al-Sahafa would highlight the vulnerability of the police to 
public and social condemnation of their use of coercion, demonstrating their 
limitations as a tool for the intimidation of the public by military regimes. Apart 
from publishing all the petitions of complaint penned by doctors, university lecturers 
and lawyers concerning the ‘savagery’ of the police during the University Incident, 
the newspaper told other stories of how the police dealt with the ensuing 
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demonstrations.
18
 These included accounts of them insulting women and beating and 
shooting innocent demonstrators in front of young children.
19
 The doctors described 
the wounds they had seen inflicted by the police on the students as if they had been 
struck ‘in a battle between noble Muslims and Jews callous of heart’20 and refused to 
treat injured policemen who were instead sent to military wards.
21
 The university 
lecturers, who also protested the action, described the university as a haram jadir b’il 
taqdis (sanctuary worthy of reverence).
22
 It is likely that at a time when urban 
Sudanese society was still relatively close-knit, this public and religiously-tinged 
stigmatization would have significantly demoralized the police force, which was still 
at this time largely composed of recruits drawn from the same riverain backgrounds 
as the student protestors.
23
 
 
Soon after the shooting, the lawyers’ and judges’ associations declared a 
strike and marched out onto the street.
24
  They also issued a petition, which 
emphasized that the police action not only contradicted legal regulations (yatanafi 
wa al-qawa’id al-qanuniyya) but had also violated the ‘haram’ (sanctuary) of the 
university which was a ‘mihrab muqaddas’ (holy sanctum). Most importantly, the 
judges stated that the shooting of Ahmad Qurayshi should be treated as a crime of 
intentional homicide.
 25
   
 
The immediate effect of this moral and legal condemnation of the behavior of 
the police by the professional groups and the media was that large sections of the 
police started to refuse orders to open fire on the public, which in turn played a 
crucial role in the continuation of the demonstrations that eventually toppled the 
regime. This happened in particular after the Ministry of Interior issued a statement 
blaming the police themselves for opening fire on the students, and claiming that no 
orders had been issued sanctioning this. Thus a number of policemen, realizing that 
they would not be supported by the regime and would perhaps be liable to 
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prosecution if they used further force in similar situations again, began to refuse to 
act against demonstrations and even joined the crowds instead.
26
 The police also 
showed their deference to the judiciary by agreeing to disperse when commanded to 
do so by ‘Abd al-Majid Imam, who led the judges’ and lawyers’ demonstration.27 
Mahgoub al-Tijani, a liberal ex-policeman, recalls that  
 
The Sudan’s police was positively acting towards people. They did not shoot 
at them with gunfire. They did not rush to arrest them.  They sometimes 
abandoned certain stations to avoid confrontation with the demonstrators.
28
  
 
Leftist activists also have a similar memory of events to that of al-Tijani. For 
example, one ex-Communist recalled that the police in Khartoum remained inactive 
for three weeks afterwards because ‘they did not want to hurt the people’.29 The 
police also adopted non-confrontational behavior in towns such as Port Sudan and 
Dueim, as the Revolution spread to the provinces.
30
  
 
However, the active nature of the force’s participation in the Revolution can 
be exaggerated. While policemen and those nostalgic for the Revolution often 
proudly remember how they ‘joined the people’, the extent to which this actually 
happened is by no means clear. K. D. D. Henderson, a European witness, implies 
that they were simply overwhelmed by the situation. He states that on Friday 23 
October ‘the police were thoroughly demoralized and stood by helplessly’ as 
demonstrators hijacked their broadcasting apparatus, sabotaged their vehicles and 
committed various acts of vandalism.
31
 Aging Khartoumers tend to remember that 
those policemen who joined in the demonstration did so in plain-clothes, leaving 
their uniforms at home.
32
 This would seem to indicate that their involvement was as 
individual citizens rather than as policemen. Meanwhile, some policemen continued 
to support the army in clashing with demonstrators and killed three more of them on 
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the evening of 25 October.
33
 Nevertheless, it is clear that large sections of the force 
refrained from further action against demonstrators for fear of legal and public 
reprisals. Thus the events that followed the University Incident epitomized the 
dilemma of Sudanese policemen, who were socially stigmatized and caught between 
competing pressures exercised by different factions within the state – in this case an 
intransigent military government and an independent judiciary. 
 
The police and the transition from military to parliamentary government 
It is difficult to assess precisely how important police passivity towards 
demonstrations was in toppling the regime and in subsequent events. Although 
Sudanese officers did not exactly play a decisive political role, it seems that their 
inactivity enabled other political actors to put pressure on the departing regime and 
its successors. Certainly, the role of the military should be acknowledged. Sudanese 
are fond of stating that the army determines precisely what occurs in Sudanese 
politics; and it is clear that it was the rebellion of left wing officers led by Farouk 
Hamdalla and Hashim al-Atta within the army itself on 26 October that played a key 
role in persuading the military rulers to step down.
34
 A number of historians have 
also stressed the importance of the fact that Abboud himself was not keen to hold on 
to power.
35
 Nevertheless, by its passive approach towards the demonstrations the 
police had to some extent forced the hand of the army by bringing it into direct 
confrontation with the Sudanese public. When anti-regime demonstrators led their 
decisive ‘march towards the Palace’ on 27 October while civilian leaders were 
negotiating with the Supreme Council inside, it was the military that was forced to 
confront them. The army opened fire with machine guns, ultimately killing tens of 
demonstrators. Thus the military found itself in the same position in which the police 
had been put days before: forced into the use of legally and morally questionable 
violence against the public.
36
 The historian Hajj Hamad recalls the effect this had on 
soldiers, observing that some grabbed the weapons of their comrades to prevent them 
harming demonstrators. He also suggests that the demonstrators were stronger than 
the soldiers not because of force of arms but ‘because we were of them’.37 Thus 
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while the (in)action of the police force during the October Revolution was not 
decisive, indirectly it put a great deal of pressure on the army which may well have 
contributed to the military regime’s decision to relinquish power. 
 
During the transitional period police inaction would continue to have 
significant political consequences, although again this was perhaps as much evidence 
of police passivity as it was of police autonomy. Although the Revolution had 
demonstrated the capacity of the police to act independently of the regime, it also left 
them in a state of disarray. On 14 November Abboud was forced to resign as 
president, and was replaced by a ‘Transitional Regime’ dominated by the 
‘Professional Front’, which contained a number of leftists and labour activists who 
had been monitored by the police under Abboud’s regime.38 The new minister of 
interior in this regime was a southerner, Clement Mboro. According to one former 
northern security official, Mboro blamed the police for having previously arrested 
him on suspicion of affiliation to the southern rebel movement. Mboro appointed 
Franco Garang, the brother of the influential southern Communist, Joseph Garang, as 
head of his office, which supposedly gave the Communist movement a means to 
influence the ministry and take revenge on their old opponents in the police.
39
 There 
were purges of senior officers, including the commissioner of police Abbas 
Muhammad Fadl, and his deputy for criminal investigation, ‘Abdullah Abbaro.40  
 
The force remained in shock on account of these political reprisals against it 
for its role in the University Incident and in consequence adopted a stoic attitude 
towards the outbreaks of crowd violence that occurred during the transitional regime 
of Sirr al-Khatim al-Khalifa. They ‘were still demoralized and had tacit instructions 
not to interfere with demonstrations’ during this period.41 On 9 November, a 
Communist purporting to be a member of the transitional regime used Radio 
Omdurman to spread a rumor that the army was planning a coup, prompting crowds 
of Communist-led demonstrators to erect barricades and block traffic. The police 
appear to have been singularly passive during these events, and it was ultimately the 
Umma party, through its deployment of the Ansar against the rioters, that broke up 
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the protests.
42
 The police were similarly passive during the ‘Black Sunday’ riots of 6 
December, when southern migrants living in Khartoum began rioting after hearing 
false rumours that the plane of the southern minister of interior, Clement Mboro, had 
been shot down. The media observed that the police simply stood by and watched 
the ethnic violence between northerners and southerners ensue.
43
 In a statement the 
next day, al-Khalifa defended the police by stating that events following the October 
Revolution had made them uneasy in dealing with demonstrations,
44
 although Hajj 
Hamad claims that the police had specific orders not to deal with the riots, perhaps 
reflecting the fact that the regime was just as nervous as the police themselves about 
the use of violence against Khartoum citizens.
45
 
 
 Al-Khalifa’s government would finally make its position clear after the 
police did use their firearms on 18 February 1965, against striking workers at a 
cotton ginnery in Port Sudan. Al-Khalifa and his minister for prime ministerial 
affairs Muhammad Jabara Awad publicly condemned this incident, promised a full 
investigation, and stated that the police would not be used to violently disperse 
strikes or any other kind of gathering in the future.
46
 Naturally, these promises were 
forgotten after the transitional government’s replacement by a far more conservative 
government, less closely linked to the unions, after the March elections. Nevertheless 
the reaction of the al-Khalifa government towards the Port Sudan shootings was 
further evidence of how, in the aftermath of the Revolution, the tensions within the 
state had continued to leave the police in a state of paralysis. Given the uncertainty 
of the dispensation of power at this time and their continuing exposure to public 
criticism, officers – with the exception of those involved in the Port Sudan shootings 
– seem to have decided that inactivity posed the least risk to themselves. 
 
Police-society relations 
The October Revolution put the spotlight firmly on the relationship between the 
police and the Sudanese public, in some respects offering an opportunity to sections 
of society to make the police ‘theirs’. For instance, in the aftermath of the 
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Revolution, with the police in chaos and senior officers being purged, popular 
committees composed of ‘citizens’ began to call on members of the police to join 
units known as the ‘National Guard’ (al-haras al-watani) and even donated their 
own guns and cars to them.
47
 
 
The police themselves, both before and after the October Revolution, were 
determined to represent themselves as a ‘public’ force. Policemen were afraid that 
the reputation of being ‘black English’ (ingliz sud),48 obtained while they had been 
suppressing nationalist and trade union demonstrations in the late colonial period, 
would carry over into the nationalist era. A symbolic effort to renegotiate this image 
had been made in 1961 by replacing the old militaristic colonial motif of the police 
of two crossed rifles with the one still used by the Sudanese police today, that of the 
‘sleepless eye’ (al-ayn al-sahira) and ‘hand of help’ (al-yadd al-musa’ada).49 This 
was a conscious attempt by the police to decolonize the old Condominium motif, 
which according to one policeman writing in 1965 was designed to put fear into the 
Sudanese people and ‘has distorted the image of the police to this day’.50 Moreover, 
the helpful hand and watchful eye emphasized what are seen to be the two key 
aspects of a modern and civil police force, a panoptical vision and a willingness to 
help the public.  
 
In spite of this bid to re-engineer their image, the police had struggled to 
develop a strong relationship with the public, particularly during Abboud’s regime. 
Key elements in this lack of trust were the twin political and criminal functions that 
the police continued to exercise. This was evidenced at a press conference in 1964 
when al-Ra’i al-‘Aam reported that  
 
Mukhtar Muhammad Hasan asked the Minister of the Interior whether he 
knew that the investigative police (al-bulis al-mubahith) disappear in national 
dress (al-jalbab al-watani) to get information secretly. However, it is not 
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long before they are required to give evidence and thus reveal themselves and 
after this the crowds treat them with reservation.
51
 
 
When al-Ra’i al-‘Aam interviewed the deputy commandant of the Omdurman police, 
Joel Akec, on this subject in July 1964 he observed that when members of the public 
were willing to accept police help they usually demanded that they come to their 
houses in a vehicle other than a government car.
52
 Thus the public, deprived of a 
genuinely community-orientated police force, were willing to accept police help only 
if officers displayed no connection with the state. Another useful observation made 
by Akec – who, as a southerner, perhaps offered a more detached viewpoint – was 
that the problem of lack of trust in the police was more profound in the cities than in 
the countryside, which to him seemed counterintuitive as he treated trust in the state 
as a question of ‘awareness’ (wa’i).53 However, popular suspicions could easily be 
explained by the fact that urban areas were where the CID cracked down on trade 
unions and student movements, to which many urban Sudanese were in some way 
connected. 
 
After the October Revolution, the police would launch a new drive to 
represent themselves as a ‘civil’ force, but they continued to struggle to refute their 
stigmatization in the press as a tool of colonialists and military dictators. In 1965 two 
articles appeared in Police Magazine bemoaning the charges in the newly liberated 
Sudanese press that the police had a minimal presence on the street and were unable 
to solve crimes.
54
 Their author, ‘Abdullah Ibrahim, argued that the press was 
deliberately exploiting the negative image of the police created by colonialism. It 
was this that deterred citizens from assisting the police, demoralized policemen and 
encouraged criminals.
55
 Thus even during what would later be regarded as the 
halcyon days of civil policing, both the legacy of the politicization of the force by the 
colonial state, and its contemporary manipulation by various political groups, were 
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sowing the seeds of mistrust between police and public – in spite of the social links 
that existed between them at the riverain core. 
 
 
Relations between judiciary and police 
 
As observed above, the actions of the Sudanese judges during the October 
Revolution provided clear evidence of the moral and legal influence an 
independently-minded judiciary could exercise to rein in police brutality directed by 
the political executive. Throughout the revolutionary period, judges showed little 
eagerness to sanction police actions against demonstrators. In Port Sudan, the 
commandant of police used tear gas to disperse a demonstration only after 
disobeying the order of the resident judge, who reportedly observed that ‘the country 
would change in a few minutes’ and that dispersing the crowd would lead to 
innocent women and children being hurt.
56
 Here, the police officer was willing to 
disregard judicial authority but in Khartoum, the events that followed the ‘University 
Incident’ demonstrated that the police both feared and respected it. They showed 
their deference to the judiciary by refusing to disperse the demonstration of lawyers 
and judges and withdrawing at the command of Chief Justice ‘Abd al-Majid Imam.57  
 
The ‘Abd al-Majid Imam incident was a key moment in a chain of legal and 
political tensions that occurred in the early nationalist period between Sudan’s 
soldiers and politicians on the one hand, and the most legally principled of judges on 
the other. Abboud, on taking the reins of power in 1958, had rapidly announced a 
state of emergency and declared war on perceived political subversives, using the 
CID to arrest Communists and members of banned political parties. The regime was 
also particularly harsh on youth organizations, using the police to arrest their 
members in Fasher and Medani, and sending police with whips and tear gas into the 
libraries and classrooms of Khartoum University to detain students who had 
protested against the regime.
58
 As part of this crackdown, the first military regime 
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extended to one month the period of detention without trial for those deemed 
subversive of ‘national security’, which could be extended by the minister of interior 
if he believed the reasons for arrest remained.
59
  
 
However, the judiciary proved to be unwilling to rubber-stamp arbitrary 
methods. Their refusal to capitulate in the face of executive tyranny recalled the 
clashes between the judiciary and administration over habeus corpus in the colonial 
era. As a result, while the police frequently intimidated and arrested Communists, 
they were often unable to justify holding them for long periods or to make persuasive 
cases for prosecution. For instance, the police case against ‘Abd al-Khaliq Mahgub, 
leader of the Sudan Communist Party, was dismissed by the attorney-general in 
1960.
60
 This was after ‘Abdullah Abbaro, the head of the CID branch within the 
force, had refused to divulge most of his evidence on the grounds that it involved 
‘state secrets’, and one prosecution witness had withdrawn his testimony claiming 
that it was fabricated and that he was coerced into attesting the truth of it by 
Abbaro.
61
 Abbaro, who was present at the University Incident, would be discharged 
from service after the Revolution, in which the judiciary played a key role.
62
 
 
In the aftermath of the Revolution, the judiciary continued to maintain its 
institutional autonomy and authority over the police force and this ensured that both 
were respected by the politicians of the second parliamentary regime. It was police 
officers acting on behalf of the attorney-general who investigated senior army 
officers who had exploited the military’s period in power to accumulate illegal 
wealth in the ‘forbidden riches’ (thara’ al-haram) case.63 ‘Abd al-Wahhab Ibrahim 
recalls that in 1965 the minister of interior, Ahmad al-Mahdi, was accused of assault 
by a lawyer whom he attacked with a stick during an Umma Party meeting. Ibrahim 
states that after the incident al-Mahdi came willingly to the police station and 
surrendered the stick, which demonstrated his respect for the police.
64
 Sudanese 
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police officers were also publicly entrusted with the investigation into the actions of 
the generals who attempted to overthrow the parliamentary government during the 
Khalid al-Kidd coup attempt of 1967. They also acted as witnesses for both the 
defence and prosecution at the trial.
65
 
 
The authority that the judiciary could exercise over the police was further 
demonstrated by the fact that policemen who committed criminal acts on or off duty 
continued to be tried in the mainstream courts, even during the Abboud Regime.
66
 In 
1961, a civilian court convicted a policeman for killing a man who resisted arrest.
67
 
In another court case from the same year, a Sudan justice dismissed an accusation of 
assaulting a public servant made by a policeman against a man he had tried, with 
little justification, to arrest in Wau market. The justice, al-Fatih Awouda, observed 
that policemen ‘should not be allowed to please themselves with (their) powers. 
Abuse of power leads to a disregard of the law of the state, and disregard of the law’, 
he concluded, ‘leads to a state of chaos.’68 
 
  Policemen were also tried in the mainstream courts in the second 
parliamentary era.
69
 However, as was the case during the colonial era, a criminal 
conviction by a judge did not necessarily debar a policeman from continuing to serve 
in the force. In 1964 a court in Khartoum found a policeman guilty of causing a man 
to lose his eye by poking it in a fight. The presiding magistrate awarded the 
policeman a 15 pound fine, but observed that he did not expect the policeman to be 
dismissed as he was not wearing official clothes at the time.
70
 It also remained easy 
for policemen to get away with abuses in Sudan’s peripheral regions, where state 
judicial authority continued to be weak. One former officer, Abu Humayd Ibrahim, 
recounts that while he was serving at Raja in Bahr al-Ghazal in the 1960s a 
policeman was found to have abducted a local girl and hidden her in his house. 
Rather than being dismissed from the force, the local police authorities simply dealt 
with the ‘misdemeanour’ by transferring him to Wau.71 Thus even in the 1960s, 
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when regulation of the police by the judiciary was still strong, the willingness and 
ability of the state to control police criminality was still limited. The policies of the 
judiciary during this period reflected an unresolved conflict within the state that had 
been inherited from the colonial power, between legal professionals who strove for a 
well-regulated and apolitical police force and policemen and politicians who sought 
to evade such regulation. 
 
 
The continuing struggle for a ‘civil’ police force 
 
Professionalization and education 
Partly as a response to some of the negative public opinion that had persisted even 
after the Revolution, and partly as a means of improving their status as an institution, 
a number of officers launched a concerted effort to transform the Sudan’s police into 
a more identifiably modern and civil force. As in the colonial era, one key factor in 
this drive was education. This expanded considerably between the late 1950s and the 
1970s, at least in comparison with the colonial era. While the numbers of police 
officers graduating from the Police College between 1937 and 1941 were in single 
figures, by the 1950s these figures were in the twenties and in the 1960s the numbers 
had reached the thirties.
72
 In 1959 the Police College was moved to a new building 
in Khartoum to meet the needs of advanced training. Education played an 
increasingly more important role in the police system. In 1967 the minister of 
interior announced that the Police College would start taking in university students, 
arguing that crime in Sudan had developed to the extent that a greater level of ability 
was required to deal with it.
73
 In 1968 the system of promotion was modified so that 
officers were required to take examinations in order to rise through the ranks, with 
165 officers sitting promotion examinations in that year.
74
 Hills argues that post-
colonial police training differed little from that of the colonial era, but such claims 
are not entirely true.
75
 When Abu Humayd Ibrahim took his proficiency pay exam in 
1971 he studied both psychology and sociology, neither of which was offered on the 
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Police College curriculum during the colonial era.
76
 The result of this education was 
that officers such as Ibrahim developed a far more sophisticated view of criminal 
behavior and compiled records on miscreants that analyzed their family 
relationships, personal lives and educational experience.
77
  
 
The prestige of the Police College at this time was reflected in the numerous 
senior positions its graduates took up outside the police. Salim’s Tarikh al-Shurta 
(History of the Police) lists several prominent individuals who graduated from the 
Police College in the late 1950s and during the 1960s and took up posts as 
diplomats, members of parliament, provincial governors, and government 
ministers.
78
 The last time Salim mentions any individual graduating from the College 
who would later take up a senior post is in his entry for 1976, which underlines the 
importance of the College in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
 
An indication of the new, educated, outlook of the force was the appearance 
of the Police Magazine (Majallat al-Shurta), which began publishing in 1961. Here 
police officers and students of the Police College expressed views that could broadly 
be seen as progressive, humanitarian and modernist. One article suggested to 
policemen that they had a ‘humanitarian message’ (risalatak insaniyya) to send.79 
Modern sociological texts such as Michael Banton’s pioneering work The Policeman 
in the Community were reviewed.
80
 The police considered that they were adapting to 
meet the needs of an urban society that was increasingly breaking down the bonds of 
village and ‘tribe’ (qabila).81 Thus, when the police depicted themselves as the 
protectors of the people what was often meant was the people of urban Sudan and 
the central ‘Arab’ riverain region in particular. The vast western and southern 
regions of Sudan that were still perceived as ‘tribal’ were otherized in language 
similar to that used by the former British colonizers. Southern Sudan was referenced 
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in the Police Magazine primarily in the context of amateur anthropology
82
 and ‘tribal 
fights’ (al-mushajarat al-qabaliyya), which were described as a feature of ‘backward 
primitive societies’.83 Thus the education that was so key to the professionalization 
of the police force was also strengthening its geographical, cultural and racial biases. 
The 1960s – and the aftermath of the Revolution in particular – were also a period in 
which the police were particularly successful in managing the technical development 
of the force. The field of technical expertise was another realm in which the 
Sudanese had felt ‘left behind’ because of colonialism. In 1948, for example, 
journalists bitterly lamented that policemen were not carrying cameras to photograph 
crime scenes or using police dogs, which were being used in other Arab countries.
84
 
After dealing with a case of embezzlement in the late 1950s, Sudanese magistrate 
Jalal Ali Lutfi complained that police handwriting and fingerprint experts had not 
been much use as Sudan’s British colonizers had never given them ‘a proper 
scientific training’.85  
 
To remedy these deficiencies, in the mid-1950s the force established a 
relationship with West Germany which resulted in the provision of a new telex 
system, alongside the opportunity for officers to be sent for training to that country.
86
 
By 1967 the West Germans had finished establishing a telex system for the police 
that covered all of Sudan’s provinces and major cities; they had also provided a 
system of mobile radios to be used in cars and steamboats.
87
  After the Revolution 
this relationship became particularly fruitful, a new criminal laboratory being 
established in 1965 with equipment, training and expertise provided by West 
Germany.
88
 Also, police dogs were imported from Egypt and by 1968 were being 
successfully used by the Criminal Investigation Department.
89
 As the police system 
expanded, more and more citizens began reporting offences to the police. The figure 
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for the number of offences reported to the police in Sudan per 100,000 of the 
population rose from 2,159 in 1965 to 2,608 in 1969.
90
 
 
The year 1960 witnessed the emergence of the ‘bulis najda’, although it was 
not until 1968 that this new unit was furnished with new cars and up-to-date 
communications equipment.
91
 The meaning of ‘najda’ is somewhat ambiguous and 
therefore difficult to translate. Hans Wehr translates ‘bulis najda’ as ‘riot squad’ 
with reference to Egypt, although in Sudan the crowd control functions were clearly 
performed by other units (see Chapter 5). One ex-policeman informed me that najda, 
in this context, should be translated as ‘rescue’, which emphasized the desire of the 
police to help the people, in keeping with the popular image the police were then 
trying to develop. However, the English language press at the time translated ‘bulis 
najda’ as ‘Emergency Police’.92 The ‘Emergency Police’, who continue up until the 
present day, were there so that 
 
If you have a thief come to you, any problem, your wife is ill, would like to 
give birth, you can get help from them. It is not only for riots.
93
 
 
Indeed, the ‘Emergency Police’ possessed a special, easy-to-remember telephone 
number to facilitate access by the public.
94
 However, it is important to remember that 
at the time that this body was established, only the most developed quarters of 
northern riverain towns would have access to telephones.
95
 This again demonstrates 
how the ethos of civil policing espoused by the policemen of this generation in fact 
excluded vast numbers of Sudanese in the peripheries. 
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The struggle to demilitarize and depoliticize the police 
A number of police officers in this period were keen to demonstrate that, being a 
civil force, the Sudanese police were non-military and independent of politics. In 
1966, Commandant Babiker Ahmed Abid declared proudly in the Police Magazine 
that the police were a ‘civil force’ (quwwa madaniyya) and so differed significantly 
from the army in terms of their functions, training and the laws that governed them.
96
 
However, the ‘civil’ nature of the police was something that was constantly 
contested. The conflict between the new civil service – the successor to the Sudan 
Political Service – and the police continued along much the same lines as in the 
colonial era. One senior police officer recalled in an interview that Sudan’s post-
colonial administrators ‘wanted to keep the same standard, the same situation as in 
British rule’ whilst ‘the police, mainly, they say that they are educated, they are 
specialized in their field of work, and they need not go to a person who is not 
specialized in … security matters’.97 
  As we have seen, the degree of authority which the Police Headquarters had 
managed to achieve over the provincial forces in the late colonial era was soon 
curtailed in the early independence era as the official power to govern these forces 
was handed back to the administration;
98
 this occurred even though police officers 
often retained de facto responsibility for the training, administration and technical 
management of their local forces.
99
 After the 1958 coup, Abboud transferred 
responsibility for ‘security’ in the provinces from the civil administration to military 
governors, thus placing the police commandants there under a new set of masters.
100
 
However, in some respects the decline in the status of the civil governors and district 
commissioners enhanced the authority of the police. The 1961 Provincial 
Administration Law, designed on the advice of a judicial committee under Chief 
Justice Abu Rannat, acknowledged the de facto authority of police commandants in 
technical matters and decreed that provincial police commandants should once more 
be responsible to the police commissioner for the administration, organization and 
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discipline of the force.
101
 The Abu Rannat committee also rehabilitated the position 
of the police commissioner by updating the 1928 Police Law so as to grant him legal 
authority to issue orders to commandants – which he had, in practice, been doing 
without sanction for some time.
102
 
 
Thus Hills’ argument that after independence African police forces 
increasingly blurred with the military
103
 is not entirely applicable in the Sudanese 
case. Nevertheless, under army rule the police were often made to feel like the ‘little 
brother’ of the military, following behind the army in grandiose military parades and 
being expected to carry out all the tasks of the armed forces (including dangerous 
quasi-military roles in the south) without receiving any of the benefits.
104
 However, 
by the 1960s the force had achieved at least some level of success in establishing 
itself as an institutionalized and civil force independent of the army. This was also 
how they were seen by a group of Somali police students visiting the Sudanese 
Police College in 1965, who compared them favourably in this respect with their 
own more military-style police force.
105
  
 
As well as seeking to disentangle a civil force from its historical military 
connection, in this period the Sudanese police were fighting for institutional 
autonomy and separation from politics. During the October Revolution itself the 
force experienced a number of purges at the hands of leftist politicians. After the 
1965 elections saw the return of the more conservative political forces, the Umma 
party – which initially dominated the new government – created its own security 
organization. This was largely composed of Ansaris and, according to Bayoumi, 
‘supervised over’ (ashrafa ‘ala) the police.106  
 
The parliamentary period following the Revolution also revived the old 
struggle between administrators and police professionals. The appointment of an 
                                                 
101
 Salim, Tatawwur, pp. 277-278. Sudan Almanac 1962 (Khartoum 1963), p. 86. 
102
 Salim, Tatawwur, p. 279. 
103
 Hills, Policing Africa, p. 2. 
104
 ‘Abbas Salih Musa, Mishwar fi Durub al-Khidma al-Madaniyya [Errands on the Paths of the Civil 
Service] (Khartoum 2005), p. 63. Sudanese government official, Interview, Durham, 16 June 2009. 
APD, 10 March 1959. Ibrahim, Qissat, p. 170. 
105
 ‘Mugabila akhira ma’ dubbat as-Somali’in’ [‘The recent meeting with Somali officers’], Majallat 
al-Shurta, April 1965. 
106
 Bayoumi, Jihaz Amn, p. 67. 
162 
 
administrator, Clement Mboro, as the new minister of interior, provided a particular 
focus for police frustration. Immediately after the Revolution the police sent a 
memorandum to the government demanding the removal of the civil servants from 
the ministry. However, this proved fruitless and according to Mu’tader a group of 
administrators led by an ex-policeman, Amir al-Sawi, controlled the ministry ‘from 
behind the scenes’ (wira’a al-kawalis), regaining the power they had lost to the 
military during Abboud’s regime and frustrating police demands for a separate 
department.
107
 Nevertheless, police commandants continued to be directly 
responsible to the police commissioner for the administration, organization and 
discipline of the force, although the province governors retained their executive 
control over the police in matters relating to law and order.
108
 However, police 
officers continued to struggle with administrators in the Ministry of Interior 
throughout the second parliamentary regime, leading a group of police officers to 
send another memorandum to the minister in 1969 demanding the removal of Amir 
al-Sawi and his group.
109
 Thus even during a decade that represented a high-point in 
the police drive for autonomy, this autonomy was contested by soldiers, 
administrators, and politicians. 
 
Corporatization: The emergence of a ‘Police family’ 
The goal of creating an institutionalized, modern police force, which entailed 
detaching its members from the bonds of family and ‘tribe’, was sometimes depicted 
in terms of transforming the force itself into a kind of ‘family’. The ‘family’ ethos in 
the police also reflected a desire to escape reliance on a fickle economy and a 
government that had a limited capacity to provide for the wants of its employees. 
The force had a good deal of success in achieving this kind of corporate identity in 
the early nationalist period, at least at the riverain centre. Amin Hussein’s reforms in 
Wad Medani in 1950 represented the earliest example of the nationalist generation of 
Sudanese policemen attempting to achieve this. Apart from improving police 
housing in Wad Medani, Hussein established a police ‘benevolent fund’ to which 
volunteers would contribute five piastres at first and then twenty-five piastres 
monthly. The accumulated funds enabled policemen to improve collectively their 
                                                 
107
 Mu’tader, Kitab, p. 132. 
108
 Sudan Almanac 1965-1966 (Khartoum 1966), p. 92. 
109
 Mu’tader, Kitab, p. 132. 
163 
 
family life through the provision of various services: hiring nannies to educate young 
police children, financial support for the education of children up until university, 
providing a place where police wives could be looked after during pregnancy, 
support and loans to policemen on marriage, financial support to police widows, and 
finding jobs for those who left the police on grounds of disability so that they would 
have an income in addition to the pension provided by the government.
110
 Once he 
became commissioner of the force in 1954, Hussein began to spread these benefits to 
all police units in the country; indeed, an overall ‘Police Benevolent Fund’ (sunduq 
mal khayyari) was created.
111
 The money set aside for educating police children even 
allowed the sons of a number of policemen to attend universities in Europe and the 
wider Middle East, which further increased the attractiveness of the police as an 
occupation at that time.
112
 The setting up of police social clubs in most of the 
important police centres in Sudan was another feature of the later 1940s and early 
1950s.
113
  
 
In the early 1960s, developing an idea first practiced by Hussein in Blue Nile 
Province in 1951, a police co-operative project was established which enabled 
policemen to invest funds in agricultural land in Port Sudan. This scheme was used 
to provide food for policemen and their families, reduing their dependence on local 
traders for sustenance.
114
 By 1964 the profits of this scheme had reached 14,000 
Sudanese pounds.
115
 One article in Police Magazine even used the word ‘usra’ (or 
family) with reference to the establishment of these projects, noting that members 
who co-operated in it would ‘raise the level of the members of this family’ (rafa’ 
mustawa afarid hadhihi al-usra).
116
 
 
Sudanese policemen also pushed strongly to wrestle concessions from the 
government that would benefit this ‘family’ and were particularly successful in 
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doing so during the Revolution period. Despite – or perhaps because of – the 
continuing struggle against military, political and administrative control, this period 
was one in which Sudanese policemen regained some of the spirit that had driven the 
Police Strike of 1951. In November 1964, policemen in Blue Nile Province staged a 
massive demonstration, leading a procession to the provincial headquarters and 
presenting the governor with a petition demanding the formation of a police union, 
increased salaries, the creation of a pension system, and a modification of the 
allowance system. The governor reportedly agreed to these demands, admitting that 
they were fair.
117
 
  
In January 1965, a number of police officers put a plan to the Ministry of 
Interior to develop the police by advancing salaries and providing increasing job 
specialization. By May a ministerial ‘Committee for the development of the police’ 
under judge Muhammad Abu Qasim was established. This interviewed policemen 
throughout Sudan’s provinces and recommended increasing their salaries, bonuses 
and compensation for injuries.
118
 All of these recommendations were passed without 
qualification in October of the same year.
119
 However, as the more conservative 
Umma party strengthened its grip on power, a less sympathetic line was taken. When 
around 300 policemen demonstrated against their conditions in Khartoum in October 
1965, the Umma-dominated government arrested them all and temporarily 
suspended the press due to its coverage of the story.
120
 Eventually nearly a hundred 
were fired for their involvement in the demonstration.
121
 However, police officers 
recall that throughout the 1960s methods such as strikes and negotiation were 
broadly successful in improving the collective lot of the police.
122
 
 
Most married policemen in this period lived in the police barracks, or ashlaq, 
alongside their wives.
123
 Some however were granted permission to live outside the 
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barracks with their wives on condition that it was not in a place where the policeman 
was, in the words of one senior officer, ‘mingling with people who are majanoun 
[mad] or whatever else’ – suggesting that the force was keen to keep its men out of 
the regions collectively deemed ‘nests of crime’ (see Chapter 6).124 Policemen’s 
wives were usually housewives, or could be nurses or cleaners (farrashat), and since 
– unlike members of the army – the police were not regularly transferred, family 
lives at least had the prospect of being relatively stable.
125
 However, relationships 
with extended family could cause problems, particularly because of the difficulties 
involved in travelling long distances in Sudan. In 1964, a policeman serving in 
Khartoum was dismissed from service and imprisoned for three weeks after he had 
absented himself from service for 26 days to travel to al-Ubayyid in order to console 
his aunt on a family bereavement.
126
 Nevertheless, the severity of his punishment is 
in itself revealing of the drive for greater professionalism at this time. Thus it seems 
that a number of officers were committed to developing a sense of corporate identity 
in the early nationalist era. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The period of the October Revolution and the 1960s in general demonstrate that the 
police were influenced by the same fissures within the state that had been a feature 
of the colonial era. The first military regime sought to use the police force to provide 
for its own political security against students and trade unionists, while both the 
administrators of the second parliamentary regime and the political parties sought to 
curtail police independence and establish personal control over the workings of the 
force. On the other side, the judiciary sought to prevent the arbitrary use of the police 
by both military and parliamentary regimes, while its condemnation of the 
‘University Incident’ demonstrated the authority it could exercise over police 
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behaviour. Sudanese police officers revived the same spirit that had motivated their 
battles against the administration in the late colonial era, using the post-October 
period in particular to push for improved service conditions and a larger, better 
equipped, and professionalized force. The force in the 1960s attempted to carry out 
the values of ‘civil’ policing that the British colonizers had kept confined to rhetoric, 
struggling to shake off the negative reputation that it had acquired under both the 
colonial and military regimes. The communal life of the police barracks and 
investment in mutual co-operative schemes also created a sense of institutional 
identity amongst policemen that furthered their capacity for autonomous action. 
Thus the 1960s represented a time in which both police professionals and the 
judiciary were capable of challenging the regime and fostering the development of a 
police force that aimed to provide security for Sudanese society as a whole.  
 
However, even though Sudanese remember this era fondly in comparison 
with what would follow it, there are a number of caveats to the characterization of 
the 1960s as a high point in the history of civil policing. While the events following 
the ‘University Incident’ demonstrated that the force was socially porous to the 
extent that its condemnation within urban society led it to adopt a non-
confrontational role towards political demonstrators, this did not necessarily 
represent positive action. Indeed, it left the field open for a variety of other political 
actors to impose their will by force. The police never quite captured the trust of the 
public and there were times when they were still subject to political manipulation. 
Furthermore, the development of the force remained heavily focused on the urban 
areas of northern Sudan and the language of ‘civil’ policing both excluded and 
otherized the rural peripheries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
167 
 
5 Institutional fragmentation of the Sudanese police 
in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
 
As Joel Migdal has observed, post-colonial regimes are often forced to choose 
between developing the central institutions of the state to extend its overall 
mobilizational and defensive capacity, and weakening them to prevent them 
becoming the focus of alternative centres of power.
1
 The police in Sudan have been a 
particularly good example of such a body, since they can theoretically hold regimes 
to account for corruption and other abuses of power,
2
 despite being a useful 
defensive asset and offering the government the kind of technical expertise of which 
more blatantly politicised institutions were bereft. Ja’afar Numayri, the leader of the 
military coup that overturned Sudan’s parliamentary system in 1969 and established 
the ‘May Regime’, was in particular need of such defensive assets. The ‘Free 
Officers’ who led the coup were divided between a Communist faction ousted in 
1970 and groups of Arab nationalists, Ba’athists, Nasserists, and more pragmatic 
developmentalists; and the resulting infighting within the Revolutionary Command 
Council led the Communists to launch a brief but bloody three-day coup attempt 
under the leadership of Hashim al-Atta in 1971. After the failure of this attempted 
coup lead to Numayri’s return, the Revolutionary Command Council dismissed itself 
and appointed him as president – a position he would increasingly use to rule by 
personal decree.
3
 He would face further resistance from the students who had led the 
Sha’aban riots of 1973 and the National Resistance Movement, an armed coalition 
of the former religious parties (Umma, DUP, ICF) that with Libyan backing invaded 
Sudan and attempted to overthrow the regime in 1976.
4
 Numayri continued to 
expand the police as a means to counter these challenges, while simultaneously using 
the military to develop his own security organizations.  
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However, this chapter will demonstrate that as Numayri’s own security 
organizations grew stronger and his dependence on the police was reduced, his 
regime was able to revert to old colonial techniques by crippling the police as a 
central institution, and exerting executive power over the various provincial forces 
under the slogan of ‘decentralization’. A number of scholars, politicians and 
development workers have often tended to see decentralization in countries like 
Sudan as a purely positive phenomenon because of its ability to solve the problems 
posed by regional difference and prevent concentration of power amongst narrow 
central elites;
5
 however, this approach neglects the extent to which dictators such as 
Numayri used decentralization tactically, as a means of dividing and ruling over 
central institutions that posed a threat to their own authority.  
 
Thus it will be shown that the civil policing project, which modernizing 
officers had continued to develop after the strong foundations built in the 1950s and 
1960s (see Chapter 4), was gradually neglected by a regime which increasingly 
reverted to focusing its resources on protecting the main strategic bases of its own 
power. Ideals of civil policing also fell afoul of the Islamist movement, which, as 
Gallab has argued, ‘perceived the Sudanese not as worthy citizens with civil and 
human rights’ but rather as ‘individuals and groups owned by the state’.6 The 
alliance between the Islamic Charter Front (ICF), the political wing of the Islamist 
movement, and the military regime would lead to a further subversion of the 
authority of the police. The chapter will reveal that the period after 1983, during 
which Numayri’s newly ‘Islamized’ laws were implemented, demonstrated exactly 
how porous the identity of the police force had become, as policemen were 
mimicked and supplemented by the state security services, the military, Islamists, 
and criminals. While the criminal laws became increasingly arbitrary, by loosening 
the judicial regulation of the police force the state increasingly lost control over the 
way its agents (or those who impersonated them) implemented them – as in the 
colonial era. 
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 Numayri’s tenure would demonstrate that the police could be manipulated by 
one or other of the various competing political groupings within the regime, such as 
the military or the Islamist movement. But were the police completely divorced from 
the rest of Sudanese society in this period? It will be seen that the April intifada of 
1985, which overthrew the dictator, would demonstrate the influence that wider 
Sudanese society could also still exert on the police. Just as after the 1964 October 
Revolution (see Chapter 4), the leftist and professional organizations who led the 
uprising held the ambivalence of the police force during the popular demonstrations 
against Numayri to demonstrate their sympathy with the Sudanese public, and thus 
once more began to champion the idea of a civil police force. Although some 
commentators on post-colonial Africa have argued that parliamentary regimes were 
equally as brutal as their military counter-parts,
7
 the parliamentary period that 
followed the intifada would demonstrate that this was not entirely the case, as 
lawyers’ bodies and the judiciary acted on numerous occasions to prevent the abuse 
of the police by the political executive. Thus it will be demonstrated that the old 
conflict between the executive and legal organs of the state over the use of the police 
that had begun in the colonial era (see Chapter 1) still persisted, although Numayri 
had more than ever tried to resolve it in favour of the executive during his period in 
power. Meanwhile, the police leadership and other public bodies would attempt to 
rebuild the force as an institution in the post-intifada period, but only had limited 
success in reversing the process of fragmentation that had occurred since the late 
1970s. This chapter will first explore the wider ramifications of the complex pattern 
of relations between the police, the military and the Islamic Charter Front for the 
‘civil policing’ project, before comparing the fate ‘civil’ policing in the military 
regime with its fate during the parliamentary regime that followed. 
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Police-military tensions and the creation of parallel security 
organizations 
 
Tensions between the police and military in Sudan were indicative of a post-colonial 
state divided into a variety of competing institutions. Recalling his dismissal from 
the post of minister of interior by Numayri in 1979, the ex-minister observed that:- 
 
The army officers when they are governing and ruling and so on, they try to 
undermine the police, you see. Because of the jealousies and so on.
8
  
 
However, relations between police and military were not always hostile during 
Numayri’s regime. Initially his government pursued a strategy of incorporating the 
most politically useful police units into the regime, even though it was 
simultaneously developing its own parallel and militarized security organizations 
which would gradually replace the police in their ‘national security’ function. This 
was not unusual, since post-colonial dictators usually preferred a multiplicity of 
security organizations so that they could play them off against each other.
9
 This was 
particularly important in the context of the power struggles that dominated the early 
years of the Numayri regime.  
 
 The regime’s immediate establishment of the National Security Organization 
(NSO) in 1969 represented an attempt by the military to colonize the field of 
domestic security policing. It was, in the words of one of its officers, ‘like a child 
born out of a branch of military intelligence’ (tifl walidan li-fara’ min al-istikhbarat 
al-‘askari).10 The regime supplied it with officers recruited directly from military 
intelligence and made directly responsible to Numayri.
11
 Rather than borrowing CID 
men, the NSO acquired 2,500 operatives of its own to perform security work.
12
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 However, the establishment of the NSO did not simply represent an attempt 
by the military to dominate the police, since its creation was also related to the power 
struggles amongst the ‘Free Officers’ themselves. They represented a mixture of 
Ba’athists, leftists, Nasserists, pragmatists, nationalists and Communists, although 
the Communist element was certainly strongest during the early years of the 
regime.
13
 This affected the development of the NSO, which was initially so 
dominated by Communists and their Soviet trainers that those applying to join it 
were expected to answer either ‘Communist’ or ‘Devoted Communist’ when asked 
to indicate their political affiliation.
14
 Not long after the installation of the ‘May 
regime’ an internal rift between Numayri and the Communists developed, 
culminating in a brief coup by a pro-Communist General, Hashim al-Atta, in 1971. 
In the period before and after this short-lived coup, which lasted only three days 
before Numayri’s return to power, Numayri and his allies on the Revolutionary 
Council removed all the Communists from the security services, including the 
NSO.
15
  
 
 Numayri’s regime was forced to rely to some extent on the regular police 
force in the wake of the attempted coup – indicating the fact that all the institutions 
of the regime were so pervaded by the political struggles that had occurred in the last 
two years that he could not trust any single one by itself. Indeed, members of the 
police had a major role in rounding these up after Hashim al-Atta’s failed coup – al-
Atta himself was arrested by a police officer.
16
 This said, even the police themselves 
had to be purged of a large number of Communists who had been absorbed into their 
ranks between 1969 and 1971. These included 26 university graduates whom the 
leftist minister of the interior, Farouk Hamdalla, admitted to the Police College in 
1970.
17
 Nevertheless, it seems likely that it suited Numayri to preserve the political 
roles of both the police and the NSO as he did not have sufficient confidence in 
either. 
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 In line with this policy, the regime continued to develop the political branch 
of the police, the Public Security Organization (PSO), which would in effect serve 
identical functions to those claimed by the NSO. Another reason for maintaining the 
PSO was that it possessed far more expertise, since its men were trained security 
professionals possessing records on activists and politicians in Sudan dating back 
generations.
18
 This demonstrated the fact that specialist knowledge possessed by 
bureaucratic institutions made it difficult for regimes to bypass them entirely. 
 
Thus initially Numayri did not adopt a policy of outright neglect of the police 
force, but of gradually bringing it under closer control by both himself and the 
regime as a whole. Although the PSO initially functioned as a separate department 
within the Ministry of Interior and would continue to be staffed by Police College 
students, Numayri separated it from the regular police in 1973 and put it under his 
personal command.
19
 The commissioner-general of the police and other senior 
officers were made members of the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), the political party 
Numayri formed to bolster his regime after the 1971 counter-coup.
20
  
 
 From the late 1970s, Numayri began to rely less on the police for the 
maintenance of regime security, as the army began to acquire more expertise in 
controlling domestic politics in the north. Thus in 1978 he merged the PSO with the 
NSO to form the State Security Organization (SSO). Umar Tayyib, a leading general 
who would also assume the functions of vice-president in 1982, was appointed head 
of this new organization.
21
 This precipitated a rapid decline in police–military 
relations. In 1979 Numayri established a new pay scale that effectively placed police 
officers one pay-grade below their companions in the army, making the rank of an 
‘amid of the police equivalent to an ‘aqid in the army. This led to great 
disappointment among police officers and the ‘supreme leadership’ (al-qiyadat al-
‘ulya) of the police and prison service sent a memorandum of protest to the minister 
of the interior,
 22
 who was at this time ‘Abd al-Wahhab Ibrahim, the former head of 
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the now dissolved PSO. This in turn provoked a dispute between Ibrahim and 
Numayri, which led to Ibrahim’s dismissal and the dissolution of the Ministry of 
Interior through presidential decree no. 52 in February 1979.
23
 
 
In response to these measures, Abu Humayd Ibrahim recalls that large 
numbers of policemen announced their resignations, even leaving the country before 
waiting to hear if they were accepted.
24
 ‘Abdallah Hasan Salim, who was the police 
commissioner-general at the time, claims that both he himself and a large section of 
the officer class considered offering group resignations but feared that their 
departure would have left the police in almost total disarray.
25
  Numayri was slowly 
and successfully marginalizing the police and Abu Humayd Ibrahim remembers 
bitterly the contempt he publicly showed for them at this time.
26
 As a result, policing 
became a highly unattractive profession; instead, according to one interviewee, all 
young men were keen to enter the ranks of the SSO.
27
 Although the new SSO was 
manned by members of both the old PSO and NSO, in 1980 Numayri reportedly 
fired 31 members of the new organization, the great majority of whom were from the 
police.
28
 Overall it seems that professional police officers, after having initially 
developed a relatively positive relationship with Numayri’s government, became 
increasingly distant from and in conflict with the political executive towards the end 
of the May Regime. 
 
 
The impact of military rule on the institutional identity of the police 
 
The fate of the police as an institution was tied to the pattern of its relations with the 
military regime. In the first years of the May regime, the Sudanese police became a 
more specialized, professional and well-equipped unit, and acquired an increasing 
status within the government. The initial support provided by the regime to the 
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police also permitted the continuation of the ethos of ‘civil’ policing that progressive 
officers had developed in the 1950s and 1960s. However, as the regime’s own 
security agencies grew stronger, it began to neglect the police and in 1979 launched 
a strong assault on its institutional identity by dissolving the Ministry of Interior, as 
already noted. This neglect of the police also mirrored the deterioration of other 
public services during the later years of the May Regime.
29
 The regime thus reduced 
the status of the police system to a level similar to that which had obtained in the 
colonial era: the police force was subject to politicized regional bureaucrats and was 
granted resources only to supervise the major ‘nodes’ of the post-colonial economy. 
 
The initial fortunes of the police within the government 
The arrival of the military regime initially guaranteed a more favourable position for 
the police within the government. While military regimes in Sudan have historically 
tended to undermine the police, they have also undermined the civilian 
administration, and ultimately the power struggle between civil servants and 
policemen within the Ministry of Interior (see Chapter 4) was resolved in favour of 
the latter. The police gained increasing importance within this ministry, which was 
divided into five new departments under the overall authority of a senior police 
officer, Ziada Satti, as ‘director-general’.30 This led to the development of a 
‘security’ ethos in the ministry, hampering the remaining offices such as that of the 
office of the commissioner for refugees, who felt that the ‘hegemonic’ position of the 
police had led to unsympathetic positions being taken towards refugees in the 
country.
31
 This of course reflected the fact that ‘civil policing’ in Sudan remained 
focused on protecting the population of the riverain heartlands of the state (see 
Chapter 6). 
 
The initial dominance of the police in the Ministry of the Interior was not 
paralleled in provincial governments, where there was instead a revival of the 
bifurcated system of the colonial era in which provincial police forces were subject 
to the control of security-focused central government bureaucrats. At the beginning 
of the May Regime, provincial police commandants did become responsible to the 
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heads of their various units in Khartoum, who in turn remained directly under the 
commissioner-general. The commissioner-general was responsible for the 
‘supervision and good administration of the force’, and appointing the officers 
immediately below him.
32
 However, these commandants remained responsible in the 
realm of security to provincial commissioners, the senior provincial representatives 
of the SSU, in the role of the latter as heads of the Province Security Committees 
(lijan amn).
33
 The 1971 People’s Local Government Act, 1971, stated that ‘The 
Commissioner shall be responsible for the maintenance of order and security in the 
province and shall submit reports to the Minister of Interior’.34 This commissioner 
was appointed directly by Numayri. The strengthening of the position of the police 
within the Ministry of Interior thus demonstrated only a partial and short-lived 
degree of success in their battle with the administration.  
 
This relatively favourable situation for the police disappeared after the 
development of their tensions with the military which followed the creation of the 
SSO in 1978. Following the dismissal of the minister of interior in 1979, Numayri 
shattered the unity of the police force by dispersing its various units among other 
government departments. Thus the CID was attached to the attorney-general, and the 
Passports, Emigration and Nationality Police to the Ministry of Finance. Numayri’s 
decree also gave responsibility for promoting and transferring officers to the general 
secretariat of the cabinet office (al-amana al-‘aama li-majlis al-wuzara’). This left 
the emasculated Police Headquarters as an office to which the Police College and the 
administration and training of the police were subject. Meanwhile regional police 
forces were placed under provincial commissioners appointed by Numayri, who 
became responsible for the general administration of local units, including such tasks 
as promoting NCOs.
35
  
 
In response to protests from police officers about the effects of the new 
measures, Numayri issued a presidential decree that established a new Police 
Headquarters in Khartoum which would be supervised by a re-styled ‘Inspector-
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General’ reporting directly to him. However, while this Headquarters regained 
control over the CID, all the other decentralization measures remained in force, and 
the provincial forces would remain responsible to the inspector-general only via the 
province commissioner.
36
 The 1979 Police Law confirmed the fragmentation of the 
police by describing them, along with the prison service, as multiple ‘Regular 
Forces’ instead of a single ‘Police Force’.37  
 
One particularly important aspect of Numayri’s decisions towards the police 
in 1979 was that he also took direct personal control of the Central Reserve Police 
(CRP), which had been created five years earlier to merge the various ‘riot squads’ 
(buluk) into one body.
38
 Salim argues that one reason for Numayri’s move was that 
the establishment of the CRP, which had received military training in Egypt, 
increased the ‘jealousy’ (ghaira) of the army towards the police, particularly after its 
successful involvement in repulsing the 1976 coup attempt.
39
 Thus Numayri’s 
actions further demonstrated the fact that the decentralization measures of 1979 were 
occurring in the context of a power struggle between himself, the army and the 
police. 
 
Meanwhile, The People’s Local Government Act of 1981, which capped 
Numayri’s policy of regional ‘decentralization’, stipulated that it was the prerogative 
of the regional governors who had replaced provincial commissioners under the Act 
to ‘supervise over police forces’.40 This thus provided for a more direct form of 
control over the police than that stipulated in the 1971 act. The regional governor 
was appointed by Numayri from a list drawn up by local SSU branches and could be 
removed by the president at any time.
41
 Thus the ‘decentralization’ of the police in 
fact simply amounted to a re-assertion of control by the political executive. ‘Abdalla 
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Hasan Salim, the re-styled ‘Inspector-General’ at the time, argues in his history of 
police laws that the new system allowed the police to be run by ‘local bodies’ who 
were ‘unqualified to lead an important apparatus such as the police’.42 Admittedly 
Salim, particularly in his disdain for the fact that regional governments were 
insisting on employing officers from their own regions,
43
 is perhaps indicative of the 
jealousy with which the riverain professionals cherished their monopoly over the 
police. Nevertheless, it seems that decentralization was being used by Numayri as a 
political tool to marginalize the police. Salim observes that by decentralizing the 
police Numayri passed the burden of financing them onto the newly formed regional 
governments, which had extremely weak financial resources in comparison with the 
central government – and that the new measures were therefore just another tactic for 
undermining the police.
44
 Just as in the colonial era, regional differences were being 
used as an excuse to justify the ruling political executive in the state dominating and 
weakening the other central institutions. 
 
The fate of ‘civil’ policing and of the corporate existence of the police under the 
military regime 
The police force during the May Regime continued to espouse the same doctrine of 
civil policing that had been pursued during the early nationalist period, but would 
struggle to uphold this ethos as the government began to starve it of influence and 
resources towards the end of the 1970s. Nevertheless, at the inception of the May 
Regime a new ‘Department of Public Relations’ was established to focus on 
improving relations between the police and the public.
45
 The director of this new 
department, Muhammad Muhammad Dahab, exploited the populist rhetoric of the 
May ‘Revolution’ by stating that ‘security had been transformed into power in the 
hands of the people for the purpose of the people’.46 While this was in itself only 
rhetoric, the May regime did initially adopt a developmentalist approach towards the 
police. In 1974 the government supplied the ‘Emergency Police’, which continued in 
the northern urban areas to serve ‘humanitarian’ functions such as bringing pregnant 
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women to hospital, with a further 41 new vehicles.
47
 The first female students 
entered the Police College in 1972.
48
 The force also became increasingly specialized. 
For instance, the CID had by 1974 acquired separate branches specializing in matters 
such as forensics, drugs, forged currency, homicide, and offences against property.
49
  
The status of the Sudanese police at this time was demonstrated by the fact that in 
1974 Sudan was able to begin lending officers to the newly independent United Arab 
Emirates.
50
 In 1977 the force also became more distinctively ‘Sudanese’ as the old 
Turkish officer ranks (Hakimdar, Onbashi, Sol) were abandoned and new Arabic 
titles were introduced (‘amid, ‘aqid etc) – although this in itself reflected the central 
importance of riverain Arabism to the police force.
51
 Thus the experience of the 
Sudanese police in the early years of the May regime was a comparatively positive 
one for the force: it became more professionalized, specialized, and institutionalized, 
in spite of the increasing influence of politics in its public role. It was also becoming 
a more accessible force. Between 1970 and 1978 the figure for the annual number of 
offences reported to the police per 100,000 of the population ranged between 3,011 
and 2691.5, a steady increase on the figure from the 1960s (see Chapter 4).
52
 
 
The Sudanese police force also remained a fairly privileged institution during 
the early years of the May regime. Its independent financial strength was reflected in 
the establishment of a ‘Police Branch’ at the Sudanese Real Estate Bank (al-Bank al-
‘Aqqari al-Sudani).53 These developments were certainly favourable in comparison 
with what would happen to the force later on during the May regime. The Police 
Law of 1971 also specified new service conditions and post-service benefits.
54
 
However, this law was a legacy of Farouk Hamdalla, who was executed for his 
participation in Hashim al-Atta’s ill-fated coup in the same year.55 
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After the bitter disputes of 1978 and 1979, the regime’s increasing 
marginalization of the police force impacted on both its level of resources and its 
capacity to act as a public service. The technical standards the force had begun to 
achieve in the 1960s were allowed to slip as the regime began to transfer key 
resources to the SSO.
56
 The result was a rapid deterioration in the facilities that had 
been available to the police in the 1960s. In 1978, 50 per cent of police cars were off 
the road and, according to former police officer Abu Humayd Ibrahim, the Ministry 
of Interior refused to provide the funding for their repair.
57
 Salim claims that the fact 
the police were budgeted for on a provincial basis after the 1979 measures had a 
negative impact of the provisions of uniforms and technical equipment to local 
officers.
58
 The police dogs acquired in the 1960s were neglected and became infested 
with insects, a minor but pitifully indicative metaphor for the wider neglect of the 
police.
59
 In a 1981 edition of the Police Magazine ‘Amid ‘Abdallah ‘Abdu Kahin 
lamented the fact that a decline in police numbers and equipment had resulted in a 
deterioration in police standards, a circumstance for which, following the 1985 
intifada, he immediately blamed Numayri’s regime.60 Meanwhile, the figures for 
offences reported to the police slowly declined, with the average per 100,000 
inhabitants dropping from 2,599 in 1979 to 2,093 in 1982, and to 1,899 in 1984.
61
 
This was more likely indicative of the lack of police presence than a drop in crime 
levels. 
 
Nevertheless, although the May regime neglected the police as a whole 
throughout the later 1970s and 1980s, the period did see further specialization at a 
central level through the introduction of the ‘Technical Police’ (al-Shurta al-
Finniyya) in 1983. The Technical Police absorbed secondary school leavers and 
undergraduates who were immediately placed in complex administrative roles in the 
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passport and traffic sections.
62
 This reflected the fact that while Numayri hampered 
police professionalization in a legal and political context, he increasingly accepted it 
in a bureaucratic context to respond to the challenges of the modern urban economy 
in and around Khartoum and other important northern towns. These jobs became 
popular since entrants started with a salary equivalent to that of a sergeant in the 
police, but this did not increase the attractions of service in the rank and file.
63
 
Naturally, this further underlined the dichotomy between the affluent, literate elite 
within the police and the neglected rank and file, a dichotomy mirroring the 
inequalities within urban riverain society at the time (see Chapter 6).  
 
Islam and ‘civil’ policing 
Although the regime was increasingly neglecting the police as an institution, those 
officers who developed a progressive outlook in the 1950s and 1960s remained 
committed to the ideologies associated with civil policing that had been developed in 
the early nationalist period. Even at a time when the regime was preparing to replace 
Sudan’s existing criminal and police laws with a more arbitrary, punitive and 
supposedly more ‘Islamic’ set of laws, senior police officers remained committed to 
showing that progressive police values could work in an Islamic framework.  
 
One senior police officer, Hasan ‘Atiallah, writing an article in 1982 entitled 
‘International Human Rights in Islam’, argued that some of the tolerant attitudes of 
the UN Charter on Human Rights could be discerned in classical Islamic philosophy. 
For instance, he observed that the Hanafite school of Islamic law permitted 
Christians to both drink alcohol and eat pork as a measure of religious tolerance. In 
addition, ‘Attiallah commented that the Qu’ran advocated a gradualist approach 
towards the removal of alcohol from Muslim society, using the force of faith rather 
than physical compulsion to discourage its consumption.
64
 In 1981, Ma’mun 
Mubarak published an article in the Police Magazine arguing that the coercion of 
evidence, whether by physical or psychological methods, was ineffective. Mubarak 
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not only pointed out that Sudan’s constitution and criminal laws forbade torture, but 
also cited in support of his argument a saying of ‘Umar ‘Ibn al-Khitab Radiullah, one 
of the rightly-guided caliphs. Radiullah had observed that ‘a man will not be truthful 
about himself should you have hidden him or beaten him or bound him’ (laysa ar-
rajul ‘aminan ‘an nifsahu idhan anta akhfeytuhu au darabtahu au awthaqtahu).65  
 
Another police writer, Mahjoub al-Tijani, wrote an article in 1982 trying to 
establish Islamic and Sudanese pretexts for the reform-minded criminal system 
Numayri was about to reverse. Al-Tijani analyzed the Khalifa ‘Abdallahi’s penal 
policy during the Mahdist state, arguing that the Khalifa showed elements of a 
correctionist policy by sitting amongst criminals in prison and praying for their 
repentance.
66
 Thus a number of Sudanese police officers felt Islam offered scope for 
a liberal, progressive and reformist interpretation of the criminal law distinct from 
the deterrent and arbitrary form of Islamic law Numayri was about to introduce. 
Again, this demonstrated the distance between police agendas and the agendas of the 
political executive. 
 
 
The ‘Islamization’ project and the increasing fragmentation of the 
police 
 
Numayri’s ‘Islamization’ of Sudan’s legislation in 1983 reflected a new set of 
regime priorities that also changed its relationship with its police force and in turn 
the relationship between police and society. Previously the May regime, like its 
predecessors, had been focused purely on providing for its own political security, but 
now it required a police force that would participate in the cultural re-engineering of 
society as a whole. When Numayri first launched his ‘Islamization’ project with the 
September Laws of 1983, he acknowledged that Islam was a religion which 
‘condemns people with proof’ and ‘in which privacy is inviolable’.67 However, he 
radically changed his approach in May 1984 when he declared a state of emergency 
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and equipped both the police and a variety of non-police bodies with arbitrary 
powers designed to facilitate a totalitarian transformation of Sudanese society. 
Justifying these actions, Numayri argued that 
 
Islam has its state of emergency…and when society is seen to have become 
corrupted and to have deviated strongly…we declare a state of 
emergency…we enter houses…we search…we search people 
everywhere…he who drinks behind doors…he who commits adultery….the 
houses of prostitution…every house we shall enter and search…Islam has 
ordered us to take such measures as well, for despite it being the religion I 
have mentioned…we are now in the phase of correcting and amending.68 
 
Nevertheless, Numayri’s plans to use the police to ‘correct’ and ‘amend’ Sudanese 
society fell apart for reasons similar to those that prevented the colonial state using 
its police force to ‘civilise’ Sudanese society. Numayri had chosen both to fragment 
his police force and starve it of resources in the years leading up to the crisis in 1983. 
Given the effect that his policies had had on the morale of the force, he could only 
really impose his laws by further undermining it as an institution – by coercing the 
police into enacting the laws and using the other security forces to bypass police 
authority.  
 
 Part of the reason that the authority of the police force became so fragmented 
at this time was that both Numayri and the Islamist movement – which was also 
attempting to usurp the authority of the police – were pursuing their own distinct 
agendas in spite of the nominal alliance between them, which would eventually 
disappear in March 1985.
69
 Thus the police suffered a twin-pronged assault on their 
status, with Numayri attempting to militarize them and outsource their functions to 
the military and a series of vigilante groups, while the ICF tried to incorporate police 
officers within the Islamist movement and use its own security wing to usurp the 
police authority. The resulting confused fragmentation led to a situation in which 
members of the public did not know who the police were meant to be, leading to 
widespread mimicry of police authority. Thus while it is questionable whether the 
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‘Islamization’ project managed to transform society in the manner which the regime 
intended, it certainly led the authority of the state to impact more immediately on the 
lives of the Sudanese. However, just as in the colonial era (see Chapter 2), the state 
could not control the extent to which its authority was subverted during this process. 
 
The Islamic Charter Front and its subversion of police authority 
By the time the ‘September Laws’ were promulgated in 1983, the ICF had used the 
close relationship it had developed with Numayri since the latter’s ‘National 
Reconciliation’ with the political parties in 1977 to expand its organization within 
the country and to infiltrate the state apparatus.
70
 Hasan al-Turabi, the mercurial 
leader of the ICF, became attorney-general and headed a parliamentary committee 
which was to modify the legal system so as to conform with shari’a law.71 Although 
Numayri removed Turabi from the post of attorney-general in 1983 and appointed 
his own personal advisers to draft the final version of the new laws, the ICF 
continued to support the new legislation and prominent ICF figures such as al-
Mukashifi al-Kabbashi were given seniors positions in the new judiciary.
72
 The ICF 
had been aided by the vast financial resources afforded to it by its economic links to 
the Arab Gulf states and control over the system of Islamic banking that had begun 
in Sudan after 1977.
73
 From 1978 the Islamist movement used these funds to expand 
its own ‘police’ system, including the ‘Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of 
Vice’ (‘Amr bi’l-Ma’ruf wa’l-Nahi al-Munkar) groups that had begun to appear in 
northern cities, offering financial incentives to the inhabitants of the poorest quarters 
to join them.
74
 These groups acted as a ‘civil wing’ (janah madani) of the ICF which 
penetrated society by operating through ‘networks of gangs’.75 
 
 Numayri appears to have set the precedent for outsourcing police work to 
these vigilante groups with his promulgation of the Protection of Public Tranquility 
Act of 1982, which sanctioned the direct recruitment by the police of volunteers who 
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would be empowered to arrest law-breakers and instantaneously try them.
76
 As 
‘Abdullahi Ibrahim argues, this legislation would ‘loom large’ in the practices of the 
‘Prevention of Vice’ groups after the official ‘Islamization’ of the law in 1983.77 
Officially, the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice Act of 1983 did not give 
the ‘Prevention of Vice’ teams any authority to inflict vigilante-style justice. Indeed, 
it stipulated that those who observed immoral acts should merely inform the proper 
authorities ‘without resorting to defamation or slander or spying or trespassing on 
other people’s freedoms’.78 Al-Mukashifi al-Kabbashi, who was a member of the 
Supreme Court and president of the Criminal Court of Appeal in Khartoum during 
the implementation of the September Laws, argued in his defence of the 
‘Islamization’ project that these groups merely had the task of ‘directing and 
guiding’ (wazifa tawjihiyya wa irshadiyya), and had no executive authority to inflict 
punishment.
79
 Nevertheless, these groups would often assist the physical application 
of the laws, for instance by reporting inhabitants of ‘suspicious houses’ (manazil 
mashbouh), who they believed to be practising pre-marital sex, to the police.
80
 
 
 Furthermore, it is clear that a number of these groups appear to have taken 
police authority in the manner sanctioned by the 1982 Act – although probably 
without the official permission of the police themselves. In 1984, members of the 
ICF began to argue that they were more qualified than the other security forces as the 
latter had been established during the period of jahiliyya (ignorance).
81
 Numayri, 
after he chose to denounce the Islamist movement later in 1984, claimed that the 
‘Prevention of Vice’ groups had exceeded their legal authorities and started to 
assume police authority.
82
 As one of the contemporary critics of the ‘Islamization’ of 
the law argued, they took police powers  
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in a very chaotic way, because they are not trained, and they think they have 
the right to do so, so they intrude people’s privacies, and they just implement 
what they thought is right on other people… they gave them the power to 
implement the laws they thought in their head on other people, if they think 
that woman is not wearing good...they can whip her.
83
 
 
It appears that a number of groups also actively impersonated policemen or other 
members of the ‘security forces’ in implementing the law, taking advantage of the 
manner in which the regime itself had subverted police authority. In June 1984, the 
first vice-president, Umar Tayyib, issued a statement observing that ‘infiltrators’ 
(mundassin) who had been ‘dressing up in the uniform of the regular forces’ had 
been arrested for committing crimes while so dressed.
84
 Tayyib stated that directives 
had been issued to the army, police and prison forces stipulating the need to carry 
identity cards, implying that this had not been a regular practice beforehand.
85
 The 
statements made by Tayyib, who was a staunch opponent of the Islamist 
movement,
86
 were quite possibly a reference to the attempts of ICF-linked bodies to 
usurp police authority. However, the phenomenon could also have been a result of 
individual criminals ‘impersonating’ policemen – one famous group of criminals 
active during this period made it their practice to wear police uniforms whilst 
burgling shops at night-time.
87
 As one critic of the new legislation observed, 
impersonation of policemen had become a particular problem since 1983 as the law 
had become ‘so wide that you can harass anyone if you are a policeman’ so that 
‘some people they say, a young man is driving his car with a girl, they will stop them 
and say we are police, and they show fake documents, and they say you have been 
kissing her, and they extort money from them’.88   
 
However, the ICF themselves were clearly responsible for a great deal of the 
subversion of police authority. In 1985, Numayri accused the movement of having 
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‘penetrated various organizations of the regime’, including the police and prison 
services.
89
 In 1983, during his earlier period of alliance with the Islamist movement, 
Numayri had begun to send police, army and prison officers to the ‘African Islamic 
Centre’ (al-merkaz al-Afriki al-Islami) to obtain diplomas in ‘the Islamic call’ (al-
da’wa al-Islamiyya) and study the principles of shar’ia and fiqh.90 While this was to 
some extent a state-sponsored Islamization project, Hasan al-Turabi was involved in 
the study programme and the centre often took it upon itself to recruit officers 
independently, particularly during the ‘umra.91  
  
The militarization of policing under the state of emergency 
Some members of the Sudanese police had remained committed to a ‘civil’ system 
of policing. As a result, in order to compel them to implement arbitrary legislation, 
the May regime was forced in 1984 to enact a new Police Law. This in effect marked 
a return to the old colonial understanding of the police as ‘an army in the field’ (see 
Chapter 3), although the principle was taken even more literally now. The new law, 
according to Mahgoub al-Tijani, was ‘almost a copy of the armed forces law’.92 It 
facilitated the establishment of a ‘Police High Council’ that had the power to impose 
the death penalty on members of the police for disobeying a legal order.
93
 Numayri 
himself admitted publicly that the new code was influenced by the armed forces and 
state of emergency laws and ‘allowed for martial courts to be promptly formed in the 
field in order to try those who neglected their duties’.94 This new law also gave the 
regional governors and the commissioner of the national capital an increased degree 
of supervision over the police.
95
 Meanwhile, a senior intelligence officer, Ibrahim 
Ahmad ‘Abd al-Karim, was appointed head of the Police Force in Khartoum.96 
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Numayri’s numerous acts of legislation also gave police powers to a variety 
of non-police bodies, particularly to the branches of the ‘security forces’ linked to 
the military. His May 1984 emergency legislation stipulated that ‘All soldiers of the 
People’s Armed Forces shall have all the authority stated in this order or in any law, 
ordinance or other orders, such as that of the security forces’.97 The phrase ‘security 
forces’ presumably refers to the police in this context, although it is frequently used 
in other Middle Eastern contexts to refer jointly to the army, police, and other 
paramilitary bodies. For instance, members of the army were given the same level of 
permission to enter houses without a warrant that were granted to the police under 
the emergency legislation.
98
 Khartoumers recall that the new legislation was applied 
by all the ‘security forces’ jointly, and informants struggled to distinguish between 
the roles of the regular police, CRP, military and SSO in applying the laws.
99
  Again, 
this reflected the extent to which police authority was subverted, fragmented and 
dispersed in this period. 
 
 
The April intifada and police-society relations 
 
In spite of the efforts of Numayri and his allies to subordinate, fragment and control 
the police, the latter would demonstrate at the climax of the May regime that they 
were still vulnerable to popular pressure. After the ‘second’ intifada in April 1985, 
the police force was praised by the leaders of the uprising for not opening fire on 
demonstrators, just as in the 1964 popular uprising which had overthrown the 
previous military regime. In both uprisings, labour agitators and professional groups 
had organised mass civil disobedience to force the military rulers out of power. 
Nevertheless, the second uprising differed in that the military leadership, having 
denounced Numayri, quickly assumed control of the situation and established a 
                                                 
97
 ‘State of Emergency declared in Sudan’, Omdurman Home Service 1728 gmt 29 April 1984, 
BBCSWB ME/7631/A/6, 1 May 1984. 
98
 Ibid. 
99
 Prominent Republican Brother, Interview, Khartoum, 6 Dec. 2010. Anti-Numayri activist and 
former Ba’athist politician, Interview, Khartoum, 20 Dec. 2009. Darfuri Masalit inhabitants of Um 
Bedda, Interview, Um Bedda, Khartoum, 25 Dec. 2010. 
188 
 
‘Transitional Military Council’ (TMC) which would see the country through a one-
year transitional period in the lead-up to the national elections of April 1986.  
 
 Although the various leftist and professional groups constituting the 
‘National Alliance’ which led the uprising gained less power than their predecessors 
in 1964, they still attempted to use it to represent the police as a civil force that had 
acted on the side of the people. At a conference held in November 1985, the National 
Alliance accepted the police force’s request that it should be acknowledged as being 
among the first forces which carried out the intifada.
100
 This would reflect the wider 
attempts of the left-wing and professional bodies to make the police a ‘public’ force 
in the period before and after the intifada. This trend was assisted to some extent by 
the fact that the creation of the SSO had left the police as a body devoted to crime-
fighting (albeit that crime-fighting after 1983 became politicized in itself), the 
neglect of which since 1978 had become a source of public concern. Participants in 
the uprising now recall that the police ‘helped the people’ because they were ‘linked 
to them’ and opposed the lack of ‘justice’ (‘adala) under Numayri.101 However, 
popular identification with the police occurred in a somewhat different context 
during the 1985 uprising. Whereas the 1964 uprising effectively represented a 
movement originating in the urban professional elite, the latter intifada was the fruit 
of a temporary social alliance between this group and the marginalized populations 
of the shanty towns (see Chapter 6).
102
 The fact that the police identified with the 
uprising and were remembered as being ‘linked’ to the people therefore reflects the 
demographics of the police force itself. 
 
 As was the case during 1964, the extent to which the police had an active and 
autonomous role in the uprising is somewhat questionable. During its first days, 
between 27 March and 3 April, the police did participate in campaigns to rid the 
capital of the unemployed ‘vagrants’ held to be responsible for it, and used batons, 
tear gas and gunfire on rioters, reportedly killing between six and eighteen of them 
                                                 
100
 Al-Midan, 22 Nov. 1985. 
101
 Ex-Communist, Interview, Wad Medani, 16 Dec. 2010. Resident of Umm Bedda, Interview, Umm 
Bedda, Khartoum, 16 March 2011. 
102
 Hussein, al-Faidan; Munzoul Assal, ‘Urbanization and the future of Sudan’, Making Sense of 
Sudan, posted 29 Jan. 2008,  http://blogs.ssrc.org/sudan/2008/01/29/urbanization-and-the-future.  
189 
 
on 27 March.
103
 Nevertheless, witnesses tend to recall that it was the SSO and CRP 
that played the principal role in crushing the demonstrations.
104
 However, as one 
former member of the regime recalls, even these units adopted a hesitant and 
uncoordinated strategy towards the rioting because they were bound to take their 
orders directly from Numayri, who was in America at the time.
105
 This was another 
example of how personal control over police units could diminish the overall power 
of the state. 
 
However, identification with popular sentiments doubtless played some role 
in making the police adopt an ambivalent attitude towards the suppression of the 
demonstrations.  There were leaflets issued in the name of a ‘Police Officers’ 
Association’ indicating that the police would be willing to join in any campaign 
against the regime, although the latter dismissed these as propaganda spread by the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army, the southern rebel movement.106 It was on 3 April 
that the police first appeared to participate alongside the demonstrators, who began 
to lift policemen onto their shoulders chanting ‘police go with the people’.107 
Nevertheless, it seems that these actions were largely symbolic and eyewitnesses 
recall that the police did not participate themselves in the demonstrations in any 
active way.
108
 However, their refusal to carry out orders was important enough. By 5 
April, one of the decisive days of the uprising, even the riot police were actively 
refusing to confront large crowds of protesters.
109
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 The ambivalence of the police during the April uprising reflects a long term 
trend in the attitude of police officers during the May regime: resentment at the 
insistence of the regime’s leaders that they use arbitrary methods against anti-regime 
activists, to whom they often possessed social links. ‘Abd al-Wahhab Ibrahim, the 
head of the PSO, maintained a close friendship with opposition leader Hussein al-
Hindi and insisted that one of the reasons that Numayri dismissed him was that he 
told the dictator he would not assassinate opponents such as al-Hindi on his 
behalf.
110
 A number of officers refused to be transferred to ‘security’ and chose 
instead to remain in the regular police force because they resented being used as the 
state’s tool against its own people.111 There were times when policemen refused to 
fire on student demonstrations when ordered to do so by their officers.
112
  
 
The sympathy that members of the underground opposition had with police 
officers was reflected in the views of the underground Communist organ al-Midan, 
which reported that during the heated discussion between senior police officers and 
the minister of interior in 1979 one officer had accused the regime of spending more 
money on its own security than on that of its citizens.
113
 That al-Midan managed to 
acquire such information implies that the underground leftists must have had some 
links to the police, again demonstrating that the police were not simply a malleable 
tool of the state.  In the regions of Deim and Sahafa in Khartoum, the Communist 
Party, in spite of being outlawed by Numayri after 1971, exercised de facto control 
over a long period of time partly because of its links to the police.
114
 
 
The identification of the professional groups with the police force after the 
intifada also demonstrated the extent to which the creation of state security agencies 
had left the police to be seen by the people as a public force responsible for fighting 
crime. In one sense this was a positive step, except that the regime had 
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simultaneously starved the police of resources by transferring funding to the SSO. 
Thus public criticisms of the police became focused on their inability to respond to 
crime, rather than their more political actions. In 1981, ‘Amid ‘Abdalla Kahin 
admitted that ‘We have become the talk of the clubs in society not out of hatred or 
fear of us but [in fact] one question after another is asked about our condition and the 
reason for our continuous absence’.115 
 
Public reactions to the deterioration in police standards show an element of 
continuity with attitudes towards the police in the 1960s. Local bodies tended to see 
the regular police as a force that could be made ‘theirs’, in lieu of the state providing 
for their protection. Abu Humayd Ibrahim recalls that during his time serving as a 
police officer at Nahud in the late 1970s he managed to persuade the local council to 
supply funds to fix police cars in Nahud. The governor of Kordofan, a political 
appointee, had apparently refused a request for such funds on the grounds that the 
police were the only institution which did not obey him.
116
 However, a degree of 
cynicism towards the police amongst local public bodies also remained on account of 
their association with corruption. This was evident when in June 1981 the demand of 
the governor of Khartoum that representatives of trading houses and professionals’ 
unions should contribute towards funding the police was met by the objection that 
the police themselves ‘could be counted amongst the list of criminal gangs and 
robbers’.117 In this respect, by distancing himself from the police Numayri had also 
to some extent succeeded in distancing the police from society; by depriving the 
force of both funds and judicial regulation (see below) he had created a force that 
was likely to prey on members of the public.    
 
Nevertheless, after the intifada both the media and a number of public bodies 
launched funding campaigns designed to transform the police into a more ‘public’ 
force. In December 1985 the post-intifada Sudanese Youth Union also held social 
events at the Blue Nile Casino to raise funds for them and established a number of 
projects including work camps focusing on the maintenance of a fleet of good police 
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cars.
118
 In 1986 the newspaper al-Sahafa, after producing a number of articles 
criticizing the weak police presence in the poor and heavily populated 
neighbourhood of Haj Yousif, established a popular fund (sunduq) to provide 
support for the police. This fund aimed at establishing new police posts and buying 
more police cars, beginning in Haj Yousif.
119
 The campaign encouraged the police to 
be seen as the protectors not just of the historic and affluent ‘Arab’ areas of 
Khartoum, but the newly risen ‘African’ shanty-towns of which Haj Yousif was a 
prominent example. In 1988, the minister for youth and sports issued a decision 
decreeing the establishment of ‘Societies for the Friends of the Police’ (jama’iyyat 
asdiqa’ al-Shurta) on a national and regional level to encourage donations from local 
communities.
120
 These events demonstrated the closer links that could be fostered 
between the police and public bodies during civilian regimes. 
 
 
Contrasts between policing in the parliamentary and military 
regimes 
 
The more open atmosphere of the 1986-89 parliamentary period would reveal more 
clearly the institutional divides within the state that the May regime had tried to 
manage by bypassing judges and police officers who were unwilling to sanction the 
regime’s abuse of the police. A comparison between the parliamentary and military 
regimes demonstrates that, while both the political parties of the parliamentary era 
and Sudan’s military rulers tried to manipulate police authority to further their own 
political goals, the greater independence of the media, the judiciary and other legal 
bodies during the second parliamentary period restricted the capacity of politicians to 
do so. One critic of the third democratic regime, whilst deeply critical of the 
parliamentary politicians’ inability to repair the economy and provide effective 
governance, acknowledges that they presided over a greater freedom of the press and 
that independent legal bodies such as the Sudanese Lawyer’s Association were able 
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to prevent the full revivification of the Septembers Laws.
121
 Nevertheless, it should 
be stressed that the capacity of the judiciary and media to expose and prevent abuse 
of the police was largely restricted to the developed urban areas of the riverain north; 
police authority continued to be abused in the urban and rural peripheries (see 
Chapter 6). Moreover, although professional groups, the media and police leaders 
once more strove for a centralized and independent force in the third parliamentary 
period, they struggled to reverse the process of fragmentation and mimicry of police 
authority that had escalated out of control in the 1983-5 period. 
 
A more civil force? 
After the intifada, its leaders aspired to an apolitical, united and public-orientated 
Sudanese police force. It was the ‘National Alliance’ that pressured the TMC to 
dissolve the SSO and return the majority of its functions to the police, demonstrating 
the influence that these professional, liberal and educated groups could exercise in 
police matters.
122
 After the SSO was dissolved, a governmental committee was 
established to re-distribute its resources among the other security organs, including 
the police.
123
 Sudanese police officers also took the re-emergence of democracy in 
Sudan as an opportunity to push once more for a more civil, well equipped and 
independent force. As the newly elected premier Sadiq al-Mahdi was due to take 
office on 29 March 1986, the entire police leadership offered him their collective 
resignation, demanding that inequalities between the police and the army in terms of 
pay and equipment be removed and improvements made to the police pensions 
law.
124
 The new government concurred swiftly with these demands and the police 
withdrew their resignations on the following day.
125
 Such tactics on the part of the 
police leadership could only succeed during a period of parliamentary rule. As seen 
above, a similar collective protest in 1979 had led to Numayri dismissing ‘Abd al-
Wahhab Ibrahim as minister of interior and deliberately breaking up the force. When 
the police leadership attempted a similar threat of mass resignation during the next 
period of military rule the military simply chose to fire the upper echelon of the 
police officer corps en masse (see Conclusion). 
                                                 
121
 Kamal Osman Salih, ‘The Sudan, 1985-9: the fading democracy’, in Peter Woodward (ed.), Sudan 
After Nimeiri (London 1991), pp. 45-75 at pp. 47, 63. 
122
 Bayoumi, Jihaz Amn al-Dawla, p. 94-5. 
123
 Bayoumi, Jihaz Amn al-Dawla, p. 5; al-Midan, 30 Jan. 1986. 
124
 Al-Sahafa, 29 March 1986, al-Midan, 29 March 1986. 
125
 Al-Midan, 29 March 1986.  
194 
 
 
However, the police were able to secure certain gains from the parliamentary 
rulers. The National Assembly soon passed a law guaranteeing a pensions allowance 
to any policemen who served for 20 years, a privilege that had previously only been 
enjoyed by members of the army and the SSO.
126
  Furthermore, in 1985 the new 
minister of interior, Abbas Medani – who was, for the first time since ‘Abd al-
Wahhab Ibrahim’s dismissal, a policeman – had announced that the new Police Act 
would re-centralize the force, removing the presidential powers that Numayri had 
enjoyed and once more giving the commissioner-general a greater power of 
supervision over local police forces.
127
 Nevertheless, not all the arbitrary aspects of 
the old 1984 Police Act were removed by the new law. It still permitted the 
imprisonment of a policeman for six months for the somewhat vaguely defined 
offence of ‘disobeying orders’, which could simply mean refusing to offer a salute to 
an officer.
128
 Summary police courts could still be established that were permitted to 
inflict any punishment on policemen, including dismissal from service.
129
 
 
It also became clear that the parliamentary regime was not willing to reverse 
completely the process of politicization of the police that had occurred during 
Numayri’s regime. Although the cabinet issued a statement in late 1985 claiming 
that police officers dismissed arbitrarily under Numayri would be returned to service, 
the process appears not to have commenced, and in March 1988 200 such officers 
sent a memorandum of protest to the prime minister insisting that they be 
reinstated.
130
 It appears that the police had little more presence on the ground during 
this period than they had done in the later years of the Numayri regime. Figures for 
offences reported to the police per 100,000 of the population between 1986 and 1989 
varied from 2,098.9 to 1,751.5.
131
 Although the committee established to transfer 
resources from the dissolved SSO to the police issued a statement in September 1985 
that it had transferred 44 cars to the police, al-Midan disputed this since they had in 
fact been transferred to an organization called the ‘National Security Organization’. 
This was not a part of the Police Department but responsible to Abbas Medani as 
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minister of interior, who would later claim that the dissolution of the SSO was a 
mistake.
132
  
 
Intense public debate over the exact status and functions of the mysterious 
National Security Organization continued throughout the third parliamentary era, 
until a new National Security Law was passed in 1988 which established the 
‘Sudanese Security Organization’ (Jihaz Amn al-Sudan). The political functions of 
this organization were clearly signposted by Sadiq al-Mahdi’s appointment of his 
own top Umma Party security man ‘Abd al-Rahman Farah as its chief.133 However, 
unlike the dissolved SSO, this body did not share the police’s legal powers of 
arresting and interviewing on oath and its functions were officially limited to 
intelligence gathering.
134
 
 
The political parties would also attempt to both mimic and manipulate the 
authority of the police. In June 1988 the Umma-dominated government decided to 
pension off the commissioner-general of police, Ibrahim ‘Abd al-Karim and his 
deputy, ‘Abd al-Latif Ibrahim, in spite of the objections of the DUP chairman of the 
Council of State, Ahmad Ali al-Mirghani.
135
 However, the political parties would 
later come to a mutual agreement that commissioner-generals of the police would be 
chosen from individuals with no party affiliation.
136
 In spite of giving up the plan to 
control the police, each of the main parties started to bypass it by creating their own 
private security organs. They started hiring their own security personnel, often from 
ex-SSO operatives, who frequently impersonated real police personnel. The NIF in 
particular continued to maintain its own security apparatus, which would form the 
basis of the Salvation Regime’s security organ when it took power in 1989.137 The 
level of chaos this behaviour produced was aptly summarized in an article in the 
Modern Sudan Daily Times, published in February 1989, which reported that 
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It has incidentally come to public attention that some political parties keep 
private police forces in the name of private party security. Some of these 
personnel, particularly that [of] one of the ruling parties has been posing as 
regular state security personnel and have on several occasions terrorized 
citizens. These have become among the faked policemen of the national 
capital who masquirate [sic] as security personnel.
138
 
 
Thus the parliamentary regime failed to reverse the process of subversion and 
diffusion of police authority that had begun after 1983.  Although the police were 
offered a greater degree of centralization and improved service conditions, the party 
leaders attempted to control the upper echelons of the police cadre whilst 
simultaneously bypassing the force through the creation of parallel party-based 
security organs. 
 
Politicized police brutality: arbitrary powers of arrest 
The new legislation issued by the May regime had facilitated greater abuse of police 
and state security powers by Sudan’s military rulers than would be the case during 
the parliamentary regimes that followed and preceded it. A key example of this was 
the 1970 National Security Law, which, paradoxically, allowed the NSO (and later 
the SSO under similar legislation) to remain outside the law. It conferred upon it the 
right to investigate and arrest suspected opponents of the regime and bring such 
individuals to a court after consultation with the legal adviser to the military, or the 
minister of justice, rather than the prosecutor-general.
139
 The subservience of the 
police to the NSO was confirmed by the subsequent 1971 National Security Law, 
which authorized its members to order policemen to apprehend individuals on behalf 
of the intelligence services, thus forcing policemen to conduct arrests with no legal 
sanction.
140
 Thus Numayri’s new laws not only created a more powerful rival to the 
police but also made the police its tool.  
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The willingness of the regime to conduct mass arrests under these new laws 
played a major role in preventing anti-regime demonstrations developing in the same 
manner that had occurred in 1964. 1500 students were arrested after the 1973 
riots.
141
 In 1974, after opposition from lawyers to his unconstitutional modifications 
to the National Security Law, Numayri altered the constitution so that it did not 
contradict his laws permitting the potential detention without trial of a citizen for 
three months for political offences, renewable for an indefinite period without 
judicial order and without judicial supervision.
142
 
 
In contrast, although Sudan’s parliamentary rulers, particularly the premier 
Sadiq al-Mahdi, attempted to use the police force against their political opponents in 
a similar manner, the increased legal accountability of the police prevented this to an 
extent. For instance, on 28 December 1987 the police arrested Dr Ushari Ahmed 
Mahmoud and two colleagues on the pretext that they had penned a ‘seditious’ 
pamphlet.
143
 However, in reality this was an attempt to gain revenge for Ushari 
Mahmoud’s exposure of police inaction during the al-Daein massacre of 1987, when 
government-funded Rizayqat militias had slaughtered over 1,000 Dinka refugees in 
south Darfur.
144
 These reports had incensed al-Mahdi, who as prime minister was 
responsible for the arming of the ‘Murahiliin’ militias. The officer who investigated 
Mahmoud was Major Dalil Adam, who was working near al-Daein at the time of the 
massacre and had acted as part of an investigating committee that Mahmoud had 
condemned as a whitewash.
145
 These events demonstrated that even during a 
parliamentary regime the police could be used to intimidate opposition elements.  
 
However, the press freedoms and legal restraints on arbitrary action that 
prevailed at the time ensured that the police were only able to take limited action 
against Mahmoud. The Sudan Bar Association organized a defense council of nine 
lawyers to defend Mahmoud and these sent an appeal to the attorney-general 
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requesting that Mahmoud be either tried or released.
146
 In the event he was released 
eight days later and able to report the ‘political plot’ against him to the free press.147 
These events represent significant evidence of the influence that independent legal 
bodies and the media could exercise to prevent politicians using the police to silence 
political opponents during democratic periods. 
 
Subversion of police authority during demonstrations 
Both parliamentary and military regimes would attempt to subvert police authority in 
order to combat demonstrations, although the weak position of the judiciary and the 
media during the military regime furthered the ability of the ‘May’ rulers to do so. In 
particular, Numayri’s subjection of units such as the PSO, SSO and CRP to his 
personal control facilitated the arbitrary treatment of anti-regime demonstrations. Al-
Midan’s admittedly biased accounts of the policing of leftist and anti-regime 
demonstrations make clear that one of the reasons why the student demonstrations of 
the 1970s and early 1980s failed to repeat the feat of the 1964 revolutionists was that 
the police were willing to be more ruthless in the later period. If al-Midan is to be 
believed, seven were shot dead during the student riots of 1973, while the British 
embassy reported two deaths in Khartoum and another two in Atbara.
148
 Al-Midan 
also claimed that in March 1982, the number of dead in demonstrations across Sudan 
reached 42, whereas 15 food rioters were killed by police in January 1985.
149
 
 
As demonstrated above, one frustrating aspect of ‘underground’ sources is 
that they rarely distinguish between the various branches of the security forces, that 
is, the regular police, the army, and the NSO, PSO, SSO, and CRP. Al-Midan 
frequently refers either to the ‘police’, which could potentially refer to the PSO, the 
regular police, or the CRP, or potentially even the NSO or SSO, or to the ‘security 
forces’ (al-quwwat al-amniyya), which could refer to any of the bodies in question. 
This in turn is indicative of the general confusion at the time. Thus it is difficult to 
discern to what extent Numayri’s extension of control over the CRP made it a more 
ruthless tool for crushing demonstrations than the regular police, although this was a 
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claim made by leftists after the 1985 intifada.
150
 However, al-Midan made claims in 
the 1970s that the army was suppressing demonstrations using tanks and that the 
NSO was using its armoured vehicles to crush demonstrators.
151
 Numayri certainly 
used the army during the Sha’aban riots of 1973,152 the railway workers’ strike of 
1981 and the student demonstrations of 1982.
153
 The latter incident forced Numayri 
to dismiss his vice-president, ‘Abd al-Majid Hamid al-Khalil, who led a military 
delegation to protest at the use of the army against demonstrators.
154
  
 
As for the leaders of Sudan’s political parties, while they attempted during 
the parliamentary regime to treat demonstrations just as ruthlessly as Sudan’s 
previous military rulers, increased pressure from the independent media and 
judiciary often denied them the same opportunity to do so. Just as in the aftermath of 
the October Revolution, the police force in the post-April period (including the third 
parliamentary regime, 1986-9) was subject to moral and legal criticism when used 
against public demonstrations. In the third parliamentary period, police responses to 
civil protest were criticized not just by left-wing and liberal organs such as the 
Modern Sudan Daily Times and al-Midan, but by more politically centrist papers 
such as al-Ayyam, which described the shooting of two schoolboys in Hassaheissa 
and Managil in 1987 as ‘abominable and objectionable’.155 Bringing legal cases 
against the police also remained an important tactic. For instance, after police shot at 
demonstrators in Omdurman in early 1988, a lawyer, Mirghani Behoun, opened up a 
case of attempted murder against them on behalf of the student Maisara Omar 
Abdalla, who was partially paralyzed by police gunfire.
156
 Also in 1988, the 
government sanctioned a legal investigation by the attorney-general’s department 
into four policemen in Kordofan after they were responsible for shooting three 
schoolchildren protesting at the poor quality of food at their school in Umm 
Badier.
157
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Given the social condemnation to which they were exposed and their legal 
vulnerability, it is not surprising that during two major civil protests in 1988 the 
police refused orders from politicians to open fire on the crowds.
158
 One of these 
occasions occurred when Darfuris in Khartoum protested against the government’s 
handling of the deteriorating security situation in their region. The police officer 
managing it refused demands by a government minister to open fire on the 
demonstrators on the grounds that such an order would require judicial sanction. 
When the judge at the march refused to give the order because he believed that the 
demonstration was entirely peaceful, the minister appealed to the chief justice to try 
and persuade him to force his colleague to comply. The result was a heated argument 
in which the chief justice accused the minister of interfering with the independence 
of the judiciary.
159
 That the demonstration continued to be peaceful and unhindered 
was due to the resolve of the judiciary and its increased status in a democratic 
government. 
 
Nevertheless, the parliamentary politicians were at times able to negotiate 
their way around the legal obstacles preventing the abuse of the police force by 
covertly using their own private security forces to attack demonstrators. This 
occurred during the second major occasion in 1988 in which the police were 
unwilling to fire on demonstrators, on the third day of an all-out general strike 
launched by Sudan’s trade unions in response to a sugar price increase. The 
protesters marched towards the cabinet building, to be met by the police and army 
using tear gas and opening fire in the air.  When the demonstrators continued to press 
forwards it was not the army or the police but a mysterious group of armed gunmen 
that opened fire on them, causing thirty injuries and one fatality.
160
  
 
Al-Ayyam reported that the casualties were inflicted by machine gun shots 
from an unidentified Toyota car, while eye-witnesses reported to al-Siyasa that 
silencer rounds had been identified coming from the Citibank building.
161
 The 
Modern Daily Sudan Times alleged that the shooting was done by the Council of 
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Ministers’ ‘so called special protection force called the commandoes’.162 Meanwhile, 
al-Midan blamed armed members of the Umma Party, observing that Umar Nur al-
Da’im, a senior Umma Party figure had twice appeared on the national television 
encouraging Umma supporters to go out onto the streets and clash with the 
demonstrators. The writer in al-Midan took this to be a message delivered to armed 
members of the Umma party.
163
 Thus, even in the democratic period the political 
parties appear to have found means to bypass the civil system of law enforcement. 
 
Criminality within the police 
Although police criminality would become a serious problem throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, the military regime took decisive steps to guard policemen against 
criminal charges. For one thing, in 1970 it altered police legislation so that it became 
extremely difficult for members of the public to bring criminal charges against them. 
This did not exactly mean that the police force was lenient on those policemen that 
committed criminal acts or other misdemeanors; as demonstrated above, by the 
1980s the Police Law had become very severe. However, the new laws did grant the 
police a great deal of authority to deal with criminality within the force themselves. 
In some respects this indicated the growing strength of the institutional identity of 
the police. However, more seriously it undermined the capacity of the judiciary to 
regulate the force in an independent manner; in other words, it hampered the ability 
of the state to govern its own instrument of governance.  
 
The Police Act, 1970, stipulated that any person wishing to make a criminal 
complaint against a policeman on the grounds of intimidation, torture, wrongful 
confinement or hurt should first obtain the permission of the commissioner of police 
to do so.
164
 Krishna Vasdev, a former judge, observes that even where this did occur, 
complainants were put under significant pressure to withdraw their charges. This was 
on the pretext of ‘protecting the good name of the police in the eyes of the 
community’.165 Meanwhile, the 1970 Act established a series of police courts so that 
policemen could be tried internally for criminal offences alleged to have been 
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perpetrated while acting on duty.
166
  This system was maintained with slight 
variations by the new police laws of 1973, 1977 and 1979. As was the case before, it 
appears that criminality did not remain an absolute barrier to a continued career in 
the police. For instance, the 1977 legislation stipulated that a policeman must only be 
fired from the force should he commit an offence that merited imprisonment for 
more than six months.
167
 Another problem was that, as senior officers would later 
admit, the police administration at this time did not have sufficient technical capacity 
to keep efficient records of policemen who had been dismissed from the force, so 
that a policeman dismissed from one branch of the police could easily rejoin another 
later on.
168
 
 
Police criminality remained highly prevalent in this era, although it is unclear 
whether it was the new police court legislation or the general demoralization caused 
by Numayri’s economic neglect of the force that was responsible for it. Even the 
government-controlled press reported cases of policemen beating journalists, getting 
drunk in bars while fully uniformed, engaging in illegal hunting and accepting 
bribes.
169
 In 1980 the more independent English language monthly Sudanow 
reported that such was the extent of corruption in the police that when ‘little men’ in 
smuggling rings were captured they were too afraid to identify ‘big men’ for fear that 
moles inside the force would in turn report them.
170
 The underground press also 
made numerous allegations that police officers charged with breaking up labour 
protests had been robbing the strikers they took into custody.
171
  
 
Although police criminality remained a serious problem after the return to 
parliamentary rule, civilian lawyers managed to some extent to make them more 
accountable. Even though the same system of ‘Police Courts’ that had existed under 
the military regime was retained under the 1986 Police Act, civilians did have more 
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success in bringing into civilian courts policemen who committed crimes against 
them.
172
 However, just as only those with sufficient financial resources to launch 
cases independently were able to prosecute their abusers in the SSO in the wake of 
the May Regime’s removal,173 citizens who were able to bring legal actions against 
policemen were usually affluent. The cases that appeared in the media in this period 
tended to involve citizens from wealthy and middle class backgrounds. For instance, 
one involved an engineer in the central administration who brought a legal action 
against a policeman for breaking his jaw, another a Saudi tourist who claimed that a 
policeman had robbed him during a checkpoint luggage search.
174
 
 
Most famously, the family of Amira al-Hakim, a schoolgirl abducted and 
killed in 1987 by a rank and file policeman called ‘Abd al-Sadiq, were able to 
exercise considerable pressure over the police during their crusade bring their 
daughter’s killer to justice. The al-Hakims, a prominent Khartoum family, were able 
to exert a great deal of on the police by criticizing their conduct of the investigation 
in the free press. One member of the family, Khalid ‘abd al-Moneim al-Hakim, used 
his position as a Mulazim (Lieutenant) in the Khartoum police to convince the 
investigation team to grant the family’s lawyer, Faisal al-Hakim, permission to 
directly observe the investigations.
175
 ‘Abd al-Sadiq was eventually caught and 
confessed to having killed ‘little Amira’, although the media would continue to offer 
a variety of conspiracy theories focusing on ‘Abd al-Sadiq’s mysterious subsequent 
suicide and the alleged involvement of various politicians and senior police officers 
in the killings.
176
 The case demonstrated the moral influence that civilians and 
lawyers could exercise over the police through a free media, but it also showed that 
rights-based policing was restricted to urban and affluent families in the riverain 
north. Amira al-Hakim was a young, photogenic girl from a rich ‘Arab’ family in 
Khartoum whilst ‘Abd al-Sadiq was a rank and file police officer hailing from the 
comparatively peripheral region of Sennar on the Blue Nile.
177
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Given that it was usually only the wealthy and socially connected who could 
gain redress, police criminality remained a problem throughout the third democratic 
period. In particular, the legacy of the subversion of police authority after 1983 also 
continued to result in the exploitation of police identity for criminal purposes. The 
1986-9 period witnessed a number of incidents in which either genuine or fake 
policemen abused police identity as a means of committing crimes. ‘It has become 
common practice lately among criminals’, observed the Modern Sudan Daily Times 
in 1989, ‘to impersonate the police and either visit homes when husbands are out or 
stop a person on a deserted road’.178 In particular, there were a number of cases of 
either ‘fake’ or real policemen exploiting police identity as a pretext to abduct 
children. In the famous Amira al-Hakim case, ‘Abd al-Sadiq used his police identity 
to dismiss the protests of a crowd of civilians at the young girl’s abduction by 
claiming he was taking her to the police station. Na’im Muhammad, a former editor 
of al-Ayyam, recalls incidents from roughly the same period where a criminal 
feigned police identity to abduct and rape a young girl, and where a gang led by a 
real CID policeman used the man’s police identity card as a means to force a young 
boy to accompany them to an abandoned place where they eventually gang-raped 
him.
179
 In the latter incident Muhammad emphasizes that the boy did not resist 
precisely because the law forbade resisting a policeman conducting an arrest, 
demonstrating how dangerous abuse of police authority could be. Thus corrupt 
policemen and criminals reproduced the manipulation and exploitation of police 
authority that was being practiced by politicians in a more individualistic context, 
making themselves symbolic of the anarchic, divided and violent nature of the state.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
While Numayri and his allies in the Islamist movement adopted an official ideology 
that promised to regulate the mores of Sudanese society, Numayri’s policy of 
fragmenting his police force was indicative of a regime that was purely focused on 
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preserving its own political security and, with the limited exception of the 
‘Islamization’ project of 1983-85, had few aspirations to govern wider Sudanese 
society. While Numayri and his fellow putschists would initially follow a policy of 
incorporating the police into the regime, they increasingly fostered a process 
whereby police authority was subverted by the various state security agencies and 
other actors. Although the ‘Islamization’ project of 1983 would be celebrated by its 
protagonists as a triumph for anti-colonialism, in fact it was part of a process that 
brought the system of policing in Sudan back to one similar to that which had 
obtained during the high colonial period. Numayri not only repeated old Sudan 
Political Service tactics for bypassing the police, but surpassed them. As he 
introduced a system of legalized coercion in the name of Islam, police officers who 
had sought to introduce a civil system of policing within the framework of Islam 
were marginalized and police authority was subverted, fragmented and mimicked at 
every level. Given the complexity of the political situation, police authority was 
subverted by an even greater number of factions than was the case during the 
colonial period – the Islamist movement, the military, opportunistic criminals, as 
well as by the political parties that succeeded Numayri in the third parliamentary era. 
By subverting police authority, Numayri had detracted from the overall authority of 
the state – as he discovered to his cost during the uprising that overthrew him, when 
his absence from the country left the government unable to marshall the units that the 
president had put under his personal control. 
 
While the police force was manipulated by almost all of the various ‘power 
centres’ in Sudanese society, some police officers continually strove to re-assert the 
independent and ‘civil’ nature of their force. After Numayri was replaced by an 
elected parliamentary regime, their collective protests achieved some success. The 
1970s and 1980s showed that, in spite of their anxiety about corruption, local 
councils and professional associations in Sudan continued to maintain links to the 
police force and aspire to a notion of ‘civil’ policing. Moreover, even at their most 
ruthless the regimes of this period retained a basic degree of dependence on the 
specialist expertise of the force, particularly when it came to safeguarding the state’s 
key centres of economic power. Similarly, the period between 1985 and 1989 
demonstrated the restraint that lawyers, judges and journalists could exercise on the 
governmental abuse of the police in a freer political climate. Nevertheless, the 
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process of subversion and fragmentation of police authority was not reversed during 
this period. Moreover, as the next chapter will demonstrate, notions of civil policing 
were largely restricted to the populations of the riverain centre. 
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6 ‘Nests of Criminals’:  The spatial and social limits of 
the civil policing vision, 1964-89 
 
 
On 1 August 2005, the death of the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army 
and newly appointed vice-president of Sudan, John Garang, triggered a wave of 
unrest amongst the displaced populations of Khartoum to whom he was a hero. Not 
just southerners, but the marginalized of Sudan at large, took part in the riots, which 
targeted those identified as members of the riverain elite on an ethnic basis.
1
 The 
police response to the events appeared to range from excessive use of force to total 
inaction. While they used extreme force to drive the demonstrators out of central 
Khartoum, their refusal to intervene in the poorest neighbourhoods on the outskirts 
of the capital, such as Haj Yousif, al-Kalakla, Ma’amura, Soba and Dar al-Salaam, 
allowed the rioting to escalate there.
2
  In total 130 people were killed, mainly in 
these poor neighbourhoods.
3
 Residents of Khartoum complained of a ‘security 
vacuum’ and swore to arm themselves with swords and firearms.4 
 
 Why was the disparity in the levels of security between the central and 
peripheral areas of the capital so strong? Although understood at the time in the 
context of Garang’s death, the events of ‘Black Monday’, which uncannily 
resembled the ‘Black Sunday’ clashes between northerners and southerners in 
Khartoum in 1964, were related to a more long term pattern of police unwillingness 
to deal with crime and outbreaks of violence in the peri-urban areas of Khartoum and 
other major northern towns. This was indicative of the strategies of post-colonial 
governments which, like their colonial predecessor (see Chapter 1), focused largely 
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on protecting the security of the ‘gateway’5 to the wider world, in this case the 
commercial regions of Khartoum. Herbst argues that the ‘fundamental problem’ 
facing state-builders in Africa has been that of ‘projecting’ authority over 
‘inhospitable territories that contain relatively low densities of people’.6 
Nevertheless, this chapter, which will focus on the densely populated peri-urban 
areas, will demonstrate that the limited presence of the police in the peripheries was 
not just the consequence of population density and territorial challenges but also of 
the limited ambitions of the state and the prejudices of its agents. Although the post-
colonial governments initially expanded the police, they would in effect mimic the 
colonial policy of keeping the most modern and civil elements of the force to protect 
Khartoum and the other major northern towns, thus reproducing the old colonial 
distinction between ‘citizens’ at the centre and ‘subjects’ on the peripheries.7 The 
ever-expanding array of central government ministers and civil servants who 
replaced the Civil Secretary and Sudan Political service, although they often 
espoused a more technocratic and professional outlook,
8
 also inherited assumptions 
from their colonial predecessors about the suitability of militaristic styles of policing 
in the south and the merits of relying on the Native Administration rather than the 
professional force to deal with crime in the countryside. 
 
Thus the various parties, factions, and bureaucratic and military cliques that 
have dominated the executive and security branches of the post-colonial state have 
been responsible for this perpetuation and even strengthening of the centre-periphery 
divide. But a number of policemen themselves also rehashed colonial attitudes (see 
Chapter 1) that emphasized the ‘otherness’ of peripheral Sudan and its resilience to 
modern systems of policing which would deal with criminals on an individual basis. 
As will be seen, this was why both policemen and local government bureaucrats 
advocated continuing to use Native Administration personnel to solve crimes even 
after its official abolition by Numayri in 1970. These views also proved to be 
particularly important in shaping police policy towards the burgeoning peri-urban 
areas of post-colonial towns, which were swelled by migrants escaping famine, war 
and economic stagnation in Sudan’s regions. The discourse of senior policemen, 
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together with media coverage, suggests that the police either responded to law-
breaking in such areas through crude use of force and collective attribution of guilt, 
or encouraged such neighbourhoods to police themselves in vigilante-style fashion. 
It will be seen that the ‘civil policing’ vision which had, as demonstrated in previous 
chapters, at times served to foster a more socially-orientated view of policing and 
restrain political abuse of the force at the riverain centre, had a fundamentally limited 
scope. 
 
Understanding this point enables us to identify the role of the police in 
shaping the character of urbanization in Sudan. The current debate on post-colonial 
urbanization sharply divides those who suggest that the rapid expansion of the cities 
has created a ‘melting pot’ in which ethnic ties have started to dissolve and those 
who argue that the manner in which urbanization has occurred in Sudan has merely 
severed to reinforce existing ethnic distinctions and social disparities. For Assal, 
conflict in Sudan has ‘defeated the melting powers of urban centres’ to the extent 
that ‘what we see instead is a reconstitution of primordial identities’. Thus the major 
urban areas act as ‘a configuration of the ills of the countryside’. 9 Whilst it is beyond 
the scope of this chapter to answer fully whether or not the expanding urban areas 
have acted as a ‘melting pot’, what it will demonstrate is that police and government 
policies have sought to prevent such a phenomenon occurring. The police force, far 
from offering equal protection to the populations of Sudan’s new urban zones, has 
effectively attempted to recreate the centre-periphery divide within the major towns 
and cities themselves. It will be demonstrated that their role has been to act as 
guardians of the affluent urban areas against perceived political and social threats 
from the countryside and peri-urban regions of the towns, which have been treated 
collectively as sources of criminals but not of victims. Thus urban policing has 
fortified a system of unequal citizenship, enforced by an identity card regime used by 
the police to distinguish the marginalized rural poor from the affluent urban elite. 
The role of the force in enforcing the centre-periphery divide has been such that it 
has policed the boundaries between Khartoum and rural Sudan almost as if they were 
international ones.  
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Nevertheless, studying policing in Sudan allows us to observe that the centre-
periphery divide, while crucial, is not quite as simple as it at first appears. De Waal 
argues that the various factions within the central state have always united in keeping 
power concentrated amongst the riverain elite.
10
 However, we will see here that this 
has not prevented one central faction using peripheral groups against another. Just as 
the Umma party would use the rural supporters of the Mahdist movement to police 
the Communist movement in the 1960s, the state in the 1970s and 1980s would 
accept the inevitability of the ‘peripheralization’ of the rank and file police in a 
manner that threatened the ‘Nile Decorum’11 established by the historical riverain 
elite. 
 
 
Government policy and the policing of the periphery 
 
Throughout the post-colonial era, the government showed only a limited 
commitment to expanding Sudan’s police system into the rural peripheries. 
Admittedly, the geographic size of Sudan and weak resources of the state posed a 
serious challenge to the expansion of the police into the regions, but as demonstrated 
earlier the government, particularly between 1978 and 1985, deliberately limited the 
resources it assigned to the police. Thus it effectively perpetuated the bifurcated 
system of policing between centre and periphery that was established by the British 
in the colonial era. In particular, the government continued militaristic styles of 
policing inherited from the Condominium in the south, reproducing the attitude of its 
colonial predecessor that the region was unfit for a ‘civil’ system of policing. The 
limited resources assigned to the police by the state ensured that it struggled to fully 
replace the Nazirs, Shaikhs and chiefs associated with the Native Administration in 
its crime fighting role, in spite of the state’s official abolition of the Native 
Administration in 1970.  
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The limited presence of the state police in the peripheries 
In spite of the strenuous efforts of the police officers of the nationalist generation, 
establishing a presence in Sudan’s rural peripheries proved problematic. In 1963, the 
official government staff list counted 33 senior officers serving in the capital and 
another 21 distributed evenly between the other provinces – usually a commandant 
and two superintendents in each province.
12
 Crime statistics compiled by the Central 
Bureau of Criminal Records for the years between 1965 and 1991 show that by far 
the greatest number of offences reported to the police were in Khartoum Province, 
where the capital was located, and Central Province where the major agricultural 
development schemes were to be found. In each year between 1965 and 1983 
Khartoum and Central each registered a greater number of crimes than Darfur and 
the three southern provinces put together.
13
 Given the unbalanced levels of police 
development in Sudan, these figures should perhaps be taken as an indicator of 
police presence, rather than the actual level of the activities defined by the state as 
criminal. 
 
Distance and difficulties posed by the Sudanese environment were certainly 
factors that hampered the extension of police power into the peripheries. The vast 
distances that the police were required to traverse in the Sudanese countryside also 
posed difficulties in investigations and forensic work. For example, a judge observed 
in a homicide case from 1959 that ‘the medical evidence owing to the circumstances 
of the incident and the long interval between the date of the offence and that of the 
post-mortem (twenty-one days roughly) is conspicuously unhelpful’.14  
 
However, the government played it own role in limiting the presence of the 
police in the rural peripheries by weakening it as an institution and by starving it of 
resources. After Numayri’s decision to decentralize the police in 1979, smuggling 
stolen goods or fleeing across provincial boundaries became an obvious resort for 
criminals because decentralization had hindered communication between police 
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commands.
15
 The governement also began to neglect police communications 
equipment from the later 1960s onwards, in spite of the positive advances made by 
the police in this regard during earlier periods. The further extension of the telex 
system begun in 1954 was hampered in the later 1960s by the breakdown of the 
West German relationship and the army’s determination to prevent potential British 
suppliers building up their rivals in the police.
16
 In any case, this system was not 
extended to the south where it could be days before rebel attacks on police posts 
were reported.
17
 However, as seen in Chapter 5, it was the deteriorating relationship 
between Numayri and the police which led to government neglect of police transport 
and communications equipment from the late 1970s onwards. In 1978, fully half the 
vehicles allotted to the police were out of commission and awaiting replacement 
parts,
18
 although these difficulties were alleviated to some extent by the later 
emergence of cheap airplane travel.
19
 In 1978 six officers were seconded from the 
year’s group of Police College graduates to study aeronautics and fly the first batch 
of police planes.
20
 However, the use of planes simply enabled the state to focus even 
more on securing the important ‘nodes’ of communication. 
 
‘Showing the flag’: the militarization of policing in the south 
Throughout the post-colonial era, the southern Sudan would be considered the 
Khartoum-based state’s extreme periphery. The state’s policy after ‘Sudanization’ – 
only employing northerners in senior posts within the southern administration, army, 
and police – would almost immediately trigger a rebellion that eventually developed 
into an all-out civil war which lasted  until 1972 and re-ignited between 1983 and 
2005.
21
 The policy of the post-colonial government in numerous ways mimicked that 
of its colonial predecessor (see Chapter 1), in that it was unwilling to adopt anything 
other than highly militaristic styles of law enforcement in the south. 
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Indeed, the northern administrators and policemen who succeeded British 
officers during the transitional period (1954-6) immediately inherited the 
assumptions of their predecessors about the need for paramilitary methods of 
policing in the south. When Ahmad Sharafi took over from Dening as Assistant DC 
of Nasir in 1954, he recalled how he requested the use of the Mounted Police from 
Malakal, repeating an old colonial axiom that ‘the Nuer feared cavalry to the greatest 
of extents’.22 Though these were not used in this incident, Sharafi later used them in 
1955 in line once more with old colonial policy, to demonstrate the force of the 
government ‘or as it is expressed in English, to “show the flag”’.23  
 
There could not be better evidence of the continuities between colonial policy 
and that of the post-colonial northern government. Militaristic methods of policing 
persisted in the south throughout Sudan’s post-independence history. Northern 
administrators and policemen recall that in the first civil war, policemen were 
frequently expected to participate in operations against the rebels in spite of their 
relative lack of military training and were ‘expected to carry out all the tasks of the 
armed forces without receiving any of the benefits’.24 The government withdrew 
police from a number of posts located outside the major towns during the first war, 
as these were vulnerable to rebel attacks, and replaced them with military 
garrisons.
25
  
 
Given their role in carrying out the militaristic policies of a government in 
Khartoum which was scarcely representative of southern society, it was far more 
difficult for the police to breach the gap between state and society in the manner 
envisaged by the proponents of ‘civil policing’ in the riverain north. The government 
gradually ceased to employ southerners in policing the south after their participation 
in attacks on northerners and mass defections to the rebel movement; where 
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southerners were still employed by the government, they were never armed.
26
 To 
replace the defectors, the government relied on recruits from the north, who were 
housed at government expense.
27
 
 
Once war broke out again in 1983, after the police had been under the 
Southern Regional Government for eleven years, there were again mass defections 
from the force to the newly-formed SPLA rebel movement.
28
 Northerners continued 
to doubt the loyalty of those that remained in the force. One member of an NIF 
delegation to Wau in 1986 recalled that they relied on the military garrison rather 
than the police for protection, claiming of the latter that ‘their hearts and swords 
were with John Garang’.29 Thus the government again disarmed large numbers of 
southern policemen and increasingly replaced them with the quasi-military Central 
Reserve Force.
30
  
 
The government also increasingly substituted militias for the regular police in 
the south and regions along the north-south border. One example was the ethnic 
Misseriyya militia, the murahiliin, established in southern Kordofan between 1985 
and 1986 by the senior Umma-affiliated general, Burma Nasir, and the Umma Party 
Prime Minister, Sadiq al-Mahdi.
31
 The official function of the murahiliin was to 
replace the police force, which had since Numayri’s neglect of it in the later years of 
the May Regime struggled to perform its role of guarding the pasture routes (himayat 
al-marahil) of the nomadic Misseriya in southern Kordofan.
32
 Thus rather than 
responding to the incapacity of the police force by strengthening its presence in the 
region, Sadiq al-Mahdi’s government substituted for it an ethnic militia linked to the 
Umma party that would in 1987 participate in a massacre of Dinka refugees in el-
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Daein.
33
 In Bahr al-Ghazal province the government armed the Fertit militias known 
as the ‘peace forces’ that would engage in violent clashes with the police force of the 
provincial capital Wau, which was still manned mainly by southern Dinka whose 
loyalties, as demonstrated above, were suspected by northern politicians.
34
 These 
negative policies towards the regular police, as well as the use of militias, were 
indicative of the government’s lack of commitment to installing a system of civil 
policing in the south. 
 
Government policies towards the Native Administration 
It was not just in the south that the state failed to extend the system of civil policing 
outside the major urban areas, but in the country as a whole, as was demonstrated by 
the persistent tendency of the government to use the Native Administration to 
substitute for the regular police force. In the period leading up to the 1969 coup, 
Sudan’s governments remain committed to preserving the role of the Native 
Administration system inherited from the British in the management of provincial 
affairs, including policing. The governments of this period were comprised of a 
narrow series of political, social and religious groupings that possessed close 
affiliations to the powerful families who dominated the Native Administration in the 
north and even organized provincial and district boundaries to allow particular ethnic 
groups and their Nazirs, or ‘Umdas, to exercise influence.35 Nevertheless, as the 
police system expanded in the early nationalist period, it would come into much 
closer contact than before with the Native Administration, even if it did not replace 
the ‘investigative’ role of the Shaikh or chief. Interviewees recall that Native 
Administration personnel in the north would cease to possess their own specific 
police forces. Instead, upon notifying the local magistrate of a crime they would 
request the use of government policemen to enforce their authority.
36
 Thus in the 
1960s policemen and Native Administration personnel had a far more symbiotic 
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relationship than in the past, although the latter still retained their go-between role. 
The Nazir Umum (paramount Nazir) of Dar Hamr in the 1960s claimed that 
individuals who reported offences directly to the police were turned away and 
informed that they must first gain permission him.
37
 Police interviewees suggested 
that during this time they were often happy to allow homicides to be quietly resolved 
by members of the Native Administration by means of dia payments, without resort 
to state courts.
38
 
 
 In 1970, Numayri and the Revolutionary Command Council, who had come 
to power with the support of a variety of leftist factions and were thus initially 
opposed to the conservative family elites associated with the Native Administration, 
sanctioned its abolition by Jafa’ar Bakheit, Sudan’s technocratic and modernizing 
minister of local government. The government substituted a series of ‘popular 
courts’ as part of an expanded judiciary to serve its legal functions, with whom the 
police co-operated directly.
39
 Nevertheless, Numayri never fully removed the 
influence of the notables associated with the Native Administration from the 
countryside, and became less committed to doing so after his violent split with the 
Communist movement in 1971 and rapprochement with the more conservative 
political parties in 1977.
40
 In the south in particular, the abolition of the Native 
Administration had little impact on the position of chiefs on the ground.
41
 In 
practice, the Nazirs, Shaikhs and chiefs associated with the Native Administration 
continued to exercise a role in the investigation of crimes and resolution of disputes 
after its official abolition.
42
 One former commissioner-general interviewee recalled 
of the situation after 1970 that 
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Strictly it was dissolved, Khalas [finished]. But for some time, people used to 
refer to these Nazirs, and make their complaints to them, and the Nazirs used 
to help them, in helping them arrest, in helping them search, helping them 
call the state police to do all these things. But in some areas, Khalas.
43
 
 
However, interviewees also claimed that there were simply not enough policemen to 
replace the old Native Administration.
44
 This became an increasing problem in the 
wake of Numayri’s growing neglect of the police following the dissolution of the 
Ministry of Interior in 1979 (see Chapter 4). Abu Humayd Ibrahim complains that in 
this period they were expected to fulfill the role of the old Native Administration in 
resolving inter-ethnic disputes, while the state was refusing to provide them with 
communications equipment or repair the vehicles that were needed to transport 
policemen across Sudan’s vast countryside.45  
 
 
The limits of the civil policing vision: governmental perceptions of 
the periphery 
 
Throughout the post-colonial period, the elite of northern bureaucrats, local 
government officers, and even policemen who were the prime beneficiaries of 
colonial education continued to demonstrate the persistence of the old colonial belief 
that vast sectors of Sudanese society outside the urban riverain area were essentially 
un-policeable by modern methods. The attitudes concerning the essential function of 
the Native Administration of ‘Abdullah Ali Jadallah, a Sudanese administrative 
officer from the 1950s until the 1970s and governor of Kassala in between 1966 and 
1971, exemplify those inherited by the post-colonial elite from their colonial 
predecessors. Jadallah cites favourably Gawain Bell, a former British administrator 
who spoke eagerly about the role played by Ahamda Shaikhs and Nuba Meks in 
preserving security. He argues that the fellata, or West African community, in 
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Sennar were a ‘closed society’ to all but their Sultan Maiurno, whom he describes as 
a seemingly ‘mythical’ figure who ‘knew the charms and magics of the fellata’. The 
police were unable to ‘penetrate’ (ikhtaraqa) this society. As a result, after fruitlessly 
searching for thieves, they would have to resort to requesting assistance from 
Maiurno, who would immediately surrender them.
46
 In 1987 Hasan Jibril, the 
executive officer of Umm Ruaba, expressed similar beliefs to Jadallah, claiming in 
an interview with al-Ayyam that ‘One Nazir is the equivalent of a great number of 
watchmen (khufara’) and policemen’.47 Again, this demonstrates the tendency of the 
administrative service, inherited from the colonial predecessors, to regard as alien 
vast sections of Sudanese society and imply its resistance to modern methods of 
policing. 
 
                  One might expect those police officers who remained committed to 
expanding the police and wrestling institutional independence from administrators 
like Jadallah to resent the role the Native Administration exercised in crime-fighting 
in the post-colonial era. Nevertheless, one senior officer who served in the police 
from the 1950s recalled positively in an interview that the Native Administration was 
a ‘cheap administration’.48 Another senior officer who had been in the police since 
the 1970s claimed that Numayri ‘made a mistake’49 when he dissolved it. This 
reflected the views of other members of the northern administrative elite that the 
removal of the Native Administration was a negative phenomenon which had led to 
a rise in crime.
50
 Abu Humayd Ibrahim recalls that while dealing with offences 
reported in Maelig and Hassaheissa, he would establish committees in which the 
‘oldest and wisest men’ in the village gave their advice.51 He also recounts that 
during his time in the railway police in the later 1970s he hired a respected 
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Hadendoa Shaikh, Haj Nur, to assist him in preventing thefts in the vicinity of the 
line between Khartoum and Port Sudan that fell within his shaikhdom.
52
 
 
Nevertheless there was clearly some difference of outlook between members 
of the Native Administration and police officers, as the latter tended to emphasize in 
interviews the acceptance of police authority more than the former. For instance, 
while policemen interviewed in the course of this research insisted that local 
communities would always relent when it was necessary to perform an autopsy on a 
body, a senior Shaikh observed that ‘it’s a strange behaviour’ and ‘they rarely agree 
to it’.53 However, one senior police officer argued that ‘by education, by civilization, 
they started to know that…this was for the benefit of them’.54 Again, these 
statements related to the old debate over whether or not the Sudanese population 
could be policed using ‘modern’ methods. In contrast to police officers who argued 
that the increasing sophistication and networking of crime in Sudan required greater 
CID centralization,
55
 Native Administration officials and their advocates would 
emphasize the essentially local nature of crime in Sudan. They argued that rural 
society was still so close-knit that strangers would easily be identified and played 
down the existence of widespread crime networks in Sudan. As one ageing Nazir 
observed, ‘You don’t think what happens in America and in England happens in 
Sudan here...not like Mr Biggs...’.56  
 
A number of policemen saw the extension of modern methods of policing 
into Sudan’s peripheries as a natural part of the ‘spreading of civilization’.57 
Nevertheless, their understanding of ‘civil policing’ remained limited to some extent 
both by the bifurcation of the system of policing established in the colonial era and 
by their own position as members of a narrow riverain elite with a limited ability to 
identify with the societies of Sudan’s rural peripheries. Thus whilst the police came 
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into conflict with other branches of this geographically restricted governmental elite 
when striving for institutional independence, they often concurred in the belief in 
their dependence on the system of Native Administration bequeathed by colonialism. 
 
 
Police attitudes towards the peri-urban regions of riverain cities 
 
The events of 6 December 1964, or ‘Black Sunday’, in which the police were widely 
accused of failing to prevent riots between the northern and southern populations of 
Khartoum, provide an early example of the inability or unwillingness of the police to 
manage the challenge urban migrants posed to a system of policing organized on the 
basis of an urban-rural dichotomy. While southern journalists accused the police of 
deliberately standing by and allowing anti-southern pogroms, northern newspapers 
criticized the inability of the police to monitor the influx of southerners into the 
capital.
58
 The riots demonstrated well what Simone describes as the wars in the 
peripheries coming ‘back to haunt’ the riverain elite. Hamad claims that the 
southerners who sparked off the conflict were recent migrants from the war-affected 
region.
59
  
 
These events foreshadowed the persistent incapacity of the post-colonial 
Sudanese regimes to police the peri-urban areas of riverain cities, which became a 
dominant theme in the country’s post-independence history. Partly this was due to 
the sheer pace of urban migration. For instance, Khartoum’s population rose from 
about a quarter of a million in 1956 to almost three million in 1993.
60
 A significant 
amount of this migration was the result of forced displacement caused by drought, 
famine and war in Sudan’s regions.61 However, it was also due to the fact that the 
economic policies of the various post-colonial regimes had made urban living far 
more attractive. As elsewhere in Africa,
62
 governments in Sudan have forced rural 
food producers to sell their produce at a minimal price to benefit traders supplying 
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the needs of urban populations.
63
 Migration from rural Sudan to the urban centres of 
the north was experienced as a particular threat to the ruling elite, since the latter was 
largely composed of an urban clique from the northern Nile with few links to 
Sudan’s vast eastern, western and southern regions. Singerman has observed that in 
Cairo the Egyptian government has continued to use ‘discursive practices of 
colonialism’ to represent ‘neglected’ regions of the capital as backward.64 Sudanese 
politicians, administrators and policemen have developed similar attitudes, 
representing this migration in terms of a ‘ruralization’ of the city. Although the 
notion of the ‘ruralization’ of African cities has received some academic support,65  
Simone observes that actually what the state fears about rural migrants to cities is 
their capacity to develop new forms of association that transcend ‘traditional’ rural 
values.
66
 Nevertheless, by representing these peri-urban areas as essentially rural, 
peripheral and alien, the government and the police could justify treating them 
purely as sources of crime and thus deny them the same standards of policing applied 
in the more affluent urban regions. 
 
Police perceptions of the peri-urban regions 
The sense of threat that rural migration to Sudanese cities created amongst the 
riverain elite is best indicated by the description of the phenomenon in Sa’id al-
Mahdi’s work al-Jarima wa’l Uquba (Crime and Punishment) in 1971. Al-Mahdi 
was the Dean of the Khartoum Faculty of Law, highly respected by senior police 
officers, and his views are indicative of a broad correspondence between police 
officers and other legal professionals within the riverain elite.
67
 First of all, he 
blamed the prevalence of crime in Sudanese cities on the bars where Merissa – the 
local beer in rural Sudan – was imbibed. He complained that in these bars ‘the poor 
classes (tabaqat) migrating from all ends of Sudan, north, west, south and east, meet 
– members of a tribe sit in a specific place and drink huge quantities of this drink and 
fights happen between men of tribes from west Sudan and other tribes from other 
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regions’.68 In particular, he blamed crime on marginalized groups such as Nuba, 
southerners and westerners, and brought up the old colonial bugbear of such 
individuals working as servants and then stealing off their masters.
69
 He also referred 
to the settlements on the edge of the city as ‘nests of crime’ and ‘tribal villages’ (al-
qura al-qabaliyya).
70
 Similarly, one former officer informed me that the police 
‘considered these areas crime areas’ full of ‘idle person [s]’ who had ‘left their 
places where they were needed for agriculture’.71 People from western Sudan who 
were in origin migrants from West Africa, the so-called ‘fellata’, provoked particular 
prejudice among police officers. In 1976 a police officer observed in an 
administrative report that migrants from West Africa ‘come from the most backward 
people in their home countries’ and asserted confidently that ‘most of the crimes of 
theft and murder are committed by immigrants’.72 Al-Mahdi recommended that 
dealing with the phenomenon of southern and western rural migration required 
closer ‘observation’ (ruquba) of travel between countryside and city and the 
spreading of industry (sina’at) and agricultural projects (mashari’a) to the 
countryside to absorb potential migrants.
73
 Such discourses reproduced almost 
exactly colonial arguments that increases in crime in riverain Sudan were ‘due 
entirely to western immigrants and riff-raff from the rest of Sudan’.74 
 
There were a number of urban legends surrounding the ‘tribal’, mysterious 
and dangerous character of the inhabitants of these peri-urban areas. Na’im 
Muhammad’s Min Milaffat al-Jara’im fi Sudan (from the Crime Files of Sudan) 
recalls the story of Dueina, an inhabitant of western Sudan settled in Khartoum after 
fleeing the 1983-5 Darfur famine, who responded to the arbitrary police actions 
against the inhabitants of these areas by going on a killing spree against the police. 
The (almost certainly exaggerated) accounts of this incident recall that Dueina was 
literally invulnerable to bullets and that it was only when an officer leading a squad 
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of the Central Reserve Police recognized that he was a westerner and ‘knew hijab’75 
that he realized how he could kill him, which was by urinating on his bullet before 
shooting him.
76
 The story of Dueina – although the officer perhaps shared his belief 
in hijab – epitomized how those who policed the peri-urban regions, just like many 
of their colonial forbears, saw inhabitants of rural Sudan as fundamentally 
mysterious and ungovernable by modern technology and a modern legal-rational 
system.  
 
Members of the riverain elite continued to blame the nature of the peri-urban 
environment of Sudan’s expanding post-colonial cities for the state’s inability to 
police these areas. In 1971, al-Mahdi reported that a lack of street lighting and the 
persistent electrical breakdowns afforded criminals an ample number of dark places 
in which to operate.
77
 Al-Mahdi also observed that police were often informed of 
crimes too late in the various quarters (‘ahya) of Sudanese cities because these areas 
had no telephones, and so usually arrived at the scenes of fights after the killers had 
fled.
78
 In particular, in Khartoum, the non-planned residential areas that frequently 
housed the city’s poorest southern and western migrants were held to provide 
criminal gangs with havens from authority where they could stash stolen goods and 
hoard weapons.
79
 The sheer scale of these shanty towns and the incapacity of the 
Khartoum police to operate within them is vividly depicted by Simone, a former 
advisor to the NIF in the 1980s, writing in 1994: 
 
There is a shantytown outside of Khartoum known as Gatati South Mayo 
whose main thoroughfare is called 125
th
 street. Initially conceived as a place 
where the police could build large, inexpensive housing compounds, Mayo 
quickly became a place where police seldom ventured. During the last years 
of the Numayri regime, there was a half-hearted attempt to raze the shanties 
and displace the residents, but the community resisted fiercely, using 
weapons stolen from the local police stations and spears.
80
 
                                                 
75
 In contrast to the conventional Muslim understanding of hijab, in West African Muslim culture it 
often denotes a kind of protective magic.  
76
 Al-Na’im, Mawasim al-Dima’, p. 56. 
77
 Al-Mahdi, Jarima, p. 111. 
78
 Ibid., p. 114. 
79
 Modern Sudan Daily Times, 27 Nov. 1987. 
80
 Simone, In Whose Image?, p. 120. 
224 
 
 
Police neglect of the peri-urban areas 
In spite of what the police wrote about the ‘impenetrability’ of the peri-urban zones, 
the main limiting factor on police activity was their prioritization of the safeguarding 
of the most affluent urban areas and the security of the capital of Sudan’s leading 
businessmen. In 1964 al-Sahafa reported that although Ashash al-Fallata, one of 
Khartoum’s shanty-towns, was known as the ‘Chicago of Sudan’ and no-one dared 
enter it unarmed, no police post had been established there due to financial 
stringency.
81
 In 1971, al-Mahdi observed that statistics showed that more crimes 
occurred in the commercial regions and those where government employees and the 
rich lived and that these areas therefore required greater levels of policing.
82
 This 
was of course a self-fulfilling prophecy, as criminal statistics are as much an 
indicator of police focus as of criminal activity. Nevertheless it was an attitude 
shared by police officers themselves. Interviewed in 1978, Police Lieutenant Colonel 
‘Abd al-Gabir Atia observed that commercial areas with large shops, banks and 
markets required more policing than residential districts where families were related 
to each other.
83
 This was partially due to police officers’ belief that it was the more 
modern types of crime associated with capitalism that were most difficult to solve, 
and that in areas where social ties were strong people were usually aware of who was 
responsible for a particular crime and criminals often simply chose to hand 
themselves in.
84
 ‘Abd al-Gabir’s argument, made in justification for the lack of 
police presence in such districts, offers an ironic contrast to al-Mahdi’s 
representation of rural values as being inherently threatening to city life, 
demonstrating the ambiguities of a police discourse set upon ‘otherizing’ the peri-
urban regions of the capital, whether positively or negatively. 
 
Nevertheless, social and familial bonds do not appear to have prevented 
crime in the poorest residential areas. Although these were usually depicted as 
sources of crime in Sudanese criminological literature, they were also the location of 
most its victims, mainly as a result of almost total neglect by the police. In 1984, an 
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urban survey group reported that although ‘all types of crime’ occurred at a very 
high rate in the sizeable neighbourhood of Um Bedda, it possessed only one small 
police station and was thus ‘inadequately prepared to handle crime’.85 An elderly 
resident of Um Bedda claimed in an interview that after the 1985 intifada the role of 
this station became purely ‘symbolic’ (ramzi).86 In 1986 the citizens of Hag Yousif, 
traditionally home to Khartoum’s population of Nuba migrants, repeatedly 
complained to the police that in spite of continued spates of armed robberies and 
housebreakings the government had only provided them with one poorly-equipped 
police post, staffed by a mere two officers.
87
 Nevertheless, the police were willing to 
cover great distances and commit significant resources when a merchant’s money 
was involved. For instance, in 1964 the Gedaref police travelled all the way to the 
Nuba Mountains to find 3,000 Sudanese pounds that a servant had stolen from his 
master, and then managed to arrest the servant in Khartoum.
88
 This indicates that the 
spatial limits on police activity were dictated not just by police incapacity but also by 
the manner in which their resources were directed. 
 
One particular result of the very limited presence of the police in these areas 
was the rise of vigilantism and other forms of self-defence amongst northern 
communities in neighbourhoods bordering the shanty-towns occupied by migrants 
from Sudan’s peripheries. This phenomenon was highlighted in particular by the 
events of ‘Black Sunday’.  Al-Sahafa observed that up until half-past seven at night 
on ‘Black Sunday’ the streets were empty of police and controlled by southerners, 
causing ‘citizens’ (muwatinuun -ie. implying northern residents of Khartoum) to arm 
themselves with spears and knives, establish barricades, and form patrols to protect 
their homes. In Burri-Lamab, the northern community was called to arms by the 
beating of the nahhas (drum) and established guards to gather up southerners and 
hand them over to the police.
89
 Ironically, Burri-Lamab had for the first time 
petitioned Khartoum North rural council for a policeman to be stationed in the 
                                                 
85
 Omer M. A. el Agraa, Adil M. Ahmad, Ian Haywood and Osman M. elKheir, Popular Settlements 
in Greater Khartoum (Khartoum?, 1985), p. 206. 
86
 Interview, resident of Um Bedda, Um Bedda, Khartoum, 20 March 2011. 
87
 Al-Sahafa, 29 June 1986. 
88
 Al-Ra’i al-Aam, 8 May 1964. 
89
 Al-Sahafa, 8 Dec. 1964. 
226 
 
suburb in the last few years; the inhabitants claimed that an influx of unmarried 
migrants (including southerners) to the village had led to an increase in crime.
90
  
 
Jabra, which bordered the shanty settlements of al-Ishash and al-Ushara, was 
a typical example of a residential area where police absence encouraged violent and 
retributive forms of local vigilantism. In 1985, Jabra, a settlement of around 8000 
people, possessed only one police station with two officers, no car and no telephone. 
Here, young men equipped themselves with clubs and knives and conducted regular 
night watches.
91
 Abdullahi Ali Ibrahim recalls that such neighbourhood watches in 
Jabra would identify thieves ‘largely on a racial or ethnic basis among those 
suspicious walkers in the night’. After beating them violently, they would then hand 
them over to the police, who made little effort to question the vigilantes’ actions.92 In 
1965 al-Sahafa reported that residents of Khartoum would assist the police in 
rounding up those they identified as vagrants, gamblers and pickpockets in the days 
before the Muslim eid.
93
 Often the appearance of vigilantism as a phenomenon was 
directly linked to state neglect of the police. In 1981 al-Midan claimed that 
Numayri’s neglect of the police in favour of the SSO was leading to a spate of armed 
robberies and forcing young residents of some quarters (ahya’) to form nightly 
watches (waradiyyat) to protect themselves.
94
 
 
The state made its own attempts to incorporate urban vigilantes into the 
police, usually with limited results. Salim recalls that in 1976 efforts were made by 
the Ministry of Interior, supported by East European advisors, to amalgamate the 
various voluntary late-night neighbourhood watch groups into one cohesive 
organization, the ‘Popular Police’ (al-Shurta al-Sha’abiyya). This force anticipated 
one similarly named that would appear under the ‘Salvation Regime’ after 1989. 
However, the ‘Popular Police’ were soon disbanded after protests from the regular 
police and after the regime began to ‘borrow’ its members to provide guards 
(khufara’) for government institutions and take part in public displays of support for 
the regime, which caused these groups of young men to deviate from their original 
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purpose of providing their communities with protection from late-night robbery.
95
 
Nevertheless, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, Numayri sanctioned police delegation of 
power to vigilantes in 1982, further diluting the authority and presence of the force 
in the capital’s vast urban neighbourhoods. The emergence of the ‘Prevention of 
Vice’ groups deployed by the Islamic Charter Front in the period leading up to the 
1983 September Laws, many of whom were recruited from the poorest 
neighbourhoods,
96
  also indicated the poor presence of the police force in the more 
peripheral regions of post-colonial northern cities. 
 
 
Imposing unequal citizenship: the role of the police in enforcing the 
urban-rural divide 
 
By otherizing the peri-urban regions of Khartoum and depicting their inhabitants as 
hostile and violent the police could effectively exclude them from the civil policing 
project that had gradually begun to emerge at the riverain centre since the Second 
World War. By representing these neighbourhoods as collectively predisposed 
towards crime they could justify policing them with collective and punitive means. 
Thus the police became the physical tool for the state’s application of the centre-
periphery divide in these areas, conducting ‘sweeps’ and ‘dragnet’ operations and 
demolishing homes in the shanty towns. These campaigns indicated the 
government’s fear not just of the social and demographic change that widespread 
immigration from country to town would provoke but also the fear that marginalized 
populations within the major cities would be exploited by political opponents of the 
regime. These policies further demonstrated that the police were not only trapped 
within the bifurcated system of governance originally established by colonialism but 
that they were now actively perpetuating it, driving rural migrants back into the 
countryside and establishing a system of identity cards to distinguish city-dwellers 
from rural ‘vagrants’. The police further established checkpoints at the edges of 
cities and allocated resources and attention to protecting the riverain towns and the 
capital, Khartoum, from the perceived threats of the countryside, including drugs and 
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migrants. Nevertheless, this system would remain fundamentally porous, indicating 
the limit to the capacity of the police to enforce the urban-rural divide. 
 
‘Dragnet’ operations and collective policing in the shanty-towns 
The result of the police’s inability to establish a permanent presence in the shanty 
towns was that they were, like their colonial predecessors, incapable of identifying 
criminals on an individual basis. The police would blame poor and under-privileged 
groups from these peri-urban areas collectively for crimes, rather than targeting 
criminals on an individual basis. This in itself had echoes of late colonial discourses 
that justified ‘reducing’ quarters deemed as ‘a hot bed of araki selling and hashish 
distribution’, and undertaking ‘sweeps’ to arrest ‘unlicensed pedlars and small 
boys’.97 The process was well underway by the 1960s, and being applied on 
considerably greater scale than during the Condominium. In May 1964, the 
Khartoum police declared a new policy which would involve targeting ‘nests of 
criminals’ (awqar mujrimin).98 As Singerman has observed with regard to Egypt, 
where the same phrase was used, such language was important because by 
stigmatizing the ‘environment’ of these neighbourhoods the government made all 
their inhabitants collectively culpable.
99
 The next month, after a number of robberies 
in the area of Khartoum between Sug Arabi and Sikkut al-Hadid, the police took 
‘severe measures’ which involved 50 arrests for ‘vagrancy’.100 In 1968, in response 
to a wave of thefts and robberies, they conducted a series of campaigns among these 
so-called ‘nests of criminals’ in Omdurman. al-Ra’i al-‘Aam observed that the police 
found such crimes difficult to investigate because victims of theft were prone to 
exaggeration (mubalaga) in their accounts. As a result, they simply arrested 
hundreds of ‘vagrants’ and presented them to court.101  
 
Another response to the perceived threat coming from these areas was simply 
to raze the makeshift residences to the ground and force their inhabitants to return to 
the country, as recommended by al-Mahdi. As Simone has observed, it was because 
of the ‘relative invisibility and impenetrability’ of such areas that ‘the state is 
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basically forced to destroy the entire neighbourhood as its counter-response’.102 The 
first legislation sanctioning such actions by the police was passed in early 1961.
103
 In 
1966 a violent clash occurred between police and the inhabitants of Fitihab when the 
police arrived, accompanied by tractors, to demolish housing that had been 
established without government permission.
104
 Such policies were halted during the 
particularly liberal phases of Sudanese politics, such as the transitional periods that 
followed the 1964 and 1985 uprisings, and after the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement 
that brought peace to the south, from whence a great number of these peripheral 
populations came.
105
  
 
However, as Numayri’s relations with the south deteriorated in the later 
1970s
106
 these policies re-emerged. In 1979 the dictator declared that he was 
launching a campaign of ‘public discipline’ (al-indibat al-‘aam), ordering the mass 
arrest of unemployed people on the outskirts of the capital who were sent to work on 
the government’s newly established, rain-fed agricultural schemes in the 
countryside.
107
 In September 1981 Numayri ordered the police to launch ‘dragnet’ 
operations throughout Sudan’s major urban centres, particularly the slums, the 
purpose of which was to ‘clean up the country of criminals and jobless elements’. 
15,000 individuals were unceremoniously dumped into a holding camp at Sofa, from 
where they were transported back either to their home provinces, in the case of the 
unemployed and ‘vagrants’, or to their home countries in the case of refugees.108 It 
reveals a great deal about the urban-rural dichotomy in Sudan that a largely city-
based police force chose to deal with the underprivileged groups from which urban 
criminals sprang by throwing them back into the countryside, where the force had 
comparatively little practical jurisdiction.  
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These peri-urban populations were heavily targeted by the regime and the 
police after the ‘Islamization’ of the legislation in 1983. This legislation occurred at 
a time when migration to the capital from Darfur in particular was at its peak, due to 
the famine which was occurring in the western region at that time. These Darfuris 
were pouring into makeshift settlements on the edges of Khartoum, such as Fitihab, 
Um Bedda, Mesalma, Radmia and Marzuk, defying the numerous attempts of the 
police and other ‘security forces’ to clear them out.109 It seems that those who 
implemented the September Laws focused their efforts most heavily on these 
gateways between rural and urban culture, attempting to protect the affluent and 
developed regions of Khartoum from the threat which was perceived to come from 
the shanty-towns. It is worth noting that the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of 
Vice Committees focused their efforts in particular on ‘outermost quarters’ (al-ahya’ 
al-tarafiyya) where prior to the new laws issued by Numayri there had been licensed 
bars and brothels.
110
 
 
 In particular, a vast number of migrants in these regions found guilty of theft 
were sentenced to have their hands amputated in accordance with the hadd penalties 
of classical sharia law. Estimates of the number amputation penalties inflicted 
between 1983 and 1985 range between 60 and 120.
111
 The majority of these were 
upon the inhabitants of Khartoum’s shanty-towns. One contemporary critic of the 
September Laws recalled that the mahakim al-adala najiza (instantaneous justice 
courts) 
 
were distributed in the areas, like in these shanty towns...and nobody cares 
about the people who live in these places, the government is not concerned 
exactly what is going on, and the people are poor, they don’t know their 
rights, and they are taken to the courts and whipped and amputated and I used 
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to have the pictures of all the people who were amputated at the time, these 
people all of them, with no exception, they were from these shanty towns.
112
 
 
The victimization of Khartoum’s peri-urban populations by the 1983 legislation was 
quite clearly demonstrated by their participation in the 1985 April Uprising that 
overthrew Numayri. Secular and leftist figures associated with the Ba’ath and 
Communist parties helped organize the ‘mutasharriddin’, or ‘vagrants’, who 
included numerous famine migrants from Sudan’s west. In mass demonstrations 
against the regime they vandalized vehicles and public property.
113
 The regime 
responded with more kashas, claiming that there were at least 60,000 ‘vagrants’ in 
the city.
114
 Meanwhile, its newspapers described the demonstrators as ‘tramps’ and 
‘rabble’ (gauga’).115 This is further evidence that the legislators of September 1983 
had abandoned all hopes of individuating these populations and incorporating them 
into Sudanese society, returning instead to depicting them as a threatening, violent, 
tribal ‘mass’, as they were seen during the high colonial period.  
 
After the 1985 intifada, the cabinet appointed by the Transitional Military 
Council responded to criticisms of the previous regime’s kasha campaigns by 
declaring such actions unconstitutional on the basis that Sudanese citizens had a right 
to move wherever they liked in the country.
116
 However, police representatives were 
quick to blame this decision for escalating rates of crime in the capital.
117
 Thus, in 
co-operation with Sadiq al-Mahdi’s parliamentary regime (1986-9), they began to re-
initiate the kashas. In April 1987 the Modern Sudan Daily Times estimated that 
18,000 urban migrants had been arrested and returned to their home towns.
118
 The 
police often destroyed shanty housing altogether in regions such as Dar al-Salaam 
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and Shambat to force citizens to leave, provoking violent clashes in which some 
residents of the shanty towns were raped and killed.
119
 
 
The use of identity cards, which were first legislated for in 1962, would later 
become one of the police’s key tools for the system of ‘sweeps’.  Although 
theoretically a means to unite the Sudanese nation, they in effect led the police to 
play a role in widening the urban-rural dichotomy and enforcing a system of unequal 
citizenship. Actual identity cards were introduced to Khartoum by the customs and 
immigration police in 1966 and later to major ports and important provincial cities. 
Geili claimed in 1974 that the identity card system had been established in all major 
towns.
120
 However, it appears that the Sudanese government first began to attempt to 
enforce the identity card regime on all of Khartoum’s citizens as a result of the 1976 
coup attempt engineered by Libyan leader Mu’ammar Gaddafi and exiled Umma 
party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi. The government claimed that the fighters, who had 
been recruited for the coup by Gaddafi and al-Mahdi in Darfur and a number of the 
Sahelian countries such as Niger, Mali and Chad, had been infiltrating the residential 
areas of the capital in the months leading up to the attempted putsch.
121
 Qalandar, a 
former member of the regime, claims that the rebel fighters settled in Um Bedda, one 
of the marginalized settlements on the edges of the capital which was particularly 
associated with Darfuri migrants.
122
 Thus the government – after a campaign of 
arrests by the Public Security Organization conducted against Darfuris, many of 
whom, according another political prisoner from the time, had nothing to do with the 
coup attempt
123
 – conducted a new census in Khartoum, ran checks on citizenship 
certificates and undertook a ‘re-inspection’ of residential areas ‘considered a refuge 
for fugitives’.124 Thus the identity card regime, which was enforced more strictly in 
the capital than anywhere else, reflected not just the regime’s anxiety about the 
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‘moral crisis’ caused by Khartoum’s peri-urban regions but also the fear that they 
would be exploited politically and militarily by opponents of the state. 
 
Identity cards would later play a vital role in the kashas of the 1980s, when 
the authorities pleaded that non-‘vagrant’ citizens of Khartoum should carry them at 
all times to avoid being caught up in the ‘sweeps’.125 Those that did not have cards 
were ferried back to the countryside, implying again that citizenship was not applied 
to those hailing from Sudan’s rural peripheries.126 The Identity Card Law of 1981 
had stipulated that all Sudanese above the age of 18 had a legal requirement to obtain 
identity cards.
127
 Clearly, possession of identity cards was not widespread even in 
Khartoum at this stage. It was reported as the ‘sweeps’ began in 1981 that in the 
capital ‘one of the busiest offices now is the one issuing identity cards’.128 During 
the ‘sweeps’ that preceded the 1985 intifada, officials in Khartoum issued a 
statement ‘urging those citizens of the national capital’s district government who do 
not possess identification cards to go to the centres that issue these cards and obtain 
them’.129 Meanwhile in Darfur, the vast rural region from which many of the 
migrants came, it was not until 1988 that the governor established a working plan to 
hand out identity cards in order to distinguish Darfuris from Chadian mercenaries 
and other cross-border migrants.
130
 Thus the identity card system represented the 
state using the police to shield the cities from the influx of migrants from the 
countryside more than it represented any attempt to govern the country as a whole.  
 
Protecting the towns: the role of the police at the urban edge 
The police became so intent on enforcing the urban-rural divide that security around 
the major riverain towns, especially Khartoum, became almost akin to that at a 
national border. After the first major ‘dragnet’ operation of 1981, plans were 
established to ‘set up check-points at all the capital’s inlets and in all the major 
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towns of the region’.131 This system was acerbically satirized in an article by Ibrahim 
Da’ud in al-Siyasa in 1988, entitled ‘This is what I would do if I was Minister of 
Interior! (Hadha ma kuntu afa’alhu lau kuntu waziran li-dakhiliyya)’, writing at the 
height of the state of emergency in the 1980s. Da’ud observed that those travelling 
into Khartoum from Port Sudan could be stopped and have their baggage searched as 
often as ten times while buses coming from the White Nile region would be stopped 
both in Jebel Auliya and Azuzab on the outskirts of Khartoum. However, they were 
not searched at the point of origin, which reflected the capital-focused nature of 
security. Da’ud also observed that these checkpoints were not even effective at 
preventing the entrance of drugs and refugees into Khartoum, since there were many 
potential entrances to the capital which they did not cover, including Omdurman 
from the west, through the Green Belt (al-Hizam al-Akhdar) to the south of the 
capital, and from the Butana via Bahri.
132
 Thus Da’ud’s article drew attention not 
only to the Khartoum-centric nature of security but also to the implications that the 
police system’s inability to monitor the rest of the country had for security in the 
capital. 
 
Good evidence for the urban bias in policing was the strategy that the 
national force adopted towards the issue of drugs. As in the colonial era (see Chapter 
1), the struggle of the police force to manage the inter-regional trade in drugs 
highlighted the divided nature of the police system in Sudan. Drugs remained a key 
issue of concern in the post-independence years. In the 1970s and 1980s social 
workers began to decry the influence that recreational drug use was having on 
students, workers and civil servants in Khartoum.
133
 The national papers frequently 
praised the police for making impressive drugs hauls, although these were usually 
made at key transport nodes and in Sudan’s main trade entrepots such as Khartoum, 
Port Sudan, Nyala, Kassala and Gedaref.
134
 For instance, in 1985 the Dangerous 
Drugs Unit claimed to have burned a number of hashish farms in Gedaref and Port 
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Sudan, and to have impounded 3,101 sheaths being transported on camel back near 
those cities.
135
  
 
However, the police were usually unable to deal with the sources of drugs, as 
the regions that produced them were affected by Sudan’s various post-colonial 
conflicts. One senior officer observed that 
 
We the police, know where the hashish, the drugs, were planted, in the south, 
in Wau Province, in Southern Darfur, Radom, mintaqa al-Radom [the Radom 
region], some places in Gedaref, but now the security situation in these places 
gave the offenders a good chance to plant without being dispersed. So most 
the operations done by the police is either to burn the farms, or to cut the 
ways, not to enter the big towns, and they achieved very good results in 
this.
136
 
 
The fact that police activity was focused on preventing drugs reaching Sudan’s 
principal towns again reflects the extent of the urban-rural dichotomy in the country 
and it is questionable to what extent the police achieved ‘good results’ even in this 
regard. In Khartoum itself it was estimated in 1980 that 50 Kantars of hashish 
entered the city annually, of which only ten per cent was seized by the police, which 
would seem to support Da’ud’s observation (cited above) with regard to the 
inefficacy of most of the border checks.
137
 Smugglers devised increasingly ingenious 
methods for concealing drugs, including smuggling them past customs police in 
camels’ stomachs.138  
 
Nevertheless, in the 1980s the police launched a particularly determined 
campaign to block the entrance of drugs into the northern towns.
 139
 In 1988 the 
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drugs police impounded 600,000 Sudanese Pounds worth of hashish after 
establishing an ambush for drug smugglers in the hills to the west of Omdurman, 
thus to some extent answering Da’ud’s assertion that the police were unable to cut 
off these entry routes.
140
 However, this was an isolated success and the inability of 
the police to establish a country-wide presence inevitably impacted on their ability to 
control the spread of drugs throughout Sudan. This limited focus of the police on 
preventing the entry of drugs into the major cities, rather than dealing with drugs 
networks at source, indicated the extent to which police policy was affected by the 
rural-urban dichotomy and desire to protect the main urban centres. 
 
 
 
‘The violence of the wilderness’: breaching the centre-periphery 
divide 
 
Although, as demonstrated above, the state has usually employed its police force to 
enforce the divide between centre and periphery, factions within the state have often 
been willing to use the police against competing factions in ways that cut across this 
same divide. For example, in the 1960s, the Umma party used its Ansar followers, 
most of whom hailed from the rural periphery, to substitute for the regular police in 
clashes with the Communist movement. In a similar although largely unrelated 
context, the rank and file of the police in the 1970s and 1980s were ‘peripheralized’ 
as members of affluent riverain families moved into the SSO and other more 
attractive professions and began to be replaced by recent migrants from the 
countryside – which was evidence of the paradoxical nature of the police’s role in 
enforcing the urban-rural divide. The ‘peripheralization’ of the police led to an 
increasing gulf between the police and the educated and affluent classes of the 
riverain centre, which in itself revealed the specificity of the notions of civil policing 
that had obtained in the 1960s. 
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Umma use of Ansar ‘police’ 
While the majority of the riverain elite in Sudan have possessed only limited links to 
the peripheral regions, the Mahdist movement has a history of using its followers to 
‘police’ the riverain centre. The Khalifa Abdullahi set the precedent for this strategy 
in 1889 when he brought members of the Ta’isha section of the Baggara from Darfur 
to police Omdurman, the capital of the Mahdist state. As Thomas observes, this was 
evidence of the capacity of ‘people from a violent periphery’ to challenge an ‘older 
order’.141 During the 1960s, the Umma party increasingly encouraged its Ansar 
supporters from the west and the White and Blue Nile regions to settle in Omdurman 
to provide it with a political power base.
142
 As seen in Chapter 4, the Umma party at 
this time used the Ansar to substitute for the regular police against its political 
opponents, particularly the Communist Party, which Sadiq al-Mahdi banned during 
his first period as Umma prime minister. One ex-Communist recalled that they acted 
as ‘demonstration breakers’ wearing ‘Mahdi military uniforms’.143 The tactics of the 
Umma party during this period recalled colonial tactics of using the Ansar to police 
protest movements begun by the urban elites during the 1920s (see Chapter 1).  
 
The state police were often unable to challenge these shows of force by the 
Ansar. This was the case in the aftermath of the 1964 October Revolution when such 
displays both prevented a Communist takeover during the ‘day of the barricades’ in 
November 1964 and forced the transitional government to step down in the 
following February.
144
 However, at other times there were violent clashes between 
police and Ansaris, as during the Neguib Riots of 1954 (see Chapter 2). Another 
such clash occurred during the ‘Mulid Incidents’ of 1961 when Siddiq al-Mahdi, the 
then Imam of the Ansar, had been strengthening the presence of the Ansar in 
Khartoum in preparation for a potential conflict between the banned political parties 
and the military regime of Ibrahim Abboud. Umma politicians claimed that the 
government deliberately staged the attack, in which 14 Ansar were slain.
145
 The 
Khartoum police, alongside the army, clashed bloodily with the Ansar once more in 
Wad Nubawi in Omdurman in 1970 when the supporters of the Imam al-Hadi al-
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Mahdi, who was at that time engaging Numayri’s army at Aba Island, rose up 
against the regime.
146
 
 
Clashes between the police and Ansar provided their opponents amongst 
Khartoum’s elite with an opportunity to ‘otherize’ the latter and direct attention to 
the threat they posed to urban values. For instance, the judges who tried the Umma 
politicians accused of inciting the 1954 riots accused Abd al-Rahman Nugdalla of 
stirring up a mob of ‘fanatical, unsophisticated and excited westerners ... liable to 
lose control if they became excited and were opposed by the police’.147 This 
mirrored the general portrayal of the Ansar in al-Ra’i al-‘Aam, where they were 
described as issuing battle cries like those of ‘Red Indians’.148 Thus, the educated 
Sudanese elite were using colonial tropes to establish their superiority over the 
Ansar. The events of 1 March have been used by one modernizing anti-Mahdist 
Sudanese historian to state that it was impossible for a ‘tribal, regional backward 
society’ to settle its disputes within the boundaries of an industrial, democratic 
society.
149
 The Communist movement and other members of the educated elite 
developed the concept of unf al-badiya (lit. ‘the violence of the wilderness’) to 
express their disdain for the use of people from Sudan’s peripheries to police the 
sophisticated classes of the city.
150
 Communist historian Hasan Jizouli described the 
Ansaris who were deployed against his party by the Umma party in 1965 as wielding 
‘barbaric spears and axes’ (fu’us wa harrab hamajiyya).151 However, while these 
colonial tropes were usually used by members of the riverain elite simply to impose 
a distance between themselves and the inhabitants of peripheral Sudan, here they 
were being deployed within the context of a specific conflict between factions in the 
centre. 
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‘A big problem’: the incorporation of the marginalized peoples into the police force 
It was not just Ansar ‘police’ that breached and complicated the divide between city 
and countryside. One of the ironies of the police’s attempts forcibly to define the 
boundary between centre and periphery was that the force itself increasingly began 
to recruit from the marginalized populations of the shanty towns, partially due to its 
own marginalization within the government. The anxieties that this phenomenon 
provoked among both the senior police establishment and their anti-government 
opponents reflected the ambiguities and confusion caused by the porosity of the 
centre-periphery divide. 
 
As the Shayqiyya began to use the benefits that accrued to members of the 
police force to acquire a decent education for their sons, later generations would 
reject police employment in favour of business or work in Numayri’s other security 
agencies, which attracted better salaries and increasingly came to be seen as the 
guardians of ‘Arab’ security.152 This also reflected more widespread patterns in the 
Sudanese economy in which affluent riverain Sudanese were migrating en masse to 
reap higher salaries in the Gulf States and thus opening up urban jobs for migrants 
from the peripheries.
153
 Northern Sudanese police professionals, who proudly claim 
that they were the ones who established the modern police systems of the Gulf States 
when they acquired their independence in the 1970s, were a part of this migration.
154
  
Thus, although the higher echelons of the force have continued to be officered by 
men born in the region to the north of Khartoum,
155
 from the late 1970s rank and file 
policing increasingly became a job that only the marginalized migrants from the 
shanty towns would perform. One officer interviewee observed that from this period 
onwards ‘most, but not all’ the rank and file policemen came from the shanty 
towns.
156
 The ethnic balance within the police force has thus come more and more to 
resemble that which has historically obtained within the army, where officers have 
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been drawn from the riverain elite and soldiers from ex-slave populations from 
Sudan’s rural peripheries.157 This could further explain why the police force became 
more heavily militarized in the 1980s (see Chapter 5), since the social distance 
between the rank and file and officer corps has increased. The police officer corps 
clearly saw this ‘peripheralization’ of the rank and file as ‘a big problem’,158 which 
would provide a further explanation to that of the previous chapter as to why the 
disciplinary laws were tightened in this period. 
 
The ‘peripheralization’ of the police is seen now by aging Khartoumers as a 
negative phenomenon, as the new recruits were not trusted by Khartoum’s historic 
population, who rapidly began to associate them with corruption, brutality and 
theft.
159
 Khartoumers recall nostalgically that in the 1950s and 1960s, the time when 
‘civil’ policing in Sudan was at its peak, the police in the Nile Valley were made up 
of ‘Arabs’, usually Shayqiyya with ‘strong traditions’; this is contrasted favourably 
with the era in which the marginalized peoples entered the force.
160
 This reminds us 
that discourses about ‘civil’ or ‘popular’ policing were based upon a fundamentally 
exclusive notion of who ‘the people’ were supposed to be (see Chapter 4). However, 
in another sense the ‘peripheralization’ of the force warns us against a simplistic 
understanding of the centre-periphery relationship. A number of students who fell 
afoul of the Sudanese police argue that it was their comparatively privileged 
background that made policemen treat them with bitterness and fierceness as they 
suppressed demonstrations.
161
 In this sense the Sudanese police had become 
‘oppressed oppressors’. Thus whilst the educated classes of Khartoum continued to 
stigmatize and stereotype the marginalized peoples who had entered the police force, 
their incorporation within the state apparatus represented a new breach within the 
centre-periphery boundary that provoked fundamental anxieties in the riverain elite. 
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Conclusion 
 
There are many explanations for the limited spatial presence of the police outside the 
most affluent urban areas of Sudan. Often it was a result of neglect following 
internal wrangling within the government and Ministry of Interior, as was the case 
during the ‘Black Sunday’ riots of 1964 and in the period after the dissolution of the 
Ministry of Interior in 1979 (see Chapter 4 and 5). It can also be explained by the 
limited logistical capacity of the police, which indicated not just the poor resources 
of the post-colonial state but also the biased manner in which it distributed them. But 
this chapter has also shown that the perceptions, ideologies and cultures of the senior 
police officers themselves also reflected their northern riverain elite origins; the 
police themselves thus contributed to the perpetuation of a bifurcated and 
dichotomized system of policing in Sudan, that acted to establish barriers within the 
country more than it did to unite it. 
 
Thus the police force in the riverain towns in effect acted to prevent the kind 
of social integration that the process of urbanization was capable of creating. The 
police not only continued to reproduce within the countryside the same militaristic 
and collective forms of policing that had been applied during the colonial era but 
also allowed them to feed back into urban systems of law enforcement. They 
resorted to crude methods such as mass arrests and demolitions of ‘shanty’ housing 
which suspected criminals were held to inhabit, as well as the use of stigmatizing 
corporal punishments during Numayri’s Islamization of the law-books. Members of 
the riverain elite who dominated the police force and government justified this 
collective action by otherizing and defining as ‘tribal’ vast chunks of Sudanese 
society from which these peri-urban populations were drawn. Westerners, 
southerners, Nuba, and Ansaris were stigmatized with a variety of tropes that were 
supposedly held to make them collectively pre-disposed to criminal behaviour. 
However, the stigmatization of the latter group, which was at times a target of the 
state police and at other times incorporated within the government’s security 
apparatus, reminds us that the brutalization of peripheral peoples by groups at the 
centre was sometimes as indicative of conflicts at the centre as it was of the overall 
centre-periphery paradigm. 
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The state’s inability to police the peri-urban areas and the limited sovereignty 
of the state and its police force in the countryside both resulted from the 
prioritization of the capital and urban nodes of the government and economy, as was 
reflected in the fact that Khartoum’s borders were policed almost like an 
international border. Nevertheless, this border remained porous and the police were 
unable to control the influx of people, weapons and drugs from Sudan’s vast 
countryside in spite of their arbitrary efforts to do so. That the centre-periphery 
divide remained breachable was seen in the incorporation of the marginalized 
peoples into the lower ranks of urban police forces, a phenomenon that reflected 
wider social and demographic changes caused by post-colonial urban migration. 
However, since the higher echelons of the force remained closely linked to the 
riverain elite this simply made the force itself a mirror for the prevailing 
contradictions, divisions and tensions within state and society at large. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has sought to explore the uneasy position of Sudanese policemen who 
found themselves at the nexus of a complex relationship between state and society, 
asking whether the police in Sudan can be understood purely as the henchmen of the 
various unrepresentative governments that have ruled over the country in the 
twentieth century. It has responded to this question by arguing that to understand 
whether or not policemen were pliant collaborators with the state, we must first 
establish whether there was indeed a strong and united state apparatus capable of 
mobilizing a unified police force for the purpose of pursuing specific economic, 
political and ideological objectives. It has thus explored contrasting academic 
discourses about colonial governance. These include those that emphasize the 
institutional capacity of colonial states and their capacity to transform society on a 
European legal model together with those that stress the limited ambitions of 
governments focused purely on preserving the security of principal strategic points. 
Employing Homi Bhabha’s notion of colonial ambivalence, it has contended that the 
colonial state itself was extremely divided over which mode of governance to apply.  
Understanding this point is crucial, since analysts of Sudan’s various developmental 
crises have tended to focus on the divisions between the centre and periphery of the 
country, rather than those schisms existing at the centre itself. Although the thesis 
acknowledges arguments that the state’s limited material resources and the 
considerable geographical size of the country have impeded the growth of a strong 
governmental apparatus, it has also demonstrated that these rifts at the centre of the 
state have played a vital role in limiting its capacity to govern. In fact, the colonial 
administration pursued a fundamentally different strategy towards its police force 
than that preferred by the colonial Legal Department and professional police officers. 
Whilst the latter took a developmentalist and technocratic approach to the police 
force, preferring to see it as a tool for crime fighting and social intervention, the 
colonial administration consistently used relativistic discourses to insist that 
Sudanese society was not fit for a modern and professional police system. Although 
the administration accepted the need for such a system within the key urban ‘nodes’ 
of colonial economic power, it preferred to employ policemen as political agents or 
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administrative dogsbodies, whilst delegating local notables and their retainers – the 
so-called Native Administration – to solve crimes on a local level. The 
administration also cited regional diversity as a justification for preventing the 
emergence of a police force that was united on a national level, although the 
practical effect of this was to leave power over the police concentrated within the 
hands of the administration. The administration effectively retained the upper hand 
in this conflict of outlooks, even during the more developmentalist phase of colonial 
governance that occurred in the 1940s and 1950s. This was demonstrated by its 
ability to scapegoat Leslie James, the modernizing commandant of the Khartoum 
Police, for the 1951 Police Strike. Thus by clinging tenaciously to its own 
prerogatives in policing, the British administration sapped the overall governmental 
capacity of the colonial state. 
 
The thesis has also argued that the divisions at the centre of the post-colonial 
Sudanese state have played just as important a role in limiting its capacity to impose 
law and order as was the case during the Condominium. Just like the colonial 
administration, post-colonial governments, whether military or party-based, often 
tended to see the central legal institutions less as a means to expand the presence of 
the government in the lives of citizens than as a potential threat to themselves.  
Although the professional police system acquired a far greater degree of institutional 
power during the early nationalist period, regimes in this period frequently adopted 
old colonial techniques for bypassing and enfeebling it. When Numayri 
decentralized the police force in 1979 and delegated police authority to the army, 
intelligence services, and vigilante groups in the following years, his actions were 
typical of a post-colonial dictator mimicking old colonial tactics. 
 
Having established these questions, the thesis has been able to return to the 
‘collaborator’ problematic. It has asked, if both colonial and post-colonial 
administrations feared the emergence of a modern and professionalized police 
system, can the police be seen as the straightforward collaborators of either? Thus 
instead of simply analyzing the police as agents of the government it has sought to 
explore the other forms of agency that they exercised, whether in the service of 
institutional agendas, individual agendas, or those of the various social, religious and 
political groups to which they were affiliated. It has argued that they exploited the 
245 
 
frailties and schisms within the state in order to pursue these agendas. Firstly, a 
number of the educated generation of professional Sudanese policemen began to 
identify with the demands of British professionals and members of the Legal 
Department for a centralized, modern, and apolitical system of crime-fighting in 
Sudan – the same objectives that the administration was attempting to obstruct. 
Although the introduction of a modern legal system to Sudan was represented by the 
Islamist movement in the 1980s as a colonial assault on Sudanese culture, Sudanese 
policemen pursued the supposedly ‘British’ values of civil policing most actively 
during the early nationalist period, before the assault Numayri launched on the police 
as an institution in the late 1970s. Thus the thesis has maintained that understanding 
the Sudanese police force as a colonial relic is problematic, since Sudanese 
policemen actively attempted to develop a strong police system in Sudan as a means 
of pursuing independence from the British colonial administration. 
 
Whilst Sudanese policemen did make attempts to improve their status as a 
professional body, the thesis has also demonstrated that the eagerness of both 
colonial and post-colonial administrations to de-institutionalize the force allowed a 
variety of actors to subvert it to pursue their own agendas. The practical effect of this 
was that the police often exercised violence on behalf of particular groups, especially 
the Shayqiyya and the political and religious movements to which they were 
affiliated. Similarly, on a more atomistic level the resigned attitude of local 
administrators towards corruption within the force and the willingness of the 
Political Service to distribute arms and police authority to local proxies facilitated 
the manipulation of police authority by a variety of local actors. In this respect, 
colonialism was responsible for spreading a great deal of state violence in Sudan, 
although this violence was not so much a part of the system as a result of the lack of 
system. The frequent impersonation and abuse of plain-clothes powers was further 
evidence of the manner in which individual actors could exploit the state’s weak 
integrity. The mimicry and abuse of police powers by other branches of the security 
establishment, ethnic militias, party militias, criminal gangs, and vigilantes was also 
a phenomenon during the post-colonial era – as was particularly the case after 
Numayri’s manipulation of the police force during the later years of the May 
Regime.   
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However, one positive effect of the social porosity within the police was that 
it limited the extent to which colonial and post-colonial governments could use them 
against their own people, at least in the riverain areas. By recruiting its police force 
in the central urban areas principally from the Shayqiyya and other riverain ethnic 
groups, the colonial state failed in playing ‘divide and rule’, since it was these groups 
that also provided the impetus behind the Sudanese labour and nationalist 
movements. The refusal of the police to suppress a number of demonstrations, and 
their imitation of the tactics practiced by the labour movement, was proof of the fact 
that they were far from the pliant tools of the state. Further evidence of the influence 
that Sudanese society, along with the media, judiciary and professional 
organizations, could exercise to restrain abuse of the police by the state occurred 
during the post-colonial era, particularly during the October Revolution of 1964 and 
the April intifada of 1985. Moreover, during the parliamentary periods that these 
uprisings ushered in, local councils, professional organizations, lawyers’ bodies, the 
media and the judiciary all scored moderate successes in preventing political abuse 
of the police and turning them into a more publicly-orientated body.  
 
The thesis has also sought to assess the manner in which the various 
twentieth-century governments have allowed the classic divide between ‘centre’ and 
‘periphery’ identified by analysts of Sudan’s social and political history to affect the 
development of the police. It has argued that rather than passively adapting their 
police forces to pre-existing social and political divides, both colonial and post-
colonial states actively pursued a policy towards the police that exacerbated the 
disparities between the central and marginalized regions of Sudan. Being unable to 
play ‘divide and rule’ effectively among the police force at the riverain centre 
because of their reliance on the Shayqiyya to man it, the colonial state did so on the 
national level instead by isolating these officers from the provincial administrations. 
By keeping police forces in the provinces subject to immediate administrative 
control and delegating a great deal of the criminal work to the Native 
Administration, the administration hindered the development of a unified and 
national police force applying a central code of law. The success that the British had 
in divorcing the professional cadre of police officers from the provinces was 
demonstrated by the limited geographical extent of the 1951 Police Strike, as the 
participants were unable to spread their demands for a national police department 
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beyond principle urban centres such as Atbara, Khartoum and Port Sudan. The net 
result was that the bifurcated system of policing established by the British increased 
the level of social disparity within the country. Whilst relatively affluent urban 
dwellers were policed in accordance with the central legal code, the Sudan Political 
Service subjected inhabitants of the rural peripheries to administrative forms of 
policing which failed to individualize guilt and thus treated whole communities as 
collective entities.  
 
Post-colonial administrators reproduced the old colonial beliefs concerning 
the merits of localized and collective systems of policing on the periphery, sticking 
to these policies even in the midst of rapid urbanization and migration from 
periphery to centre. In this context, post-colonial regimes not only structured the 
police force around the centre-periphery schism but also increasingly began to use it 
as a physical tool for the enforcement of the divide. That the senior police officers 
themselves largely fell in with the various post-colonial governments in playing this 
role reflected not just the enduring legacy of the dichotomized system of policing 
established by the British but also the importance of the northern riverain origins that 
they shared with other members of the indigenous colonial elite. Whilst the social 
connections of the police to other branches of northern riverain society had served to 
prevent the force being used against the public in the riverain towns during events 
such as the 1964 October, in a wider context it caused the police to perpetuate to 
some extent the divisions within Sudanese society. Nevertheless, the centre-
periphery divide was never impermeable and, ironically, members of the rank and 
file increasingly started to hail from the marginalized populations of the peri-urban 
areas. However, the negative reaction to this phenomenon of older members of 
riverain society and the senior police officers themselves, was a reminder that the 
force was still serving to reproduce the divisions within Sudanese society. 
 
The analysis of a police force that was a part of the state, and yet often at 
odds with it, offers useful parallels with the present regime in Sudan, which was 
ushered in by Umar al-Bashir’s pro-NIF coup of 1989. The current rulers of Sudan 
have created a variety of units parallel to the police, such as the Shurta Sha’abiyya 
(Popular Police), the Amn al-Mujtama (Security of Society), and the Shurta Nizam 
al-‘Aam (Public Order Police) in Khartoum, all of which serve the purpose of 
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enforcing the regime’s interpretation of Islamic morality.1 The powers given to these 
units were clearly resented by a number of regular police officers and up until today 
these units effectively issue edicts on matters such as inappropriate dress 
independently of police command;
2
 they also conduct arrests under the aegis of 
separate bodies such as the Committee for the Commanding of Virtue and 
Prevention of Vice (Hi’a ‘Amr bi’l Ma’arouf wa’l Nahy al-Munkar).3 A continuing 
indicator of how shadowy and ambiguous police authority has become is the 
frequency of the crimes committed by ‘police impersonators’, from theft to 
abduction and rape.
4
 Thus in the current era police authority has been subverted both 
on a macrocosmic level by the state and a microcosmic level by individual criminals, 
continuing a pattern identified in the thesis. 
 
Nevertheless, the thesis has also demonstrated that the Sudanese police have 
continued to survive and at times prospered as an institution due to two factors. First, 
colonial and post-colonial regimes in Sudan have, in spite of their fear of police 
institutionalization, always been reliant on the professional capacity of policemen to 
preserve a basic level of order – if only in the regions in which the regime has strong 
material interests. This historical trend of uneasy dependence has continued under 
the present regime, which has been compelled to abandon its efforts to manipulate 
the state bureaucracy from top to bottom by its dependence on the knowledge and 
skills of the latter.
5
 Thus the plan of the ‘Salvation’ government to substitute 
completely its own parallel units for the regular police force by 2005 was abandoned 
in 1999. At this point the regime’s chief ideologue, Hasan al-Turabi, split from the 
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government and a series of more pragmatic politicians began to allocate the 
country’s newfound oil wealth to developing the mainstream security forces.6 
 
Second, Sudanese policemen have exploited modern education and notions of 
civil policing to press for more independence and autonomy as an institution. 
Professional officers in the riverain centre have sought to make life in the police 
profession akin to a ‘family’ life, providing for the material needs of officers at times 
when weak colonial and post-colonial states had little capacity to make welfare 
provision for them. This was seen in the establishment of clubs, as well as co-
operative societies and benevolent funds that would care for the educational and 
health needs of police families. Again, this ethos of institutional economic 
independence has continued to grow in modern Sudan, as the police, now with some 
level of support from the state, have turned the force into a business enterprise 
running hospitals, hotels and sporting clubs.
7
 In 2000 the police established al-Ribat 
university on ‘police land’ to serve ‘police purposes’, guaranteeing eight per cent of 
university seats for police children
8
 – thus indicating the strength of the notion of 
institutional solidarity and self-help. 
 
In some respects, this resurgence of the regular police force has encouraged a 
re-emergence of ‘governmentalist’ attitudes towards the regulation of crime in 
Sudan. Ever since the invitation of Plumbridge to be Sudan’s first police advisor in 
1910, specialist professionals and members of the judiciary have sought to expand 
the capacity of the force to practice a wider regulation of Sudanese society, in spite 
of the unwillingness of the colonial administration and Sudan’s post-colonial rulers 
to expend resources in this direction. In particular, these professionals have 
demanded a strongly centralized police force with the technical resources to deal 
with violations of state law in Sudan’s provinces. This remains an aspiration of 
contemporary policemen. In 2007, the chief of Sudan’s CID proudly talked of a 
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‘police empire’ which would ensure security for all citizens.9 Technological 
expansion has been a part of this – in recent years, the Sudanese police have sought 
German technical assistance to develop an Automated Fingerprint Identification 
System and strengthen the ‘identity card regime’, deployed speed-cameras in 
Khartoum, and established new forensic laboratories in al-Ubayyid and Port Sudan.
10
 
They have even begun their own media empire, establishing a radio station and 
media office which serves the purpose of training police and media students to 
‘enlighten and culture’ Sudanese citizens.11  
 
Nevertheless the project for a ‘police empire’ has been limited in the present, 
as it was in the twentieth century, by Sudan’s classic ‘centre-periphery’ divide. In the 
relatively well integrated northern, central and – to some extent – the eastern areas of 
the country modern communications technology is slowly bridging the gap between 
police and public. Due to the recent expansion of mobile phone networks, members 
of the public can report offences quickly even in the hinterland areas of major towns 
such as Khartoum, Kassala, Port Sudan and Wad Medani and the jeeps of the 
Emergency Police, the unit established in the 1960s, are able to make a relatively 
swift appearance.
12
 However, in the regions of the west and south affected by 
conflict the gap between police and society has remained comparatively much 
greater and policing has remained a quasi-military activity focusing on the protection 
of the principal urban areas and transport networks. The most active unit of the 
police in Darfur is the quasi-military Central Reserve Police, which incorporates a 
number of the pro-government ethnic militias and serves to guard trade convoys and 
government-held towns against rebel attacks.
13
 The regular police, whether as a 
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deliberate part of government policy or not, do little to prevent the escalation of 
robbery, assault and rape cases within the rural areas and the refugee camps.
14
  
 
A similar pattern occurred in the areas of the south and Nuba Mountains 
affected by the Second Civil War, where the government relied heavily on the 
Central Reserve Police and armed militias, from the predatory activities of which the 
regular police did little to protect civilians.
15
 Similarly, the rebel Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement rarely established any effective police force in the ‘liberated’ 
areas, although since the end of the conflict in 2005 the United Nations has assisted 
the SPLM-dominated Government of South Sudan in developing the infrastructure 
of the police in the south.
16
 Although the current government has rightly been 
criticized for its neglect of the police in these regions, this neglect in itself represents 
a continuation of the logic of previous colonial and post-colonial states which have 
seen little merit in using resources to provide for anything other than regime security 
outside the urban core. 
 
Meanwhile the Darfur conflict has also brought to the fore another key theme 
of the thesis, specifically the inability of the state to regulate the violence of its own 
policemen. Although police officers have most often been criticized for failing to 
respond to reports of crimes, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights issued a report in 2006 stating that the police in the region had 
themselves been responsible for a number of rapes and assaults.
17
 Although the 
government’s unwillingness to regulate criminality amongst the Darfur police is 
related to the politics of the conflict, it also reflects the wider history of the state’s 
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anti-governance outlook. Even in the colonial era administrators – and some judges 
and police officers – took a resigned attitude towards police violence. The immunity 
of policemen from criminal prosecution increased as separate police courts were 
established in 1970; these have remained to the present. The judiciary have been 
further prevented from regulating police criminality by the expansion of the system 
of attorney-general’s offices (niyabat), which first appeared in 1983 and effectively 
began to replace the role of the judiciary in supervising police investigations.
18
 Since 
the role of the attorney-general has often overlapped with that of the minister of 
justice, and his office effectively remains a branch of the government executive,
19
 
this offers little chance for independent regulation of police investigations. However, 
recently a few cases of policemen killing members of the public in the course of their 
duties, or abducting and raping girls have been successfully tried in civilian courts, 
although lawyers and journalists claim that prosecutors often choose not to launch 
investigations against policemen and that it is still common for members of the 
public who apply for an external prosecution to be refused.
20
 
  
The relationship between state absence and violent forms of policing has 
been marked not just in the countryside but in the peripheral regions of the capital 
filled with migrants and refugees fleeing war and famine in the peripheral regions. 
The post-colonial tendency of Sudanese governments to use the police force to 
enforce the urban-rural dichotomy has continued until today, as the contemporary 
security organs employ collective methods that often target specific ethnic groups, 
attributing guilt on a racial basis. The decision of the police and National Intelligence 
and Security Services to arrest between 200 and 3,000 Zaghawi Darfuris after the 
2008 raid into Khartoum by the Zaghawa-backed Justice and Equality Movement 
serves as a reminder of this,
21
 recalling similar collective reprisals against westerners 
conducted by the police in the wake of the Neguib Riots of 1954. 
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The policy of the current regime is indicative of its struggle to use the police to 
enforce the ‘centre-periphery’ divide at a time when the force is becoming 
increasingly ‘peripheralized’ itself. The new security groups such as the Public Order 
Police have also become one of the regime’s agents of choice for the continuation of 
the kasha campaigns, rounding up, arresting and exiling to the countryside deprived 
migrants from Sudan’s peripheries.22 Nevertheless, in spite of the regime’s strategy 
of using the police to enforce the urban/rural divide, it seems that it may have 
fostered the ‘peripheralization’ of a number of its police security units during the 
1990s. A number of educated Khartoumers have the impression that these units were 
being recruited from members of the peripheral population, in particular Darfuris, so 
as to create a social divide between the security forces, including the police, and the 
‘sophisticated’ population of the urban riverain areas.23  For the riverain elite, the 
arbitrary and aggressive behaviour of these new security men showed their inability 
to ‘pay attention to the decorum of things’.24  
 
Whilst the current regime has evidently seen some advantages in using 
recruits from the marginalized populations within the force, the police officer class, 
which continues to be drawn from amongst the elite, evidently remains fearful of this 
phenomenon.
25
 The social divide between the officer class and the NCOs and rank 
and file may be one reason that discipline remains so strict. The 2008 Police Law 
stipulates that a policeman may be imprisoned for one year for disobeying a legal 
order, or for going absent without leave for more than three days.
26
 The social gulf 
between the ranks may also be the reason that the higher police authorities have been 
willing to tackle low-scale corruption amongst the rank and file. For instance, the 
Ministry of Interior recently fired tens of traffic policemen from the force for taking 
bribes and abusing their authority.
27
 Thus, as seen earlier in the thesis (see Chapter 
6), the state has developed an ambivalent attitude towards the employment of 
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marginal groups within the lower ranks of the police. Whilst such groups have at 
times offered factions within the state a potential tool to use against their political 
opponents, simultaneously they have feared the threat that the appearance of 
marginal groups within the police force poses to the dominant riverain culture and 
riverain values. 
 
Overall, this thesis has provided some evidence to support the stereotype of 
African and Middle Eastern policemen as a microcosmic example of the parasitic 
relationship between a distant state and a vulnerable society. Throughout the 
twentieth century policemen have abused members of the public for both the benefit 
of politicians and themselves and the government has often failed to curtail this 
abuse. More importantly, however, the thesis has contested this view as over-
simplified. It has demonstrated that the state is far from monolithic and that 
progressive judges and police officers have frequently challenged the anti-
governance and anti-legal orientation of politicians and administrators who have 
seen a well regulated police force as a threat to their political control. Furthermore 
the thesis has undermined the notion of a divorce between police and society. Even 
during the colonial era, policemen amongst the northern riverain population 
sympathized with and mimicked the tactics of the nationalist and labour movements; 
later revolutions against oppressive regimes demonstrated the effect that legal 
organizations, journalists and professional bodies could have on the police through 
moral and legal stigmatization of their actions. It remains to be seen whether the re-
emergence of journalistic freedoms in contemporary Sudan and the rapid 
proliferation of electronic media will make the police more socially accountable. The 
enormous public reaction to the recent Youtube video of a women being whipped by 
members of the Public Order Police offers some hope that it could. 
 
Nevertheless, the overwhelming challenge facing the police force in Sudan 
remains the country’s enduring centre-periphery dichotomy. Unfortunately, the 
insecurity and ineffectiveness of policing in Sudan’s peripheries are just as indicative 
of long term trends as they are of the destructive policies of the current regime. 
Throughout the colonial era, for pragmatic, political and ideological reasons the 
colonial administration chose to restrict the expansion into the peripheries of the 
professional systems of policing that were developing in the riverain centre. As the 
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central police system has expanded in the post-colonial era it has been used by the 
state to enforce this divide rather than bridge it, physically demarcating the boundary 
between city and countryside. Nevertheless, a novel development since the last 
quarter of the twentieth century has been the influence of the peripheries on the 
lower ranks of the police in the centre itself, which have increasingly begun to 
recruit from the peri-urban settlements established by impoverished rural migrants to 
the riverain heartland of the state. This phenomenon complicates the notion of a 
simplistic centre-periphery divide, as inhabitants of the peripheries have become 
agents of the state even at the riverain core, although these urban police forces have 
continued to remain socially stratified following common patterns of discrimination 
within Sudanese society. However, it will be interesting to see what effect this 
phenomenon has on the police force as the marginalized populations of Sudan 
continue to contest the domination of the central state. 
256 
 
PhD Bibliography 
 
Primary Sources 
 
 
Unpublished Sources: Government Archives 
 
Sudan Government Archives, National Records Office, Khartoum 
 
During my visit to the NRO I was granted access to the following sets of papers: 
CIVSEC, DARFUR, KORDOFAN, KHARTOUM. Papers classified under 
CIVSEC are the records of the Civil Secretary’s Office, whereas the other classes 
contain the records of the relevant provincial administrations. 
 
British Government Archives, The National Archive, London 
 
FO 371 Foreign Office: Egypt, Political Correspondence 
CO 537 Colonial Office and predecessors: Confidential General and Confidential 
Original Correspondence 
 
 
 
Unpublished Sources, Private 
 
University of Durham Library (Sudan Archive) 
 
Officials whose papers were used: 
 
1. Allison, O. C. 
2. Arber, H. B. 
3. Arthbutnot, E. D. 
4. Arthur, A. J. V 
5. Baillie-Strong, W. 
6. Baily, R. E. H. 
7. Balfour, A. 
8. Barter, G. H. 
9. Blaikie, J. A. A. 
10. Bolton, A. R. C. 
11. Collins, R. O. 
12. Daly, M. W. 
13. Donald, J. C. N. 
14. Dupuis, C. G. 
15. Harrison, G. F. 
16. Henderson, K. D. D. 
17. Howell, P. P. 
18. James, L. 
19. Johnson, W.     
20. Kinmoth, W. 
21. Lampen, G. D. 
257 
 
22. Lea, C. E. A. 
23. Lewis, B. A. 
24. Longe, J. 
25. Luce, W. H. T. 
26. MacPhail, J. G. S. 
27. Mayall, R. C. 
28. Miller, J. W. 
29. Parry, J. I. 
30. Owen, T. R. H. 
31. Quinlan, H. 
32. Roberston, J. W. 
33. Parr, M. W. 
34. Sarsfield-Hall, A. G. 
35. Sembiante, F. M. 
36. Vicars-Miles, A. W. L. 
37. Watson, J. R. S. 
38. Winder, J. 
39. Udal, J. O. 
 
International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam 
 
Hizb al-Shuyu’i al-Sudani Collection 184-195 (Leaflets, Pamphlets and other 
documentation concerning the popular uprising of April 1985), 263-285 (Pamphlets, 
leaflets, letters, reports and other documents related to political detainees and 
campaigns to release Sudanese prisoners 1967-1990) 349-366 (Copies of al-Midan, 
1972-1984, 1989-1990) 
 
 
 
Published Sources Official 
 
BRITISH 
 
Report [s] on the finances, administration and condition of the Sudan, 1926-1932, 
continued as Report[s] on the administration, finances and condition of the Sudan, 
1933-1938, continued as Report[s] by the governor-general on the administration, 
finances, and conditions of the Sudan, 1945-1947; continued as Report[s] on the 
administration of the Sudan, 1948, 1949, 1950-1, 1951-2.    
 
 
SUDAN GOVERNMENT 
 
Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan, Proceedings, (Khartoum 1945-7) 
Comments on Dr Marshall’s report on local government (Khartoum 1949) 
Half-Yearly Staff List of the Government of Sudan (Khartoum, 1943-1948) 
Quarterly List, Sudan Government (Khartoum, 1919-1940) 
Sudan Government List (Khartoum, 1949-1959) 
The Laws of Sudan, prepared and arranged for the laws commission by C. 
Cummings , edited by C.H.A. Bennett  (London 1956) 
 
258 
 
Oral Interviews 
 
Senior Police officer A, Khartoum, 17 November 2008 
Senior Police officer B, former head of Public Security Organisation and minister of 
interior, Khartoum, 13 Jan. 2010.  
Senior Police officer C, former head of CID, Khartoum 6 Jan. 2010. 
Senior Police officer D, former commissioner-general of police and minister of 
interior, Khartoum, 27 Dec. 2009. 
Senior  police officer E, former commissioner-general of police, 17 Dec. 2009. 
Police officer F, Forensic Specialist, Interview, Port Sudan, 17 November 2010. 
Police officer G, Interview, Kassala, 6 December 2010. 
Police officer H, Interview, Khartoum, 21 December 2011. 
Ex-Police NCO, Interview, Karima, 19 January 2011. 
Senior Police Officer E, former commissioner-general of police, 17 Dec. 2009. 
Retired schoolteacher, Khartoum, 10 November 2009, 26 December 2009, 8 Jan. 
2010. 
Lawyer, Khartoum, 13 Jan. 2010. 
Sudanese government official, Durham, 16 June 2009. 
Anti-Numayri activist and former Ba’athist politician, Interview, Khartoum, 20 Dec. 
2009. 
Sudanese academic, Interview, Khartoum, 17 December 2009. 
Sudanese academic, Durham, 6 Oct. 2009. 
Hamr Nazir, Khartoum, 13 Jan. 2010. 
Army general, interview (via phone), Khartoum, Jan. 2010. 
Former Shaikh of Wad Ramleh, Khartoum, 13 Jan. 2010. 
Shaikh of Wad Ramleh, Wad Ramleh, 10 Dec. 2010. 
Prominent Republican Brother, Khartoum, 6 Dec. 2010. 
Southern academic, Khartoum, 5 January 2010. 
Sudanese ex-student, Interview, Khartoum, 13 Jan. 2010. 
 
 
 
 
Primary Sources In Arabic 
 
‘Abd al-Aziz, Muhammad, and Abu Rannat, Hashim, Israr Jihaz al-Israr: Jihaz al-
Amn al-Sudani 1969-1985 (2
nd
. Edition, Khartoum, 2008). 
 
‘Abd al-Rahim, Muhammad, al-Nida’ fi Daf’ al-Iftira’ (Khartoum, 195-?). 
 
‘Abd al-Qadir, Zein al-Abdin Muhammad Ahmad, Mayo: Sanawat al-Khasb wa’l 
Jafaf (Khartoum 2011). 
 
‘Abu Bakr, Umar Salih, Tarikh al-Shurta fi Sudan (Riyadh, 1990). 
 
‘Adlan, ‘Awad, Jara’im Hazzat al-Sudan (Khartoum, 2001). 
 
Bayoumi, Hussain, Jihaz Amn al-Dawla Imam Mahkama al-Tarikh (Cairo, 1993). 
 
Bayoumi, Hussain, Mu’dilat al-Amn wa al-Siyasa fi Sudan (Cairo, 1998). 
259 
 
 
Hamad, Muhammad Abu al-Qasim Hajj, al-Sudan: al-Ma’zaq al-Tarikhi wa Afaq 
al-Mustaqbal (Beirut, 1996). 
 
Hamid, Musa ‘Abdullah, Istiqlal al-Sudan Bayna al-Waqa’iyya wa al-Romansiyya 
(2
nd
 Edition, Khartoum 2008). 
 
al-Hussain, Tijani, al-Faidan (Khartoum, 1985). 
 
Ibrahim, ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Awraq min Dhakira (Khartoum, 2007). 
 
Ibrahim, Abu Humayd Ahmad, Qissat Kifah wa Najah: Mudhakkirat al-Shurti 
(Khartoum, 2007). 
 
Aleish, ‘Abd al-Majid, Yawmiyyat al-Dawla al-Islamiyya (Khartoum 2005) 
 
Jadallah, ‘Abdallah ‘Ali, Ma’a al-Idara al-Ahliyya fi Masiratiha (Omdurman, 2005). 
 
Jizouli, Hasan, Unf al-Badiya (Khartoum 2006). 
 
al-Kabbashi, Mukashifi Taha, Tatbiq al-Sharia (Cairo, 1986). 
 
al-Karouri, Shaikh ‘Abd al-Jalil al-Nadhir, Athr Juhud al-Inqadh fi Tazki’a al-
Mujtama’ (Khartoum 2005). 
 
al-Mahdi, Sa’id Muhammad Ahmad, al-Jarima wa’l Uqubat (Khartoum, 1971). 
 
al-Mahdi, Sadiq, Jihad fi Sabil Istiqlal (Khartoum, 1965?). 
 
al-Mahdi, Sadiq, Jihad fi Sabil Dimuratiyya  (Khartoum, 196-?). 
 
Muhammad, Zubeir Muhammad, Tarikh ma Ahmalahu al-Tarikh, Idrab al-Shurta 
Shahir ‘Aam 1951 (Khartoum, 1998). 
 
Muhieddin, ‘Abd al-Rahim Umar, Al-Islamiyyun wa Ma’azaq Istilam al-Sulta fi al-
Sudan Askariyyan, (Khartoum 2009). 
 
Musa, ‘Abbas Salih, Mishwar fi Duruub al-Khidma al-Madaniyya (Khartoum, 
2005). 
 
al-Na’im, Muhammad, Mawasim al-Dima’ al-Radhilah: min Milaffat al-Jarimah fi 
al-Sudan (Cairo, 1991). 
 
Qalandar, Muhammad Sa’id, Sanawat al-Numayri: Tawthiq wa Tahlil al-Ahdath wa 
Waqa’i Sanawat Hukm 25 Mayo fi al-Sudan, (Khartoum 2005). 
 
Sharafi, Husayn Muhammad Ahmad, Suwar min al-Ida’ al-Idari fi as-Sudan, 1942-
1973 (Khartoum, 1991). 
 
Yas, Ahmad Muhammad, Mudhakhirat, (Khartoum, 2001). 
260 
 
 
 
Newspapers 
 
 
al-Ahram. 
 
al-Alwan. 
 
al-Ayyam.  
 
al-Dar. 
 
al-Khartoum 
 
al-Istiqlal. 
 
Majallat al-Shurta 
 
al-Midan. 
 
al-Ra’i al-‘Aam. 
 
al-Ra’i al-Akhar. 
 
al-Raya. 
 
al-Sahafa 
 
al-Sudani. 
 
al-Umma.  
 
al-Watan. 
 
Nile Mirror. 
 
Modern Daily Sudan Times. 
 
Sudan Tribune. 
 
The Vigilant. 
 
 
 
Primary Sources In English 
 
Andrew, Paul, A History of the Beja Tribes of Sudan (Cambridge, 1954). 
 
261 
 
Anderson, Norman G., Sudan in Crisis: The Failure of Democracy (Gainesville, 
1999). 
 
Alier, Abel, Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured (Oxford, 1990). 
 
Bell, Gawain, Shadows on the Sand: the Memoirs of Sir Gawain Bell (London, 
1983). 
 
Bennett, C. H. A., The Laws of Sudan 10 vols. (London, 1956). 
 
Bousfield, Leonard, Sudan Doctor (London, 1954). 
 
Boustead, Hugh, The Wind of Morning (London, 1971). 
 
Brown, Malcolm, (ed.) T. E. Lawrence in War and Peace: an Anthology of the 
Military Writings of Lawrence of Arabia (London, 2005). 
 
Cunnison, Ian George, Baggara Arabs: Power and the Lineage in a Sudanese 
Nomad Tribe (Oxford, 1966). 
 
D’Arcy, Patrick Francis, Laboratory on the Nile: A History of the Wellcome Tropical 
Research Laboratories (New York, 1999). 
 
Hawley, Donald, Sandtracks in Sudan (Norwich, 1995). 
 
Henderson, K. D. D., Set Under Authority (Somerset, 1987). 
 
Henderson, K. D. D., Sudan Republic (London, 1965). 
 
Jackson, H. C., Behind the Modern Sudan (London, 1955). 
  
Jackson, H. C., The Fighting Sudanese (London, 1954). 
 
James, Leslie, ‘The Sudan Police Force in the final years of the Condominium’, 
Lavin, Deborah (ed.), The Condominium Remembered: Proceedings of the Durham 
Historical Records Conference, 1982. Vol 1., The Making of the Sudanese State 
(Durham, 1991), pp.54-59. 
 
Lea, C. A. E., On Trek in Kordofan: the Diaries of a British Officer in Sudan, 1931-
1933 (edited by M. W. Daly, Oxford 1994). 
 
Kirk, R., ‘Some vegetable poisons of the Sudan’, Sudan Notes and Records, 27 
(1946), pp. 127-151. 
 
MacMichael, Sir Harold, The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (London, 1934). 
 
Mahgoub, Mohammed Ahmed, Democracy on Trial: Reflections on African and 
Arab Politics (London, 1974). 
 
Marshall, A. H., Report on Local Government in Sudan (Khartoum, 1949). 
262 
 
 
Malwal, Bona, People and Power in Sudan: the Struggle for National Identity 
(London, 1981). 
 
al-Nur, Mohammed Ibrahim, ‘The role of the native courts in the administration of 
justice in the Sudan’, in Lavin, Deborah (ed.), The Condominium Remembered: 
Proceedings of the Durham Historical Records Conference, 1982. Vol 1., The 
Making of the Sudanese State (Durham, 1991), pp. 78-88. 
 
Scoones, Sir Reginald, ‘The Neguib Riots, March 1954’, in Lavin, Deborah (ed.), 
The Condominium Remembered: Proceedings of the Durham Historical Records 
Conference, 1982. Vol 1., The Making of the Sudanese state (Durham, 1991), pp. 
178-179. 
 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
 
Secondary Sources in Arabic 
 
Aleish, ‘Abd al-Majid, al-Aqwal wa al-Afa’al didda al-Nisa’a wa’l Atfal, 1984-2009 
(Khartoum 2010). 
 
‘Ali, Haydar Ibrahim, Azima al-Islam al-Siyasi (Alexandria, 1992) 
 
‘Ali, Haydar Ibrahim, Suqut al-Mashroua’ Hadari (Khartoum 2004). 
 
Ibrahim, Ahmad Muhammad Ahmad, Tasfi’a al-Idara al-Ahliyya wa Nata’ijha fi 
Darfur (Khartoum, 2007). 
 
Mannallah, Shaikh al-Din Yusuf, al-Hukm al-Mahalli Khilal al-Qurun: ‘Ard Tahlili 
li-Tajriba al-Sudan, 1899-1988 (Khartoum, 1998). 
 
Shibeikah, Makki, al-Sudan fi Qarn 1819-1919 (Cairo, 1947). 
 
Salim, ‘Abdallah Hasan, Tarikh al-Shurta (Khartoum, 2008). 
 
Salim, ‘Abdallah Hasan, ‘Tatawwur Qawanin wa Anzima al-Shurta al-Sudaniyya 
(1899-1999) Muqarantan ma’ Qawanin al-Bulis al-Injlizi’ PhD Thesis: Khartoum, 
2005. 
 
Salim, ‘Abdallah Hasan, al-Taharriyyat wa’l Jina’iyya (Khartoum, 1998). 
 
 
Seconary Sources in English 
 
‘Abd-al Salam, A.H. and de Waal, Alex (eds.), The Phoenix State: Civil society and 
the Future of Sudan (Trenton, 2001). 
 
Abdin, Hasan, Early Sudanese Nationalism: 1919-1925 (Khartoum 1985?)  
263 
 
 
Abu Shouk, Ibrahim Ahmed, ‘Kordofan: from tribes to Nazirates’ in Kevane, 
Michael, and Stiansen, Endre (eds), Kordofan Invaded: Peripheral Incorporation 
and Social Transformation in Islamic Africa (Leiden, 1998), pp. 120-144. 
 
al-Affendi, Abdelwahab, Turabi’s Revolution: Islam and power in the Sudan 
(London, 1991). 
 
el Agraa, Omer M. A., Ahmad,  Adil M., Haywood,  Ian and el Kheir, Osman M. 
(eds.), Popular Settlements in Greater Khartoum (Khartoum?, 1985). 
 
Agozino, Biko, Counter-colonial Criminology: A Critique of Imperialist Reason 
(London, 2004). 
 
Ahire, Philip Terdoo, Imperial Policing: The Emergence and Role of the Police in 
Colonial Nigeria 1860-1960 (Milton Keynes, 1991). 
 
Ahmad, H. M., Sudan: The Christian Design (Leicester, 1989). 
 
Allawi, Ali A., The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (Yale, 
2007). 
 
Alon, Yoav, ‘ “Heart-Beguiling Araby” on the frontier of empire: Early Anglo-Arab 
relations in Transjordan ’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 36 (2009), pp. 
55-72. 
 
Alon, Yoav, ‘Tribes and state formation in Mandatory Transjordan’, International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, 37 (2005), pp. 213-240. 
 
al-Amin, Nuri Mohammed, ‘Britain, the 1924 Sudanese uprising, and the impact of 
Egypt on the Sudan’, The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 19 
(1986), pp. 235-260. 
 
al-Amin, Nuri Mohammed, ‘International Communism, the Wafd Party and the 
Sudan’, British Society for Middle Eastern Studies, 16 (1989). 
 
Anderson, David M., and Killingray, David (eds.), Policing and Decolonisation: 
Politics, Nationalism and the Police, 1917-1965 (Manchester, 1992). 
 
Anderson, David M., and Killingray, David (eds.), Policing the Empire: 
Government, Authority and Control, 1830-1940 (Manchester, 1991). 
 
Anderson, David, ‘Stock theft and moral economy in Colonial Kenya’, Africa, 56 
(1986), pp. 399-416. 
 
Anderson, David, Histories of the Hanged: Britain’s Dirty War in Kenya and the 
End of Empire (London, 2005). 
 
Ayubi, Nazih J., Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East 
(London, 1995). 
264 
 
 
Bakheit, Ga’afar M. A. ‘Native Administration in the Sudan and its significance to 
Africa’, in Yusuf Fadl Hasan, (ed.), Sudan in Africa (Khartoum, 1971), pp. 256-278. 
 
Barclay, Harold B., Burri al-Lamab: A Suburban Village in Sudan (New York, 
1964). 
 
el-Battahani, Atta, ‘Ideological Expansionist Movements versus Historical 
Indigenous Rights in the Darfur Region of Sudan: From Actual Homicide to 
Potential Genocide’, in Salah M. Hassan and Carina E. Ray (eds.), Darfur and the 
Crisis of Governance: A Critical Reader (Ithaca, 2009). 
 
Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (London, 1993). 
 
Bechtold, Peter K., Politics in the Sudan: Parliamentary and Military Rule in an 
Emerging African Nation (New York, 1976). 
 
Berridge, William “What the men are crying out for is leadership: the Khartoum 
Police Strike of 1951 and the battle for administrative control”, Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History, 39 2011, pp. 121-142. 
 
Berman, Bruce and Lonsdale, John, Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa 
(London, 1992). 
 
Berman, Bruce, Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: the Dialectic of Domination 
(London, 1990). 
 
Beshir, Omer Mohammed, The Southern Sudan: A Background to Conflict, (London, 
1968). 
 
Beshir, Omer Mohammed, ‘Decolonization and the transfer of power in the Sudan: 
An overview’, in al-Safi, Mahasin (ed.), The Nationalist Movement in Sudan 
(Khartoum, 1989), pp. 385-436. 
 
Beswick, Stephanie, Violence, Ethnicity and Political Consolidation in south Sudan: 
a History of the Dinka and their Relations with their Neighbours (Ann Arbor, 1999). 
 
Beswick, Stephanie, and Spaulding, Jay (eds.), White Nile, Black Blood: War, 
Leadership and Ethnicity from Khartoum to Kampala (Lawrenceville, 2000). 
 
Bierschenk, Thomas, and de Sardan, Jean-Pierre Olivier, ‘Local powers and a distant 
state in rural Central African Republic’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 35 
(1997), pp. 441-469. 
 
Brown, Nathan J., ‘Brigands and state-building: The invention of banditry in modern 
Egypt’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 32 (1990), pp. 258-281. 
  
El-Bushra, Mohamed el-Amin, Criminal Justice & Crime Problem in Sudan 
(Khartoum 1998). 
 
265 
 
Cell, John, “Colonial rule”, in W. M. Roger Louis (ed.) The Oxford History of the 
British Empire vol. 4: the Twentieth Century (Oxford 1999), pp. 232-254. 
 
Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, Africa Works: Disorder as Political 
Instrument (Oxford, 1999). 
 
Chanock, Martin, Law, Custom and Social Order: the Colonial Experience in 
Malawi and Zambia (Portsmouth, 1998). 
 
Chazan, Naomi, et al., Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa (Basingstoke, 
1988). 
 
Clayton, Anthony, and Killingray, David, Khaki and Blue: Military and Police in 
British Colonial Africa (Athens, 1989). 
 
Cohen, Ronald, ‘Endless teardrops: prolegomena to the study of human rights in 
Africa’, in Ronald Cohen, Goran Hyden and Winston P. Nagan (eds.), Human Rights 
and Governance in Africa (Gainesville, 1993). 
 
Cohen, Stanley, ‘Bandits, rebels and criminals: African history and Western 
criminology (Review Article)’, Africa, 56 pp. 468-483. 
 
Collins, Robert O., ‘Sudanese nationalism, Southern Policy and the unification of the 
Sudan, 1939-1946’, in al-Safi, Mahasin (ed.), The Nationalist Movement in Sudan 
(Khartoum, 1989), pp. 222-265. 
  
Collins, Robert O., Shadows in the Grass: Britain in the Southern Sudan, 1918-1956 
(New Haven, 1983). 
 
Comaroff, John, ‘Governmentality, materiality, legality, modernity: on the colonial 
state in Africa’, in J. G. Deutsch, P. Probst, H. Schmidt, African Modernities, 
Entangled Meanings in the Current Debate (Oxford, 2002), pp. 107-134. 
 
Cooper, Frederick, Decolonisation and African society: The Labour Question in 
French and British Africa (Cambridge, 1996). 
 
Cooper, Frederick, Africa since 1940: the Past of the Present (Cambridge, 2002). 
 
Critchley, T. A., A History of the Police in England and Wales (London 1978). 
 
Crummey, Donald (ed.), Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in Africa (London, 
1986). 
 
Daly, M. W., Darfur’s Sorrow: A History of Destruction and Genocide (Cambridge, 
2007). 
 
Daly, M. W., Empire on the Nile: the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898-1934 
(Cambridge, 1986). 
 
266 
 
Daly, M. W., Imperial Sudan: the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 1934-1956 
(Cambridge, 1991). 
 
Daly, M. W., and Deng, Francis M., Bonds of Silk: The Human Factor in the British 
Administration of Sudan (East Lansing, 1989). 
 
Daly, M. W., & Holt, P. M., A History of the Sudan: From the Coming of Islam to 
the Present Day (London 2000) 
 
Davidson, Basil, Africa: History of a Continent (London, 1972). 
 
Deng, Francis M., War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan (Washington, 
1995). 
 
Deng, Francis M., Customary Law in the Modern World: The Crossfire of Sudan’s 
War of Identities, (New York 2010). 
 
Dodge, Toby, Inventing Iraq (New York, 2003). 
 
Dorman, W. Judson, The Politics of Neglect: The Egyptian State in Cairo, 1974-98 
(PhD Dissertation, SOAS, 2007). 
 
Dinar, Ali B., ‘The Darfur Conflict: A Natural Process or War by Design?’ in Salah 
M. Hassan and Carina E. Ray (eds.), Darfur and the Crisis of Governance (Ithaca, 
2009), pp. 103-204. 
 
Elnur, Ibrahim, Contested Sudan: The Political Economy of War and Reconstruction 
(New York, 2008). 
 
Emsley, Clive, The English Police: A Political and Social History (Hemel 
Hempstead, 1991). 
 
Evans-Pritchard, E. E., The Azande: History and Political Institutions (Oxford, 
1971). 
 
Fahmy, Khaled, “The anatomy of justice: forensic medicine and criminal law in 
Nineteenth Century Egypt”, Islamic Law and Society 6 (1999), pp. 224-271. 
 
Fanon, Frantz, The Wretched of the Earth (Harmondsworth, 1967). 
 
Fanon, Frantz, Black Skin, White Masks (London, 1970). 
 
Fawzi, Sa’ad al-Din, The Labour Movement in Sudan, 1946-1955 (London, 1955). 
 
Fegley, Randall, Beyond Khartoum: A History of Subnational Government in Sudan 
(Trenton 2011) 
 
Fluehr-Lobban, Carolyn ‘An analysis of homicide in the Afro-Arab Sudan’, Journal 
of African Law 1 (1976), pp. 20-39. 
 
267 
 
Fluehr-Lobban, Carolyn, Islamic Law and Society in Sudan (London, 1987). 
 
Foucault, Michel, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison (London, 1977). 
 
Fourchard, Laurent, ‘Lagos and the invention of juvenile delinquency in Nigeria, 
1920-1960’, The Journal of African History 47 (2006), pp. 115-137. 
 
Fourchard, Laurent, ‘A new name for an old practice: vigilantes in South West 
Nigeria’ Africa 78 (2008) pp. 535-558. 
 
Freund, William, ‘Theft and social protest among the tin miners of Northern 
Nigeria’, in Crummey, Donald (ed.), Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in 
Africa (London, 1986), pp. 49-65. 
 
Frickle, Adrienne and Kheir, Amira, ‘Sudan’s Legal System and the Lack of Access 
to Justice for Survivors of Sexual Violence in Darfur’, in Salah M. Hassan and 
Carina E. Ray (eds.), Darfur and the Crisis of Governance (Ithaca, 2009), pp. 285-
293. 
 
Gallab, ‘Abdullahi A., The First Islamist Republic: Development and Disintegration 
of Islamism in Sudan (Aldershot, 2008). 
 
Gelvin, James L., The Modern Middle East: A History (Oxford, 2005) 
 
Glentworth, Garth and Idris, Mahdi Sheikh (eds.), Local Government and 
Development in Sudan: The  Experience of Southern Darfur Province (Khartoum, 
1976). 
 
Gray, Richard, Fadl Hasan, Yusuf (eds.), Religion and Conflict in Sudan (Nairobi 
2002), pp. 58-71. 
 
Gutteridge, William, ‘Military and police forces in Colonial Africa’, in Gann and 
Duignan (eds.) Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960 vol.2: The History and Politics of 
Colonialism 1914-1960 (Cambridge 1970), pp. 286-320.  
 
Hassan, Salah M., ‘Naming the Conflict: Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in 
Sudan’, in Salah M. Hassan and Carina E. Ray (eds.), Darfur and the Crisis of 
Governance: A Critical Reader (Ithaca, 2009), pp. 154-169. 
 
Heald, Suzette, ‘State, law and vigilantiism in Northern Tanzania’, African Affairs 
105 (2006), pp. 265-283. 
 
Herbst, Jeffrey Ira, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority 
and Control (Princeton, 2000). 
 
Hills, Alice, Policing Africa: Internal Security and the Limits of Liberalization 
(London, 2000). 
 
Holdaway, Simon (ed.), The British Police (London, 1979). 
 
268 
 
Holt, P. M., The Mahdist State in Sudan: A Study of its Origins, Development and 
Overthrow (Oxford, 1970). 
 
Howell, John (ed.), Local Government and Politics in the Sudan (Khartoum, 1974). 
 
Howell, Paul, A Manual of Nuer Law: Being an Account of Customary Law, its 
Evolution and Development in the Courts established by the Sudan Government 
(London, 1954). 
 
Hutchinson, Sharon, Nuer Dilemnas: Coping with War, Money and the State 
(Berkeley 1996). 
 
Keddie, Nikkie R., Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani: A Political Biography (Berkely 
1972) 
 
Khalid, Mansour, Nimeiri and the Revolution of Dis-May (London, 1985). 
 
Khalil, Mohamed Ibrahim, “Human rights and the Islamization of the Sudan legal 
system”, in Richard Gray & Yusuf Fadl Hasan (eds.), Religion and Conflict in Sudan 
(Nairobi 2002), pp. 58-71. 
 
Killingray, David, ‘ “A swift agent of government”: air power in British Colonial 
Africa, 1916-1939’, Journal of African History 25 (1984), pp. 429-444. 
 
Killingray, David, ‘Punishment to fit the crime? Penal practice in British Colonial 
Africa’, in Bernault, Florence (ed.), A History of Prison and Confinement in Africa 
(Portsmouth, 2003) pp. 97-118. 
 
Killingray, David ‘Gender issues and African Colonial Armies’, in Killingray, David 
and Omissi, David (eds.) Guardians of Empire: the Armed Forces of the Colonial 
Powers, c. 1700-1964 (Manchester, 1999), pp. 221-248. 
 
Killingray, David, ‘Guarding the extending frontier: policing the Gold Coast, 1865-
1913’, in Anderson, David M., and Killingray, David (eds.), Policing the Empire: 
Government, Authority and Control, 1830-1940 (Manchester, 1991), pp. 106-125. 
 
Killingray, David, and Omissi, David (eds.) Guardians of Empire: the Armed Forces 
of the Colonial Powers, c. 1700-1964 (Manchester, 1999).  
 
Kopytoff, Igor (ed.), The African Frontier: The Reproduction of Traditional African 
Societies (Indiana, 1987). 
 
Lewis, Joanna, Empire State-Building: War and Welfare in Kenya 1925-52 (Oxford, 
2000). 
 
Ibrahim, ‘Abdullahi ‘Ali, Manichean Delirium: Decolonizing the Judiciary and 
Islamic Renewal in the Sudan, 1898-1985 (Boston, 2008). 
 
269 
 
Ibrahim, Hassan Ahmed, ‘Imperialism and Neo-Mahdism in the Sudan: A study of 
British policy towards Neo-Mahdism, 1924-1927’, The International Journal of 
African Historical Studies, 13 (1980), pp. 214-239. 
 
Ibrahim, Hassan Ahmed, ‘Mahdist risings against the Condominium Government in 
the Sudan, 1900-1927’, The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 12 
(1979), pp. 440-471. 
 
Ibrahim, Hassan Ahmad, A Study of Neo-Mahdism in the Sudan, 1899-1956 (Leiden, 
2004). 
 
Idris, Amir H., Sudan’s Civil War: Slavery, Race and Formational Identities 
(Lewiston, 2001). 
 
Idris, Amir, Conflict and Politics of Identity in Sudan (New York, 2005). 
 
Ismail, Salwa, Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State, and Islamism (New 
York, 2003). 
 
Johnson, Douglas. H., Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars (Oxford, 2003). 
 
Johnson, Douglas. H. (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire, Series B., 
Vol.5: Sudan (London, 1998). 
 
Johnson, Douglas. H., Nuer Prophets: A History of Prophecy from the Upper Nile in 
the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Oxford, 1994). 
 
Johnson, Douglas H., ‘Criminal secrecy: The case of the Zande ‘Secret Societies’, 
Past and Present, 130 (1991), pp. 170-200. 
 
Johnson, Douglas H., ‘From military to tribal police: policing in Upper Nile province 
of the Sudan’, in Anderson, David M. and Killingray, David, Policing the Empire: 
Government, Authority and Control, 1830-1940 (Manchester, 1991). 
 
Johnson, Douglas H., ‘Judicial regulation and administrative control: customary law 
and the Nuer, 1898-54’, The Journal of African History 27 (1986) pp. 59-78. 
 
Johnson, Douglas H., ‘The fighting Nuer: primary sources and the origins of a 
Stereotype’, Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 51 (1981), pp. 
508-527. 
 
Johnson, Douglas H., ‘The structure of a legacy: military slavery in North-East 
Africa’, Ethnohistory, 36 (1989), pp. 72-88. 
 
Johnson, Douglas H., ‘Sudanese military slavery from the Eighteenth to the 
Twentieth Century’, in Archer, L. (ed.), Slavery and Other Forms of Unfree Labour 
(London, 1988). 
 
Lawrence, Benjamin N., Osborn, Emily Lynn, and Roberts, Richard L., 
270 
 
‘Introduction: African Intermediaries and the “Bargain” of Collaboration’ in 
Benjamin Lawrence, Emily Osborne and Richard Roberts (eds.), Intermediaries, 
Interpreters and Clerks: African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa 
(Madison, 2006), pp. 3-35. 
 
Lavin, Deborah (ed.), The Condominium Remembered: Proceedings of the Durham 
Historical Records Conference, 1982. vol 1., The Making of the Sudanese state 
(Durham, 1991). 
 
Layish, Aharon and Warburg, Gabriel, The Re-instatement of Islamic Law in Sudan 
under Numayri: an Evaluation of a Legal Experiment in the Light of its Historical 
Context, Methodology, and Repercussions (Leiden, 2002). 
 
Leonardi, Cherry, Knowing Authority: Colonial Governance and Local Community 
in Equatoria Province, Sudan, 1900-1956 (unpublished PhD thesis, Durham, 2005). 
 
Leonardi, Cherry, ‘ ‘Liberation’ or ‘Capture’: Youth in between ‘hakuma’ and 
‘home’ during the civil war and its aftermath in the Southern Sudan’, African Affairs, 
106 (2007), pp.391-412.  
 
Lesch, Ann Mosley, The Sudan: Contested National Identities (Oxford, 1998). 
 
Lonsdale, John, ‘The european scramble and conquest in African history’, in J. D. 
Fage and Roland Oliver, (eds.) The Cambridge History of Africa vol. VII 
(Cambridge, 1986), pp. 680-766. 
 
Kevane, Michael, and Stiansen, Endre (eds.), Kordofan Invaded: Peripheral 
Incorporation and Social Transformation in Islamic Africa (Leiden, 1998). 
 
Kibreab, Gaim, State Intervention and the Environment in Sudan, 1889-1989: the 
Demise of Communal Resource Management (Lewiston, 2002). 
 
Mahmoud, Mahgoub al-Tijani (ed.), Sudan Law and International Human Rights 
Norms: Comparative Research (Lewiston 2000). 
 
Mahmud, Ushari Ahmed, Arabic in the Southern Sudan: History and Spread of a 
Pidgin Creole (Khartoum, 1983). 
 
Makec, John Wuol, The Customary Law of the Dinka: a Comparative Analysis of an 
African Legal System (Khartoum, 1986). 
 
Mamdani, Mahmood, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of 
Late Colonialism (Princeton, 1996). 
 
Mamdani, Mahmoud, Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics and the War on terror 
(New York, 2009). 
 
Mangan, J. A., The Games Ethic and Imperialism (Harmondsworth, 1986) 
 
Mann, Kristin, and Roberts, Richard (ed.), Law in Colonial Africa (London, 1991). 
271 
 
Marenin, Otwin, ‘Policing African states: toward a critique’, Comparative Politics, 
12 (1982), pp. 379-396. 
 
Marenin, Otwin, ‘Policing Nigeria: Control and autonomy in the exercise of 
coercion’ African Studies Review, 28 (1985) pp. 73-93. 
 
Martin, Percy F., The Sudan in Evolution (London, 1921). 
 
McCracken, John ‘Authority and legitimacy in Malawi: policing and politics in a 
colonial state’, in Anderson and Killingray, Policing the Empire in Anderson, David 
M., and Killingray, David (eds.), Policing and Decolonisation: Politics, Nationalism 
and the Police, 1917-1965 (Manchester, 1992), pp. 158-179. 
 
Meredith, Martin, The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years Since Independence 
(London, 2005). 
 
Migdal, Joel S., Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State 
Capacity in the Third World (Princeton, 1988). 
 
Mills, James H. Cannabis Britannica: Empire, Trade and Prohibition, 1800-1928 
(Oxford 2003). 
 
Mitchell, Timothy, Colonising Egypt (London, 1988). 
 
Mitchell, Timothy, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Technopolitics and Modernity (Berkeley, 
2002). 
 
Mohamed, Jama, ‘The 1937 Somaliland Camel Corps mutiny: A contrapuntal 
reading’, The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 33 (2000), pp. 
615-634. 
 
Moore-Gilbert, Bart, Post-Colonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics (London, 
1997). 
 
Moore-Harrell, Alice, Gordon and the Sudan: A Prologue to the Mahdiyya, 1877-
1880 (Portland, 2001). 
 
Morton, John, ‘Ethnicity and politics in Red Sea Province, Sudan’, African Affairs, 
88 (1989), pp. 63-76. 
 
Mustafa, Zaki, The Common Law in the Sudan: an Account of the ‘Justice, Equity 
and Good Conscience’ Provision (Oxford, 1971). 
 
Nadel, S. F., The Nuba: An Anthropological Study of the Hill-Tribes in Kordofan 
(London, 1947). 
 
Nicoll, Fergus, Sword of the Prophet: The Mahdi of Sudan and the Death of General 
Gordon (Stroud, 2004). 
 
272 
 
Norris, Jacob, ‘Repression and rebellion: Britain’s response to the Arab Revolt in 
Palestine in 1936-9’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 36 
(2008), pp. 25-45. 
 
Nugent, Paul, Africa Since Independence: A Comparative History (Basingstoke, 
2004). 
 
O’Ballance, Edgar, The Secret War in Sudan 1955-72 (London, 1977). 
 
O’Ballance, Edgar, Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism, 1955-99 (Basingstoke, 2000). 
 
O’Fahey, R. S., State and Society in Dar Fur (London, 1980). 
 
Omissi, David, Air Power and Colonial Control: the Royal Air Force 1919-1939 
(Manchester, 1990). 
 
Otu, Noel and Horton, Nancy A., ‘Ethnicity and crime: criminal behaviour 
redefined’, African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies 1 (2005), pp. 1-22. 
 
Parsons, Timothy, ‘All Askaris are family men: sex, domesticity and discipline in the 
King’s African Rifles, 1902-1964’, in Killingray, David, and Omissi, David (eds.) 
Guardians of Empire: the Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers, c. 1700-1964 
(Manchester, 1999), pp. 157-178. 
 
Perkins, Kenneth J., Port Sudan: The Evolution of a Colonial City (Boulder, 1993). 
 
Peters, Rudolph, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from 
the Sixteenth to the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, 2005). 
 
Poggo, Scopas, The First Sudanese Civil War: Africans, Arabs and Israelis in the 
Southern Sudan, 1955-1972 (New York, 2009). 
 
Porter, Bernard, The Origins of the Vigilant State: the London Metropolitan Police 
Branch before the First World War (London, 1987). 
 
Qaradawi, Ahmad, Refugee Policy in Sudan, 1967-1984 (New York, 1999). 
 
Ranger, Terence O., ‘Connexions between ‘Primary Resistance’ movements and 
modern mass nationalism in East and Central Africa’ Parts I+II, Journal of African 
History, 9 (1968) pp. 437-453, 631-641. 
 
Ranger, Terence, ‘The invention of tradition in Colonial Africa’, in E. J. Hobsbawm 
and T. O. Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 211-62. 
 
Reid, Donald Malcolm, ‘Political assassination in Egypt, 1910-1954’, The 
International Journal of African Historical Studies, 15 (1982), pp. 625-651. 
 
Reid, Richard, A History of Modern Africa (London, 2009). 
 
273 
 
Reynolds, Jonathon, ‘Good and bad Muslims: Islam and indirect rule in Northern 
Nigeria’, International Journal of African Historical Studies, 34 (2001), pp. 601-
618. 
 
Robertson, James, Transition in Africa (London, 1974). 
 
Robb, Peter ‘The ordering of rural India: the policing of nineteenth century Bengal 
and Bihar, in Anderson and Killingray (eds.), Policing the Empire: Government, 
Authority and Control, 1830-1940 (Manchester, 1991), pp. 126-150. 
 
Robinson, Francis, ‘The British Empire and the Muslim World’, in W. M. Roger-
Louis (ed.) The Oxford History of the British Empire vol. 4 (Twentieth Century), 
(Oxford, 1999), pp. 398-420. 
 
Rodenelli, Denis A., ‘Administrative Devolution and Economic Development: The 
Sudan’s Experiment with Devolution’, Journal of Modern African Studies 19 (1981), 
pp. 595-624. 
 
Roussilon, Alain ‘Republican Egypt: revolution and beyond’ in M.W. Daly, The 
Cambridge History of Modern Egypt II: Modern Egypt from 1517 to the End of the 
Twentieth Century (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 334-393. 
 
al-Safi, Mahasin (ed.), The nationalist movement in Sudan (Khartoum, 1989). 
 
Said, Edward, Orientalism (London, 1978). 
 
Salih, Kamil Osman, ‘The British colonial policy and the accentuation of inter-ethnic 
divisions: the case of the Nuba Mountains region of the Sudan’, in Hurreiz, S. and 
Abdel-Salam, E. A., (eds.), Ethnicity, Conflict and National Integration in the Sudan 
(Khartoum, 1989), pp. 231-268.  
 
Salih, Kamil Osman, ‘British colonial recruitment policy in the Nuba Mountains 
region of Southern Sudan, 1900-1945’, Middle Eastern Studies, 41 (2005), pp. 169-
192. 
 
Salih, Kamil Osman, ‘The Sudan, 1985-1989: the fading democracy’, in Peter 
Woodward (ed.), Sudan After Nimieri (London, 1991), pp. 45-75. 
 
Salih, M. A. Mohammed and Harir, Sharif, ‘Tribal militias: The genesis of national 
disintegration’, in Sharif Harir & Terje Tvedt (eds.), Short-cut to Decay: the Case of 
Sudan (Uppsala, 1994), pp.185-202.  
 
Salmon, Jago, A Paramilitary Revolution: The Popular Defence Forces (Geneva, 
2007). 
 
Samatar, Ahmed I., ‘The curse of Allah: civic disembowelment and the collapse of 
the state in Somalia’, in Ahmed I. Samatar (ed.), The Somali Challenge: From 
Catastrophe to Renewal? (Boulder, 1994), pp. 95-146. 
 
274 
 
Sanderson, G. N., ‘Sudanese nationalism and the independence of Sudan’, in M. 
Brettt (ed.), Northern Africa: Islam and Modernization (London, 1978), pp. 97-109. 
 
Sanderson, Lilian Passmore, Education, Religion and Politics in the Southern Sudan 
(London, 1981). 
 
Satia, Priya, Spies of Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of 
Britain’s Covert Empire in the Middle East (Oxford, 2008). 
 
Scott, David, ‘Colonial Governmentality’ Social Text, 43 (1995), pp. 191-220. 
 
Sen, Amartya, Identity and Violence (London, 2006). 
 
Shah, Sayed Sikander, ‘Homicide in Islam: Major legal themes’, Arab Law 
Quarterly, (1999), pp. 159-168. 
 
Sharkey, Heather, ‘The Egyptian colonial presence in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 
1898-1932’, in Beswick, Stephanie, and Spaulding, Jay (eds.), White Nile, Black 
Blood: War, Leadership and Ethnicity from Khartoum to Kampala (Lawrenceville, 
2000), pp. 279-314. 
 
Sharkey, Heather, ‘A century in print: Arabic journalism and nationalism in the 
Sudan, 1899-1999’, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 31 (1999), pp. 
531-549. 
 
Sharkey, Heather, Living with Colonialism: Nationalism and Culture in the Anglo-
Egyptian Sudan (California, 2003). 
 
Sharkey, Heather, ‘Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan: The Politics of Language, 
Ethnicity, Race’ African Affairs, 107 (2008), pp. 21-36. 
 
Sidahmed, Abdel Salam and Alsir Sidahmed, Sudan (London, 2005). 
 
Sikainga, Ahmad Alawad, Slaves into Workers: Emancipation and Labour in 
Colonial Sudan (Austin, 1996). 
 
Sikainga, Ahmad Alawad, The Western Bahr-al-Ghazal under British Rule, 1898-
1956 (Athens, 1991). 
 
Sikainga, Ahmad Alawad, ‘Military slavery and the emergence of a Southern 
Sudanese diaspora in the Northern Sudan, 1884-1954’, in Beswick, Stephanie, and 
Spaulding, Jay (eds.), White Nile, Black Blood: War, Leadership and Ethnicity from 
Khartoum to Kampala (Lawrenceville, 2000), pp. 23-37. 
 
Silvestri, Michael, ‘The thrill of “Simply dressing up”: The Indian Police, disguise 
and intelligence work in Colonial India’, The Journal of Colonialism and Colonial 
History 2.2. (2001) 
 
Simone, T. Abdou Maqilam, In Whose Image?: Political Islam and Urban Practises 
in Sudan (Chicago, 1994). 
275 
 
Sinclair, Georgina, ‘ ‘Hard-headed, hard-bitten, and courageous men of innate 
detective ability…’ from criminal investigation to political security policing at the 
end of empire, 1945-1950’ in Clive Elmsley and Haia Sphayer, (eds.), Police 
Detectives in History Aldershot 2006). 
 
Sinclair, Georgina, At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial 
Endgame, 1948-1980 (Manchester, 2006). 
 
Sinclair, Georgina, and Williams, Chris. A., ‘‘Home and away’: the cross-
fertilisation between ‘British’ and ‘Colonial’ policing’, Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 35 (2007), pp. 221-238. 
 
Singerman, Diane ‘The siege of Imbaba, Egypt’s internal ‘other’, and the 
criminalization of politics’, in Diane Singerman (ed.), Cairo Contested: Governance, 
Spaces and Global Modernity (Cairo, 2009), pp. 111-146.  
 
Spaulding, Jay and Beswick, Stephanie ‘Sex, bondage and the market: the 
emergence of prostitution in Northern Sudan, 1750-1950’, Journal of the History of 
Sexuality, 5 (1995), pp. 512-534. 
 
Springborg, Robert, Mubarak’s Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order 
(Boulder, 1989). 
 
Streets, Heather, Martial races: the military, race and masculinity in British imperial 
culture, 1857-1914 (Manchester, 2004). 
 
Sumner, Colin, (ed.), Crime, Justice and Underdevelopment (London, 1982). 
 
al-Tayyib, Hasan Abdel Rahman, ‘The stick fighting of the Nuba Muru’, Sudan 
Society, 5 (1972), pp. 1-9. 
 
Tayyib, Muddathir ‘Abd al-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan: a 
Study in Constitutional and Political Development, 1899-1956 (Oxford, 1969). 
 
Tayyib, Mudathir ‘Abd al-Rahim, ‘Arabism, Africanism and self-identification in the 
Sudan’, Journal of Modern African Studies (1970), pp. 233-249. 
 
Tibbs, Michael and Tibbs, Anne, Sudan Sunset (Lynchmere, 1999). 
 
Titeca, Cristof, ‘The ‘Masai’ and Miraa: public authority, vigilance and criminality 
in a Ugandan border town’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 47 (2009) pp. 291-
317. 
 
Thomas, Eddie, The Kafai-Kingi Enclave: People, Politics and History in the North-
South Boundary Zone of Western Sudan (London 2010). 
 
Thomas, Graham F. (ed.), The Sudan Journal of Ismay Thomas (Lewes, 2000). 
 
Thomas, Martin, Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder 
after 1914 (London, 2008). 
276 
 
 
Throup, David, ‘Crime, politics and the police in colonial Kenya, 1939-63’, in 
Anderson, David M., and Killingray, David, Policing and Decolonisation: Politics, 
Nationalism and the Police, 1917-1965 (Manchester, 1992), pp. 127-157. 
 
Tollefson, Harold, The British Occupation of Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Struggle 
over Control of the Police, 1882-1914 (Westport, 1999). 
 
el-Tom, Abdullahi Osman, ‘Darfur People: “Too Black for the Arab-Islamic Project 
of Sudan” ’, in Salah M. Hassan and Carina E. Ray (eds.), Darfur and the Crisis of 
Governance: A Critical Reader (Ithaca, 2009), pp. 84-102. 
 
Tripp, Charles ‘Sudan: State and Elite’, Africa, 67 (1997) pp. 163-174. 
 
Trout-Powell, Eve M., A Different Shade of Colonialism: Egypt, Great Britain, and 
the Mastery of the Sudan (Berkeley, 2003). 
 
Tvedt, Terje, The River Nile in the Age of the British: Political Ecology and The 
Quest for Economic Power (London, 2004). 
 
Vasdev, Krishna, The Law of Evidence in the Sudan (London, 1981). 
 
Vasdev, Krishna, The Law of Homicide in the Sudan (London, 1978). 
 
Vezzadini, Elena, ‘The 1924 Revolution: Hegemony, Resistance and Nationalism in 
the Colonial Sudan’ (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Bergen, 2007). 
 
Wai, Dunston, ‘Pax Britannica and the Southern Sudan: The view from the theatre’, 
African Affairs, 79 (1980), pp. 375-395. 
 
Waller, Richard, ‘Rebellious youth in Colonial Africa’, Journal of African History, 
47 (2006), pp. 77-92. 
 
Waller, Richard, ‘Witchcraft and law in Colonial Kenya’, Past and Present, 180 
(2003), pp. 241-275.  
 
Warburg, G., ‘Mahdism and Islamism in the Sudan’, International Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies, 27 (1995), pp. 219-236. 
 
Warburg, G., and Kupferschmidt, U. (eds.), Islam, Nationalism and Radicalism in 
Egypt and the Sudan (New York, 1983). 
 
Warburg, G., Islam, Nationalism and Communism in a Traditional Society: the Case 
of Sudan (London, 1978).  
 
Warburg, G., The Sudan under Wingate: Administration in the Anglo-Egyptian 
Sudan, 1899-1916 (London, 1971). 
 
277 
 
Washbrook, D. A., ‘Orients and Occidents: Colonial discourse theory and the 
shaping of Empire’, in (W. R. Louis ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire 
vol V., Historiography (Oxford, 1999). 
 
Willis, Justin, ‘A model of its kind: Representation and performance in the Sudan 
self-government election of 1953’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 
35 (2007), pp. 485-502. 
 
Willis, Justin, ‘Hukm: the creolization of authority in Condominium Sudan’, Journal 
of African History, 46 (2005), pp. 29-50. 
 
Willis, Justin, ‘Killing Bwana: peasant revenge and political panic in early colonial 
Ankole’, Journal of African History, 35 (1994), pp. 379-400. 
 
Willis, Justin, Potent Brews: a Social History of Alcohol in East Africa, 1850-1999 
(Oxford, 2002). 
 
Willis, Justin, ‘Violence, authority and the state in the Nuba Mountains area of 
Condominium Sudan’, Historical Journal, 46 (2003), pp. 89-114. 
 
Wolff, J. B., ‘Asian and African recruitment in the Kenya Police, 1920-1950’, 
International Journal of African Historical Studies, 6 (1973), pp. 401-412. 
 
Woodward, Peter, Sudan, 1898-1956: The Unstable State (Boulder, 1990). 
 
Woodward, Peter, Condominium and Sudanese Nationalism (London, 1979). 
 
Young, Crawford, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (London, 
1994).  
 
